

The Fight against Terrorism and Crime: A Paradigm Shift? An Algerian Perspective

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Without any popular support, AQIM, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, as well as other terrorist organizations in the region, no longer represent a strategic threat to the Algerian state. While they remain an important security concern, this has become less serious in recent years. A criminal-terrorist hybrid, AQIM is divided, fragmented, and its leadership based in Algeria no longer holds the same power it once did. Under growing pressure from Algerian security forces, AQIM has been forced to retreat to the south, to the Sahel; its declaration of allegiance to Al-Qaeda confirms the regionalization of a changed but weakened organization. Today, the Sahel units are the largest and AQIM represents a major security threat in the area, which is now its main theater of operations.

Strengthening the country’s role as a “security provider” for the Sahel would be a legitimate vector for Algerian foreign policy. It is a difficult task, however, because in this vast region, the fight against terrorism must now include the hybridization of terrorism and crime.¹ Indeed, the terrorist/criminal groups that have emerged over time in Africa have become more difficult to target and fight; all of them have infiltrated the population, and yet they still differ in their orientation and mission.²

The presence of very active illegal elements thus submits the region to a dangerous regime of civil conflicts and terrorist and/or criminal activities, as all future regional security strategies will now have to include this latter dimension.

1 See the latest statistics for the Algerian army in 2015 in the magazine (in French) *El-Dieich*, 630, January 2016, 20-23. http://www.mdn.dz/site_principal/sommaire/revue/images/EldjeichJan2016Fr.pdf (accessed March 24, 2016).

2 Kehinde A. Bolaji, “Preventing Terrorism in West Africa: Good Governance or Collective Security?,” *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 12 (1) (2010): 207-222.

Yet these dangerous regional, or even transnational, criminal organizations are often overlooked, because in comparison to spectacular terrorism, their real harm is less visible due to their progressive and insidious nature and more removed from immediate negative consequences. Moreover, for many of these groups, the Sahel is more a zone of transit to the urban centers in the North and even Europe. AQIM operates in two groups: one carrying out most of its operational missions in northern Algeria, and the other in the south, active in smuggling (arms and other supplies) for the organization in the North, as demonstrated by the repeated capture of large quantities of arms on the southern and eastern borders of Algeria.

The traditional view of insurrection and counter-insurrection is that it is destined to take place in the mountains, as in Afghanistan. This view is in the process of changing. In the near future, theaters of operations consisting of deserts, valleys, and mountains will become rare, as they are exposed to the electronic eyes of the national government or major powers. The conflicts of the twenty-first century will increasingly occur in the sprawling cities on the littoral. The future battlefields will be in urban centers, where criminal groups and terrorists will find refuge, resources, and recruits and in the “mega-cities,” a further source of political exclusion and urban violence.³

The importance of the littoral—areas characterized by large cities, highly populated coastlines, and by the intersection of trade routes between land and sea—is clear (I will return to this point). Even though it can be understood in many ways, the littoral is commonly defined as the shore and coastal zone, with its surrounding or adjacent waters, covering an inland area of ~50 to 250 miles. The Free Dictionary describes the littoral as a “shore” or “coastal region.”⁴ When used by the armed forces, including the navy, this term has a broader meaning that describes the complex interface between the operational areas of the sea (undersea, air, and land) where naval and inter-army warfare occurs. The littoral is an extension, both toward the sea and the land. Navy planners have a broad view of how the littoral extends inland, defining it as any zone of maneuver from the sea and under its direct fire: anywhere that the navy can reach.⁵

3 Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, *Mega Cities: The Politics of Urban Exclusion and Violence in the Global South* (New York: Zed Books, 2009).

4 <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/littoral> (accessed March 24, 2016).

5 “The Littoral: Those regions relating to or existing on a shore or coastal region, within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of naval expeditionary forces. J. E. Rhodes and G. S. Holder, *Concept for Future Naval Mine Countermeasures in Littoral Power Projection: A 21st Century Warfighting Concept* (Washington, DC: Department of Navy, 1998), <http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/docs/mcm.htm> (accessed March 24, 2016). “The littoral comprises two segments of battlespace: 1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.” Rubicon Planning, *Military Terms and Definitions*, <http://www.militaryterms.net/1> (accessed March 24, 2016).

TERRORISM IN MAGHREB/SAHEL: AN EVOLVING THREAT

In the new strategic context of recent years, Algeria has faced a new category of terrorists, one that paradoxically comes from the “global war on terror.” By provoking a third wave of Islamist insurrection, the intervention in Libya and the destabilization of Syria were the key moments in the transformation of the strategic environment of security in the Mediterranean–Sahel zone. Before 2007, for example, suicide attacks were not really part of the program of active terrorist groups in Africa.

After the failure of the first militant Islamist attack on the region in 1990–2000, the invasion of Iraq triggered the second phase of Islamist insurrection in North Africa. After being routed in Algeria,⁶ Egypt, Libya, and other places, a second wave of Islamists returned to the attack on a regional scale. Many of its leaders incorporated tactics and techniques they learned on the battlefield: urban tactics in Iraq and rural ones in Afghanistan. When arresting terrorists returning from Iraq, Algerian security services observed that their agenda, methods, and objectives bore the trace of Al-Qaeda-type groups.⁷ Globally, “the data strongly suggests that terrorism today, in large part a by-product of the war in Iraq, greatly differs from the terrorism of the last half of the twentieth century.”⁸ This second generation of warriors is less interested in “Islamism in a single country” than by the “global jihad” advanced by Al-Qaeda and Daesh, with which the combatants maintain often ambiguous ties.

Throughout the world, the 9/11 attacks and their repercussions incited the push for recruitment and global support for a second generation of Islamist terrorism. Having profoundly modified its mode of organization, it now favors self-radicalizing cells of a “micro-terrorist” nature, according to a “bottom-to-top” logic. In this case, the initiative for planning and executing attacks comes from the cells

6 As noted by a former terrorist leader of the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), Mourad Khettab, “We did not have enough weapons. People did not want to join us. And money, we didn’t have enough money.” Michael Moss, “In Algeria, Insurgency Gains a Lifeline from Al Qaeda,” *The New York Times*, July 1, 2008; Souad Mekhennet, Michael Moss, Eric Schmitt, Elaine Sciolino, and Margot Williams, “A Threat Renewed: Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Lifeline From Al Qaeda,” *The New York Times*, July 1, 2008.

7 Roger Hardy, “Algeria: A New Front for al-Qaeda?” *BBC*, December 13, 2009; Michael Hayden, “Transcript of Remarks by Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Hayden at the Atlantic Council,” November 13, 2008.

8 The total amount of deadly terrorist attacks, which have increased spectacularly between 1970 and the early 1990s, declined until the start of the twenty-first century, and then grew again over the past ten years. The increase is clearly greater after 2003 if we include all of the cases of terrorism in Iraq. Even when excluding the cases in Iraq, where no specific group can be identified, the total number of terrorist attacks almost tripled from 2000 to 2006. Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and R. Kim Cragin, “Trends in Global Terrorism,” in *Peace and Conflict 2010*, eds. Hewitt Joseph, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2010), 22.

more than the leaders. The death of Bin Laden helped spread this new approach to armed jihad based on the effective autonomy of local cells that are free to carve their own path and plan their own campaigns of violence.

Because of the independence of these terrorist groups and the diversity of their interests and objectives, what do the declarations of allegiance made by these local groups to Al-Qaeda or Daesh mean in practical terms? They probably represent a mutually beneficial symbolic connection: for local groups, taking the label could increase their legitimacy among radicals and make recruitment easier. And it gives Al-Qaeda and Daesh the illusion of being all-powerful and having a global presence. For research, there is therefore an interest in placing the accent on the operational environment (factors influencing operations) to understand the behavior of each group.

Finally, I would note that, today, the serious and immediate dangers come especially from Islamist groups, although the list could be longer with the “super-autonomization” that technology offers non-state actors.⁹

On the front line, Algeria must also face the multiple strategies deployed by hostile Islamist organizations that use oil as a weapon (the taking of hostages in In Amenas), practice extortion, take hostages, and engage in other practices (economic jihad);

- penetrate cultural centers and centers of identity to weaken national resilience (ideological jihad);
- coax and distract the public to render self-defense sterile (political jihad);
- use national laws to dismantle freedoms and protect the money gathering and expressive capabilities of terrorists—the attacks of Madani Mezrag and Hamdache serve as examples (subversive jihad); and
- seek to control foreign policy: for example, protests in front of embassies (diplomatic jihad).¹⁰

THEATRICAL MILITARISM AND THE “AMERICAN WAY OF WAR”

The Sahel features several factors that favor potential terrorists and criminals: a long history of conflicts, stocks of weapons, trade, social and religious ties with the Arabian Peninsula, shared poverty, poor governance, and a heritage of external interference. Islamist terrorists in the Sahel benefit from this conjunction, but their presence also derives from other factors: ideological ones (presence of jihadist Salafism), institutional ones (unstable states), and organizational ones (activities of existing organizations).¹¹ The arrival of jihadists and

9 John Robb, *Brave New War* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 160.

10 Walid Phares, *Future Jihad* (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2005).

11 Abu Bakr Naji, *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through Which the Umma Will*

experienced fighters trained in Iraq and Afghanistan has aggravated the situation even further.

In this context and on this terrain, the American army has entered the scene, a force mainly prepared for major classic campaigns and never very successful with “operations outside war,” including counter-insurrection. This army “conceived of themselves in Clausewitzian terms of big battles and maximum violence.”¹² The upheavals of history thus seem to escape a myopic America¹³ largely responsible for the regional geopolitical chaos. The “theatrical militarism” of the United States¹⁴ should also be questioned—especially since Iraq, Libya, and Syria have become centers that export terror.

The “lesson of Vietnam was above all: ‘never again.’” Since then, nothing has really been learned. “Underlying most of the failures of American planning is the systematic failure of sociological analysis of the Iraqi regime and of the social conditions necessary for the establishment of democracy in Iraq. Nothing has been learned since Vietnam.” The real “problem” is that these lessons are based on false hypotheses. The doctrine of “low intensity” operations reappeared in the 1980s, albeit hesitantly. Even worse, the doctrinal publications that were being reworked called for the same enemy-focused operations and tactics as the ones developed in the sixties, with little importance given to the security of the population and the fight against political subversion.

Despite the fact that war is fundamentally political, the “American way of war” persists in its “obsession with speed, firepower, and decision making” to obtain the complete and unconditional surrender of the enemy. Its obsession with battle “leads to a divorce between military operations and political goals. The relationship between political objectives and military means is not correctly synchronized. This means that the United States can overthrow a regime but fails to create peace as a positive conclusion to its military exploits.”¹⁵ A former British Prime Minister recognized this, having to apologize “for some of the mistakes in

Pass, translated by William McCants, Combating Terrorism Center, May 23, 2006. This strategic text written online in 2004 is like the *Mein Kampf* of the jihadists.

- 12 Wesley Clark, *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 164.
- 13 Referring to the United States, Reinhold Niebuhr wrote: “It is particularly difficult for nations to discern the limits of human striving and especially difficult for a nation which is not accustomed to the frustrations of history to achieve this moderation. It is not sloth or the failure to exploit our potentialities but undue self-assurance which tempts the strong, particularly those who are both young and strong.” Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Structure of Nations and Empires* (New York: Scribners, 1959), 299.
- 14 Emmanuel Todd, *Après l’empire* (Paris: Gallimard, 2003), 40; Pepe Escobar, “The US and Eurasia: Theatrical Militarism,” *Asia Times Online*, December 4, 2002. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/DL04Aa01.html (accessed March 24, 2016).
- 15 Ian Roxborough, “Iraq, Afghanistan, the Global War on Terrorism, and the Owl of Minerva,” *Political Power and Social Theory*, 16 (2004): 195-211. [Translator’s note: Quotation back-translated from the French-language version of this article.]

planning and, certainly, our mistake in our understanding of what would happen once you removed the regime [of Saddam Hussein].”¹⁶

Recently, American leaders and their allies have therefore applied a “reactive and anachronistic” strategy based on classic military reflexes and geopolitical perspective. Giving in to its “natural tendency” to use military force to obtain quick results, the American “long war” has always favored the classic “American Way of War”—which causes more problems than it resolves.¹⁷ Exaggerating these very real transnational phenomena tends to hide the fact that global politics always depends on states. “[E]ven after September 11 and now post-Operation Iraqi Freedom, national security by and large continues to be defined in the traditional way.”¹⁸ The American strategy remains state-centered and “the link between terrorist organizations and state sponsors of terrorism has become the main strategic thinking” in the war on terrorism.¹⁹ Here, the long “War on Terror” resembles the Cold War, first in the way that insurrection and counter-insurrection are judged in terms of inter-state rivalries (as tragically illustrated in the case of Syria); despite their critical nature, local or regional dynamics of revolution/counter-revolution are generally neglected. In the strategic thinking of the United States, the primacy of geopolitics and state-centrism has led it to think that the significance of terrorists comes only from their state sponsors. They therefore respond mechanically to terrorist threats using a state-centered approach to confront a primarily non-state phenomenon.²⁰

ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS

Understanding non-state actors is one of the most pressing security concerns. The challenge is not whether to admit that transnational threats influence international security geopolitically—this much is obvious—but

16 Jethro Mullen, “Tony Blair Says he’s Sorry for Iraq War ‘Mistakes,’ but not for Ousting Saddam,” *CNN* October 25, 2015. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/25/europe/tony-blair-iraq-war/index.html> (accessed March 24, 2016).

17 Mark T Berger and Douglas A Borera, “The Long War,” *Third World Quarterly* 28 (2007): 197-215.

18 “Threats are concrete, specific, and grounded in material capabilities. At issue, for the most part, are political-military questions such as power, territory, alliances, credibility, and prestige. Most important, the response when challenged is to deploy the tried and true elements of real politik—military action, coalition building, threats and promises, intervention overt and covert.” Michael J. Mazarr, “The Psychological Sources of Islamic Terrorism,” *Policy Review* (Stanford University), 125 (2004).

19 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: the Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003); James Gibney, “Globalization, American Exceptionalism and Security,” in *Globalization and Conflict*, ed. Robert G. Patman (dir.) (New York: Routledge, Contemporary Security Studies, 2006), 79-94.

20 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” *International Security*, 27 (3): 30-58.

to identify the forms, structures, and intensity of its influence. On the local, state, or international level, all violent non-state actors pose one of the most troubling problems to security practitioners, the danger that they represent aggravated by their nebulous and evasive nature.²¹ Perceiving threats to national security in the twenty-first century first requires admitting that the danger posed by these armed state groups goes beyond the traditional use (or threat) of military force by states. To understand the causes of post-Cold War disorder, we must analyze the infra-national forces as well as the relevant inter-state relationships.

The risk here is that an examination of these new challenges to security may lead to inventing enemies or threats because “danger does not exist outside those it can threaten.” In society, the potential dangers are indeed infinite. “There is such an abundance of risk that it is impossible to objectively know all that threatens us.”²² In this context, indicating the danger is a question of interpretation: there is no way to perceive a danger without interpreting it as such in a discursive domain that gives it meaning.²³ Of course, the obsession with security is not always the source of security, which should not hinder the efforts to reevaluate the challenges to national and international security, and to identify the new threats when they have a solid empirical basis.²⁴

There is no single, recognized definition of transnational threats. In the broad sense, they are (but not only) the actions of non-state actors that transcend national borders, have a regional if not global impact, and for which the emergence and prevention imply (directly or not) more than one country. The spread of technology also triggers a redistribution of power outside the state itself toward these non-state actors, toward these armed individuals who collectively use violence without being part of the regular forces of a nation-state, and who act autonomously from recognized states. This portrait includes combatants, but also those who join these groups without taking arms or using violence.

Among these groups are urban gangs, militias, insurgents, bandits, pirates, smugglers, organized criminals, and the paramilitary forces of “warlords.” Their ideologies, objectives, strategies, modes of organization, bases of support, legitimacy, and degree of national and international recognition vary considerably, but these armed non-state groups share in undermining the authority and legitimacy of the state and corrupting the social fabric. Moreover, “humanitarian crises and catastrophes, ethnic cleansing, wars, and insurrections have become opportunities for organized crime” and terrorism. “The desperate ones fleeing their country are an

21 John Robb, “Threats to US Security in the Early 21st Century,” Congressional Testimony, House Armed Services Committee, April 2, 2009.

22 David Campbell, *Writing Security* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 2.

23 Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999), 21-22.

24 Phil William, “Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security,” in *In Athena’s Camp*, eds. John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt (dir.) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 315.

easy target.”²⁵ Traditionally, armed non-state groups are arrayed along a horizontal continuum according to the following criteria:

- Motivation
- Size
- Organization
- Function.

The changes of recent years reveal a more complex reality with the blurring of traditional lines based on the criteria above. Major similarities between these armed groups have now rendered obsolete the distinctions that once helped us understand or evaluate the landscape of security. This landscape has become complex, uncertain, unstable, and ambiguous. Some changes have aggravated the threat presented by violent non-state actors, to the point of raising them to the rank of major strategic challenges:

- They all create insidious threats. A growing but ambiguous connection emerging between groups (gangs, terrorists, criminals, and others) from diverse regions (Europe, Africa, America, the Middle East, and other regions).²⁶
- They function and operate according to increasingly similar modalities. Their operational efficacy, lethality, and global reach continue to grow thanks to their mastery of the “Infosys” of globalization.²⁷
- Globally, these threats represent both an asymmetrical challenge to global security and a reaction to the new world order.²⁸

25 Kimberley L. Thachuk and Sam J. Tangredi, “Transnational Threats and Maritime Responses,” in *Globalization and Marine Power*, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2002).

26 This “internationalization of criminal activities induces organized crime from different countries to establish strategic alliances to cooperate, rather than fight, on each other’s turf, through subcontracting arrangements, and joint ventures, whose business practice closely follows the organizational logic of what I identified as “the network enterprise,” characteristic of the Information Age. Furthermore, the bulk of the proceedings of these activities are by definition globalized through their laundering via global financial markets. Estimates of profits and financial flows originating in the criminal economy vary wildly and are not fully reliable. Yet they are indicative of the staggering size of the phenomenon we are describing ... In 1999, the IMF ventured a very broad estimate of global money laundering in a range between 500 billion and 1.5 trillion dollars a year (or 5 percent of global GDP). A substantial proportion of profits is laundered ... and about half of the laundered money, at least in the case of the Sicilian Mafia, is reinvested in legitimate activities.” Manuel Castells, *End of Millenium: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture Volume III* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 174.

27 Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat* (New York: Straus and Giroux, 2007), 595-596.

28 Peter Bergen and Laurie Garrett, *Report of the Working Group on State Security and Transnational Threats* (Princeton: The Princeton Project on National Security, Princeton University, 2005), 3; Kimberley L. Thachuk and Sam J. Tangredi, “Transnational Threats and Maritime Responses,”

THESIS OF THE “BACKLASH AGAINST GLOBALIZATION”

Even the most fervent apostles of globalization hesitate to claim that all of its effects are positive. Most recognize that it has created global classes of haves and have-nots. At the same time, the new globalized media have made the have-nots more aware of what they lack and of how the developed world lives, creating tension and anger. While “globalization has led to the expansion of economic opportunities, it has also had disruptive effects on society,” writes Bowdish. “There is a growing backlash against globalization ... throughout the world.”²⁹

Integrating objective and subjective elements, the thesis of the “backlash against globalization” comes from a fractured (but sometimes convergent) movement including diverse influences and figures such as Benjamin Barber, Samuel Huntington, Thomas Friedmann, Robert Kaplan, Martin van Creveld, and others. Lacking the space to develop their arguments here, I would briefly say that this theory relies on shaky sociology and a simplified reading of Durkheim’s theory of anomie. As Bernard Brodie said in 1973, “good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology. Some of the greatest military blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile evaluations in this department.” Brodie cited Napoleon’s and Hitler’s shared disregard for the Russians. If Brodie were still alive, “he might well have cited the case of those who invade Iraq without understanding” the history and sociology of the country.³⁰ In its different versions, this thesis (widespread in the American strategic community since the 1990s) led to a number of strategic mistakes in what was once called the “Third World.”

In short, the thesis of a “backlash against globalization” asserts that outside developed countries, globalization has caused often violent reactions against a troublesome modernization, against the global integration of markets, and the inability of markets to self-regulate and protect the interests of the population. This thesis presents the conflicts of today as a series of “wars on globalization,” with each conflict different than the others but all related to globalization and the backlash against it serving as the central theme of these conflicts. Globalization (a process reliant on the improvement of communications technology and transportation that allows a more open circulation of goods, people, money, technology, ideas, and cultures across international borders) has led to “space-time compression” and the creation of a “global village.” This is the world described by Thomas Friedman in *The World is Flat*.

His popular theory of a “flat world” explains how the forces of globalization

in *Globalization and Marine Power*, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002).

29 Randall G. Bowdish, “Global Terrorism, Strategy, and Naval Forces,” in *Globalization and Maritime Power* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), 2002), 1/20.

30 Colin S. Gray, *Out of the Wilderness* (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 2006), 2, <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-out.pdf> (accessed March 24, 2016).

tend to make the rules of the game more uniform. Yet not that much: certain factors have converged to flatten the world and give human beings an unprecedented autonomy, while at the same time globalization has caused alarming inequality. For Friedman, globalization is not universally popular. Many nations and peoples will resist it by their attachment to the “olive tree” that represents “everything that roots us, anchors us, identifies us, and locates us in the world.” “But after 9/11, the olive tree wars became all-consuming for me.” The expression “Lexus and the Olive Tree” serves here as a metaphor to describe the tension between global economic integration and national identity: the “tension between the ‘Lexus’ forces of economic integration and the ‘Olive Tree’ forces of identity and nationalism.” Thus, those that resist Americanism in the name of their olive trees can represent a real threat—especially when little money is needed to finance their attacks.³¹

If half of the world is “flat,” the other is not: the half of failed states, regions, and economies. Even more dangerous is the border between these two worlds, a zone of “lost” people expressing their anger in an ideological critique of globalization and inevitably participating in terrorism. In other words, the most dangerous forms of this “backlash against the system” are “Super-Empowered Individuals, Super-Empowered Angry Men” using terrorism to respond to a force they fear and do not understand. For globalists, September 11 did not derail globalization: it simply revealed the dark face of those that resist it by paradoxically using the means of globalization to destroy it. What an ironic fate! The very mechanisms, technological forces, and economies themselves that spread globalization increased the power of the terrorists and gave them a global reach. “This is a particularly difficult problem. In fact, it may be the most vexing geopolitical problem for flat-world countries.”³²

The vision of the future held by former Colonel Ralph Peters is typical of the American version of the “backlash against globalization.” His widely published views describe a tribal world where chieftains follow an archaic morality of the family and ethnic group, a world governed by corrupt and inept leaders. More worrying, according to him, the revolution in military affairs is misguided, incapable of seeing the “new warrior class,”³³ consisting of individuals from the “bottom

31 Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat*, 8-9, 200-232, and 447-555.

32 Thomas L. Friedman, *The World Is Flat*, 595; Thomas L. Friedman, “Super-Empowered Angry Men to Kill America,” *Spartanburg Herald Journal* (1998); Thomas L. Friedman, “Foreign Affairs: Angry, Wired and Deadly,” *The New York Times*, August 22, 1998; Thomas L. Friedman, “How Do We Cure Hate Of Suicidal Intensity?,” *The New York Times*, March 28, 2002; Thomas L. Friedman, “No Mere Terrorist,” *The New York Times*, March 24, 2002; John A. Nagl, “Globalization for Dummies,” *JFQ* (Summer 1999): 122-123; Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment: Tendances & Challenges for the Future Joint Force Through 2030* (December 2007): 41.

33 His views can be summarized as follows: “post-state organizations, from criminals to the international media,” will cause “a break in the integrity of the nation-state ... The greatest challenge could be our moral order ... Intercultural conflicts, with their unbridled savagery, are the major nightmare of the next century... We have entered the era of passion and illogicism, the era of rejection of the ‘scientific order.’ This is exactly what the pandemic of nationalism and fundamentalism is ... The

billion,”³⁴ who have lost all hope in progress and spontaneously turn to force because they lack any better social future.

Growing urbanization is an aggravating factor—to the point that urban risks will most likely pose the most critical security problems of the twenty-first century. In the three coming decades, cities will absorb the population growth of the planet while additionally drawing millions of migrants from rural regions due to climate changes that each year cause 20 to 30 million displaced persons and refugees. Boko Haram has found recruitment easier as Lake Chad has dried up and destabilized the local economy.³⁵

In this urbanized, overpopulated world connected to the coastal zones of the planet, many armed groups are adopting asymmetric methods. On the operational level, strategists therefore have to predict a war ranging from Fallujah-style attacks to complex attacks like in Mumbai, Nairobi, or the Bataclan, in addition to the persistent urban violence of the drug wars, the Brazilian favelas, and more. The enemy in each case is a small, rather well-armed group in a network.³⁶

It is the era of “chaoplexic warfare,”³⁷ crucial changes to war will come from “Netwars” more than classic military forces. Given “the prospect that network-based conflict and crime will become major phenomena in the decades ahead,” these “Netwars” will involve criminals, extremists, and terrorists motivated by religion, ideology, or ethnicity. Made up of small cells, these combat networks will tend to disperse “in swarms” to attack their adversaries, launching omnidirectional, coordinated attacks on centralized enemies. “Various actors across the spectrum of conflict and crime are already evolving in this direction.”³⁸

enemies we will face ... will not be ‘soldier’ disciplined with modernity” in the Euro-American sense, “but ‘warriors’—erratic primitives with shifting allegiances, used to violence, without a stake in the social order ... The most likely ‘battlefields’ are urban landscapes where humanity is rotten ... The point of it all is simple: win. In a time of war, nothing else counts. If you cannot win clean, win dirty. But win. Our victories in the end are in the human interest, while our failures feed the monsters.” Ralph Peters, *The Perfect Soldier* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); “The New Warrior Class,” *Parameters* (Summer 1994): 16-26; “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations,” *Parameters* (Spring 2000): 4-12; “Wishful Thinking and Indecisive Wars,” *Journal of International Security Affairs* 16 (Spring 2009); “The Coming Crusade,” *New York Post*, July 19, 2010; “Return of the Tribes,” *Weekly Standard* 11 (47) (September 2006).

34 Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

35 Christian Losson, Isabelle Hanne, and Coralie Schaub, “La lutte climatique mobilise les militaires,” *Libération* (2015); Coralie Schaub, “INTERVIEW: ‘Le lien entre changement climatique et conflits n’est ni à surévaluer ni à négliger,’” *Libération* (2015).

36 David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 29, 106-107.

37 Antoine J. Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

38 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (dir.), *Networks and Netwars* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

TERRORISM AND CRIMINALITY: A RELATIONSHIP OF OSMOSIS

With the exception of terrorism, transnational threats weigh less on global security than geopolitical rivalries and other regional wars. However, criminal organizations threaten the national economy, quality of life, and the safety of citizens.³⁹ They “pose serious threats to both national and international security and are extremely resistant to efforts to contain, disrupt, or destroy them.”⁴⁰

Terrorism targets ethno-national, religious, or revolutionary objectives. Criminality, by contrast, seeks material gain through smuggling weapons, drugs, and goods; through human trafficking; and through illegal money transfers, among other practices. It is therefore hard to imagine how these “global disasters” converge and in what ways terrorists with political ideals would cooperate with cartels and international criminal networks motivated by profits. Engaging in violence for power (terrorism) or for material gain (criminal enterprise) is very different. Yet some points of convergence are possible.

Beyond these definitions, their convergences come from their choices of strategy and organization. This allows us to move beyond the objection that some have to “treating transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) as an international security problem: they are economic rather than political organizations; they do not pose the same kinds of overt or obvious challenges to states as do terrorist organizations; crime is a domestic problem and law enforcement and national security are based on very different philosophies, organizational structures, and legal frameworks.”⁴¹ Normally based on their motivations, the distinctions between them have been surpassed—first, due to the fact that terrorists always fund their needs by committing criminal acts.⁴²

Transnational crime has thus become a tool of terrorist groups and networks. The American government has reported that ~40 foreign terrorist groups are linked to drug trafficking. Experts use the concept of “multinational systemic crime” to define those groups that practice terrorism, spying, and drug and arms

39 “Organized crime is more dangerous than terrorism,” according to the leading criminologist Xavier Raufer and “it will win out under globalization ... Al-Qaeda ... is undergoing a collapse of its intellectual foundations.” “Xavier Raufer, ‘Il faut anticiper les dangers en matière de sécurité globale,’” interview with *Le Figaro*, December 29, 2009.

40 Phil William, “Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security,” in *In Athena’s Camp*, eds. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, (dir.) (New York: RAND Corporation, 1997), 315; Perter Andréas, “Illicit International Political Economy,” *Review of International Political Economy* 11 (3) (August 2004): 641–652.

41 Phil William, “Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security,” in *In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, eds. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, (dir.) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 315.

42 David E. Kaplan, “Paying for Terror: How Jihadist Groups Use Crime to Pay for Attacks Worldwide,” *U.S. News and World Report*, December 18, 2005, <http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/1429> (accessed March 24, 2016).

trafficking at the same time.⁴³ The two organizations, terrorist and criminal, use illegal violence in their search for power and profit, respectively. Theoretically, the “combatants” of these two types of groups can be classified as international criminals, because their prohibited acts breach international laws, international penal law, and international accords. International conventions also tend to place crime and terrorism together: legally, terrorism is a criminal offense. The UN has thus qualified terrorism as the most visible and openly aggressive form of organized transnational crime.⁴⁴

In truth, the clear distinctions of the past between terrorism and organized crime have become blurred, in relation to the motivation, size, and mode of organization of these dangerous entities. Today, criminals and terrorists operate in decentralized cells; they tend to target civilians and use similar tactics, such as kidnapping and drug trafficking; they often follow the same practices (in particular, laundering their money in the same way); and they engage in multiple activities in parallel.⁴⁵ In fact, several international criminal groups have already diversified their activities, and police with limited resources to fight drug trafficking might miss a parallel activity such as migrant trafficking carried out by the same group or one connected to it.

Like terrorists, criminal groups have also evolved from hierarchical structures with a few bosses/godfathers at the summit to networks with dispersed functions and activities. Their “leadership structures” have become “more difficult to target and identify with a decapitation attack.”⁴⁶ “Even street gangs,” explain Sullivan and Elkus, “are increasingly evolving into ‘third-generation’ gangs.”⁴⁷ Terrorists and insurgents have recourse to organized crime. In the opposite direction, criminal

43 Martin John and Anne Romano, *Multinational Crime: Terrorism, Espionage, Drug and Arms Trafficking* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992).

44 Resolution 1566 of the UN Security Council, for example, describes terrorism as being “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population, or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” See paragraph 3, UN Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) Concerning Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorism*, October 8, 2004, S/RES/1566 (2004), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/42c39b6d4.html> (accessed March 24, 2016).

45 Kimberley L. Thachuk and Sam J. Tangredi, “Transnational Threats and Maritime Responses,” in *Globalization and Marine Power* ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, December 2002); John Rollins and Liana Sun Wylar, “*International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress*,” Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2010, 5-7.

46 Robert J. Bunker (dir.) *Non-state Threats and Future Wars* (New York: Frank Cass, 2003), 44.

47 John Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Red Teaming Criminal Insurgency,” *Red Team Journal* (January 2009). <http://redteamjournal.com/2009/01/red-teaming-criminal-insurgency-1/> (accessed March 24, 2016).

groups now operate like terrorist networks to intimidate or coerce national or local powers. “Some criminal organizations have adopted extreme, generalized violence, clearly attempting to intimidate governments at different levels.”⁴⁸

CONVERGENCE: THE CASE OF THE SAHEL

In the Sahel, armed groups have grown in number since the 1980s and their capability of doing harm has often become lethal. Terrorists, insurgents, criminals, and militias are distinguished by their views, missions, and the means they employ. Yet these subsets are porous, the most troublesome being

Convergence ... the dark side of globalization ... the most obvious example of this kind of convergence is narco-terrorism. Drug cartels use sophisticated trafficking routes to move huge amounts of heroin, cocaine and methamphetamines. Terrorists can in effect ‘rent’ these routes by co-opting the drug cartels through money, coercion or ideological persuasion. These organizations can then move personnel, cash or arms... Other globally trafficked illicit goods can also be found constantly moving on these routes: stolen and counterfeit intellectual property, illegal migrants, human slaves, laundered cash, sophisticated armaments ... Too often the focus is on single-point threats—drugs, money laundering, human trafficking, weapons trading, production of weapons of mass destruction—while the true threat lies in their convergence ... what is most worrisome is the convergence of such a weapon with a sophisticated global trafficking route enabled by cybercrime and the cash it generates.⁴⁹

The imperative is to “prevent” this convergence.

Moreover, “the Sinjar Records reinforce anecdotal accounts suggesting that Al-Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliates rely on smugglers and criminals—rather than their own personnel—to funnel recruits into Iraq.”⁵⁰ The border is therefore porous between

48 U.S. National Intelligence Council, *The Threat to U.S. National Security Posed by Transnational Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C., 2011); Chester G. Oehme, “Terrorists, Insurgents, and Crime – Growing Nexus?,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31 (1) (2008): 80-93.

49 James Stavridis was supreme allied commander at NATO (2009-2013) and head of the US Southern Command (2006-2009), “How Terrorists can Exploit Globalization,” *Washington Post*, May 31, 2013.

50 The data comes primarily from mining documents and computers discovered when American forces attacked a camp in the desert near Sinjar, close to the Syrian border. The most significant discovery was a collection of detailed biographical notes on more than 700 foreign combatants who came from Iraq starting in August 2006. In Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “Al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records,” *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, January 2008, 27.

the war on terror and the war on organized crime. Thus, there are few true military battles but skirmishes and a tendency for militias to target civilians; even if they sometimes receive outside aid, the new economies of war clearly rely on pillaging, the black market, and a continued use of violence.⁵¹

This can be seen in the Sahel, where criminals and terrorists use the same routes and networks. Before becoming a renowned terrorist, Mokhtar Belmakhtar was a smuggler known as “Mister Marlboro.” The former Algerian Minister Delegate for Defense Abdelmalik Guenaizia protested at the time against “the nexus of arms, drug, and contraband smuggling in northern Mali” which created an “enabling environment” for terrorist groups.⁵² In fact, the AQIM’s involvement in arms smuggling and drug trafficking no longer needs proving. Nor do its potential ties with Colombian traffickers.⁵³

In the past, Africa held a marginal role in the transnational drug trade, but with the help of globalization, it has become a place of active trafficking, starting with cocaine. According to recent estimates, from 46 to 300 tons of South American cocaine transit through West Africa to Europe each year. The latest cocaine seizures are significantly larger than those made in the 1990s, which scarcely reached one ton for Africa as a whole each year.⁵⁴ Whether they have clear ties to terrorism or not, this smuggling plays strongly on the anti-terrorism fight.

Constraint, persuasion: criminal groups and local terrorists rely on the populations that shelter them and ensure their freedom of movement. Several factors could drive terrorists and criminals to move to the sub-Saharan region but they do not explain the motives behind this complex cooperation. Three factors can help us understand this relationship. The alliances between politics and crime are based on the following.

1. The existence of trans-state, ethnic, and religious community movements which allow for collaboration between terrorists and criminals on the basis of shared values and mutual trust.
2. The presence of armed conflict, which provides incentives and possibilities for interdependency.
3. Constraints that come into play in the complex transnational exchanges

51 Fanny Coulomb and Dunne J. Paul, “Economics, Conflict and War,” *Real-World Economics Review* 46 (2008): 147-157.

52 See a US embassy cable from October 25, 2009 revealed by Wikileaks: “US embassy cables: Algerians take lead in regional fight against al-Qaeda,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/231198> (accessed March 24, 2016).

53 Joelle Burbank, “Trans-Saharan Trafficking: A Growing Source of Terrorist Financing,” Occasional Research Series, Center for the Study of Threat Convergence, The Fund for Peace 2010, September 21, 2010.

54 Sandy Winnefeld, “Maritime Strategy in an Age of Blood and Belief,” *Proceedings Magazine*, 134/7/1, 265 (July 2008). <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2008-07/maritime-strategy-age-blood-and-belief> (accessed March 24, 2016).

of illegal merchandise and exchanges that often involve other intermediaries and corruptible forces of internal security.⁵⁵

In the Sahel-Maghreb, these threats bring together, more or less, fanatical actors and bandits, in three functional categories.

1. Smuggling, trafficking, and piracy, associating the transportation of illicit goods with the theft of legally transported merchandise.
2. Acts of terrorism dependent on the acquisition of (basic and sophisticated) weapons by non-state actors.
3. Emerging ecological/social threats involving state activities that are not always caused by an organized group but from which it profits (human migration, environmental threats, infectious diseases).

A clear link between these various activities can be seen. For example, smuggling allows weapons acquired by terrorists to be transported into the target country. Criminals and terrorists often use the same routes; moreover, they launder their money using the same schemes and engage in multiple and parallel (licit or illicit) activities.⁵⁶

Thus, terrorists and criminals in the Sahel zone share common characteristics.

1. Frequent practice of clandestine activities aiming for legitimacy, public support, and control of important territories.
2. Creation or development of an apparatus dedicated to illegal operations. Thus, the terrorist, criminal, or hybrid entity obtains arms, means of communication, and information, and it secures the territory it controls.
3. Disregard for international norms, the rule of law, or the notion of human rights, and intention to kill those that oppose them.
4. Use of long-term guerilla combat to control a territory and populations.
5. These guerilla fighters create cells that specialize in using the media and the Internet to publish their propaganda and their demands.⁵⁷

55 Lyubov Mincheva and Ted Robert Gurr, "Unholy Alliances? How Trans-state Terrorism and International Crime Make Common Cause," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Panel on Comparative Perspectives on States, Terrorism and Crime, San Diego, March 24, 2006.

56 Kimberley L. Thachuk and Sam J. Tangredi, "Transnational Threats and Maritime Responses," in *Globalization and Marine Power*, ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2002).

57 Roy Godson and Richard Shultz, *Adapting America's Security Paradigm and Security Agenda* (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 2010), 6.

All of the above has deep and lasting implications. Criminal and terrorist groups know how to resist any effort to contain, disrupt, or destroy them. They threaten the stability, structures, and political authority of a country or a region. They undermine the authority and the legitimacy of the state and corrupt the social fabric. As it is not impossible that these negative groups can “develop a real political conscience,”⁵⁸ these aggravated combinations of threats and challenges can come together to provoke “chaos,” and undermine society like termites in a wooden house. These “organized crime corruption networks can be understood as the HIV virus of the modern state, circumventing and breaking down the natural defenses of the modern state.”⁵⁹

This reveals the fragility of a state competing with terrorist and/or criminal groups, defied and tested in its defense capabilities. This is particularly true in the Sahel, where armed rebels, drug traffickers, and other fanatic groups ignore national borders, with deadly consequences for regional security and stability, especially in Algeria. Unsurprisingly, AQIM has multiplied its smuggling and terrorism activities in these regional grey areas. Illicit transnational activities like drug, arms, and human trafficking, piracy and terrorism, as well as the crucial tools of corruption and money laundering should not be neglected either, because as a whole, they are a serious handicap to political and economic stability, in other words, to the security of entire regions.

VIOLENCE AND “FOURTH WAVE” TERRORISM

Long dominant throughout history, religious terror reappeared in the 1980s. Until then, political violence in the twentieth century was more revolutionary and secular, associated in particular with the rise of nationalism, anarchism, and revolutionary socialism.⁶⁰ Today, however, the dangerous mix of religion–terrorism practiced by Al-Qaeda and Daesh signals the return of a “meta-physical” terror; this return is part of a more general trend: the return of religion into a global ideological void.

Based on divine imperatives,⁶¹ this “fourth wave” of Islamist terrorism is

58 John Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Red Teaming Criminal Insurgency.”

59 Phil Williams. Cited by Willem van Schendel and Itty Abraham, *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 3.

60 Hoffman examines how terrorism motivated solely by a religious imperative differs from purely secular terrorism. He places the accent on their radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimation and justification, the concepts of morality embraced by terrorists, and the millenarian perspective that informs their thought processes and the influences of their actions. Bruce Hoffman, “‘Holy Terror’: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 18 (4) (1995).

61 David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” *Anthropoetics* 8 (1)

inseparable from the emergence of “religious nationalism.”⁶² Yet focusing on religion alone to explain its extreme violence would be a mistake.⁶³

The massacres are not irrational instances of random violence motivated [solely] by extremist Islamist ideology. They can be understood instead as part of a rational strategy initiated by the Islamist rebels aiming to maximize civilian support under a particular set of constraints. Mass, yet mostly targeted and selective, terror is used to punish and deter defection by civilians in the context of a particular strategic conjuncture characterized by (a) fragmented and unstable rule, (b) mass civilian defections toward the incumbents, and (c) escalation of violence.⁶⁴

Daesh is a practical example that refers to the “theory of competitive control.”⁶⁵ This theory provides a basis for understanding systems of control applied by armed non-state actors and their relationships with populations in a conflict environment.

The theory suggests that “people support armed groups in places where those groups are already strong enough to impose an incentive structure (or system of control) that provides predictability, order, safety, and stability. Support follows strength, not vice versa [...] The many non-state armed groups draw their strength and freedom of action primarily from their ability to manipulate and mobilize populations, and that they do this using a spectrum of methods from coercion to persuasion, by creating a normative space that makes people feel safe through the predictability and order it creates.” In short, “in irregular conflicts ... the local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to dominate that population.” Thus, “populations respond to a predictable, ordered, normative system that tells them exactly what they need to do, and not do, in order to be safe.” Eliminating this normative system, a “set of rules correlated with a set of consequences,” and chaos will follow.⁶⁶ Like the Taliban, Daesh provides a sense of order and “protects” the population from the many warlords.

(Spring-Summer 2002).

62 Mark Juergensmeyer, “The Worldwide Rise of Religious Nationalism,” *Journal of International Affairs* 50 (1) (1996); Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); John Calvert, “The Mythic Foundations of Radical Islam,” *Orbis* (winter 2004); Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism,” *Political Psychology*, 25 (5) (2004): 741-767.

63 Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: New York University, 2000).

64 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria,” *Rationality and Society* 11 (3) (August 1999): 243-285.

65 Daniel Fisher and Christopher Mercado, “Competitive Control: How to Evaluate the Threats Posed by “Ungoverned Spaces,” *Small Wars Journal* (September 2014).

66 David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 114, 125-126, and 132.

In Africa, crime has a profound impact, as it weakens the state and the safety of people, while posing a threat to travelers and economic actors. It discourages (national and foreign) investment and tourism. International drug trafficking, for example, benefits terrorism in at least five ways: abundant funds in cash; creation of unstable or chaotic areas; corruption; emergence of infrastructures dedicated to illicit activities; and distracting the attention and resources of specialized services. Here, the “dirty money” and “chaos” aspects are the most important in that they disrupt states and contribute to their instability.⁶⁷

In Algeria, for example, the two actors of its “dark decade,” the Algerian state and the Islamist insurgent terrorists, were in constant competition for the country’s resources, causing the worst violence in the richest regions. Luis Martinez thus proposed a detailed analysis of the economic dimension of the confrontations in the center-north of Algeria. This dimension attracted many warlords that at the time controlled the traffic of merchandise to and from Algiers. According to him, the presence of armed gangs in the regions of Cherarba, Baraki, and Les Eucalyptus can be explained of course by an extreme desire for jihad, but also by the large financial resources of many prosperous merchants. The main roads full of vehicles favored extortion and could explain the proliferation of fake checkpoints.⁶⁸

Another example of the osmosis between chaos, crime, and terrorism is Kabylia. Even in the most somber moments of its “dark decade,” it was able to protect itself from Islamic terrorism and was one of the least affected regions. Yet the withdrawal of police forces after 2001, in reaction to political and socio-economic protests, created a climate of instability and chaos that was exploited by several criminals and by terrorists, all of whom wanted to make the region a safe haven. The analysis of recent data shows that (out of all the terrorist attacks committed in Algeria), 50% of the cases of extortion, 70% of individual attacks, and 65% of attacks with explosives took place in the four wilayas of Kabylia (Bouira, Bejaia, Tizi-Ouzou, and Boumerdès).⁶⁹

A further example: in a sensitive context, the army had to reestablish order in Ghardaïa instead of securing the borders. At the time, those who measured the real implications of recourse to the army to reestablish order were rare. Recourse to the army meant that the traditional security forces (police) were overwhelmed, disarmed, and poorly prepared to face the emerging forms of an increasingly serious violence. This was clearly recognized by an Algerian official, indicating that the military forces and the intelligence services of the army were directly involved in the fight against drug trafficking. The cause of this turning point was the growing

67 Mark A.R. Kleiman, *Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist Threat* (CRS Report for Congress, April 20, 2004), 1-8.

68 Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 5-6, 117.

69 Liess Boukra, “Du Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC) à Al-Qaeda au Maghreb islamique,” *African Journal* (Algiers: Centre Africain d’Etudes et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme, 2010), 35-57.

seriousness of this traffic, Algeria's passage from a consumer country to a transit country for many active international networks, and the inability of the traditional security forces to present any effective opposition.⁷⁰ This type of recourse may become common in the future, as the army has to assume tasks that were once given to the civil sector. Yet here is the concern: this was done without political cover or conceptual framework; however, the evolution of army missions should be translated in terms of doctrines, training, concepts, structures, and arms acquisition.

AUTONOMIZATION AND MOBILIZATION

In this new war, the adversary is primarily transnational or infranational. "Increasing interconnectedness will enable individuals to coalesce around common causes across national boundaries, creating new cohorts of the angry, downtrodden, and disenfranchised."⁷¹ The spread of technology, information, and financing gives terrorist/criminal groups greater mobility and access to the entire world. At this stage, the information era helps non-state actors more than states.⁷² Globalization allows these groups to work in a network, use these new technologies to promote their causes, and increase their "organizational effectiveness, their lethality, and their ability to operate on a truly worldwide scale."⁷³ The rise of Daesh/Al-Qaeda has benefitted from the global explosion of communications technologies: ideologically, virtually, and/or physically, radical groups are increasingly connected in a constellation of global extremists.

The ease of connection to the global network expands the physical theater of operations of the past to include new virtual theaters. Cyberspace can draw in people and forces that do not have a geographic connection to a conflict from anywhere on the planet. The role of information networks in Libya is an example of this electronic mass mobilization. Using platforms and networks like Facebook, Skype, Twitter, and other services, the democratization of connectivity plays a key role in global affairs.⁷⁴ By mobilizing people in times of peace and in times of war, technology has led to a global change that has only just begun. "Current state actor

70 "The army declared war on smuggling gangs: information services were behind half of the operations of drug seizure," *El-Khabart* (in Arabic), (January 2016).

71 National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2008), 68.

72 Moises Naim, "Five Wars of Globalization," *Foreign Policy*, November 3, 2009.

73 Querine H. Hanlon, "Globalization and the Transformation of Armed Groups," in *Armed Groups*, ed. Jeffrey H. Norwitz (dir.) (Washington DC: US Department of the Navy, 2008), 115-125.

74 See the stories of a certain number of individuals in Europe and the United States that have sought to aid the Libyan "insurgents" in Benghazi through social media and satellite communications. John Pollock, "People Power 2.0: How Civilians Helped Win the Libyan Information War," *MIT Technology Review* (2012), <http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/427640/people-power-20/> (accessed March 24, 2016).

capabilities are limited,” but not for long. A window of opportunity of 5 to at most 10 years is now open to develop “cyber counterinsurgency.”⁷⁵

Cyberspace is transforming communication and allows cyber mobilization. In the minds of Islamists, cyberspace could become the equivalent of the territorial foundation of states for the Ummah, which by definition is not a geographical body but a community of believers.⁷⁶ Thus, “like the *levée en masse*, the evolving character of communications today is altering the patterns of popular mobilization, including both the means of participation and the ends for which wars are fought.”⁷⁷

The spread of information networks allows almost anyone to command guerilla operations from a distance. These information networks can change the power equations in the field and become “the backbone for the uprising” by “helping synchronize and coordinate the combat power of a diverse group of non-state actors.”⁷⁸

Beyond fantasies of a “caliphate,” in concrete operations, these groups no longer need to control or create a real state. In fact, “statelessness has become increasingly feasible and desirable in order to pursue a broad spectrum of objectives.”⁷⁹ Criminal cartels replace states in many places: we are now feeling the first effects. It presages a dangerous trend: the “specter of criminal insurgency” or “a kind of criminal empire” resulting from “the interaction of feral cities, state organizations, and the global economy.”⁸⁰ Indeed, the destructive capabilities of criminality have tended to grow in gravity and sophistication. Criminal groups are taking advantage of new technologies and the proliferation of arms to expand.

Over time, the leverage effect of technology and the availability of weapons

75 Paul Rosenzweig, “The Changing Face of Cyber Conflict,” *The Journal of International Security Affairs* 28 (Spring/Summer 2015): <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/number-28/changing-face-cyber-conflict> (accessed March 24, 2016).

76 Philip Bobbitt predicted the rise of “market states”—states maximized to generate profits—and “virtual states”—states that only exist in the minds and allegiances of their clandestine members in cyberspace. John Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Red Teaming Criminal Insurgency.”

77 The concept of an electronic *levée en masse*, as developed by Cronin, implies that the age of information is in the process of transforming participation in war in a similar way to the effects of new publication and communications methods on the mass mobilization of armed forces in the Napoleonic wars. Deregulation of the press in France between 1789 and 1793 caused a rush to publish in the form of low-priced pamphlets and prints. The democratization of communication was crucial in developing the conditions—such as the popular sense of national identity and the responsibilities of citizens—for repeated calls for mass mobilizations during the Napoleonic wars. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Cyber-Mobilization: The New *Levée en Masse*,” *Parameters* (Summer 2006): 77-87, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/06summer/cronin.htm> (accessed March 24, 2016).

78 David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 172.

79 Jakub Grygiel, “The Power of Statelessness,” *Policy Review* (Stanford University), 54 (April 1, 2009).

80 John Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Red Teaming Criminal Insurgency.”

in the vicinity of unstable geographic areas could lead hybrid entities to bring entire countries easily under their sway through parasitic or phagocytic action, without creating a true state apparatus. In the future, the operational motivation of terrorism could very well no longer be its suicidal fanaticism, but its level of mastery of technology and its access to stocks of arms.

At the same time, the ease of access to information increases the perception of inequalities between individuals, groups, and nations, opposing the classes of enlightened haves and determined have-nots. In fact, in “a sharply asymmetrical yet interdependent world,” malicious people with modest budgets can demolish the economy of specific areas—a handful of global “cities”—that remain strategically important despite the rhetoric on deterritorialized flows.⁸¹ “The evils of the twentieth century—Nazism, fascism, communism—were caused by populist mass movements in Europe whose powers were magnified by industrialization; likewise, the terrors of the next century will be caused by populist movements ..., this time empowered by post-industrialization.” While “industrialization. concentrated power in the hands of state rulers ... post-industrialization, with its miniaturization, puts power in the hands of anyone with a laptop and a pocketful of plastic explosives.”⁸²

CHAOS ON THE LITTORAL AND PANIC IN THE CITY: URBAN WAR

We know that the prosperity of nations depends on the safety of maritime trade. Almost three fourths of the planet is covered in water and 90% of global commerce takes place through maritime routes. Moreover, 95% of cyberspace traffic passes through cables under the oceans. Dominating maritime trade, oil travels on 0.7% of global seas and 95% of international maritime trade passes through 9 vulnerable chokepoints (for example, straits).

Despite being a small part of the planet, littorals house three-quarters of the world’s population, >80% of world capitals, and the primary markets for international trade. The great majority of global population and its megalopolises are <150 km from a coast; four of five world capitals are at least 400 km from a coast; and ~70% of the world’s population is <250 km from a coast.

And yet, littorals are also the place where many important conflicts could occur. National interests and potential enemies most often collide on the coastline. “As we look ahead,” writes General James F. Amos, “we see a world of increasing instability, failed or failing states, and conflict characterized by: poverty, unemployment, urbanization, overpopulation, and extremism; competition for scarce

81 Saskia Sassen, “Globalization After September 11,” in *The Anthropology of Development and Globalization*, eds. Marc Edelman and Angelique Haugerud (dir.) (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 173-176.

82 Robert Kaplan, “The Return of Ancient Times,” *The Atlantic*, June 2000.

natural resources; and rapid proliferation of new technologies ... These troubling socio-economic and geopolitical trends converge in the littorals.”⁸³

Terrorism therefore goes far beyond Al-Qaeda and Daesh. Acting as if only Islamist terrorism counts, because it is easier to measure, quantify, and manipulate, is the equivalent of “the drunkard saying that the reason he is stumbling around looking for his keys under the streetlight is because it is the only place where he can see. What we need are better flashlights so that we can also look for our keys down the dark alleys of the global economy.”⁸⁴ Four “megatrends” thus shape the future of war as a human endeavor.

- *Demographic growth*: In 2050, the population of the planet will stabilize at between 9.1 and 9.3 billion people. Most of this growth will be absorbed in cities, leading to the second trend.
- *Rapid urbanization*: In 2008, the urbanization rate of the world’s population reached 50% and this number should reach 75% in 2050.
- *Littoralization of the population*: A large part of this growth will take place in cities on a littoral that will contain most of this urbanization, leading to the third trend, littoralization.
- *Rise in digital connectivity*: This last trend will connect these overpopulated coastal regions with the rest of the world. Connectivity is the great multiplier of force in modern urban insurrections.

These coastal urban zones are not marginal but at the heart of the global system. Urbanization in itself is not new. The first three of these “megatrends” are not new. Sociologists have written on urbanization for decades and conflicts in urban environments already concerned military strategists of the 1990s—before cell phones, the Internet, and widespread access to satellite television. The acceleration of these trends, combined with growing digital connectivity, but not as foreseen, indicates that urban conflicts will probably reach a higher level of violence and intensity as soon as the whole world hears of them.⁸⁵

If we ignore these trends, terrorism will become unmanageable, as Daesh has proven. Its members mix in with populations, which prevents them from being distinguished from civilians. Thus, “it is now time to recognize that a paradigm shift in war has undoubtedly occurred.”⁸⁶

83 General James F. Amos (Commander of the Marine Corps), *2011 Report to Congress on The Posture of United States Marine Corps* (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, Department of Navy, 2011), 2.

84 Perter Andréas, “Illicit International Political Economy: The Clandestine Side of Globalization,” *Review of International Political Economy* 11 (3) (August 2004): 641–652.

85 David Kilcullen, “The City as a System,” *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 36 (2) (Summer 2012): 19–39; David Kilcullen, *Urbanization and the Future of Conflict* (London: Chatham House, 2013); Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums* (New York: VERSO, 2006).

86 Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2007), 5.

Demographic trends suggest that future military operations will have an urban dimension. Due to the growth and concentration of vast populations in poor regions, the question is not knowing whether war will occur, but what type of war. “The most likely but also the most challenging conflict environment will be urban.”⁸⁷ Future conflicts will take place in the “streets, sewers, skyscrapers, industrial parks” of the broken urban cities of the world.⁸⁸

Under neoliberal globalization, “metro-strategy has replaced geo-strategy. The site of modern war has gradually become the city.” The borders of a nation are no longer external but now run through its cities. Nations will have to defend themselves from the outside, but also inside their own metropolises because “the metro-politics of globalization will replace the geopolitics of nations.” Modern war will be “a war of civilians,” which with the help of instant telecommunications, will lead to a “global civil war” (the global equivalent of the Los Angeles riots).⁸⁹

Urban warfare is as old as war itself. Cities have always been centers of gravity, but they are now more magnetic than ever. While they have always been at the heart of war, “cities were seen as targets, not as battlefields.” Now, they have become the ultimate creators of wealth. Cities concentrate both population and power, communications and control, knowledge and capabilities: yes, “war, like everything else, is urbanized” and conflicts will primarily take place in “the strategic sites of our times: cities.”⁹⁰

This suggests that the conflicts of the twenty-first century will migrate far from the mountain villages, agricultural areas, and border valleys of countries like Afghanistan, toward sprawling cities like Mumbai or Mogadishu, where technology is omnipresent, enabling groups to establish the networks of influence that erode the capacity of states to conserve and exercise power, and to defend their citizens. These scenarios are a concern for the Atlantic alliance. The “Technical Report on Land Operations in the Year 2020,” for example, “concluded that in the future it is likely that NATO forces will have to conduct operations in urban areas, that is, where physical structures, non-combatants, and infrastructure will be significant characteristics. Furthermore, LO2020 concluded that such operations will pose significant challenges for the Alliance.”⁹¹

87 “Urbanization will potentially pose a sizeable challenge to [Atlantic] forces,” Research and Technology Organization (RTO), “Urban Operations in the Year 2020,” *RTO Technical Report*, 8, (Paris: NATO, December 2001), 11-13, [http://natorto.cbw.pl/uploads/2001/12/TR-008\(F\)-\\$ALL.pdf](http://natorto.cbw.pl/uploads/2001/12/TR-008(F)-$ALL.pdf) (accessed March 24, 2016).

88 Ralph Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” *Parameters* (Spring 1996): 43-50; James Kitfield, “War in the Urban Jungles,” *Air Force Magazine*, 81, 12 (December 1998); Steven Kosiak, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers, *A Strategy for a Long Peace* (Washington, D.C.: CSBA, 2001), 7.

89 Paul Virilio, *The City of Panic* (Oxford: Berg Publications, 2005).

90 Stephen Graham, *Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Stephen Graham, “War and the City,” *New Left Review* 44 (March/April 2007). [Translator’s note: Quotation back-translated from the French-language version of this article.]

91 See Research and Technology Organization (RTO), “Urban Operations in the Year 2020,” RTO

This growing urbanization poses a significant challenge to armed forces and security, to the point that it gives “urban operations the potential to become a critical security issue in the twenty-first century”⁹² because “urban areas will continue to increase in number and size and are likely to become focal points for unrest and conflict.”⁹³ Outside its consequences for the environment and public health, the urbanization of global poverty will provoke the urbanization of insurrection. Security experts must “start to approach the city as an element of analysis in itself;” by integrating the way in which the “city’s subsystems and subdistricts fit together as well as how the city nests within and interacts with regional and transnational flows.” “More people than ever before in history will be competing for scarcer and scarcer resources in poorly governed areas that lack adequate infrastructure; and these areas will be more and more closely connected to the global system, so that local conflict will have far wider effects”⁹⁴ especially on “keeping order on the seas.”

THE ASYMMETRY OF COSTS

Inhabited by non-state adversaries armed with asymmetrical practices, these urban, littoral, overpopulated, and hyper-connected environments are powerful catalyzers that give “Netwars” enormous power, sometimes the power to overthrow governments. In this context, some cities could become “extra-legal” zones where the presence and authority of the State are restricted. These cities could serve as refuges for criminal–terrorist networks. As shown in the example of Bin Laden who, as early as 2003, sought refuge in the garrison city of Abbottabad, contrary to what the Americans thought,⁹⁵ these cities are the postmodern equivalent of the jungle and mountains (citadels of the dispossessed and irreconcilable) since “rapid urban growth in under-developed littoral zones overloads economic, social, and government systems, and saturates the transportation capacity of cities designed for smaller populations.”

The implications for the security environment are profound. The chaos of megalopolises represents a “new normal” for future conflicts in which “more people will compete for scarce resources, in overpopulated, poorly served, and under-governed urban areas.”⁹⁶ Poorly prepared for large spectrum urban operations,

Technical Report, 71, (Paris: NATO, April 2003), vi.

92 Alice Hills, *Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma* (London: Routledge, 2004), 28.

93 Research and Technology Organization (RTO), “Urban Operations in the Year 2020,” vi.

94 David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 50, 107, and 240.

95 Speaking of Bin Laden, an American general said that “he’s hiding in a cave at six thousand feet freezing his ass off.” Quoted by Seymour Hersch, *Dommages collatéraux, la face obscure de la guerre contre le terrorisme* (Paris: Denoël, 2006), 237.

96 *Ibid.*, 35-36. [Translator’s note: Quotation back-translated from the French-language version of this article.]

military institutions, including those in Algeria, are not ready for tomorrow. If it does not prepare itself for military operations in these “feral cities” of the twenty-first century⁹⁷ among innocent civilians, the Algerian state will lose the means to ensure its defense and its security.

In truth, it concerns developed countries as well. Mechanical-technological solutions to the complex problems posed by war are an illusion. Those that propose them fail to see the connection between armed conflicts and are not aware of the limits of new technologies and emerging military capabilities. Concepts that rely on the ability to strike the enemy with long-range precision payloads separate war from its political, psychological, and cultural contexts.

Terrorism is not 50 armored divisions. Instead of armies meeting in battle, now there are surgical strikes on small terrorist cells and arms caches. War against non-state actors will involve small-scale operations with reduced forces, without sophisticated technology, except for information gathering and surveillance systems throughout the world. Success will not be measured in territory gained or losses on the battlefield, but in networks infiltrated, communications intercepted, bank transfers blocked, and secret weapons programs discovered.

In this war, intelligence and surveillance, multilateral diplomacy, and increased vigilance on the domestic front will count more than military prowess. Given their specialization in complex expeditionary actions, the operations of Special Forces will become the model of high-risk military operations. Polyvalence and adaptability will be important characteristics for these forces. “We often think that terrorist attacks are complex, well-orchestrated, and committed with sophisticated weaponry. However, contrary to the media narrative on terrorism, most terrorist attacks use easily accessible weapons [...] such as explosives or firearms.”⁹⁸ As a reminder, the resources used to “plan and carry out” the 9/11 attacks were “minor.”

Moreover, the drop in the cost of technology and the availability of weapons and explosive devices allow groups and individuals, even weak ones, to threaten much more wealthy and strong powers. “The group itself was dispatched by an organization based in one of the poorest, most remote, and least industrialized countries on earth.”⁹⁹ Society’s dependence on vast infrastructures in a network (from electricity to oil to communications) means that small disruptions can cause disproportionate damages. After causing the closure of 1800 factories/companies

97 The concept of “Feral Cities”—“savage, toxic, and ungovernable” megalopolises—comes from biology and was introduced into the literature of political science by Richard J. Norton, “Feral Cities,” *Naval War College Review* 4 (Fall 2003): 97-106.

98 Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and R. Kim Cragin, “Trends in Global Terrorism,” in *Peace and Conflict 2010*, eds. Joseph J. Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2010), 22. [Translator’s note: Quotation back-translated from the French-language version of this article.]

99 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Final Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 2004), 169, 339-340.

for 1 week, the attack on a gas pipeline in Mexico gave a 100,000,000% return on investment (damages caused divided by the amount spent on the attack). And the direct economic cost of terrorist attacks is even greater.

Estimating the cost of terrorism raises a variety of problems: defining the damages, measuring losses, problems of aggregation, avoiding dual charges from damages in different sectors or statistics, and indirect effects. The indirect costs of terrorist attacks vary in terms of their separation between activities, sectors, countries, and times. Some sectors and activities are more vulnerable to attacks than others. The indirect inter-temporal implications depend on the nature and the scale of the attacks, the types of policies adopted by the state in response to the attacks, and other factors.¹⁰⁰ In addition to killing ~3,000 people (>6,000 injured), the September 11 attacks caused 40 billion dollars in losses in terms of insurance; airline companies skirted bankruptcy (and billions in losses in value for the airline companies that survived). The attacks deprived New York of 25 billion dollars in tourism revenues and destroyed or displaced 18,000 small businesses.¹⁰¹

Thus, “a \$250,000 attack was converted into an event that cost the United States over \$80 billion (some estimates are as high as \$500 billion).”¹⁰² As a result, “this would make the 9/11 attacks the most expensive terrorist attack in history” (without including the cost of the subsequent global campaign against terror). The key advantage of an adversary facing conventional superiority is “asymmetry of cost,” since terrorism causes billions in spending for defense and domestic security.¹⁰³ From this angle, the “cost–benefit ratio is against us!” as former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted in 2003. “Our cost is billions against the terrorists’ costs of millions.”¹⁰⁴ In 2009, the United States spent 400 million dollars per day in Iraq, a clearly unsustainable level for a counter-insurrection campaign that can take years to become effective. “By contrast, adversaries deliberately adopt low-cost methods in order to sustain operations over a longer time period than America can, for an acceptable cost.”¹⁰⁵

100 Patrick Lenain, Marcos Bonturi, and Vincent Koen, “The Economic Consequences of Terrorism,” OECD Working Paper, 334 (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002). [http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=eco/wkp\(2002\)20](http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&cote=eco/wkp(2002)20) (accessed March 24, 2016); Tilman Brück (dir.), *The Economic Analysis of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2007); Paul Collier (*et al.*), *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003).

101 The July 7 attacks in London had a similar effect, with a 15% drop in the number of visitors after the attacks, for example. Ian Goldin, “Globalisation and Risks for Business: Implications of an Increasingly Interconnected World,” *Lloyd’s 360 Risk Insight. In-Depth Report*, The James Martin 21st Century School, The University of Oxford, London, 2010, 37.

102 John Robb, *Brave New War* (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), 31.

103 David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, 25-26.

104 Donald Rumsfeld, “War on Terror Memo,” *USA Today*, October 16, 2003.

105 David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, 25-26.

In the fight against crime and terrorism, the government has an initial advantage in terms of resources; however, it is counterbalanced by the need to maintain order and protect its population and critical resources. Terrorists and criminals succeed by sowing chaos and disorder; the government fails when it does not maintain satisfactory order. Therefore, if it only kills and makes arrests, the state cannot win. Winning wars and winning the peace are two very different missions. Terrorists and criminals can cause chaos everywhere, while the army must maintain order everywhere.

From now on, the confluence of criminal networks and global, dispersed, and decentralized terrorists is a characteristic of the environment of international security. This makes it indispensable to carry out missions of penetration and perturbation (through regular surgical operations) of these groups that associate terrorism and crime. Weakening transnational criminal networks participates directly and indirectly in counterterrorism. Thus, to reduce the capabilities of terrorist and criminal groups to cause harm, an effective strategy must first consider the defense of citizens. As for the terrorists and criminals, the operational objective is to identify, locate, and destroy them; to deny them support, sponsorship, and sanctuary; to help populations by reducing the grievances that these groups exploit; and to win the war of ideas.¹⁰⁶

“Armed groups are living organisms, not mechanistic, organizational structures. Groups change, morph, and recombine in infinite permutations that force strategies and concepts to change over time.” However, local actors do not disappear into the new global networks. On the contrary, their connection to global networks allows former criminal–terrorist entities to survive and prosper by escaping at crucial moments from a given state. AQIM is a clear example of this. Even “regionalized” and integrated into the “global jihad,” its leaders are mainly Algerian and its activities target primarily Algeria. Daesh is the same. Its leaders are mainly former officers under Saddam. Thus, “when considering long-term strategic goals to counter armed groups, it is wise to remember that when implementing strategy, small wars are local.”¹⁰⁷

106 John T. Fishel and Edwin G. Corr, “Thinking and Writing About COIN”, *The Small Wars Journal* (July 2013); Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus,” *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2013); Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 19.

107 Peter Curry, “Small Wars are Local: Debunking Current Assumptions about Countering Small Armed Groups” in *Armed Groups*, ed. Jeffrey H. Norwitz (dir.), (Washington, DC: US Department of the Navy, 2008), 149-159; Manuel Castells, *End of Millennium: The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture VOLUME III* (Oxford: Willey-Blackwell, 2010), 175.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, as regards Algeria, we cannot ask its army to focus on its national mission while also performing tasks intended for civilians. The effectiveness of an army depends on a political project but politicians have failed in their mission. Defending the country against an external enemy and reestablishing order are two very different missions. While defending territorial integrity remains essential in an uncertain regional and international context, the Algerian armed forces must recognize the destructive potential of emerging criminality. It is possible that they will have to confront it one day. Several other countries, including developed ones, have experienced these changes.¹⁰⁸ In the United States, this work began before September 11 and the necessary conceptual and institutional changes are already at an advanced stage.

It is therefore better to avoid the errors and conceptual “difficulties” that terrorism caused for Algerian forces in the 1990s. “We faced difficulties because the concepts were not clear,” explained General Mohammed Kaidi. “On the battlefield, soldiers questioned whether their cause was just—even I wondered.” On both sides, soldiers and terrorists shout, “*Allah Akbar*”: which one is right?¹⁰⁹ Confronting “Netwars” requires an expeditionary approach. The accent must be placed primarily on information, on the “human factor.”¹¹⁰

A high technology that fascinates major powers, the insidious nature of the enemy, and the asymmetrical aspects of the fight: for small states these are the best cards to hold in order to maintain a privileged place in the concert of powers and to strengthen their influence and negotiating power. Today, having a say means being the “man on the rock.”¹¹¹ During the Cold War, people praised the “equalizing power of the atom.” Today, the needs of combat and the nature of the enemy expose the “equalizing power of information,” which is now power. Knowing how to use it is more important than the information itself.

108 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan* (New York: Random House, 2007), http://shifter-magazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Taleb_The-Black-Swan.pdf (accessed March 24, 2016).

109 <http://www.elbilad.net/article/detail?id=39340> (accessed March 24, 2016).

110 Graham Greene, *The Human Factor* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978).

111 A CIA source explained that the agency was not able to prevent the 9/11 attacks because it lacked a spy in Al-Qaeda. “If only, he told me, ‘we’d had a man on the rock beside Osama bin Laden, learning his thoughts, learning his plans.’” Quoted by Stephen Grey, *The New Spymasters* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 11.