

Theocratic Iran: A Worrying Succession

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ABSTRACT

While the health of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Seyyed ‘Ali Hoseyni Khâmene’i, seems to be wavering for several years, the question of his difficult succession arises—and sheds light on some of the mechanisms of the political functioning of the Islamic Republic and its recent developments. By proposing a historical inventory of Khamene’i’s political actions and, through that, on the evolution of Iranian institutions over the last 40 years, this article proposes a perspective on the situation of the Iranian political system through the prism of those who, within the Islamic republic, consider that the role of high-rank clerics is still too limited.

Keywords: Iran, Iranian Supreme Leader, Khomeini, Khâmene’i, elections, Islamic regime, 5th Assembly of experts, successor

Irán teocrático: una sucesión preocupante

RESUMEN

Si bien la salud del líder supremo iraní, Seyyed ‘Ali Hoseyni Khâmene’i, parece vacilar durante varios años, surge la cuestión de su difícil sucesión, y arroja luz sobre algunos de los mecanismos del funcionamiento político de la República Islámica y sus desarrollos recientes. Al proponer un inventario histórico de las acciones políticas de Khamene’i y, a través de él, sobre la evolución de las instituciones iraníes en los últimos 40 años, este artículo propone una perspectiva sobre la situación del sistema político iraní a través del prisma de quienes, dentro del República Islámica, considera que el papel de los clérigos de alto rango es todavía demasiado limitado.

Palabras clave: Irán, líder supremo iraní, Jomeini, Khâmene’i, elecciones, régimen islámico, 5^a Asamblea de expertos, sucesor

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政教合一的伊朗：令人担忧的继任

摘要

伊朗最高领袖赛义德·阿里·侯赛尼·哈梅内伊的健康状况似乎已经衰弱了好几年，同时出现了关于其继任者的困难问题，这揭示了伊斯兰共和国政治运作的部分机制及其近期发展。通过对哈梅内伊的政治行动进行历史盘点，并由此对过去40年伊朗制度的演变进行盘点，本文从“伊斯兰共和国内部那些认为高级神职人员的作用仍然太有限的人”的角度提出了对伊朗政治制度状况的看法。

关键词：伊朗，伊朗最高领袖，霍梅尼，哈梅内伊，选举，伊斯兰政权，第五届专家会议，继任者

Foreword

A few cancellations of planned activities and regular meetings in mid-September 2022, of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Seyyed 'Ali Hoseyni Khâmene'i, have revived attention on his state of health, while his family and the authorities had wished him a happy 83rd birthday on July 17. We had already reported on his health problems in an article published in the fall of 2016 in *Global Security* magazine No. 7. This article had been dedicated above all to the election on February 26, 2016, of the 5th Assembly of Experts (AEx, in Persian majles-e khobregân) whose 88 experts then elected were those who, over the next nine years, would have to choose a successor to Khamene'i in case of his death or his mental or physical inability to fulfill his responsibilities. This is until June 2025, the date also of the next presidential election in Iran if ... everything goes well.

The activities of the Supreme Leader, his speeches and messages in all fields are reported daily on his website www.khamenei.ir, written in eight languages: Persian, English, French, Spanish, Russian, Hindi, Arabic and Urdu, which is exceptionally rare for a leader even in the most technologically advanced countries. In fact, all Iranian institutions have one or more websites, often multilingual, with even an Internet address for each of their leaders or responsible members, as is the case of the Assembly of Experts, which is the main subject of this article: www.khobregan.ir & www.majlesekhobregan.ir (in Persian, English and Arabic).

Actions of the Iranian Supreme Leader

As in all states with a predominantly pyramidal power structure, a “sudden sneeze” from the leader can cause millions of citizens to sweat or hope. The 86.5 million

Iranians (NB: even Iranian sources differ!) live today under a regime that shares many characteristics with the People's Republic of China, which the hojjatoleslam 'Ali Khamene'i, then the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, went to visit with many tokens of friendship from 9 to 14 May 1989. He then left Beijing, the Chinese capital, and flew to Pyongyang where he was also received with great deference by the North Koreans until May 19. In both countries, the Iranian President signed several military and nuclear agreements that remain secret to this day. These countries had in fact provided Iran with enormous quantities of arms which had enabled it to resist the Iraqi invasion from 22 September 1980 to 20 August 1988 while Western countries had favored the Iraqi regime in Baghdad of Saddam Hussein. Thirty-three years later, this still explains a large part of Iran's policy towards Saddam's "friends"...

While he still had only the title of "hojjatoleslam" (middle-ranking cleric), the hojjatoleslam Khâmene'i was elected deputy of the Iranian Parliament on May 28, 1980, at the dawn of his 41 years. He had never stopped fighting the Iranian imperial regime since the violent speech of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini at the Feyziye theological school in Qom on June 3, 1963. The speech denounced the White Revolution of Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, which granted the right to vote to women and extended the distribution of land to the sharecroppers. At that time, they were then under the control of the descendants of those who had invaded Iran over the last few centuries, and thus had become owners of vast territories with all of their villages.

As soon as the Islamic Revolution had been won in February 1979, the great religious schools clashed underhandedly to place their leaders (ayatollahs), their graduate clerics (mojtahed) or their best students (talabe, pl. tolâb) in the new machinery of the state (according to 'Ali-Rezâ E'râfi, a fundamentalist cleric appointed Director of Religious Schools by the Supreme Guide Khamene'i on February 28, 2020, and elected expert on June 18, 2021, "the schools would house some 100,000 male talabe; 80,000 girls would also attend courses to be mojtahed"). It is in this context that 'Ali Khamene'i was pushed by the leaders of the Religious School (in Persian: howze'-e elemiye) of Mashhad to run for the post of President of the Republic for the next four years. He was elected in the elections of October 2, 1981, and officially inaugurated on October 13. He was re-elected in the presidential elections of August 16, 1985, the day after his 46th birthday.

Meanwhile, the first Assembly of Experts was elected on December 10, 1982. In 1985, it elected Ayatollah Hoseyn-'Ali Montazeri as Khomeini's successor. To replace some deceased members, an election was held on April 8, 1988. It was a real shock to the Assembly of Experts when it received a letter from Ayatollah Khomeini on March 26, 1989, stating that Montazeri was no longer eligible to replace him upon his death, thus revealing once again the muted struggles between political tendencies among Iranian Shiite clerics.

It was this first Assembly of Experts that met the day after Ayatollah Khomeini's death at the age of 86 on 3 June 1989. The majority of the 74 members present rejected the idea of a triumvirate of jurisconsults, consisting of 'Ali Meshkini Feyzabadi, Seyyed 'Abdolkarim Musavi Ardebili and Seyyed 'Ali Hoseyni Khamenei, to replace Khomeini. At the end of the debates chaired by 'Ali-Akbar Hâshemi Rafsenjâni (a filmed part of which will be broadcast in 2009), the Grand Ayatollah Mohammad-Rezâ Golpâyegâni received 14 votes and the hojjatoleslam 'Ali Khâmene'i 60 votes. As the elected was not a marja' as stipulated in the Constitution of 1979, he was appointed by interim. It was thus necessary to wait for the results of the referendum on the amendments to this Constitution that Khomeini had already recommended since 24 April 1989. Organized on the same day as the presidential election on July 28, 1989, the vote on these amendments, cast by 16,428,976 Iranians, was 97.57% in favor. This allowed the AEx to reconvene and confirm the election of Hojjatoleslam Khamene'i to the post of Supreme Leader on 6 August 1989 by 60 votes for the 64 that were present. He had just celebrated his 50th birthday. His failed attempt to be recognized as ayatollah by the Great Ayatollahs, who are the religious references recognized by the Shiites (called "marja'-e taqlid" = source of imitation), led to a more and more discreet use of the title of "faqih" which was given to Ayatollah Khomeini: the khamenei.ir website describes him as "Leader of the Revolution" (in Persian râhbar-e enqelâb).

The health of the Leader: first alert

Khamene'i's health has been a regular topic of concern since the fall of 2014, not only for supporters of the Islamic regime but also for leaders of many countries. For 33 years, he has ruled a large country—the world's 18th largest area—and a large nation—the world's 18th largest population—whose history and written language have been known for more than 2,500 years and which today remains a key player in the situation in the Middle East and West Asia due to its political positions and direct or military interventions by proxy.

It was on September 8, 2014, that it was discovered that 'Ali Khamene'i was suffering from prostate cancer. He underwent surgery on March 5, 2015, and resumed normal life and activity in the following weeks. Nevertheless, given the initial stage of his cancer, some doctors estimated that the Leader had only about 20 months to live. There is no doubt that Iranian leaders, especially clerics of all stripes, then redoubled their attention to prepare for the upcoming election of the 5th Assembly of Experts to be held on February 26, 2016, along with parliamentary elections to elect 290 new deputies.

The 5th Assembly of Experts elected in February 2016

Our previous study on the 5th Assembly provided many details that need not be repeated here, except those that determined a new political-religious situation in

the fall of 2022 after two by-elections, in February 2020 and June 2021. The reorganization of the provinces and the increase in population had officially resulted in a new number of experts per province out of a total of 88. We did not emphasize in 2016 how the distribution, which was not equitable for several provinces, given their place in the table of their population (in brackets), could only be explained by maneuvers of the conservatives, who had a majority on the Board of Supervisors, to hope for the election of clerics from their group (see below):

* 16 : Tehran (1st)

* 6 : Khorassan Razavi (2nd) & Khouzistan (5st)

* 5 : East Azerbaidjan (6st), Fars (4th) & Ispahan (3rd)

* 4 : Guilan (11th) & Mazanderan (8th)

* 3 : West Azerbaidjan (7th) & Kerman (9th)

* 2 : Ardebil (20th), Alborz (12th), Golestan (14th), Hamadan (15th), Kermanschah (13th), Kurdistan (18th), Lorestan (16th), Markazi (19th), Qazvin (21st) & Sistan-Baloutchistan (10th)

* 1 : Bushehr (24th), Chahâr Mahâl va Bakhtiyâri (26st), Hormozgan (17th), Ilam (31st), North Khorassan (27th), Khorassan Sud (28th), Kohgiluyeh va Boyer-Ahmadî (29th), Qom (22nd), Semnan (30th), Yazd (23rd) & Zandjân (25th).

The texts of the Constitution on the Assembly of Experts and the regulations confirmed by the Supervisory Board are, on paper, a guarantee of great and perfect fairness. The modalities are codified in an extremely detailed document, in 83 articles, available notably on the website of the Assembly of Experts in both Persian and English. Nevertheless, the 12 members of the Supervisory Board are not chosen for their independence. Six of the members are chosen directly by the Supreme Leader from among clerics who are experts in Islamic law, and another six members are elected by the deputies from a list of jurists, civil or religious, who specialize in various fields and who were themselves chosen by the head of the judiciary. They in turn are appointed by the Supreme Leader. These twelve people oversee judging without appeal, which cleric or jurist can present his candidacy to the Assembly of Experts, but also every four years they determine who can present his candidacy to a deputy position! A future paragraph will reveal the shenanigans for the February 2020 and June 2021 elections. The fundamentalists had already succeeded in eliminating nearly forty members on the eve of the 4th AEx election

in December 2006, even though they were elected in October 1998 to the 3rd AEx. The same pattern has been repeated in all elections and appointments in the workings of the Iranian state.

Since everything is hushed up!

In 2016, we published a table of six groups of Iranian clerics who were tearing each other apart to win an expert position (p. 59). Today we reduce it to only three groups of actors who will meet the day after the death of the “Leader of the Revolution” if it is to take place before June 2025, that is, in two years and eight months. We must remain extremely vigilant because the groups name themselves with words so similar or synonymous that countless voters probably did not check the exact box of their choice (in 2016, we had already pointed out how candidates were running under an identity quite similar to recognized and revered religious figures).

- The fundamentalists, conservatives, traditionalists or neo-Mahdists, whose leader is Ayatollah Mohammad-‘Ali Movahhedi Kermâni, 91 years old, Secretary General of the Association of Fighting Clergy (ACC, *jâmè-ye ruhâniyat-e mobârez*).
- The pragmatists and moderates: these ayatollahs or hojjatoleslams have preserved their powers that they had acquired since the establishment of the IRI in February 1979. It is not only in the essentially religious organizations that the early fighters have been marginalized, but also in the new institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Army (IRGA), where extremism has developed. The pragmatists have more support from several senior ayatollahs who are not entirely convinced of the durability of the current system of power, who do not accept that it is clerics of much lower rank who dictate the laws governing the country, and who are well aware, thanks to information received from their networks of followers, that the current regime survives only through its very strict and fussy control at all levels of the lives of its citizens. The fact that the Iranian regime, after 43 years in power, does not accept the existence of a single party or association advocating a different conception of the state betrays the extent to which its leaders fear popular sentiment or the aspirations of the population.
- The reformists or socialists: they are in the majority in the Society of Religious Fighters (SRC, *PR majma’-e rowhâniyun-e mobârez*), and the Society of Professors and Researchers of the Theological School of Qom (SPCEQ, *PR majma’-e modarresin va mohaqqeqin-e howze-ye elemiye-e qom*) The SRC was founded with the support of Imam Khomeini on March 16, 1988 by radical and “progressive” clerics, several of whom have since held high office:

President of the republic like Mohammad Khâtimi from 1997 to 2005, but others have been placed under house arrest like the former President of parliament Mehdi Karubi.

February 2020: 1st mid-term election of the 5th Assembly

The election takes place on 21st February at the same time as the parliamentary elections: 7 new experts are to be elected to replace those who died in the last four years, since 26 February 2016. Our previous remarks about the actions of conservative leaders are fully realized in this case.

In the February 2016 election, the 15 pragmatic and moderate clerics led by Ayatollah 'Ali-Akbar Hâshemi Rafsenjâni had all been elected in the 1st round, the 16th and last of the elected being then Ahmad Jannati, the leader of the fundamentalists! The fourteen other non-elected clerics of the list of fundamentalists have then sworn that they would recover, by all means, expert positions four years later in the elections of February 2020. This was possible with the help of the still fundamentalist-dominated Supervisory Board, which eliminated all candidates who were not fundamentalists. As a result, seven of the defeated fundamentalists from 2016 were able to get elected in 2020, including the two most extreme leaders: Mohammad Yazdi and Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi. Nevertheless, Allah did not give them much time to enjoy their revenge: Yazdi died on December 9, 2020, and his compatriot Mesbah Yazdi, 22 days later on January 1, 2021, much to the chagrin of their young supporters, who will have to wait another year and four months to regain positions in the Assembly of Experts.

In terms of the conduct of the parliamentary elections on February 21, 2020, it is clear that the Supervisory Board has also managed to eliminate the maximum number of pragmatists and moderates. First, 80 of the 290 non-fundamentalist deputies elected in 2016 were not allowed to run again! This decision sent a message to the public that the Supreme Leader was endorsing a recapture of Parliament by the most conservative forces. As a result, turnout dropped to **42.57% of potential voters**, the lowest since 1979 and much lower than the 61.85% in February 2016. The feeling that the elections were again rigged was so strong in the country's largest constituency, the capital Tehran, that there was only 26.2% turnout of potential voters.

The expected result was that the fundamentalists regained a strong majority in parliament. The Minister of the Interior, 'Abdolrezâ Rahmâni Fazli, justified the low turnout by the popular reaction to the repression of recent demonstrations in several parts of the country, to the bad weather and finally to the coronavirus, which is not very credible because 4 days after the elections, the total death toll was still only 16 Iranians. Another fact killed by the minister is the number of Iranians who came to "vote." Individuals must have the polling station stamp on their

identity card, which is regularly presented in order to obtain documents from the administration, in particular the aid of Islamic charity societies or mosques.

June 2021: 2nd mid-term election of the 5th Assembly

From February 2020 to June 2021, six experts died. To replace them, the Supervisory Board again managed to elect fundamentalists who had been defeated in February 2016: 'Ali-Rezâ E'rafi, appointed Director of Religious Schools on February 28, 2020, Mohammad-Rezâ Modaressi Yazdi, Ahmad Dâneshezâde Mo'men, Hoseyn-'Ali Sa'di, Seyyed Mohammad Sa'idi, and Seyyed Sâdeq Pishnamâzi.

In the presidential election, the maneuvers of the Supervisory Board also continued. The candidates who could have beaten Seyyed Ebrâhim Ra'isi were discarded and only four losers in advance were allowed to participate in a parody of democratic elections. Results: 28,933,004 voters, or only **48.78%** of the 59,310,307 potential voters, the lowest level ever reached since 1980 in Iran for a presidential election. Ra'isi collected 17.926.345 valid votes, but the second position is occupied by the 4.167.028 invalid or null votes! **This is the first time in 43 years that the number of invalid or void votes has varied from 0.8% to 3.8%.** The second candidate, Mohsen Rezai, obtained only 3,412,712 votes! And the others even less.

This is an important point that the usual commentators have failed to note, but in February 2020 we were able to predict that Iran was about to enter into a new stage of its history. More than 50% of Iranians no longer believe in this Islamic regime to allow them to lead a good life without the spy of fanatics. Therefore, their reactions will be more and more numerous, fast and violent against the oppressive measures of a regime that does not want to see the reality.

The Assembly still has 83 experts in the autumn of 2022: five have indeed died since June 2021. Like the other future deceased, they can only be replaced in the next legislative elections, which will take place in the spring of 2024. Sometime before his death in January 2017, 'Ali-Akbar Hâshemi Rafsenjâni had hinted that the Assembly had tentatively agreed on one of its members to succeed 'Ali Khâmene'i. This is Seyyed Ebrâhim Ra'isi, then 57 years old, a cleric² whose mentor is still the most extreme ayatollah of the theological school of Mashhad, Seyyed Ahmad Alamolhoda. The latter gave his daughter Jamile in marriage to Ebrâhim, an extremely common occurrence among high-ranking Shiite clerics, who exchange their children to keep it at such a level. Alamolhodâ, now 78 years old, is regularly noticed for his ultra-violent preaching against any Iranian, even religious, who opposes his conception of an Islamic state, the "velayat-e faqih" (the guardianship of the jurisconsult) like the one initially advocated by Khomeini in 1970.

2 "Ebrahim Raisi: the Iranian cleric emerging as a frontrunner for supreme leader," Saeed Kamali Dehghan, *The Guardian*, 9/1/2017.

Like many ayatollahs, Alamolhoda considers that Khomeini's acceptance of the establishment of a republic in 1979 was a huge mistake! According to him, there should not even be presidential or parliamentary elections in Iran, let alone leaders who are not educated clerics! In the end, with an Assembly of Experts composed mostly of fundamentalists, there is no hope for a relaxation of the oppressive ideological control over the 86.5 million Iranians.

List of members to the 5th Assembly of Experts elected on February 26, 2016, with updates in the by-elections of February 21, 2020, and June 18, 2021

Codes:

X = experts who died after June 18, 2021, and who can only be replaced in the 3rd by-election in spring 2024.

S. = Seyyed

Name, Surname	Age		Province of election
Abdkhodâ'i, Mohammad-Hâdi	84		Khorasan Razavi
Abdollahi, 'Abdolmahmud	75		Ispahan
Ahmadi Shâhrudi, Mohammad-Hoseyn	64		Khousistan
Akhtari, 'Abbâs-'Ali	–	Defeated on the 26 II 16, elected on the 20 II 20 to replace Nasrollah Shâhâbâdi (deceased on the 12 III 18)	Tehran
Alamolhodâ, S. Ahmad	78		Khorasan Razavi
Alavi, S. Mahmud	68		Tehran
'Âlemi, Hasan	75		Khorasan Razavi
Alimorâdi, Amânollah	–		Kerman
Âmeli Kalkurân, S. Hasan	60		Ardabil
Bahrâmi Khoshkâr, Mohammad	60		Kerman
Beheshti, Ahmad	87		Fars

Dâneszhâde Mo'men, Ahmad	–	Elected on the 18 VI 21 to replace Mohammad-‘Ali Taskhiri (deceased on the 18 VIII 20)	Tehran
Dastgheyb, S. ‘Ali-Asghar	77		Fars
Dezhkam, Lotfollah	–	Elected on the 21 II 20 to replace Asadollah Imâni (deceased on the 7 V 18)	Fars
Dirbâz, ‘Askar	63		West Azerbaïdjan
Dolâbi, Mohammad Hâji Abolqâsem	–		Zanjan
Dorri Najafâbâdi, Qorbân-‘Ali	77		Tehran
Emâmi Kashâni, Mohammad	91		Tehran
E'râfi, ‘Ali-Rezâ	–	Defeated on the 26 II 16, elected on the 18 VI 21 to replace S. Hâshem Bathâ'i Golpâyegâni (deceased on the 16 III 20)	Tehran
Eslâmi, ‘Ali	75		Qazvin
Eslâmiyân, ‘Ali-Rezâ	71		Chahâr Mahal & Bakhtyari
Esmâ'ili, Mohsen	58	The only non-religious one	Tehran
Faqih, S. Mohammad	X	Deceased on the 22 III 22, not replaced yet	Fars
Farahâni, Abdolkarim	–		Khousistan
Fayazi, Gholâm-Rezâ	–	Elected on the 21 II 20 to replace Habibollah Mehmânnavâz (deceased on the 22 IV 18)	North Khorasan
Feyzi Sarâbi, Mohammad	X	Deceased on the 14 IV 22, not replaced yet	East Azerbaïdjan
Hâshemzâde Harisi, Hâshem	84		East Azerbaïdjan
Heydari Âl-e Kasiri, Mohsen	65		Khousistan
Hoseyni, S. Mojtabâ	–		Khorasan Razavi
Hoseyni Bushehri, S. Hâshem	66		Bushehr

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Hoseyni Khorâsâni, S. Ahmad	–		Khorasan Razavi
Hoseyni Shâhrudi, S. Abdolhâdi	75		Golestan
Hoseyni Shâhrudi, S. Mohammad	64		Kurdistan
Jannati (Massâh), Ahmad	95		Tehran
Ka'binasab, 'Abbâs	60		Khouzistan
Kalântari, 'Ali-Akbar	–		Fars
Kâzerun (Kâzeruni), Mohsen	62		Alborz
Khâtami, S. Ahmad	62		Kerman
Lârijâni Âmoli, Sâdeq	62		Mazandaran
Mahdavi, S. Abolhasan	60		Ispahan
Malakuti, 'Ali	74		East Azerbaïdjan
Malek Hoseyni, S. Sharafeddin	60		Kohgiluye & Boyer Ahmadi
Mesbahi Moqaddam, Gholâm-Rezâ	–	Defeated on the 26 II 16, elected on the 21 II 20 to replace S. Abolfazl Mir Mohammadi Zarandi (deceased on the 24 XI 19)	
Mir Bâqeri, S. Mohammad-Mehdi	–		Alborz
Mir Hoseyni Eshkevari, S. 'Ali	–		Guilan
Mo'alemi, (Ramazân-)'Ali	79		Mazandaran
Moballeghi (Moravveji), Ahmad	–		Luristan
Modaressi Yazdi, Mohammad-Rezâ	–	Defeated on the 1e 26 II 16, elected on the 18 VI 21 to replace Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi (deceased on the 1 I 21). The latter, defeated on the 26 II 16, was elected on the 21 II 20 to replace S. Mahmud Hâshemi Shâhrudi (deceased on the 24 XII 18).	Khorasan Razavi
Mohammadi 'Erâqi, Mahmud	–		Kermanchah

Mohammadi 'Erâqi (Arâki), Mohsen	–		Markazi
Mohammadi Nik Reyshahri, Mohammad	X	Deceased on the 21 III 22, not replaced yet	Tehran
Mohseni Garakâni, Ahmad	96		Markazi
Mojtahed Shabastari, Javâd	–		West Azerbaïdjan
Mojtahed Shabastari, Mohsen	X	Deceased on the 17 XI 21, not replaced yet	East Azerbaïdjan
Mo'menpur, 'Ali	–	Defeated on the 26 II 16, elected on the 21 II 20 to replace 'Ali Akbar Hâshemi Rafsenjâni (deceased on the 8 I 17)	Tehran
Moqtadâ'i, Morteza	87		Ispahan
Movahhedi Kermâni, Mohammad-'Ali	91		Tehran
Musavi Farrâz (Hamadani), S. Mostafâ	–		Hamadan
Musavi Jazâyeri, S. Mohammad-'Ali	79		Khuzistan
Musavi Nanekarân, S. Fakhreddin	X	Deceased on the 18 IX 21, not replaced yet	Ardabil
Namâzi, Abdolnabi	77		Ispahan
Narimâni, Amânollah	67		Kermanschah
Niyâzi, Hâshem	–		Luristan
Nur Mofidi, S. Kâzem	82		Golestan
Parvâ'i Rik, Ahmad	–		Guilan
Pishnamâzi, S. Sâdeq	–	Elected on the 18 VI 21 to replace Nurollah Tabarsi (deceased on the 8 II 20)	Mazandaran
Pur Mohammadi, Mohammad-Taqi	66		East Azerbaïdjan
Qomi, Mohsen	62		Tehran
Qorashi (Qoreyshi), S. 'Ali-Akbar	94		West Azerbaïdjan
Qorbâni, Zeynolâbedin	89		Guilan
Ra'isi (Âl-e Sadat), S. Ebrâhim	62		South Khorasan
Ramazâni Gilâni, Rezâ	58		Guilan

Rostami, Fâyeq	–		Kurdistan
Ruhâni (Fereydun), Hasan	74		Tehran
Sadrolsâdâti, S. Ruhollah	–		Hormozegan
Sâdi, Hoseyn-‘Ali	–	Elected on the 18 VI 21 to replace Ebrâhim Hâj Amini Najafâbâdi (deceased on the 24 IV 20)	Tehran
Sâ’idi, S. Mohammad	–	Elected on the 18 VI 21 to replace Mohammad Yazdi (deceased on the 9 XII 20). The latter, defeated on the 26 II 16, was elected on the 21 II 20 to replace Mohammad Dâneszhâde Mo’men (deceased on the 21 II 19)	Qom
Sâ’idi Golpâyegâni, S. Mohsen	–		Elam
Salâmi, ‘Ali-Ahmad	77		Sistan-Baloutchistan
Shafi’i, S. ‘Ali	82		Khuzistan
Shâhcherâghi, S. Mohammad	88		Semnan
Soleymâni Asbukalâ’i, ‘Abbâs-‘Ali	75		Sistan-Baloutchistan
Tabâtabâ’inezhâd, S. Yusef	78		Ispahan
Taha Mohammadi, Ghiyâseddin	75		Hamadan
Talkhâbi, Majid	–		Qazvin
Tavvakol, S. Rahim	–		Mazandaran
Vâfi Yazdi, Abolqâsem	87		Yazd
Zâli Fâzel Golpâyegâni, Mohammad Hasan	–		Tehran

do son controvertidos. También se relatan testimonios de actores, profesionales, políticos y asociaciones, con el fin de abordar de manera más concreta los temas tratados en cada sesión del seminario.

El enfoque también es interdisciplinario, con trabajos de ciencias políticas, derecho, criminología, sociología, economía, ciencias de la administración, historia, medicina y salud pública, psicología y adicciones.

El seminario y la publicación en línea *Politiques des Drogues Journal* también están interesados en ofrecer una perspectiva internacional sobre un tema que se presta bien al análisis comparativo. Así, la *Revista Internacional de Criminología* presenta aquí una selección de artículos publicados en los tres primeros números (2021-2022), dedicados a diversos temas que van más allá de las fronteras de Francia.

¡Disfrute la lectura!

Dr. HDR Sonny Perseil, Lirsa / Cnam

编者按

2019 年 10 月，法国国立工艺学院 (Cnam) 的两个实验团队 (ESDR3C 和 Lirsa) 举办了毒品政策研讨会。该项目的科学委员会汇集了参与这些议题的许多知名学者和专家，包括 Alain Bauer 教授 (Cnam)、成瘾学家 Jean-Pierre Couteron、“打击毒品和毒瘾部际任务”机构前主席 Didier Jayle、欧洲毒品和毒瘾监测中心的 Laurent Laniel、以及哥伦比亚国立大学的 Giovanni Molano-Cruz。

该倡议旨在在不采取激进立场的情况下，就经常有争议的主题进行稳健和平衡的科学知识交流。还记录了参与者、专业人士、政客和协会的报告，以便更具体地应对研讨会各部分会议上所研究的问题。

采用的方法也是跨学科的，涉及政治学、法律、犯罪学、社会学、经济学、管理科学、历史、医学和公共卫生、心理学、以及成瘾学等领域。

研讨会和《毒品政策杂志》(*Politiques des Drogues Journal*) 也热衷于就一个非常适合比较分析的主题提供国际视角。因此，《国际犯罪学杂志》在此展示了前三期 (2021-2022 年) 发表的一系列文章，这些文章专门讨论了法国以外的不同主题。

享受阅读！

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