

## **Restorative Justice: Acknowledged Benefits versus Emerging Issues**

Catherine Rossi<sup>A</sup> and Robert Cario<sup>B</sup>

*Restorative justice refers to a series of programs or models for the management of persons focused on restoration, and may involve programs or models designed to be integrated into traditional mechanisms of criminal and penal justice, or, on the contrary, to operate in parallel with or even opposed to these mechanisms. Because restorative justice as a paradigm has become much too large and fragmented, the scientific community and the general public find it difficult to discern its precise shape and are less and less able to determine its component programs or models and evaluate their impact. On the basis of*Based on a systematic review of the literature, this article will seek to reflect generally on the question of the benefits of restorative justice, by focusing particularly on the issues that seem to have been most studied in the scientific literature, namely, the links between restorative justice and the sense of justice, well-being, healing, recidivism, forgiveness, and others. This reflection will reveal that while there are numerous consensual benefits of restorative justice which that have been clearly proven, the careful observation of practices and their effects may well prove, on the contrary, that some so-called benefits need to be nuanced, and even directly challenged. As part of the discussion, a few avenues for reflection are proposed.

**Keywords:** *Restorative justice; Impacts; Healing; Recidivism; Forgiveness*

**R**estorative justice is a paradigm that refers generally to a set of programs or models for the management of persons: programs that may or may not be integrated into traditional mechanisms of criminal and penal justice. The main objective of these programs (or models) is to observe the consequences of a conflict or crime from the angle of the *restoration* it requires, whether material, psychological, moral, or even entirely symbolic. In restorative justice, restoration is defined in a uniquely subjective way by the person who requests it: thus, any person who commits or experiences an event, or even feels that it concerns him/her (for example, the family or the community of persons directly involved) may be in a position to define their own notion of restoration.

---

<sup>A</sup> Professor, Criminology Program, School of Social Work, Université Laval, QC, Canada.

<sup>B</sup> Professor Emeritus of Criminology, Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, Chair of the French Institute for Restorative Justice (IJJR).

Restorative justice allows for dealing with the range of tensions found in a society, from the smallest conflicts to crimes with the most serious repercussions. Indeed, the first objective of any restorative justice provision or program is dialogue and being able to speak freely, that is, the certainty of being able to express oneself and understand the experienced event in the desired way. Every restorative justice provision or program allows each person to ask any question that remains unanswered following a crime or conflict. It especially provides an opportunity for all persons concerned to actively participate in re-establishing their lives, or even in the procedures that supplement, surround, or replace traditional penal provisions. Certain restorative justice programs also allow for working on personal or shared solutions that may, if necessary, be extended until the conclusion of an arrangement or mutual agreement, or even until social action or reentry is completed. In all cases, restorative justice offers an authentic, humane response by Justice whose only goal is to give back to the persons involved the possibility of choosing their own path as part of their own history, with regard to a specific event they directly or indirectly experienced or caused. Restorative justice is addressed, freely and without ever being imposed, to all persons voluntarily, whether they are the victim, offender, member of the community, adult or minor, regardless of their origin, and whether or not the acts at issue have been reported, prosecuted, or sanctioned.

In spite of our efforts in the paragraph above,<sup>1</sup> it is not easy to define, let alone delimit, the practices of restorative justice. The general paradigm itself has up to now failed to provide a consensus definition.<sup>2</sup> Whether it refers to the notion of “restoration,” “transformation,” or “reparation,” the real meaning of the paradigm

---

<sup>1</sup> See the terminology adopted by French institutions and the French Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as the definition given by Robert Cario (2010), which is also used by the French Institute for Restorative Justice: "Within a dynamic process, the measures it promotes suppose the voluntary participation of the victim and the offender as well as of all those who feel concerned by the conflict of a criminal nature in order to negotiate, together, through an active participation, in the presence of a 'justice third party' as well as the possible assistance of a 'psychological and/or social third party,' the most fitting solutions for all, with the aim of promoting, through the actors' empowerment, the restoration of all and more generally, the return to social harmony." Compare the definition included, for the first time in 2016, in the Larousse dictionary: "Judicial process which enables the victim, the perpetrator of the offense and, if necessary, their family and friends, to participate in the reparation of harm, experienced or caused, through the establishment of a structured dialogue."

<sup>2</sup> A reader seeking another definition of restorative justice should consult the following reference works: Zehr (1990), Walgrave (2008), and certain articles such as Cario (2007). We also refer the reader to these classic works in English: Braithwaite (2002); Van Ness and Strong (2006); Daly (2000); Llewellyn and Howse (2002); Weitekamp (2003); Johnstone (2002), and Gehm (1998). See also the excellent definition by the Correctional Service of Canada: <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/justice-reparatrice/003005-1000-fra.shtml>. The French Code of Criminal Procedure also now provides, in article 10.1, an excellent definition inspired in particular by practices in Quebec: [http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=779F25472188AB524410A6535A73F7A0.tpdila15v\\_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000029370752&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071154&dateTexte=20151030](http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=779F25472188AB524410A6535A73F7A0.tpdila15v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000029370752&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071154&dateTexte=20151030).

always depends on the (theoretical) traditions or (geographical) origins of the issues. Furthermore, restorative justice refers to a theoretical field, or rather a group of practices, which is still surrounded by encumbering myths and prejudices that have led to the exponential development of all kinds of models and counter-models (Rossi 2015a). In spite of this exceptionally polemical context, it is very interesting to note that in the 2010s the concept of restorative justice is gradually achieving recognition. As a general paradigm (general or imprecise), it has been able to demonstrate its benefits to the scientific community. This achievement is all the more remarkable since it seems to have been accomplished without the programs and practices it has adopted ever being fully detailed, defined, and delimited. In other words, restorative justice has been given a lot of credit without anyone really knowing what they were crediting—and in particular, without anyone being able to explain exactly why this is the case, especially with regards to the effects of other programs working in parallel, most notably offender desistance (Farrall et al. 2011; Ward and Maruna 2007), and the personal resilience of victims and/or their relatives.

Of course, many authors have managed to explain the reasons why restorative justice has retaken such a prime spot in public debate, beginning in the 1990s.<sup>3</sup> Some of the primary reasons include the questioning of penal rationality, the need to take victims into account, the search for new ways to promise rehabilitation and reentry, and the re-appropriation of the notion of community. More recently, we could add the desperate search for less-expensive forms of justice in economic and human terms, the de-legitimization of strong structures and positions of power (especially by the figure of the corrupt lawyer or the powerful judge), the constantly dropping crime rate, the aging population, the arrival of social networks, and their consequences for new individual and social dictates. In short, modern circumstances demand reform.

However, these explanations, which are essentially sociological, never really indicated why restorative justice or mediation has had such success among those who have benefited from it: they focus rather on the declining impact of the state's unfeeling reaction to criminalize and punish. In this regard, these explanations did nothing to simplify the debate, because everything that differed from a punitive or strictly clinical reaction has been shamelessly associated with restorative justice. Thus, today, police officers prefer bringing together relatives and victims in their offices for a discussion, instead of simply handcuffing an offending teenager, thereby claiming to “do” restorative justice or mediation. In the same way, parole officers invite victims to testify in front of convicted prisoners, in order to “touch” them and give them a greater desire to be rehabilitated into society (Rossi 2015b), while at the same time making the same restorative claim, without going any further. Well

---

<sup>3</sup> See Jacques Faget's account of mediation practices (1997).

beyond the criminal realm, in civil matters as well, trials are being replaced by new intervention modes in conflict situations. Mediation is practiced in family, civil, and commercial law, as well as in environmental and labor law: it is less expensive, takes less time, and produces results that are just as effective and suitable, because they are more humane (Law Commission of Canada 2003). No one would claim that these modes of resolving disagreements, or of intervention, are not at all “restorative.” But can we be so certain?

In 2003, Roche made a list of four criteria that summarize, in his opinion, restorative justice: personalization (of the conflict), restoration, reintegration, and participation. At first glance, it is impossible to disagree with such a list. But these criteria, as relevant as they may be, are in fact impossible to evaluate. An improvised encounter in the office of a police officer, a testimony in prison, a talking circle among anonymous people, an amicable resolution, community service: all of these allow for personalization, restoration, reintegration, and participation.

This article, based on a systematic literature review and observations compiled from various studies, seeks to take stock of the current possibilities for obtaining information on the personal and social benefits offered by restorative justice. Aside from the sociological recognition of its place in current structures of justice, the benefits of restorative justice for persons who take advantage of them (perpetrators, victims, parties or participants, the community) are rarely systematized. Can they be evaluated scientifically? Of course, because even though there is no consensus on the definition or delimitation of restorative justice, it is still possible to produce a relevant synthesis based on available scientific literature. Several studies, especially in the form of meta-analyses, are available and fairly often involve “restorative justice” in general, or combine (sometimes erroneously) several programs. When scientific articles focus on a specific program, it is often indicated in the title itself that the program in question claims to be a restorative justice program. This set of studies thus makes it possible to determine a fairly consensual use of the available scientific material.

In looking at the large collection of published international scientific results on restorative justice over the past 20 years, one observation stands out: all of the programs, whatever their form (dialogue encounters in the form of mediations or talking circles, institutional or volunteer programs) or wherever they took place (the United States, Europe, Africa, Oceania, or elsewhere), seem to have allowed users to achieve a higher level of restoration and satisfaction compared to the programs (or procedures) traditionally offered within the penal sphere. Such an observation is troubling, for two key reasons. The first is that there is a consensus that restorative justice “works” (1). Certainly, among existing scientific results, some programs seem more effective, more “serious” than others, in the view of more or less critical

authors, of which there are many. However, even in the opinion of the most skeptical, it appears that the most nonfunctional program in the whole restorative family produces better results in terms of satisfaction than the most successful criminal trial (though this latter is very rarely evaluated). The second reason is that this literature, as consensual and abundant as it may be, remains strangely underutilized. Articles demonstrating the benefits of restorative justice now number in the hundreds, but in vain. The general public and the professional and scientific community still balk at using this bountiful evidence to accept the concept once and for all. The benefits of restorative justice have to be demonstrated over and over again. Some of its benefits must also be challenged: on this point, a few considerations are necessary (2).

## 1. The Scientifically Evaluated Benefits of Restorative Justice

### Benefits for Persons

Among all the benefits studied, the most consistent is the satisfaction participants acknowledge when they take part in a process scientifically qualified as restorative. This observation is found in a considerable number of studies, in French and English, as in, for example, the study by Sherman and Strang (2007). This satisfaction was even quantified by Umbreit, Coates, and Vos (2002) who established that *victim-offender* mediation (in general) had a satisfaction rate among victims of 80%–97%, compared to only half of the people satisfied by traditional judiciary procedures. Much can be said concerning the single notion of satisfaction: the fact remains that it seems to apply just as much to the process (the way that a restorative program takes place, compared to legal proceedings) as to the program's results (the parties preferring the outcome of a restorative program over that of a judicial procedure).

More specific research then shored up the idea that restorative justice is indeed particularly effective for engendering a form of emotional repair. In a 2006 article, Petersen-Armour and Umbreit demonstrated, through a meta-analysis, that emotional repair is the first benefit listed by victims, especially when it involved a situation qualified as serious. According to Crégut (2016), this form of repair—also qualified as relief—comes from the verbalization by parties of their experience and their version of events as well as the mutual awareness of the other party's feelings, which encourages *catharsis*. This result could be ascribed to the empathy-based theory of shared values emerging from effective interaction rituals (Strang et al. 2013). Emotional repair may even have clinical applications, strictly speaking: Sherman and Strang (2007), among others, have confirmed that restorative justice sometimes leads to a significant reduction in symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder in victims, especially after face-to-face meetings.

On the side of perpetrators, it is more difficult to find scientific explanations for the mechanisms belonging to emotional repair. Venturing to investigate from a neuroscience point of view (and warning against possible misuse of such

demonstrations), Crégut (2016) reports that scientists seem to confirm the existence of ties between the development of brain regions involved in empathy and the development of anti-social behavior (as demonstrated, for example, by Reisel 2014). Studies seem to prove that it is possible, even in subjects believed to be the most difficult to rehabilitate or lacking in any form of empathy, to modify their neural connections using specific stimuli, such as, for example, hearing about the experience, or the history, of a victim. These forms of stimulation would enable re-creating empathy mechanisms and limiting, in so doing, anti-social behavior. Crégut also affirms that such results represent a remarkable promise for restorative applications for young people, since adolescents have significant *cerebral plasticity*.

Aside from the development of empathy, the direct link with recidivism seems to equally preoccupy a significant portion of research. Strongly backed up by meta-analysis, authors prove, over the years, that the link seems to be clear: participation in a restorative justice program leads to a net reduction in recidivism rates. The research on this point is now unanimous (Bergseth and Bouffard 2012; de Beus and Rodriguez 2007; Hayes and Daly 2004; Koss 2014; Luke and Lind 2002; Morris and Maxwell 2001; Rodriguez 2005; Sherman and Strang 2007). Most often, these results are in connection with violent offenses, or those involving property (Sherman and Strang 2007). A few researchers go so far as to affirm that restorative justice appears to be most effective for the most serious crimes, or those involving repeat offenders (the application of these same programs to less serious offenses and especially when the perpetrator is young, have generally produced more mixed results, Rodriguez 2007). But while the link between restorative justice and recidivism is now clear, it has been proven that this link is, however, indirect. The drop in the recidivism rate is not a direct consequence of participation in a program, but an effect of the sum of combined factors related to it. For this reason, we will return to “nonrecidivism” in the second part of this article.

In the meantime, let us affirm that restorative justice seems then, according to the dominant scientific literature, to successfully achieve its promise of rehabilitation and restoration. It also enables the empowerment of those who are at the center of these procedures (Braithwaite 2002; Weitekamp and Kerner 2003). This empowerment is based especially on the fact that by taking a position at the center of a mediation or family group conference, the participants, perpetrators or victims better perceive the laws in effect as well as justice and the procedures (Fercello and Umbreit 1998; Hayes and Daly 2004; Latimer, Dowden, and Muise 2005). Because they feel like they are treated with respect (McGarrell and Hipple 2007), they participate more willingly—which allows them, finally, to adhere to the laws in effect much more than when they are simply subjected to them (Sherman and Barnes 1997). In the end, they regain their honor, whether they are victims or perpetrators, which is generally negated during the normal adversarial process.

Concerning the restoration of honor, it seems useful to indicate that a more recent segment of the scientific literature has discovered that restorative justice, far from being the privilege of peaceful, aboriginal, and ancestral societies, is completely

adaptable to our Western societies, and even appropriate for Latin-based or Eastern societies. Of course, we should not confuse "microscopic" restorative justice programs (offered to perpetrators and victims of personal or one-time crimes) with programs involving international and transitional justice, such as, for example, the Rwandan *gacacas* or the Truth and Reconciliation commissions whose successes—and also, unfortunately, setbacks—are now being realized in more than a hundred countries (Leman-Langlois 2005). When it is situated outside of these socio-political contexts, restorative justice reveals its ability to shine in many countries. This is the case, for example, in Italy, where it has been very successful, despite the persistence of strong Catholic traditions and values. Restorative justice is in fact entirely fitting for Mediterranean culture (Ballor 2008; Lodigiani 2011). Against all expectations, very positive evaluations of mediation practices between perpetrators and victims have even been observed in the area of crimes related to the mafia or organized crime (Mannozi 2013—this author has noted, furthermore, that there is a similarity between the role of the mediator and the roles of intermediary traditionally played by mafia bosses, suggesting, strangely, an equivalence of this form of justice with the mafia's form of criminality). Such success has also been observed in many other countries such as, for example, in Indonesia, where perpetrator-victim mediations have been established. Restorative justice can also boast of being entirely suitable for Muslim societies (Syukur and Bagshaw 2015).

### **Benefits for the Social Climate**

Beyond its benefits for persons, restorative justice has also produced telling results in the way that it enables the reconstruction of the social link. There is nothing surprising in this fact, given that one of the three stated goals of restorative justice is dedicated to its effects on the community (see, for example, Cario 2010). But before specifying these notions, it should be noted that an unforeseen result for society is beginning, from afar, to draw broader interest: that of the savings (strictly financial) obtained by using restorative justice. It has been demonstrated that the application of a restorative program reduced costs by an average of 8–14 times, compared to traditional adversarial procedures (Strang et al. 2013).

Indeed, well beyond the benefits for participants, restorative justice leads to benefits for the conflict itself, and not simply due to the savings in procedural costs. First of all, restorative justice promises to regulate the dispute—at a minimum via the in-depth exploration of the personal tension between the parties—in order to bring the conflict or suffering to a definitive end (Marshall 1999; Van Ness and Strong 2006; Wright 1998). On the opposite side, all other procedures are limited to arbitration or settlement, to the great frustration of the loser, and even of the two parties, who may be tempted to engage in other proceedings: appeals, a civil trial, formal notices, and even reactions of personal vengeance, moving house or any kind of decision that could, over the long term, weigh heavily on the general economy. Second, a restorative program makes it possible to explore, in a much broader way

than a criminal or penal procedure, the origins or effects of personal and/or social discord. Relatives, the indirect environment, and even the entire community can have a place or be given the role of full party in programs such as circles, family group conferences, or detainee-victim meetings in particular.

The community—never fully defined (Rossi 2012), except based on the common interest shared by its members (Cario 2016)—has a prime role in restorative justice (McCold 2004; Rodriguez 2005), because the restorative process should have never been taken away from it (Zehr and Mika 1997). When a minor offense or major crime is committed, social ties are broken and the social break extends beyond the perpetrator of the act or the direct victim. Every event has immediate consequences on the parties and repercussions for their relatives, and also has an effect on the entire community (Rossi and Cario 2013). By opening up new channels for communication, by re-creating an informal network of solidarity and mutual assistance, restorative justice makes it possible to work on reconstructing these broken social ties. It also allows the community to recapture a real form of control, which sometimes can be cruelly absent (Crawford and Clear 2001; Karp and Clear 2002). Restorative justice is increasingly demonstrating its particular ability to promote a much safer society, by being the unquestionable source of a proven decrease in crime rates (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).

Aside from purely criminal conflicts, restorative justice has also become the model for preserving and developing social harmony. It has been shown to work for social, urban (Jaccoud 2009), and educational issues,<sup>4</sup> where it is often used as a guide for communication, and no longer just as an easy method for conflict resolution. On this point, McDowell et al. (2014) have studied the role played by the use of restorative modes to resolve disagreements in social microcosms, for example, in a community of university residents. The results speak volumes: restorative programs enable members of the community studied to better understand each other's perspectives. In this case, after the program was implemented, students were more ready to communicate with others and to have contact with them, they acquired better methods for managing their disagreements, and they progressed considerably in the matter of living together. While such results are interesting, it is not so much because they demonstrate the success of the practices, but rather because, contrary to adversarial or judicial procedures, restorative mechanisms become integrated as they are systematized: they become a part of the daily routine. They embody much more than justice: they construct social justice.

Finally, we should not forget that one of the great successes of restorative justice is to have shown that, in order to supplement criminal justice (in the case of serious crimes and offenses), it is capable of flourishing in the field of prevention, and even operating completely in parallel with traditional proceedings with regard to

---

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, the "Passerelles" program created by ROJAQ: <http://www.rojaq.qc.ca/les-oja/services-offerts/le-projet-passerelle/>.



deviant behavior or the various forms of therapeutic justice (Rossi 2015a). Therefore, it is not only able to smooth over conflict situations which criminal justice cannot resolve (even when arbitrating them), or to deal with situations that criminal justice has to abandon; it also makes it possible to take on conflicts criminal justice cannot handle. However, while the first two points have been greatly demonstrated since the 1990s and no longer need to be illustrated, this last point has been more difficult to measure. A few recent experiments have filled the gap. Walker (2012), for example, examined a few cases that caught the media's attention: some American judges were guilty of drunk driving but in spite of a guilty plea and criminal sanctions, they were able to continue their judicial practice, a fact that shocked the general public. The participation of these judges in restorative programs (in this case, a form of "re-integrative shaming," which primarily involved mediations with the victim(s), talking circles, and community service) had an immediate impact on the social reaction and immediately dissolved the feeling of impunity or inequity that existed within the population. Restorative justice, beyond all its benefits, represents an extraordinary form of justice that is by far the best guarantee against impunity, as well as against the punitive aspect of the system (Von Hirsch et al. 2003). It is a valuable avenue for justice: for some, it is simply *better justice* (Crawford and Newburn 2003).

## **2. The Scientifically Contested Benefits of Restorative Justice**

In spite of all of this, the scientific literature is also full of rather lukewarm assessments of many kinds of restorative programs. Close analysis of the available papers, essays, and scientific evaluations underscores that, because of questionable practices, restorative justice programs can have other effects on users and citizens beyond just providing benefits. School mediation should not be altered to become a program of over-empowering our youth. Offender-victim dialogues concerning serious crimes must never attempt to recommend or force pardon and reconciliation; they must never become forms of impromptu encounters, without preparation and a strict, rigorous framework and protocols. Restorative practices in indigenous environments or in the area of transitional justice may turn against citizens themselves when these practices are instrumentalized for the purpose of control or the reproduction of "criminal punitivity." Mediation as an alternative to judicial proceedings can too easily become programs for hidden treatment, requiring forced and poorly framed confessions and remorse from the perpetrator, and, for lack of another response, a disillusioned "acceptance" by victims that often re-victimizes them.

### **Forgiveness**

Today it is accepted that forgiveness by victims is not a relevant variable. When they are faced with an experience of criminal victimization, victims first experience a complex combination of negative emotions (notably resentment, anger, fear, and horror; see, for example, Rossi 2013). They will therefore try to reduce

the stress associated with these negative emotions by seeking other ways to channel them: judicial proceedings, vindictive vengeance, denial, and so on. But they still sometimes try to fully replace these emotions with positive ones, which makes it to seem that they have inverted their emotions, to the point where it seems like “forgiveness”—even though many aggressors or victims say that it is not a matter of forgiving the other party, but of “forgiving oneself.” All of this is in fact the result of a real jumble of emotions, very normal in dramatic situations: this is exactly what happens when a person participates in a restorative justice program. Associating an attempt to retake control of one’s emotions with forgiveness is a mistake. Furthermore, this involves a counter-truth or a misunderstanding that may prove to be significant, since it was demonstrated by Murphy (2003) that associating victims’ feelings with “reconciliation” or “forgiveness” can lead victims to feel like they have been judged. They lead people to think that the feelings of anger or rage expressed by victims have to disappear as quickly as possible and that they are unacceptable. This is a real re-victimization. However, it is interesting to realize that the process of “forgiveness” is certainly at the center of the issue of restoration and has been studied many, many times. (Petersen-Armour and Umbreit (2006) have compiled the results.) We can even find many victims who themselves mention this contested concept. However, very particular emotions can in fact be found at the heart of the debate: expressed remorse, sincere apologies, and the development of empathy are, in this sense, directly related to appeasing the wrongs caused to victims. Victims appear to be more satisfied in cases of restoration that allows them to express themselves and obtain apologies from a perpetrator than those in which they obtain only a financial reparation or restitution (Sherman and Strang 2007). This nuance concerning the act of "forgiving," however, remains critical.

## **Healing**

How many times have we heard that restorative justice heals? How many studies have looked at the therapeutic effects of restorative programs? Healing should be treated like forgiveness, in that it also involves a misunderstanding. There is first a literal misunderstanding: the application of this concept to restorative justice comes from terms used by aboriginal people (see Rossi 2015b) to refer to social healing (of the social and spiritual group), never in reference to the result of individual therapy. There is a misunderstanding figuratively speaking as well, since the feelings of restoration or appeasement experienced after a restoration approach become mixed up in an emotional drama such that it becomes easy for someone promoting the scientific proof in the human sciences to use it inappropriately. Thankfully, recent studies have demonstrated that the healing metaphor—because it is, in the end, unquestionably a metaphor—is unfounded. It can even become a problem and have negative consequences on victims, perpetrators, and mediators/facilitators—the

latter, for example, can have a tendency to use the promise of healing to attract users to restorative practice, a highly questionable, and even dangerous, approach (Borton and Paul 2015).

## Recidivism

In the first part of this article, it was established that links between restorative justice and nonrecidivism now seem increasingly clear. However, because it is hard to discuss restorative justice in general terms, there is still the need to decide exactly which restorative measure is being discussed. Take, for example, the case of family group conferences (Braithwaite 2002). Since their revival in the 1990s, these measures have affirmed their intention to achieve a sharp drop in recidivism rates among young offenders, especially minors (Cario 2014). In the early 2000s, the success of these measures appeared to have been convincingly demonstrated (Latimer, Dowden, and Muike 2005; Luke and Lind 2002): however, it was still impossible to determine the exact nature of the elements within the conferences which were responsible for such success on the recidivism rate.

A study by Duwe (2012) has provided some very interesting distinctions on the link between restorative justice and recidivism. In this case, a restorative model based on a reentry experience in Minnesota produced a significant reduction in recidivism rates generally. The restorative program apparently had a significant impact on the possible repetition of a similar act, as well as on the possibility that a new arrest or accusation for another offense would occur (so long as it did not involve an arrest due to breaking parole conditions, the type of measure which restorative justice seems to impact very little). The primary reason for the decrease in recidivism was then studied by the author: the success clearly came from the fact that the program had enabled the offender to develop a strong social support system after his/her return to society (including, for example, access to employment and participation in social support activities).

It is important to understand here that to establish the link between restorative justice and recidivism, more specific observation criteria have to be identified. In the conference example above, research has also demonstrated that only some forms of recidivism have been avoided. In addition, nonrecidivism seems to have been greater when the conference was very specific in the way it was conducted. It was not *participation in a conference*, generally, that determined the reduction in the recidivism rate, but much more the fact that the conference *concluded with or without a consensus*, on the one hand, and that the offender *felt particularly repentant and filled with remorse* during the conference, on the other hand (Hayes and Daly 2004). Of course, such observations may also apply to a criminal or restorative mediation: it is probably not the mediation itself that provides the hope of nonrecidivism, but the quality of the way it is carried out—even more than its conclusion. This observation condemns researchers then to a certain measure of frustration: it is now no longer a matter of focusing research on knowing *whether or not a measure of restorative justice*

*occurred*, but rather *how it occurred*. In this sense, it is possible to inquire about the degree to which the restorative procedure is respected, the link with procedural justice, and the mistrust expressed. Like expressed remorse, the development of particular feelings—not suggested or forced—correlates directly with the program's success, namely, no longer wanting to live as a bad person, meeting and being able to make apologies to the victim, and feeling involved in one's own process, in particular. At the same time, it has also been demonstrated that it is not participation in a traditional penal or criminal process that opens the way to possible recidivism, but rather the feeling of mistrust some of the accused express towards the proceedings.

There is another interesting characteristic: the effects of restorative justice on recidivism are not permanent and do not happen by magic. The decrease over time of restorative justice's benefits on young offenders has been observed. Although after a period of 6 months of observation, for example, the impact of a family group conference remains relatively strong in terms of impact on recidivism, its rates of success are much lower after two years. This effect could very simply be ascribed to the fact that there are many changes that take place at the end of adolescence and beginning of adulthood: the important lessons learned a few years earlier may need to be repeated once the person becomes more socially independent (Kroovand Hipple, Gruenewald, and McGarrell 2014).

### **The Re-Establishment of Peace or Social Harmony**

To delve further into the issue of restorative justice success rates, a detour is necessary into the existing literature on the subject of transitional justice, or collective reparations for mass violations of human rights. Some writers believe that, fundamentally, restorative justice was created only for these unique situations (Omale 2006) and in this regard, numerous articles and books have been written concerning Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (Leman Langlois 2008; Llewellyn 2007; Parmentier 2001) as well as the Rwandan *gacacas* (Paradelle and Dumont 2006), for example. The implicit question in all of these studies was whether such restorative methods were more likely to ensure the recognition of the violation of human rights than traditional trials and whether, over the long term, they would guarantee peace. While it was proven that *gacacas* and truth and reconciliation commissions acted differently on appeasing the societies concerned, there were, nonetheless, important parallels to establish in terms of the meta-narrative process of social healing and reconciliation (Ephgrave 2015). Results from the most recent research on this topic are very mixed and just as interesting. Rather than focusing on the micro- and macroscopic complexity of these models (which would have mainly required, for example, studying a *gacaca*, the way it is conducted, trying to subject it to a model, multiplying its results by the number of organized *gacacas* or the number of participants and redividing it all depending on the successes or setbacks observed collectively), studies looked at the simplest aspects and examined the model's collective benefits. In this sense, to take one example, did the South

African TRC have benefits? Of course, as did the *gacacas*, which allowed an entire country—and because they spread, neighboring countries as well—to adopt the road towards reconstruction, by putting words and stories to indescribable suffering. At the macroscopic, political, and sociological level, the operation of these large models was, however, quite controversial. We invite the reader to take note of how the matter is currently being reported on (the Rwandan *gacacas* being a typical example of a contested model). However, scientifically, these models are today the subject of very interesting analyses, with a focus now on individuals and their real impact on participants. To this end, variables have been isolated, such as gender and the nature of the violence suffered (like the impact of the South African TRC on women who were victims of rape). The results observed are very telling: some of these collective restoration processes could well have had adverse individual effects, beyond their contested political and social effects. It has been observed, for example, that some victims have been re-victimized and their suffering has increased, especially for women who were the primary victims of sexual violence. In spite of the process of collective reconciliation, they have been subjected to ongoing gender stereotypes and the male domination of discussions in the matter of collective restoration (Ephgrave 2015, Nesiah 2006). Some have even been reduced, more or less directly, to exchange currency, which itself was strictly speaking the purpose of the restoration.

In a completely different field, the same negative results on the ability to re-establish “social harmony”—or rather to allow for the closure of an issue—have been observed in healing circles and sentencing circles. After a sudden and highly praised appearance of these mechanisms in the large family of restorative justice (on the history of these mechanisms, see, for example, Cario 2010), the first critical studies concerning these so-called reparative models of justice, intended for aboriginal peoples, were not long in coming (Jaccoud 1999; Strimelle and Vanhamme 2009). According to researchers, these two processes fail by their tendency to want to combine the Western criminal system and the restorative system, the first always taking priority, implicitly, over the second. Sentencing circles especially, as well as healing circles, are then described as copies (with an aboriginal hue) of a Western mode which insidiously enables a gentler application of Western measures. Later, unfortunately, these impressions were confirmed: concomitantly to the Gladue<sup>5</sup> (1999) case coming into effect in Canada, scholars from the First Nations accused restorative justice of representing a new way of subjugating and controlling aboriginal peoples. After an extensive study of the actors in these processes—concerning the role of judges in particular—there was a focus on the breadth of issues these programs raise (Belknap and McDonald 2010).

---

<sup>5</sup> R. c. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688.

Finally, while there is no obvious connection between transitional justice or a sentencing circle, it is odd that this improperly used re-appropriation effect being found in many other programs said to be restorative. At the other end of the spectrum of existing measures, the use of mediation in educational environments does not always correspond to the goal of restoration that upholds it. It even seems to have a tendency to be quickly transformed into an additional disciplinary tool used for the internal regulation of the establishment, seeking only, due to the absence of any restorative measure, to set up a new dynamic in the internal communication methods used at the school, assisting with discipline, control, and prevention (Grenier 2015; Mbanzoulou 2007). We come to the same conclusion that Christie arrived at many years ago: restorative justice or not, certain holders of power are quick to re-appropriate, knowingly or de facto, the material results of restoration at the expense of victims (Christie 1977).

In terms of discussion, what can be retained, finally, concerning the benefits of restorative justice? Above all, restorative justice is a large, multifaceted family, which is fairly cohesive and composed of numerous formal or informal initiatives that may be very institutionalized or indeed social and charitable. These initiatives, in the end, share a *common goal* of re-placing *people at the center of their own history concerning a specific event*, at the center of their own progression in order to make them again masters of their own life course. Restorative justice should, consequently, be defined as including any service or program—whether or not it involves a face-to-face meeting (not always and not often necessary)—that enables a person affected by a tragedy or a conflict to finally find, *in safe and prepared conditions*, a direct answer to three simple but equally complex questions (which no judge, clinician, reentry agent, volunteer, or companion can answer for them): “*Why* did this happen to me,” “*How* can I get out of it,” and “*What* does the future hold for me *within my community*” (Rossi 2015b).

In the same way, insisting on a discourse that constantly compares restorative justice to criminal justice (or therapeutic and clinical management) will lead to a major trap: currently, there is no institutional or centralized structure that allows for affirming the restorative nature of one program over another. When “criminal justice” is mentioned in law, or the “psycho-dynamic” or “cognitive behavior” approach in psychology, they can be discussed in general terms: it is a matter of a particular approach or ethics. Thus, a psychologist trained at one school can reasonably be compared to another. In the same sense, a lawyer’s actions are monitored by the bar, or another comparable professional order, such that he or she also follows strict standards. There exists nothing similar in restorative justice—and there is nothing planned in this regard. A surprising article by Choi, Gilbert, and Green (2013) clearly shows this. After studying a series of mediation practices among perpetrators and victims in American Midwestern states, the authors concluded that the principles of restorative justice taught to practitioners were not necessarily applied in the field and led to a wide range of activities. Some of the measures implemented resulted only in the marginalization of victims: insufficiently prepared, they were influenced,

even pushed by mediators to feel or act in a particular way; they were even literally intimidated to take that direction. Immediate restoration, as experienced at the end of the program, became harmful. The authors came to an obvious conclusion: there is an urgent need to provide protection, verification, and monitoring of practices in the field in order to check on the major discrepancies existing between the training given and how it is actually implemented. These observations have been confirmed elsewhere: the practice of perpetrator-victim mediation, especially in the matter of serious crimes, appears to be completely effective—but only when the principles, values, techniques, and fundamentals of the approaches are strictly followed (Urban, Markway, and Crockett 2011). In 2015, Saulnier and Sivasubramaniam affirmed that it is now important to concentrate on the operative conditions (the "procedure") of restorative justice programs. The presence or absence of one of the parties (victim or perpetrator), the indispensable—even forced—nature of admitting the facts by the perpetrator, and so on, are some of the many variables that can transform a restorative program into a real catastrophe.

## Conclusion

What are the genuine benefits of restorative justice? On the basis of the preceding developments, we need to reformulate the question as follows: *What are the benefits offered by each of the approaches in effect in restorative justice?* In this regard, which approaches are the most promising? According to Crégut (2016), the most fitting conclusion is certainly that there is no ultimate model of restorative justice suitable for every case. It is important to realize that *"restorative justice works differently on different kinds of people"* (Sherman and Strang 2007). Measuring the effectiveness of restorative justice is distinct then from considering the breadth of the *restorative aspect* of the processes, which involves a series of typological scales measuring most notably the various levels of participation by the victim and the perpetrator, the extent of the restoration for the victim, the state of the relations between the parties at the end of the process (Weitekamp and Kerner 2002), and whether they endure over time.

While benefits can, therefore, be observed in restorative justice, they are essentially—and obviously—due to a form of procedural restoration (Pignoux 2008) that upholds these programs, that is, when they are intended for perpetrators and victims of crimes against persons and when they are carefully thought out, conducted, prepared, and defined. In this regard, the humanistic approach by Umbreit (1996) or, more recently, the relational approach by Charbonneau et al. (see Rossi 2015a) are among the best examples of defined and framed models: this is because their scope is strict and defined, their practices are proven, and the freedom of the persons who participate is assured. The victims and perpetrators of offenses who move towards restorative justice do it of their own free will, without ever being required to do so. They should therefore have the permanent right to withdraw at any point or step taken. It is only in these types of models (there are many others), that is, when such

models are carefully thought out and implemented, that the parties, victims, and perpetrators have (do we need to be reminded?) an essential and central role: these persons *are* the program and participate only for their own reasons. All persons (victims, perpetrators, relatives, members of their community of belonging, citizens) involve themselves in the way they wish, pose the questions important to them, and are engaged to the degree they are able. Only they—and this is essential—are in control of the content of subjects discussed during meetings (even though they must never be solely responsible for carrying them out). Even though at every moment, a strict guided framework is necessary, essentially the participants themselves decide on every moment that takes place (the victim(s) as much as the perpetrator(s), or both parties in the case of events not qualified as criminal). This is so that their place, actions and claims, words, and freedom are always assured and respected. In this regard, the role of the mediator or facilitator is defined as being the guarantor that such principles are respected.

In no traditional penal procedure is it possible to find greater freedom to act and think as in restorative justice. The (vertical) penal system is absolutely imposed on the parties and it is often criticized for stealing their own history from them (Christie 1977). The victim assistance support programs, the offenders rehabilitation programs, certainly responds in large part to the responses and needs expressed (sanction and compensation), but it nonetheless is generally unable to return all power to the litigants to control their own affairs. The professionals involved still tend too often to present themselves as experts of the situation. As a result, some overprotect the victims (by determining their needs for them), while others guide perpetrators (by deciding on the desired trajectories for them). Clinicians and jurists, generally speaking, are experts in the situation of persons; in restorative justice, the person is the only expert of his/her situation.

It thus seems urgent today that in order to claim the use of the qualifier "restorative," any program or measure of restorative justice should first be defined ahead of time according to the movement it is a part of and in line with the approach for which it is being used. Second, every restorative initiative should state, in a completely transparent way, the procedures it uses, the methods it employs, and the foundations upon which it is based. This is essential for research, and for the institutions or social organizations that utilize such measures. It is also unquestionably essential for citizens who are being offered, unscrupulously, some restorative measure (for payment) without really knowing, or being able to know, what to expect. Without clarifying its allegiances and internal procedures, restorative justice risks continuing to group together and mix up many effective programs with other completely improvised programs that have been created or imitated by well-meaning "sorcerer's apprentices." This all may prove dangerous for the participants. Restorative justice should never involve taking a risk. Restorative justice is not an experience to be tried out or to be subjected to; it is even less a new wonder technique intended to quickly manufacture model citizens who are miraculously rehabilitated or restored, with satisfactory results every time. To become and remain the resource it seeks to



be, restorative justice's only choice now is to rely on qualified training, harmonized practices which are ethically and deontologically impeccable, scientifically evaluated, and especially, delivered to the general public with the greatest transparency (see [justicerestaurative.org](http://justicerestaurative.org)). Finally, we need to remember that restorative justice is being institutionalized in many countries. Whether this trend is criticized or praised, we should not forget that the problematic issue is not so much the institutionalization of restorative justice, but rather the challenge to remain independent from judicial systems. Its real integration into practices also remains a delicate operation, since ideological resistance, which does not always act in good faith, remains strong.

## References

- Ballor, Jordan J. 2008. "To Abolish or to Reform? Christian Perspectives on Punishment, Prison, and Restorative Justice." *Ave Maria Law Review* 6: 481–511.
- Belknap, Joanne, and Courtney McDonald. 2010. "Judges' Attitudes about and Experiences with Sentencing Circles in Intimate-Partner Abuse Cases." *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice* 52 (4): 369–396.
- Bergseth, Kathleen J., and Jeffrey A. Bouffard. 2012. "Examining Effectiveness of a Restorative Justice Program for Various Types of Juvenile Offenders." *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology* 57 (9): 1054–1075.
- Borton, Ian M., and Gregory D. Paul. 2015. "Problematizing the Healing Metaphor of Restorative Justice." *Contemporary Justice Review* 18 (3): 257–273.
- Braithwaite, John. 2002. "Setting Standards for Restorative Justice." *British Journal of Criminology* 42 (5): 563–577.
- Cario, Robert. 2007. "La justice restaurative: vers un nouveau modèle de justice?." *AJ Pénal* 9: 372–375.
- Cario, Robert. 2010. *Justice Restaurative. Principes et Promesses*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Cario, Robert, ed. 2012. *Les Rencontres Détenus-Victimes. L'Humanité Retrouvée*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Cario, Robert. 2014. "Justice restaurative et Droit pénal des mineurs. Entre continuité et renforcement de la belle ordonnance du 2 février 1945." *Les Cahiers Dynamiques* 59: 41–50.

Cario, Robert. 2016. "De la Justice restaurative. Pour une authentique Œuvre de Justice en France." In *L'exigence de justice, Mélanges en l'honneur de Robert Badinter*. Paris: Dalloz, 167–181.

Choi, Jung Jin, Michael J. Gilbert, and Diane L. Green. 2013. "Patterns of Victim Marginalization in Victim-Offender Mediation: Some Lessons Learned." *Crime Law and Social Change* 59: 113–132.

Christie, Nils. 1977. "Conflicts as Property." *British Journal of Criminology* 17: 1–15.

Crawford, Adam, and Todd R. Clear. 2001. "Community Justice: Transforming Communities Through Restorative Justice?" In *Restorative Community Justice*, eds. Gordon Bazemore and Mara Schiff. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 127–150.

Crawford, Adam, and Tim Newburn. 2003. *Youth Offending and Restorative Justice: Implementing Reform in Youth Justice*. Portland, OR: Willan.

Crégut, Fabrice. 2016. "L'approche restauratrice dans la justice juvénile." unpublished internal document, Terre des Hommes. <https://www.tdh.ch/fr/mediatheque/documents/politique-th%C3%A9matique-2014-justice-juv%C3%A9nile-restauratrice>.

Daly, Kathleen. 2000. "Restorative Justice: The Real Story." <http://www.gu.edu.au/school/ccj/kdaly.html> (accessed March 14, 2006).

de Beus, Kimberly, and Nancy Rodriguez. 2007. "Restorative Justice Practice: An Examination of Program Completion and Recidivism." *Journal of Criminal Justice* 35: 337–347.

Duwe, Grant. 2012. "Evaluating the Minnesota Comprehensive Offender Reentry Plan (MCORP): Results from a Randomized Experiment." *Justice Quarterly* 29 (3): 347–384.

Ephgrave, Nicole. 2015. "Women's Testimony and Collective Memory: Lessons from South Africa's TRC and Rwanda's Gacaca Courts." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 22 (2): 177–190.

Faget, Jacques. 1997. *La Médiation. Essai de Politique Pénale*. Toulouse: Erès.

Farrall, Stephen, Mike Hough, Shadd Maruna, and Richard Sparks, eds. 2011. *Escape Routes: Contemporary Perspectives on Life After Punishment*. London: Routledge.

Fercello, Claudia, and Mark S. Umbreit. 1998. *Family Group Conferencing in 12 Sites in 1st Judicial District of Minnesota*. St. Paul, MN: Center for Restorative Justice and Mediation, University of Minnesota.

Gehm, John R. 1998. "Victim-Offender Mediation Programs: An Exploration of Practice and Theoretical Frameworks." *Western Criminology Review* 1: 1–36.

Grenier, Jennifer. 2015. *La Médiation Scolaire au Primaire: Limites et Enjeux de L'Implantation au Québec*. Master's thesis, Faculté des sciences sociales, Quebec: Université Laval.

Hayes, Hennessey, and Kathleen Daly. 2004. "Conferencing and Re-offending in Queensland." *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology* 37 (2): 167–191.

Jaccoud, Mylène. 1999. "Les cercles de guérison et les cercles de sentence autochtones au Canada." *Criminologie* 32 (1): 79–105.

Jaccoud, Mylène. 2009. "Origine et fondements de la médiation sociale au Québec: un double ancrage." *Nouvelles Pratiques Sociales* 21 (2): 93–108.

Johnstone, Gerry. 2002. *Restorative Justice: Ideas, Values, Debates*. Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing.

Karp, David R., and Todd R. Clear, eds. 2002. *What is Community Justice? Case Studies of Restorative Justice and Community Supervision*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing.

Koss, Mary P. 2014. "The RESTORE Program of Restorative Justice for Sex Crimes: Vision, Process and Outcomes." *Journal of Interpersonnal Violence* 29 (9): 1623–1660.

Kroovand Hipple, Natalie, Jeff Gruenewald, and Edmund F. McGarrell. 2014. "Restorativeness, Procedural Justice and Defiance as Predictors of Reoffending of Participants in Family Group Conferences." *Crime and Delinquency* 60 (8): 1131–1157.

Latimer, Jeff, Craig Dowden, and Danielle Muise. 2005. "The Effectiveness of Restorative Justice Practices: A Meta-Analysis." *The Prison Journal* 85: 127–144.

Law Commission of Canada. 2003. *La transformation des rapports humains par la justice participative*. <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/JL2-22-2003F.pdf>.

Leman-Langlois, Stéphane. 2007. "Le modèle 'Vérité et réconciliation.' Victimes, bourreaux et institutionnalisation du pardon." *Informations Sociales* 127 (7): 112–121.

Llewellyn, Jennifer. 2007. "Truth Commissions and Restorative Justice." In *Handbook of Restorative Justice*, eds. Gerry Johnstone and Daniel Van Ness. Portland, OR: Willan, 351–371.

Llewellyn, Jennifer J., and Robert L. Howse. 2002. *Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework*. Canada: Law Commission.

Lodigiani Giovanni Angelo. 2011. "La prospettiva del rendere giustizia nel canone scritturistico ebraico-cristiano." *Themis* 9: 41–45.

Luke, Garth, and Bronwyn Lind. 2002. "Reducing Juvenile Crime: Conferencing Versus Court." *Crime and Justice Bulletin* 69.

Mannozi, Grazia. 2013. "Victim-Offender Mediation in Areas Characterized by High Levels of Organized Crime." *European Journal of Criminology* 10 (2): 187–205.

Marshall, Tony F. 1999. *Restorative Justice: An Overview*. London: Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate.

Mbanzoulou, Paul. 2011. *La Violence Scolaire. Mais où est Passé l'Adulte?* Paris: L'Harmattan.

McCold, Paul. 2004. "What is the Role of Community in Restorative Justice Theory and Practice?" In *Critical Issues in Restorative Justice*, eds. Howard Zehr and Barb Toews. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 155–172.

McCold, Paul, and Ted Wachtel. 2002. "Restorative Justice Theory Validation." In *Restorative Justice: Theoretical Foundations*, eds. Elmar G.M. Weitekamp and Hans-Joergen Kerner. Portland, OR: Willan, 110–142.

McCold, Paul, and Ted Wachtel. 2003. "In Pursuit of Paradigm: A Theory of Restorative Justice." International Institute for Restorative Practices. [http://www.iirp.edu/iirpWebsites/web/uploads/article\\_pdfs/paradigm.pdf](http://www.iirp.edu/iirpWebsites/web/uploads/article_pdfs/paradigm.pdf).

McDowell, Lana A., Virginia L. Crocker, Emily L. Evett, and Damian G. Cornelison. 2014. "Perceptions of Restorative Justice Concepts: An Evaluation of University Housing Residents." *Contemporary Justice Review* 17 (3): 346–361.

McGarrell, Edmund F., and Natalie Kroovand Hipple. 2007. "Family Group Conferencing and Re-Offending Among First-Time Juvenile Offenders: The Indianapolis Experiment." *Justice Quarterly* 24 (2): 221–246.

Morris, Allison, and Gabrielle Maxwell, eds. 2001. *Restorative Justice for Juveniles: Conferencing, Mediation and Circles*. Portland, OR: Hart.

Murphy, Jeffrie G. 2003. *Getting Even: Forgiveness and its Limits*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nesiah, Vasuki. 2006. "Discussion Lines on Gender and Transitional Justice: An Introductory Essay Reflecting on the ICTJ Bellagio Workshop on Gender and Transitional Justice." *Columbia Journal of Gender and Law* 15 (3): 799–812.

Omale, Don John. 2006. "Justice in History: An Examination of African Restorative Traditions and the Emerging Restorative Justice Paradigm." *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies* 2 (2): 33–63.

Paradelle, Muriel, and H el ene Dumont. 2006. "L'emprunt   la culture, un atout dans le jugement du crime de g enocide? Etude de cas   partir des juridictions traditionnelles gacaca saisies du g enocide des Tutsis du Rwanda." *Criminologie* 39 (2): 97–135.

Parmentier, Stephan. 2001. "The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Towards Restorative Justice in the Field of Human Rights." In *Victim Policies and Criminal Justice on the Road to Restorative Justice, Essays in Honour of Tony Peters*, eds. Ezzat Fattahand Stephan Parmentier. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 401–428.

Petersen-Armour, Marilyn, and Mark S. Umbreit. 2006. "Victim Forgiveness in Restorative Justice Dialogue." *Victims & Offenders* 1 (2): 123–140.

Pignoux, Nathalie. 2008. *La R eparation des Victimes d'Infractions P enales*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Reisel, Dan. 2014. *Rewiring our Morality*. New York: TED Conferences.

Roche, Declan. 2003. *Accountability in Restorative Justice*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Rodriguez, Nancy. 2005. "Restorative Justice, Communities and Delinquency: Whom do We Reintegrate?." *Criminology and Public Policy* 4 (1): 103–130.

Rodriguez, Nancy. 2007. "Restorative Justice at Work: Examining the Impact of Restorative Justice Resolutions on Juvenile Recidivism." *Crime & Delinquency* 53 (3): 355–379.

Rossi, Catherine. 2012. "Le modèle québécois des rencontres détenus-victimes." *Les Cahiers de la Justice* 2: 107–126.

Rossi, Catherine. 2013. *Homicide: les Proches des Victimes*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Rossi, Catherine. 2015a. "La médiation au cœur de la logique pénale en justice des adolescents au Québec: au-delà des compromis opérationnels, une approche réparatrice?" In *Justice! Des Mondes et des Visions*, eds. Alice Jaspard, Sybille Smeets, Véronique Strimelle, and Françoise Vanhamme. Montréal: Erudit, 63-82.

Rossi, Catherine. 2015b. "Les mythes et préjugés entourant la justice réparatrice: quelques explications." *Porte Ouverte* 28 (1): 6–10.

Rossi, Catherine, and Robert Cario. 2013. "Les conséquences des violences criminelles sur les victimes et leurs proches." In *Traité des Violences Criminelles*, eds. Maurice Cusson, Stéphane Guay, Jean Proulx, and Franca Cortoni. Montreal: Hurtubise, 527–554.

Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. 1997. "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy." *Science* 277 (5328): 918–924.

Saulnier, Alana, and Diane Sivasubramaniam. 2015. "Effects of Victim Presence and Coercion in Restorative Justice: An Experimental Paradigm." *Law and Human Behavior* 39 (4): 378–387.

Sherman, Lawrence W., and Geoffrey C. Barnes. 1997. *Restorative Justice and Offenders' Respect for the Law* (RISE Working Paper 3). Canberra: Australian National University.

Sherman, Lawrence, and Heather Strang. 2007. *Restorative Justice: The Evidence*. Cambridge: The Smith Institute.

Strang, Heather, Lawrence Sherman, Evan Mayo-Wilson, Daniel Woods, and Barak Ariel. 2013. "Restorative Justice Conferencing (RJC) Using Face-to-Face Meetings of Offenders and Victims: Effects on Offender Recidivism and Victim Satisfaction. A Systematic Review." *Campbell Systematic Reviews* 2013: 10.

Strimelle, Véronique, and Françoise Vanhamme. 2009. "Modèles vindicatoire et penal en concurrence? Réflexion à partir de l'expérience autochtone." *Criminologie* 42 (2): 83–100.

Syukur, Fatahillah Abdul, and Dale Margaret Bagshaw. 2015. "Victim-Offender Mediation with Youth Offenders in Indonesia." *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 32 (4): 389–411.

Umbreit, Mark S. 2001. *The Handbook of Victim Offender Mediation: An Essential Guide to Practice and Research*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Umbreit, Mark S., Robert B. Coates, and Ann Warner Roberts. 2001. "The Impact of Victim-Offender Mediation: A Cross-National Perspective." *Mediation Quarterly* 17 (3): 215–229.

Umbreit, Mark S., Robert B. Coates, and Betty Vos. 2002. "The Impact of Restorative Justice Conferencing: A Multi-National Perspective." *British Journal of Community Justice* 1 (2): 21–48.

Umbreit, Mark S., Betty Vos, and Robert B. Coates. 2005. "Restorative Justice Dialogue: A Review of Evidence-Based Practice." *Offender Programs Report* 9 (4): 49–64.

Urban Lynn S., Jeananne Markway, and Kay Crockett. 2011. "Evaluating Victim-Offender Dialogue (VOD) for Serious Cases Using Umbreit's 2001 Handbook: A Case Study." *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 29 (1): 3–23.

Van Ness, Daniel W., and Karen Heetderks Strong. 2006. *Restoring Justice: An Introduction to Restorative Justice*. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing.

Von Hirsch, Andreas, Julian V. Roberts, Anthony E. Bottoms, Kent Roach, and Mara Schiff, eds. 2003. *Restorative Justice and Criminal Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms?* Oxford: Hart Publishing.

Walgrave, Lode. 2008. *Restorative Justice, Self-Interest and Responsible Citizenship*. Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing.

Walker, Richard Bryant. 2012. "Judges Who Drive Under the Influence of Alcohol: Ethical Implications and the Role of Restorative Justice Measures to Balance Judicial Duty and Societal Expectations." *Contemporary Justice Review* 15 (3): 323–337.

Ward, Tony, and Shadd Maruna. 2007. *Rehabilitation*. London: Routledge.

Weitekamp, Elmar G.M. 2003. "The History of Restorative Justice." In *A Restorative Justice Reader: Texts, Sources and Context*, eds Gerry Johnstone. Portland, OR: Willan, 111–124.

Weitekamp, Elmar G.M., and Hans-Joergen Kerner. 2002. *Restorative Justice: Theoretical Foundations*. Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing.

Wright, Martin. 1998. "Victim/Offender Conferencing: The Need for Safeguards." In *Restorative Justice for Juveniles: Potentialities, Risks and Problems*, eds Lode Walgrave. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press.

Zehr, Howard. 1990. *Changing Lenses*. Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press.

Zehr, Howard, and Harry Mika. 1997. *Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Justice*. Akron, PA: Mennonite Central Committee.