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The Inevitable Return of Order

Alain Bauer

When fathers get used to letting their children do as they please,
When sons no longer heed their words,
When teachers tremble before their pupils and prefer to flatter
them,
When young people finally despise the law because they no longer
recognize the authority of anything or anyone above them,
Then, in all beauty and youth, tyranny begins.

—Plato. *The Republic*.

Inexorably, over the last twenty years, with a recent peak between 2020 and 2022, a clear worsening of physical violence, particularly homicide (homicides and attempts) has been recorded by public services. All surveys, polls and incident reports confirm these concordant findings from all professional, sporting, medical, social, and educational organizations...

Twenty-five years ago, the author of these lines published: “There’s not a day that goes by that doesn’t see its share of violent acts affecting cities, urban transport networks, schools, housing estates ...” But these events are nothing new. Crime evolves, repeats, shifts, and renews itself. Over the course of four centuries, blood crimes have virtually disappeared (from over 100 per 100,000 inhabitants to less than two). The city has civilized crime. Over the years, however, recurring phenomena have emerged. Bands of juvenile delinquents from the suburbs (“Apaches” at the turn of the century, “Teddy boys” or “young hoodlums” after the Second World War), crime on the first metro line as soon as it opened in 1900, development of drug addiction (100,000 cocaine addicts in Paris in 1921). Nothing would really stop this text from being reprinted. Only worse.

The accelerated breakdown of the family unit, the departure of retirees to a separate universe, the rise of single-parent households that have trouble making a family, are creating spaces without presence, and therefore without surveillance. Add to this a process of family reunification decided on officially humanitarian grounds in 1976. This doesn’t consider its practical effects in terms of housing and density within the same household; you have “4:30 p.m. orphans,” schoolchildren left to their own devices as their parent(s) work later and later. Grandparents no longer take over; they are relegated to nursing homes at best. Schools are no longer providing supervised homework, expelling the most disruptive children, and

experiencing truancy that is rarely dealt with, so much so that the “troublemakers” are outside rather than in the classroom, at both elementary and high school.

The virtual world, not so much that of television as that of video games, and above all the virtual *unreality* of social networks, allows children, ever younger and ever more dependent on their consoles or telephones, to live in a parallel world. It imitates reality as closely as possible, where actions, even the deadliest, never have consequences. Each death is worth points, each game allows the resurrection of previous victims. Master of the game in the metaverse, we believe ourselves invulnerable in real life.

The relative calm that seemed to reign over the territory prior to June 27, 2023, did little to conceal an increasingly regular and widespread succession of a settlement of scores between criminals, including in rural areas, in a process of permanent restructuring of drug trafficking. Micro-events followed one another: refusals to obey orders, assaults, family dramas and brutal adjustments of criminal catchment areas on territories increasingly far from the “projects” whose command center could be treated in the paradise of the “influencer scammer.”

The riots of June 2023, marked by a tragic homicide, are both similar to those of 2005 and profoundly different. Almost twenty years ago, two children fleeing police control were electrocuted in a transformer, triggering three weeks of violence and several weeks of rebellion and violence against institutions, symbols and the forces of law and order. In 2023, everything was faster, more intense, younger, and more violent.

The TikTok-ization of the lives of younger people (but not only) also influences the durability of movements. Consequently, there is the risk of their repetition. This is due to the competition between actors creating their own reality show and who want to score points by happily burning down everything that makes up the city and society: private and public transport, buses, streetcars, libraries, media libraries, gymnasiums, shops.

In the face of these events, the state is bogged down by contradictory injunctions, between recognition of past errors, colonial remorse, and the desire to return to a “just” order.

Each time the relief of having survived the crisis is felt, the administration thinks it has escaped both the feedback of experience and the need to reform what needs to be reformed. The state had to choose between restoring order or contenting itself with an absence of visible disorder. Crime has become a phenomenon of social expression, marked by tendencies to confine oneself to a finite universe. “The neighborhood,” marked by modes of appropriation ranging from tagging to territorial control characterized by “border” crossings, not forgetting the use of modern means of telecommunication to organize trafficking at over 4,000 dealing points across the country (including in small and medium-sized towns), adding the option of home delivery between pizzas and burgers.

However, the underground economy and organized drug trafficking are, paradoxically, factors of internal stability, as is militant Islamism. For reasons linked to the desire not to attract the attention of the police, another order is replacing the republican state. It made its power felt by allowing anger and looting to take place, then insisting on a return to a precarious calm, far more favorable to business.

The state's response has been to pile up a series of measures now unified under the heading of "urban policy." The barbaric acronyms have been added one after the other in a logical shamble. But as François Dubet rightly reminds us, by focusing on buildings and transport, we have often forgotten the inhabitants. The effort has been real, and substantial, but focused on "users" or "constituents," who are often infantilized and regarded as recipients of assistance. Mayors and mothers, fathers, and peers are essential if we are to reverse this trend and give citizens back control of the streets.

It's now up to us to finally assume a strong reorientation to meet the needs expressed by the population. Otherwise, the most simplistic and extreme solutions, with the scapegoat responsible for all our ills at their fingertips, will succeed in convincing ever-growing numbers of voters—until it's too late. This is why it is no longer possible to avoid overhauling public safety policies, in particular the management of the judicial treatment of public disturbances. And, first and foremost, those caused by increasingly young minors.

We need a wide range of feedback to enable us to make the right changes to the way police are deployed in the field. As Fabien Jobard points out: "We need to get away from the idea that we need to bring the police closer to the population. Uniforms are not intended to make up for the disappearance of the adults who used to work with young people in working-class neighborhoods. Putting the social back into the social, and the security back into the security, means allowing everyone to do what they're supposed to do in the field. But with the last pillar of social order and regulation: families.

In any case, order will return. Criminal order at its worst. Extreme authoritarian order. Republican order that also guarantees democracy and freedom.

We will have to choose.

Crisis and Shock: The Double Dimension of Shocks in Crisis Management

Thomas Meszaros and Laurent Danet

Our lives are like scales,
and the slightest shock tips it.

Ménandre

From its very origins, the notion of crisis has been used to describe serious states and paroxysmal moments. In medicine, it refers to the diagnosis of the acute phase of an illness for which normally appropriate treatments are no longer certain to respond to this critical, life-threatening situation (septic shock, thermal shock, anaphylactic shock, cardiovascular collapse). In theology, it concerns the interpretation and critical judgment of augurs regarding revelations and omens. In theater, it's the crucial moment when dramatic action unravels. In law, it signifies judgment, the judicial decision that resolves a dispute. In the political and military spheres, it refers to deliberation on whether to keep the peace or go to war. In sociology and history, it characterizes a temporally circumscribed moment, more or less violent, in the evolution of societies or states. In economics, as in other fields, it describes a situation where equilibrium is disrupted. In psychology, it refers to disorders of consciousness and behavior that lead to violent outbursts or a specific reaction to an event perceived as extremely dangerous. The contagiousness of a crisis can be individual or collective. It implies the idea of a critical moment, calling for a crucial decision on the razor's edge. In its unfolding, a crisis takes the form of an escalation that culminates in a situation of uncertainty and maximum tension, the acme or paroxysmal point, the decisive moment at which either the structure is transformed, or the tension is regulated by internal or external mechanisms.

Since the 20th century, the term crisis has extended to all areas of human action and knowledge. Its study has been structured around two axes. On the one hand, there are the "substantive" approaches, which focus on the specific aspects of a particular type of crisis. Herman Kahn, for example, describes the different stages in the escalation of politico-military crises. On the other hand, "procedural" approaches attempt to produce general theories based on properties common to all crises, starting either from the effects of the crisis on decision-making units, or from the effects of the crisis on the structure of the system.

Crisis can also be studied in terms of their exceptional or normal nature. The first approach, which is in the majority today, sees a crisis as a "rupture in an organized system," to use Jean-Louis Dufour's expression, and considers the phe-

nomenon to be part of a logic of discontinuity, mainly studying its causes. The second, on the contrary, places crises within a “logic of continuity,” examining their internal dynamics and consequences. This approach was developed by Michel Dobby in his sociology of political crises, which analyzes “multi-sector mobilizations” as a source of political fluidity.

Our hypothesis is that an interesting avenue can be opened by focusing on the onset of a crisis and the psychological phenomenon that accompanies it: shock. This proposal makes it possible to distinguish between the rupture that characterizes the start of system transformation and the psychological shock that marks the entry of decision-making units into crisis. It also allows us to rethink crisis management in a novel way—through the use we can make of shocks to regulate a maximum level of tension. Our questions are twofold: on the one hand, can psychological preparation for shock reduce the negative impact of the onset of a crisis on decision-making units, and thus promote better crisis management? On the other hand, is it possible to use shocks to regulate a system in crisis, as suggested by the “reset” induced by electroconvulsive therapy to “recalibrate” the brain of a patient failing psychiatric care, or in certain situations where the patient’s psychic emergency is engaged?

We will begin by showing that rupture and shock are two different levels of crisis. This distinction seems important to us, as it has immediate consequences for crisis management, i.e., for the ability of decision-making units, faced with a sudden increase in stress, pressure and loss of reference points, to make appropriate decisions in an emergency. The study of shock allows us to explain certain neurophysiological mechanisms that shed light on the logic of flabbergasting and failure when decision-making units enter a crisis. Then, following on from this initial analysis, we propose some lines of thought on the usefulness of shocks in crisis management. Our approach is not limited to any particular type of crisis. In order to test our hypotheses, we have applied it to two different levels of analysis: international political crises and internal political crises.

Shock, the Translation of a Breakdown in Operations

Entering a crisis is a decisive moment in crisis management. As Patrick Lagadec rightly reminds us, the first difficulty for decision-making units when entering a crisis is to avoid disqualification from the outset. However, this is often the case, as the onset of a crisis generally results, at both the individual and collective level, in a phenomenon of stupefaction, the product of a brutal confrontation with unprecedented problems. This phenomenon disrupts analysis of the situation, decision-making and the adoption of appropriate reactions.

Many studies have already been carried out on the mechanisms of shock at the individual level. Our first task is to understand the structural and functional brain mechanisms involved in crisis situations. Any crisis situation involves

an acute stress response, which modifies the usual mechanisms of information analysis, processing, and decision-making, with the aim of protecting the organism confronted with the situation. To understand the importance of this response, we need to consider two levels of interaction—the psychological regulation of the physiobiological reaction to the crisis situation, and the physiobiological regulation of the perception of the crisis situation.

In simplified terms, we propose to describe the usual mechanisms of information processing to illustrate the disruption that a crisis situation induces in cerebral functioning.

The encephalon, together with the spinal cord, makes up the central nervous system. It is made up of the brain (divided into two hemispheres), the cerebellum (which controls movement and ensures balance) and the brain stem (which links the brain to the spinal cord). Each hemisphere of the brain is made up of the frontal lobe (planning, judgment, language, reasoning, coordination, motor skills), the parietal lobe (senses, perception of the environment), the temporal lobe (where we hear, remember, and manage our emotions) and the occipital lobe (where we see and manage information such as shape, color, and movement). In the anterior, inner part of the brain we find the diencephalon, made up of the thalamus (in charge of transmitting sensory signals) and the hypothalamus (a gland at the base of the brain that regulates emotions and body functions), and the telencephalon, which occupies the cerebral cortex, the hippocampus, and the basal ganglia (including the amygdala, which plays a fundamental role in managing emotions, particularly fear). The hippocampus, amygdala, fornix (white matter or cingulate gyrus) and hypothalamus make up the limbic system. The brain is linked to the brain stem by the thalamus (composed of two thalamic nuclei, themselves subdivided into sub-nuclei), which relays sensory and motor information to the cortex.

In a normal situation, the thalamic nuclei relay information to the cortex where, in the parietal lobes (sensory area and sensory association area), the various data from the sensory systems are combined to produce an “image” of the situation. This image is the basis on which information is analyzed. It is based on a rational logic (conceptualization and comparison with memory data stored in the hippocampus) which enables the choice of action or inhibition modalities (see Figure 1).

In a crisis situation, shock switches the organism into survival mode. This shift reflects the activation of a defense reaction at a lower level than the limbic system. This reactionary framework includes behavioral, neurovegetative (including stress), memory and emotional reactions. The stress reaction produced by this confrontation saturates the cortex with contradictory information and generates a “reflex” that induces physiological responses (tachycardia, chest pain, dyspnea, rise in blood pressure, drop in temperature, spasms, flushing, abdominal pain, tremors, goose bumps, sweating, dry mouth), chemical (production of cortisol, a steroid hormone that increases glucose and releases energy, dopamine, a neu-

rotransmitter that acts on motor functions as well as on the reward circuit and promotes behaviors useful to the body's survival, adrenaline, a neurotransmitter and hormone whose production increases with stress in preparation for exertion, glucose to fuel the muscles during physical activity, endomorphin, a peptide that acts as a neurotransmitter with analgesic properties, providing a feeling of well-being), emotional (fear, terror, anger, rage, surprise, astonishment, sadness), behavioral (anxiety, anguish, aggression, excitement), cognitive (impaired attention, concentration, memory, thinking), and psychomotor (startle, scream, fight, flight, inhibition, paralysis, convulsion) responses. The modulation of stress responses depends on the perceived intensity of the threat, which is the result of a complex balance between the spatio-temporal proximity of the aggression, the resources offered by the environment and the individual's perceived capacities.

Strictly speaking, the reaction to confrontation cannot be considered pathological. However, its intensity and modes of expression provide indirect information about the violence of the confrontation experienced by the individual, and its place in the subject's life history. The defense reaction plays a survival role. The intensity of the confrontation perceived by the subject, and the number of confrontations he or she has already experienced (and memorized) are at the root of the inappropriate response and the "disconnection" of the cortex, which "switches off" to protect itself. It is unable to process the information overload which implies a shortening of the information pathway: sensory data are transmitted directly from the thalamus to the fear- and anxiety-producing amygdala (Figure 1). "Psychic sideration" is the state of stupor created by this mechanism of disconnection between the amygdala complex and the cortex. It produces, in the individual or group confronted with extreme stress, a phenomenon of dissociation that translates into a form of paralysis of thought and action.

Confrontation with a situation that is exceptional in its unimaginability, senselessness, or violence—such as terrorist attacks, scenes of conflict, certain natural disasters, or major accidents—produces a loss of reference points and an increase in stress so great as to jeopardize the individual's psychological and physical integrity. These "borderline" states, marked by the individual's inability to visualize his or her situation and project him or herself out of it, explain the paralysis produced by the shock. Events such as the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, the January 7, 2015, attacks on Charlie Hebdo or the November 13 attacks in Paris, bear witness to the effect of collective stupefaction caused by the terrifying and unprecedented nature of these shocks and the strategic and tactical "vacuum" that immediately followed them. To fill this void, the first response to the shock and shock effect is emotional and memorial in nature. It is motivated by the survival instinct present in the nuclei of the trunk and by emotional memorization, which produces precedents that the individual or group has already experienced or knows about, and which will influence the response to the next confrontation.




Figure 1. Long and short information routes

From an anatomical-physiological point of view, the shock mechanism we have just described explains the possible effects of shock on decision-making units, and the behavioral and cognitive consequences they are likely to have on the course of events as soon as they enter a crisis. From a systemic point of view, the rupture that initiates the start of system transformation corresponds to the beginning of the escalation phase of negative tensions. Managing a crisis involves limiting and reducing these tensions. The shock experienced by the decision-making units is likely not only to block all decision-making and action capacities, but also to amplify the crisis, which evolves on its own, since the crisis is a complex system in which the links and resonances are multiple and have their own evolution independently of the actor.

We believe that while the shock of entering a crisis is unavoidable, the extent of this phenomenon can be limited by specific preparatory work, during which

not only should we be familiar with the anatomical-physiological mechanism of shock and its effects, but also empirically, through simulation exercises, experimenting with different scenarios of borderline situations and proposing new ways of handling them. Such is the case with electroconvulsive therapy, which could be envisaged as a technique for regulating certain seizures through the counter-shock it produces.

Electroconvulsive Therapy as a Seizure-regulation Tool

The practice of electroconvulsive therapy, or seismotherapy, also known in clinical history as “electroshock therapy,” bears witness to interesting points of convergence with the state of shock produced by certain crisis situations, particularly political and social ones. While in the case of attacks or serious disasters, the shock produced by the crisis manifests itself more particularly as an anguish in the form of sideration (ictus). In the case of electroconvulsive therapy, the aim is more to avoid the violent, agitated manifestations (raptus) caused by psychological disorders or certain pathologies (see Figure 1). However, this medical therapy is only used when drug treatments are ineffective for psychiatric conditions such as depressive, paranoid, or schizophrenic delusions, or certain manic states and severe, resistant depression.

In practice, the patient undergoes a very short general anesthetic, lasting just a few minutes, for the duration of the shock treatment. Electrodes are placed on the skull, and the current is delivered briefly. He then goes into convulsions during his artificial sleep. Current medical knowledge does not yet allow us to understand the proven therapeutic mechanism of electric shock, although psychiatrists have observed, since 1930, that epileptic convulsion and schizophrenia are very rarely associated, suggesting a biological antagonism. Nevertheless, electroshock has been shown to significantly reduce hyperconnectivity in specific areas of the brain. The side effects are interesting for our comparative approach. In the long term, memory and cognitive capacity are impaired. In the short term, we have observed a momentary slowdown in the functioning of the organism.

In a crisis situation, we have seen that an individual in a “state of shock” is as if expelled from the relational and temporal world. The shock short-circuits the cortex, preventing information from reaching the cortex responsible for the conscious, “reflective” response. This state can be compared with the spatial and temporal effects produced by electroshock: organic slowdown and memory gaps (idea of reset). Electroshock appears to be an effective treatment for hallucinatory or melancholic crises for two reasons. Firstly, it stops the passage of time which, in the case of resistant depressions, had previously seemed too fast or too long, and which, by a kind of average, returns to normal. Secondly, it clears the mental space of all erroneous, hallucinatory information, allowing social reality to reappear.

By reducing the hypercomplexity produced by the information overload and hyperconnectivity of a dysfunctional, poorly aroused brain, electroshock restores “normal” connectivity. We can reasonably extend this observation and consider that a shock delivered to an organism in a state of “normal” or “routine” functioning produces a disconnection of the subject from space and time, which ultimately leads to psychic disorientation. The following diagram summarizes these propositions:




Figure 2. Crise-ictus and crise-raptus

These two diagrams illustrate the phenomenal identity between therapeutic shock and psychobiological shock. They underline the analgesic character of shock within the psychic economy, whether in the context of seismotherapy, which enables the transition from dysconnectivity to normal cerebral connectivity, or traumatic confrontation, which slows down this same normal functioning to the sideration of shock.

“There is the medical usage according to which a crisis is a moment in an illness characterized by a sudden change, not always decisive but often severe, intense or painful, such as a gout attack or a heart attack. By extension, there is the emotional usage, which equates a crisis with a sudden, violent manifestation, such as a fit of nerves or anger.” Nervous system seizures, hallucinatory seizures or seizures produced by cortical disjunction mechanisms in situations of extreme stress are, in our view, part of the same logic.

Many specialists, such as Jean-Louis Dufour, have chosen to adapt the medical definition of crisis to international political crises, proposing the following definition: “Crisis is a moment of rupture within an organized system. It implies that decision-makers define a position in favor of either preserving or transforming the given system, with a view to returning it to equilibrium.” According to Jean-Louis Dufour, an international political crisis can be broken down into four continuous but distinct phases: Pre-crisis, escalation, relaxation, and impact. If we focus on the first part of this model, from pre-crisis and escalation to paroxysm, we obtain the following diagrams:




Figure 3. Rupture and shock

These two diagrams suggest a parallelism, even to the point of the interchangeability of terms, between the idea of “rupture,” discussed by Jean-Louis Dufour and other mainstream crisis specialists, and what we call “shock.” Negative shock, whether from a political point of view in an international crisis, or from a medical point of view in a convulsive crisis or traumatic shock, is perceived by the actor as a phenomenal reality, giving substance to the crisis and implying a loss of reference points that amplifies (idea of escalation) the state of instability testifying to the urgency of the situation.

Yet crisis is not shock. Crisis refers to a process of bifurcation produced by internal and/or external factors, and to an actor’s perception of this process and the transformation of his or her state. A crisis opens the way to a possible transformation of a state and a system. With varying speeds, it sets in gradually. Shock, on the other hand, is sudden and brutal. It shatters the established order of things. Shock is an illustration of rupture. It refers to an actor’s immediate perception of the unprecedented situation he is confronted with, the stakes of which are such as to involve his survival. He must respond with urgency and uncertainty, which significantly increases his stress level.

As we have seen, shock can be considered “negative” in the sense that it implies a disjunction and disconnection from the normal analytical functions of an individual or group. It causes a saturation of the means of processing information, of reflexive capacities which are confronted with such uncertainty that all capacity for reflection and action are momentarily unavailable. What’s more, the stupefaction it produces is likely to constitute a trauma inscribed in the individual and collective memory. But shock can also be seen in a positive light, in two ways.

Firstly, as a means of regulating a crisis, to control violent impulses (raptus), as evidenced by the therapeutic nature of electroshock therapy in the event of a crisis. As we have seen, Jean-Louis Dufour transferred the medical paradigm from the individual crisis to the international political crisis. Is the equivalent possible in the case of shock? If the physical or psychic state of a patient entering a heart attack or hallucinatory process can be cured by the shock produced by therapeutic convulsive trauma, could an international political crisis deemed non-beneficial be treated by the application of collective shock and trauma?

History offers several examples of how shocks can have positive, *id est* regulating, effects on crises. The Suez crisis is a case in point. In 1956, Egyptian President Nasser needed to find the funds to maintain his policy of non-alignment with the Big Two and continue the Arab struggle against Israel. To this end, the construction of the Aswan dam would have enabled him to increase his agricultural income, but the United States and the United Kingdom, following Egypt's recognition of the People's Republic of China, decided not to finance the project (July 20th). In retaliation, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal (July 26th). In the media and at the heart of institutions in France and the United Kingdom, the canal's main shareholders, Nasser is compared to Hitler, with political elites convinced that this time they must not give in as they did in Munich (the historical comparison is disproportionate and testifies to the inadequacy of the emotional reading grids of political decision-makers). At the end of October, following the Sèvres agreements, the Israelis, British, and French invaded Egyptian territory around the canal. This intervention provoked strong protests from Washington and Moscow. The United States imposed drastic financial measures that weakened the pound sterling and the franc. The Soviet Union threatened the three belligerents, who, stunned, withdrew from Egypt in early November under pressure from the Big Two.

The international crisis triggered by the unilateral nationalization of the Suez Canal provoked an imperialist reaction on the part of the two colonial powers, which can be explained by a reading grid and representations of their status and of the international order that predate the Second World War. Yet it was the two great anti-colonial powers, ideologically opposed in the Cold War, that were to provoke the positive shock that neutralized the escalation of the crisis. The "alliance" of circumstance between Washington and Moscow inverted the reading grid of European decision-makers: "How can these destroyers of the Nazi empire join forces against us, when we are fighting against the Hitler of the Nile?" As it happened, this colonialist Franco-British military maneuver against an independent southern state was to be the last. Colonial empires disappeared in the 1960s.

Events in Morocco in 2011 also illustrate how a shock can have a positive effect on an internal socio-political crisis. In June 2011, in the midst of the turmoil of the Arab revolutions that shook the authoritarian powers in place, and following the popular protests of February, Morocco's King Mohammed VI accepted the idea of an unprecedented, and in this respect historic, weakening of his personal powers, which stunned his population and his opposition, and put an end to the protests. In the event, the democratically elected Prime Minister becomes President of the Government in place of the monarch, the Government Council will henceforth be held without the presence of the King, the Prime Minister will be able to dissolve Parliament, and his power of appointment is increased. A Constitutional Court was created, equality between men and women was constitutionalized, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary became independent, and Berber became the country's official language, alongside Arabic. While other states collapsed under

the internal (and sometimes external) pressure of popular movements (Libya, Tunisia, Egypt), the shock applied by Mohammed VI to the Moroccan political apparatus led to a de-escalation of the socio-political crisis facing the country.

This last example allows us to question the nature of a “collective convulsion.” The transition from the individual psyche to the collective psyche, without invoking utopian organicist theories, was the subject of study by René Kaës, who established a four-stage construction, a path from individual bodies to the collective body: the phantasmatic moment (fusion through fear of otherness), the ideological moment (appearance of limits between inside and outside), the transitional figurative moment (awareness of group history, and dream projects), and the mythopoetic moment (individualization of subjects). In this scientific spirit, the affections and processes of an individual psyche become possible within a constructed collective psyche.

The following diagram shows how a shock can calm a crisis, whether it’s a heart attack, a hallucinatory crisis, or an international political crisis.




Figure 4. Restorative trauma

This diagram shows that a precise, relevant shock can neutralize the rise to extremes triggered by a crisis. By acting as a connection inhibitor, an appropriate shock calms the hyperconnectivity associated with the crisis, i.e., it slows down the crisogenic convergence between historical, sociological, and psychological affects, and the various political, economic, and strategic interests involved. It acts as a kind of “psychic anti-inflammatory.” It prevents the crisis from finding the fuel it needs to continue developing. Various examples could have been developed. As a general rule, negotiation in times of crisis illustrates this state of affairs. It begins or ends when the protagonists fail to find a way out, using ultimatums as a shock to sweep away certainties and all prior information, to create a basis for discussion.

These examples show that a positive shock always has the same dimension as the crisis it inhibits, i.e., national in the case of Morocco and international in the case of Suez. It is essentially psychic in nature, even if it is based on concrete acts that provoke it— unprecedented reforms in the Moroccan case, economic-diplomatic pressure during the Suez crisis. From this point of view, a political shock,

whether positive or negative, appears as an abrupt change in the framework of political action. A negative shock produces a hyper complexity and hyperconnectivity of interests and affects, overloading decision-making units with information, amplifying uncertainty and disqualifying customary, rational reaction procedures. A positive shock, on the other hand, neutralizes this excessive connectivity, temporizes the situation and allows us to question an inadequate (out-of-step or anachronistic) reading grid established by the first shock through contradictory and inescapable facts imposed on the belligerents.

Of course, not every shock defuses every crisis. The case of the American response to the rupture and shock produced by the attacks of September 11, 2001, the intervention in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq illustrate the need to produce a shock whose intensity is adapted to the expected effects, in order to re-establish the stability of the international system. Indeed, a shock cannot simply restore the normal pre-crisis phase. It can transport a system to another state, which may prove even more unpredictable. Which shock? According to which crisis? According to which hyperconnectivity? These questions appear as challenges in a post-Cold War international system faced with multiple major crisis processes.

As we have seen, shock also concerns the onset of crisis, i.e., it refers directly to the breaking point that marks the opening of a temporal interval when everything becomes possible, and traditional reference points and frameworks are swept away. It is the rupture that produces the shock since it leads to a sudden disappearance of the players' universe of reference. The stakes are high, because good crisis management necessarily begins with good crisis entry, i.e., managing the shock and the ripple effect it produces. The scale of a crisis, its unprecedented, unexpected, and unimaginable nature, can paralyze decision-makers, leading to their immediate "disqualification." It can also lead to structural disorganization, preventing the crisis from being dealt with quickly and effectively. Shock can have two effects—either it destroys the ability to think and act, or it stimulates the ability to react. To avoid this state of disorientation, which is detrimental to crisis management, it is essential to prepare ahead of time, so as to prevent the mechanisms of disjunction and disconnection from occurring. These mechanisms ultimately fuel the crisis, because when the rupture occurs, they prevent any projection or adequate mental representation of the situation, thus amplifying uncertainty and stress.

Conclusion

The need to pay particular attention to the notion of shock in the study of crises

The starting point of our contribution was the observation that the classic literature on domestic and international political crises pays little attention to the notion of

shock. For a long time, it has focused on the notion of rupture, and on the debate between those who advocate an approach based on discontinuity (the mainstream approach) and those who consider crises to be part of a logic of continuity (of which Michel Dobry in France is one of the leading figures). In psychology, the notion of shock is much more widespread. It refers both to the individual's internal defense mechanisms, inherent in the psyche which, in situations of extreme stress, become disconnected in order to ensure the survival of the organism, and to the external means of regulation, applied therapeutically, in order to promote the regulation of the nervous system in crisis situations. The aim of our contribution, which has a practical purpose, was to underline the usefulness of this dual dimension of shock for thinking about the management of internal and international political crises.

The aim was to show that the mechanism of shock, which is supposed to protect the vital functions of the individual confronted with an extreme situation, can have negative effects on a successful entry into a crisis, since it favors the reflex phase to the detriment of the reflective phase necessary for effective crisis management. Shock explains the attitude of inhibition, and very often the strategic and tactical vacuum that arises at the start of a crisis, making it particularly difficult to deal with.

At the same time, it has also occurred to us that shocks, as illustrated by the case of electroconvulsive therapy, can be effective means of crisis management that must be learned to master and which, if used properly, can be useful in regulating certain crisis processes. In this sense, simulations are particularly effective means of preparing for major shocks. On the one hand, they enable us to prepare for the onset of a crisis, i.e., to be confronted with the initial shock that causes our points of reference to collapse. The aim is to envisage extreme scenarios, and to train oneself to deal with them, to learn how to manage the stress overload that traditionally short-circuits thinking and blocks action. The aim is to enable the development, right from the start of a crisis, of a high-quality reflection phase that prevents a strategic vacuum from setting in and makes it easier to deal with priority issues. On the other hand, simulations enable us to test the relevance of certain shocks in different crisis scenarios. They provide an opportunity to observe the effects of deliberately using shocks (or counter-shocks) in certain situations for curative purposes. They foster the development of a creative approach that is today indispensable for dealing with future major crises.

Summary

The mainstream literature on crises, except in psychology, pays little attention to the notion of "shock." This notion is important because it is complementary to the notion of "rupture" which is very frequently used. These two notions refer to the two levels of crisis: that of the decision units and that of the system. This concept

also seems important because it has immediate consequences on the management of the crisis, on the capacity of the decision-making units to take decisions in emergency. The study of shocks thus explains certain psychological mechanisms that highlight the logic of sideration and failure of decision-making units in the beginning of the crisis. Moreover, we consider that shock strategies can be used in the management of internal and international crises.

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Rethinking the Link between Jihadism and Delinquency: The Singular Trajectory of Tunisian Returnees

Djallil Lounnas and Michael Ayari

Introduction

Since the resurgence of jihadist violence in the wake of the failure of the so-called “Arab Spring,” the link between delinquency and this type of violence has been regularly highlighted.

The aim of this article is to revisit this link by reversing the terms. It will highlight an unexpected phenomenon: that of delinquents who have become jihadists and who, on their return from combat zones or on their release from prison, reoffend, not as jihadists, but as delinquents.

Indeed, a study conducted in France by Hakim El Karaouimet and Benjamin Hodaye shows that social and economic conditions—in this case, the marginalization of young people from disadvantaged neighborhoods—are a breeding ground for recruitment to the jihad. Farhad Khosrokhavar’s analyses point in the same direction. Thus, according to the latter, 57% of European jihadists who joined or attempted to join Syria and Iraq after 2013, had been incarcerated before their departure. Further, 27% of them had been radicalized during their imprisonment. More than half of the French jihadists had criminal records and were involved in petty crime before taking action. In the same vein, Jean-François Gayraud evokes a “hybridity,” if not between the milieu of suburban delinquency and that of terrorism, at least between the prison milieu and that of jihadism. He shows that in the majority of cases, the jihadists who have committed attacks in France are ex-convicts of common law, radicalized in prison and have joined the jihadist movement after being released from prison.

This phenomenon, observed in the West, can also be found south of the Mediterranean, where several studies, in particular those by David Sterman and Nate Rosenblatt, show that, as a general rule, foreign fighters are recruited from regions marked by poverty and marginalization. This is the case in Tunisia, a country that between 2011 and 2014, was considered to be the main supplier of foreign fighters to conflict zones, particularly in Syria. As explained by a member of the Tunisian security forces in charge of this dossier at the time, “the majority of fighters were clearly from the greater Tunis area, a zone marked by marginalization and social and economic vulnerability, which facilitated the radicalization of many individuals as well as the deployment of Ansar Al Sharia networks in this territo-

ry.” For a civil society activist working in these peri-urban areas, “unemployment, idleness and repression played a pivotal role in the mobilization of these young people. Recruiters were thus responding as much to an economic and social need as to a deep-seated malaise.”

From 2016, the year that opened the series of defeats of jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, notably the Islamic State (IS), many foreign fighters began to return to their countries of origin. The North African states, from which almost 7,000 jihadists had reached the Middle East, were no exception.

In Tunisia, several hundred have returned. In 2018, a minimum of 800 young people officially returned to the country, and the main question posed by these “returnees” to the authorities was one of security. Indeed, the experience of North African jihadists returning from Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya in the 1980s–1990s had shown that they tended to set up cells in their home countries and carry out attacks there.

Yet as of 2018, Tunisian returnees have had little or no involvement in new acts of jihadist violence. Nevertheless, failing to integrate socially and professionally, many of them are, in the words of a lawyer specializing in their defense, “reverting to delinquency, even criminality, while falling back into alcohol and drugs.” A former member of the Islamic State confirms these remarks, noting that this phenomenon can be observed among many of his counterparts. Although there are no statistics to quantify this phenomenon, our contacts—members of the security services, senior civil servants, lawyers, and psychologists in the field—all confirm its prevalence.

From a sociological point of view, this unexpected recidivism illustrates, on the one hand, the weakness of the religious training of the EI jihadists of the 2010s. On the other, it shows that the actor’s theological background is a weak vector of political socialization, far from leaving an indelible mark on his system of representations and practices.

In this paper, we examine the modalities of this form of recidivism. By its very existence, this form of recidivism puts into perspective the direct causal link between the return of jihad and the proclamation of jihad at home that has often been weaved by experts and security institutions since the Afghan precedent of the 1980s. For, in many respects, the classic jihadist theological-political commitment, involving near-total personal military and religious investment, at some point in the personal trajectory does not account for the commitment of Tunisian fighters who joined the IS in Syria in the 2010s.

The possibility of a socio-professional reconversion in such direct contradiction with the precepts of religious dogma would show that the modalities of this reconversion may draw more on the springs of the pre-militant career than on those of the militant career.

In a sense, this return to the world of delinquency and criminality, which radical Islamist movements in the 1970s and 2000s so strongly sidelined, and which jihadists have often, by virtue of their career path, set up as a deterrent, raises questions.

On an academic level, it raises questions about the link between religious rigorism and commitment to the IS of the 2010s. Was the latter a political and identity-based minimum of commitment, as it was within groups linked to Al Qaeda? As we shall see, within the IS, the transition from the delinquent ethos to the rigorist religious and militant ethos, and therefore the accompanying change in the system of representations and practices, is far from having taken place.

Finally, at a more security-oriented level of analysis, this phenomenon is a reminder that recidivism may well be delinquent and criminal before it is ideological and political—especially in a context of limited opportunities for socio-professional reintegration and the military defeat of jihadist groups. It would therefore be wise to avoid considering a returnee's abandonment of rigorist religious practice as the main indicator of his or her rejection of the need to resort to political violence. Indeed, as long as a new jihadist offer is structured, it can be reinforced. Routine recourse to delinquent or even criminal violence would trivialize violence as a practice and allow the actor to be reintegrated into a network whose borders with jihadist networks may be porous. The implementation of socio-professional reintegration programs along the lines of those tried out in Algeria and de-radicalization programs in Morocco would therefore be highly advantageous in Tunisia.

I - The Nexus of Criminality and Jihadism vs. Returnees and the Threat of Relapse

1. The Crime-Jihadism Nexus

Studies on the links between criminal activity and jihadist groups are not new. In 2004, Marc Sageman had already uncovered the relationship between criminal networks (false documents, credit cards, etc.) and jihadist groups: the former helping the latter to act and move fighters from point A to point B. The work of Serge Daniel, Sergei Boeke, Luca Raineri, and Francesco Strazzari, or more recently, Beatriz Mesa, has studied the relationships between various terrorist and jihadist groups in the Sahel, as well as their collusion with local criminal organizations in the region, particularly drug traffickers.

In a similar vein, socio-economic conditions have often been put forward as factors favoring the passage to violent action. This is demonstrated by El Karoui and Hodayé's study, in which they argue that belonging to disadvantaged suburbs, in a context of educational failure and economic marginalization, favors jihadist radicalization, as it generates both material and psychological vulnerabilities

in these young people. For his part, psychologist Sami Kelal explains that “the discourse of Daesh is well crafted and well-practiced, responding to the needs expressed by young people in vulnerable situations: the need for identity, the need to belong, the need for life projects in people who are often at a loss for projects.” This is also the view of Danièle Esptein, who believes that young delinquents in socially and economically vulnerable situations “flee into omnipotence and set their lives ablaze, in the hope of giving consistency to a shattered identity.”

For their part, studies by Rajan Basra and Peter Neumann in particular, show that the transition to jihadism offers offenders “redemption” from their past, or better still, legitimizes that same past. Prison provides an environment conducive to the radicalization process, as do the networks needed to take up armed action on leaving prison. In a sense, jihadist groups perceive the criminal “skills” of these offenders as assets for their activities. Edwin Becker, in a study of the trajectory of 200 European jihadists, shows that almost a quarter of them already had a criminal record. Olivier Roy also emphasized the link between petty crime in poor suburbs and jihadism. He describes jihadists from these social and territorial backgrounds as “born again,” “almost new converts” following an often-chaotic career path, without ignoring the presence among them of people who are well integrated on a socio-professional level.

The risk of recidivism in delinquency and criminality, as well as in the jihadism of returnees, is briefly addressed by Robert Malet and Rachel Hayes. These authors base their analysis on the criminal records of recidivist criminals re-imprisoned shortly after their release. In their view, the risk of this type of returnee relapsing into jihadism is very high, especially during the first year of their return. Mohamed Hafez believes that these returnees represent a threat due to their religious indoctrination, military training, and the transnational networks that they have built up during their stays in conflict zones. This idea is also echoed by Daniel Byman, who emphasizes their violence and brutality. Thomas Heggamer and Peter Nesser, for their part, emphasize that the IS is less likely to send returnees than to attempt to mobilize self-radicalized jihadists on the spot, ready to strike. With a few rare exceptions, such as the Paris and Brussels attacks in January and November 2015, the majority of terrorist acts were committed by people who had been “radicalized on the spot” and had never been to conflict zones, although they often came from underprivileged, criminogenic backgrounds.

2. The Case of Tunisian Returnees and Delinquency/Criminality

While there are no reliable figures for the number of Tunisians who have gone to Syria and Iraq, most experts put the figure at 3,000. To this estimate around 1,500 Tunisians who have gone to Libya should be added. With around 5,000 jihadists, Tunisia is therefore considered one of the main countries of origin of foreign fighters, particularly within the IS. The reasons for this phenomenon are manifold, as

are the scales of analysis and conceptual grids that attempt to shed light on them. We shall retain that a host of factors act in a differentiated way according to the profiles of the actors. These include ideological, socio-cultural, socio-economic, religious, institutional, and “situational” factors.

Incidentally, since 2015, 800 of these foreign fighters are thought to have returned to Tunisia. Many have been released after serving 5 years in prison. The authorities tend to perceive them as a threat. However, this threat may be overestimated since at the time of writing, none of them have re-offended. On the other hand, lawyers, magistrates, members of the security forces, community activists and psychologists in the field are unanimous in noting a high number of relapses into delinquency and, more marginally, crime, given that the majority of fighters indulged in these practices before leaving for conflict zones.

A senior security official explains that this phenomenon mainly concerns the large wave of Tunisian returnees of 2014–2015. The latter, disappointed by their experiences in Syria and Iraq, were not initially motivated by ideological considerations. A significant number are said to have “plunged into alcohol, theft and delinquency,” unlike their predecessors, who were active in the Syrian Liberation Army (SLA) and returned in 2013.

A lawyer who has defended several of them, notes that “some drink and steal, but are into taqiya (precautionary dissimulation), while others indulge in these practices naturally.” For one lawyer, their return to delinquency can be explained by their chaotic pre-jihad personal and professional path, by the reality in Syria, far from what they had imagined, by imprisonment on their return, accompanied by ill-treatment, and by the society that rejects them (they returned militarily defeated, and the regime tends to feed its legitimacy through anti-terrorist rhetoric). In her view, the number of returnees in this case is particularly significant and, without question, far greater than that of ex-combatants who continue to maintain a radical political discourse and rigorist religious practice, pointing to jihadist recidivism.

II – The Quality of Islamic State Fighters: Recruitment Version “Generation Z”

In Tunisia, one of the primary causes of this phenomenon may lie in the socio-demographic characteristics of these IS fighters and the way they are recruited. As early as 2011, there were calls for Jihad in Syria from militants of the Islamist party Ennahda, a pillar of the ruling coalition, from members of the Salafist-jihadist organization Ansar Al Sharia Tunisie (AST), notably through preaching in mosques, discussions in preaching tents, as well as the dissemination on the internet of visual content showing exactions committed by the troops of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, played in concert. This recruitment drive was primarily aimed at people

living in working-class suburban neighborhoods, as they were more accessible and vulnerable.

According to one psychologist, 64% of returnees have a history of drug addiction. Similarly, a study carried out by a research team led by Emna Ben Arab shows that, out of 58 returnees (including those arrested before they could reach a conflict zone), over 40% dropped out of school in secondary school and 25% in their first year of high school. 74% of these returnees said they had experienced serious financial difficulties, and 60% said they had experienced these difficulties on a recurring basis. While half had experienced unemployment, the majority were working in precarious, low-income jobs. Finally, while 39% were totally dependent on their families, the majority had incomes ranging from 300 Tunisian dinars a month (120 euros) for the lowest to over 3,000 dinars a month (280 euros) for the highest. Finally, while more than 60% confirmed having used drugs and alcohol, only 7 of the 58 respondents confirmed having encountered legal problems, the others refusing to comment on this question.

The study shows that these players generally come from very disadvantaged backgrounds. “In such environments, a return to religion is often socially valued.” A psychologist who has worked with Tunisian prisoners of the IS, adds that “the discourse of Daesh is well ‘insidiously fictionalized’ and honed to meet the needs that young people in vulnerable situations express as, respectively, needs for identity, belonging and a life project, while they are often at a loss for any future prospects.” Thus, “in a way, the passage from criminal to jihadist status erases the past and psychologically allows one to pass from the feeling of being a zero to that of being a hero.”

This phenomenon is not unique to Tunisia. It is part of the type of recruitment chosen by the IS in Syria and Iraq. A former member of this organization explains that one of IS’s weaknesses was to have favored “the number of its recruits to the detriment of their quality.” The IS welcomed its new recruits without guarantors or sponsors, unlike Al-Qaeda, which required several. IS even offered to recruit them without any restrictions. The paradox being, as explained by an IS member, that “while Al-Qaeda was looking for quality (editor’s note: religious) recruits, IS, by taking on everyone, was going for quantity.”

Among these recruits, there were as many people who were “truly religious” and convinced of their commitment as those who were not. The Internet played a role. It significantly reduces the amount of training required of a candidate for jihad. It facilitates the dissemination of ideology, radical preaching, and combat videos. As one former IS member explains, many of these jihad candidates were connected and watched IS propaganda videos, without maintaining a political understanding of them. And, indeed, he explains that this method of recruitment attracted a large number of recruits at the expense of their quality. In his own words, “There were a lot of deviants.”

This same member of the IS reports having met many of these recruits, who consumed large quantities of alcohol and drugs, and who, after watching propaganda videos, said to themselves: “The IS is not only the good life,” but “it also pays its recruits substantial salaries”—salaries of up to US\$3,000 per month, well above what these young people from disadvantaged suburbs are usually paid when they enter the workforce.

The organization’s strategy has meant that a number of young people from disadvantaged backgrounds have preferred to join the jihad rather than continue to evolve in their criminogenic world. They are not forced by religious rigorism to break with the codes of their home environment, which is marked by a delinquent and prison culture. On their return from Syria and/or Iraq, they are often disappointed by what they had experienced there, they had become more violent without having abandoned their pre-jihadist ethos. Their system of representations and practices—or, if you prefer, their normative and cultural/cognitive symbolic frameworks—had basically remained unchanged, despite a militant behavior apparently based on religious rigor and devotion to armed jihad.

III – The Weakness of Religious Indoctrination in IS Camps

The fact that IS training camps were essentially geared towards military rather than religious training contributed to downplaying the importance of rigorous religious practice in jihadist commitment. For example, according to a Tunisian security official, the young people who joined the Al Nosra group, affiliated to Al Qaeda, in the early 2010s received high-quality military as well as theological-political training. This is confirmed by interviews with fighters involved with al-Qaeda in Syria, who claimed to have received a compulsory, in-depth religious education.

By contrast, according to a member of the Tunisian security forces, who confirms the type of recruitment described above, nothing similar is observed at IS. Selection was rapid on arrival, and young people were quickly sent into combat. As soon as they returned to Tunisia, “we quickly realized that religion (i.e., ideology) had not penetrated them well,” and they quickly reverted to their former practices, namely alcohol, drugs, and delinquency. Data found in IS camps tend to confirm this assertion. 70% of foreign fighters arriving in Syria had only a “very inadequate knowledge of Islam,” even though almost all of them claimed to “find strong inspiration in it.”

According to a former IS member, this religious training in the camps was provided mainly by Saudis and Egyptians, or sometimes simply by people who had studied in Saudi Arabia. In reality, very few of them had received advanced religious training, which was mostly only basic. The time allocated to religious training was itself very limited. The description of “a typical day” includes, after dawn prayer and breakfast, a session of Koranic and religious instruction until 7

a.m., followed by military training all morning. A religious training session was given after breakfast, followed by a brief Islamic education course, before military training which lasted the rest of the day. It ended only in the late evening with a religious course.

The emphasis was clearly on the military aspect, to the detriment of the religious aspect. The former IS member explains that “there was a reverence for death and combat, with the religious aspect being less important.” The duration of training varied from two weeks to 45 days, or even more depending on the case. Unlike Al-Qaeda, where religious indoctrination was just as important as military, this focus on the military aspect and the short duration devoted to religious education meant that these recruits were unable to “imbibe the values of Islam.” Worse still, he confirms, at IS, the religious content was, itself, basic and superficial, summed up in three words: “Allah, the Prophet and jihad, i.e., the *béaba* without more.” More specifically, he explains that the teaching centered on the concepts of *hak-kimya* (the power of God), *wala oua bara* (loyalty and disloyalty), *hijra* (exile) and *El taefa el moutania* (the community that rejects Islam), which our interviewee describes as basic.

Consultation of the documents used in the camps tends to validate these findings. For example, the manual on the jurisprudence of jihad, *Fiqh Al Jihad* by Abu Abdallah Al Muhajir, one of Abu Mussab Zarqawi’s closest friends, was compulsory. This manual, commonly referred to as “the jurisprudence of blood,” legalizes large-scale suicide bombing, the killing of civilians, as well as women and children. Also, the elementary textbook on “the oneness of God” *Muqarrar fi al-Tawhid*, written by Turki Bin Ali, the IS’s mufti between 2014–2016, deals, for the most part, with “nullifiers” in Islam, Abdel Wahab’s *Nawakid Al Islam*, which exclude an individual from membership of the Muslim community, which, in this context, induces the IS’s automatic authorization to murder him.

As a result, instructed in fundamental concepts by poorly qualified religious educators, and in a context where the overwhelming majority of training is focused on the military aspect, the theological aspect was more of a political veneer. In the IS, these young people had no time to immerse themselves deeply in a theological-political corpus, unlike those of Al-Qaeda. As a result, there was no noticeable change in either their worldview or their social behavior. On this point, a former IS official is categorical: “The organization’s camps having been what they were, it was less a question of formatting and changing their new adherents religiously than of preparing them for combat and violence.” Moreover, “in these camps, there was a great deal of abuse, theft, etc., as much on the part of the leaders as on that of the fighters themselves.” As a result, the IS milieu was not much different, if any more violent, than the one they had fled and rejected.

IV – The Absence of a Policy for Dealing with Returnees

As one Tunisian security official noted, “the returnees were disenchanted, disillusioned, disgusted and deeply depressed by the violence of the IS. Their appallingly dramatic experience in this terrorist organization revealed itself to themselves, in that it had led them and trapped them at the antipodes of the epic and heroic ideal they attached to the dreamed advent of their Islamic State.” A lawyer, who had represented some of these returnees, reports that “they had, in fact, gone to live this dream of the culmination of an Islamic state. However, all they found was violence, purges, and fighting, and they found themselves unwillingly committing acts of extreme violence.”

Despite the large number of Tunisian returnees and the hardening of some of them, the Tunisian authorities have not set up programs to deradicalize and/or reintegrate their returnees or those who are repenting, like Algeria with its “National Reconciliation” policy, or Morocco with its *IS Moussalaha* (Reconciliation) program, and Mauritania with its *Mounassaha* (Counseling and Discussion) program.

Once back in Tunisia, hundreds of young people who had belonged to terrorist organizations were sentenced, on average, to 5 years’ imprisonment, or even up to 20 years, depending on the seriousness of the charges. Once imprisoned, they were rarely isolated from other inmates, except in rare cases, where they were classified according to their dangerousness, particularly emirs (leaders) and preachers. As a psychologist in contact with several of them points out, “it would have been necessary to have been able to identify them with certainty, which was not always possible.”

Admittedly, a deradicalization and reintegration program called *Tawassul* was designed, but it never came to fruition. As one expert who worked on its conceptualization explains, “*Tawassul* was never provided with the budgetary or human resources that would have enabled it to get off the ground.” More specifically, due to the public finance crisis, few financial resources were generally allocated to reintegration programs. Added to this was the common-sense perception that these schemes offered ex-jihadists a new chance in life when they didn’t deserve it. Moreover, when credits were dispensed less sparingly, it was customary for the corresponding budgets to be credited to “soft profiles,” i.e., profiles that could be reintegrated into society. Often, this funding went to petty criminals rather than ex-jihadists.

What’s more, from 2015 onwards, faced with an increase in terrorist actions in the country, the reluctance of civil society was strongly expressed by the refusal and rejection of the return of these Tunisian returnees. Finally, there was institutional resistance, which was to lead the Tunisian authorities to abandon this type of initiative.

As a result, “departure” to the Syrian-Iraqi zones of tension was dealt with

exclusively from a security point of view. According to one lawyer, rather than tackling the roots of the evil, once in prison “these returnees were classified as criminals, and treated as such, which ended up turning some of them into real criminals.”

Once out of prison, many continued to be subject to close police control. According to the lawyer, “For them, finding a job becomes almost impossible because employers are aware of their past.” The same applies to finding accommodation. Faced with this situation, “some resist and try to rebuild their lives, but the most disadvantaged fall back into delinquency and crime.”

A psychologist explains that informal solidarity networks existed in marginalized neighborhoods, within which they maintained a neighborhood identity, attesting to the strength of this type of network. However, when they were released from prison and returned to their neighborhoods, they were excluded from these networks, suffering constant stigmatization. As this psychologist puts it, they are now “marginalized in environments that are themselves marginal, which is worrying”.

So, it’s hardly surprising that many of these socially isolated returnees try to rejoin the delinquent networks, reviving the codes of this milieu, which they have basically never abandoned.

Conclusion

On the one hand, while few of Tunisia’s released returnees have rejoined jihadist groups or committed terrorist acts to date, the absence of a socio-professional reintegration policy and strategy increases the risk of recidivism in delinquency or even criminality. On the other hand, if jihadist groups, now in decline in North Africa and the Middle East, manage to reconstitute themselves, the risk of recidivism in political violence will increase accordingly, given the trivialization of the use of violence among these returnees and their reintegration into a network whose borders with jihadist networks may be porous.

To meet this security challenge, the reintegration programs set up in Morocco and Algeria in particular would benefit from being tried out in Tunisia. In Algeria, “National Reconciliation” has reintegrated some 15,000 Islamist fighters. In Morocco, under the aegis of the *Moussalaha* program, several hundred people convicted of terrorism have been released and successfully reintegrated into society and the workplace. In both countries, recidivism rates in terrorism and crime have been extremely low, partly thanks to this.

World Cocaine Market: Is the Phenomenon Underestimated?

Michel Gandilhon


Observatoire des criminalités internationales

“**W**ords, words, words” replied Hamlet to Polonius; “Numbers, numbers, numbers” he would probably say today in the age of big data. Ever since the world became a number, an immense accumulation of numbers has stood between humanity and objective reality, between sensitive experience and the vastness of being. In the age of the reign of quantity, when Pythagoras triumphed over Homer, numbers are now sacred. Any judgment on the world that does not use numbers is immediately devalued. Number, in fact, is the science that the fact checker will pit against the doxa and common sense of the prisoners of the cave. Yet despite its aura, number is fallible, number is deceptive, number is contradictory, number is a political issue. In short, numbers are nothing more than man’s attempt to manipulate or, at best, to grasp a reality which, by definition, tends to elude him.

Cocaine by the Numbers

And what could be more mysterious than an illicit economy such as that of cocaine? Admittedly, and this is undoubtedly true, it seems that we have never had a better understanding of the economy linked to drug trafficking. Over the past 30 years, the European Union (EU) has set up observatories in each member country to monitor the phenomenon, under the umbrella of the Lisbon-based EMCDDA (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction). On a global scale, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) centralizes data to produce a World Drug Report in June each year. So, what do the figures tell us about cocaine worldwide, and particularly in the EU?

In the space of 10 years, global production, as estimated by the UNODC, has almost doubled, driven by Colombia, which has seen a 3.6-fold increase in the quantities produced on its soil over the same period. In the EU, perhaps the world’s most dynamic market, seizures reached a new record in 2021, at 240 tons. Between 2013 and 2020, sales in the EU doubled from 5.7 to 10.5 billion euros, and that’s without including the UK. In 2013, cocaine consumption ranged from 72 to 110 tons, but today it is estimated to be around 200 tons.



Consistencies and Inconsistencies

This accumulation of quantitative data gives the impression that everything is clear and precise, and that the cocaine market has no secrets. However, as soon as we link them together and try to make them speak—without torturing them—inconsistencies and contradictions appear, casting doubt on their relevance.

The questions raised in this article arose in particular from statements made in the Belgian press by Kristian Vanderwaeren, Director General of Belgian Customs, who, while deploring the fact that only 1.5% of Antwerp’s 12 million containers were checked, estimated the proportion of cocaine intercepted in transit through the Flemish port at between 10% and 20%, an estimate that was immediately taken up, albeit truncated, by some of the most authoritative French media:

- *France Culture* (January 4, 2023): “But over the last ten years or so, the port has been faced with an explosion in illegal trafficking, starting with drugs. In ten years, the quantity of cocaine intercepted in Antwerp has increased fifteen-fold. These seizures represent only 10% of the drugs in transit. A parallel business of unprecedented magnitude, with several mafia groups vying for control, generating corruption and violence in the port and the city.”

- *Le Monde* (January 12, 2023): “The quantities seized in Antwerp had a market value of some 5 billion euros, but according to a police source, they represent, at best, only 10% of the total cargo unloaded: 90% of the cocaine, mainly from Colombia, Panama and Ecuador, slips through the net and feeds the traffickers’ colossal haul.”

The 10% figure is now regularly quoted, even though we don't know how it came to be, particularly in terms of methodology. However, a quick calculation puts this figure into perspective. If we apply the average of the range, i.e., 15%, to the year 2021 when 90 tons were seized in the Flemish port, 510 tons would have slipped through the net. After all, why not? The problem is that if we don't stop there and put this estimate into perspective with others, all coherence gone.


Particularly with production in Colombia, where most of the cocaine consumed in the EU comes from, estimated by the UNODC for 2021 at 1,400 tons—i.e., in ironic parentheses, 44% more than the estimate of the White House drugs agency, which stands at 970 tons—minus the 670 tons seized in this country (and those in transit countries such as Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador). This gives a maximum of 730 tons of pure cocaine available to feed the world market.

Thus, if we assume that 100% of the cocaine seized in Europe comes from Colombia, almost 82% of the country's available production would pass through the Flemish port. Even when we consider an increasing, but probably still relatively minor, proportion of the cocaine passing through Antwerp would come from Peru, bringing the percentage down to 50-60%, the proportions would be implausible, as there would be little left to supply the American, African, and Asian markets.

Doubts are cast a little deeper if we compare the flows passing through Antwerp with the estimated 200 tons of cocaine consumed in the EU. Does this mean that what passes through Antwerp exceeds the absorption capacity of the European market by more than a factor of three? Much more, in fact, if we consider that the cocaine arriving in containers from Latin America is destined for the wholesale market and is therefore purer.

To simplify matters, if we assume that the 510 tons out of the 600 that fall through the net are 100% pure (which is never the case in reality), and after cutting to 60%, which is the average rate in the EU for cocaine circulating on the retail market, the quantities transiting through the port of Antwerp alone and circulating in the EU would potentially be equivalent to almost 714 tons cut. This is well over three times the quantities needed to satisfy the EU's cocaine requirements!

Since the drug economy is governed by the laws of supply and demand, we would expect to be in a situation of overproduction, and prices should have collapsed by 2022. However, this does not appear to have been the case.



Quantities of cocaine seized in the port of Antwerp (2013–2022)

One of Two Things

A first objection would be to assert that these flows are not all destined for the EU, but merely transit to other markets, notably in Russia and Asia. And yet, if the channels of international trade are impenetrable, it is doubtful that cocaine destined for China, Japan, or Australia passes in any significant quantities via the transatlantic route, and in particular the port of Antwerp. Whereas, for example, the port of Guayaquil in Ecuador, with its opening onto the Pacific, is an ideal gateway to Asian markets. The same applies to Russia, where supply routes tend to be via the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

A second objection is that UNODC data on world production or EMCDDA data on the size of the European market may be underestimated. Estimates of cocaine and other drug production, for example, have been challenged by researchers. In 2008, a study was carried out by the head of the Italian anti-doping agency in Colombia. The results of which were made public in February 2009 and were based on operations carried out by the Colombian army to dismantle cocaine paste and hydrochloride production units. It found an estimate of 2,000 tons of cocaine produced on Colombian soil, a figure four times higher than that of the United Nations and six times higher than that of the United States!

The same was true of Morocco in 2012, when some EMCDDA researchers expressed surprise at the hashish production estimates published in UNODC reports, admittedly on the basis of Moroccan data alone. The 75% drop in hashish production between 2003 and 2011 was far from consistent with the volumes seized internationally. Thus, aggregating the results of seizures in Spain and Morocco in 2009 and comparing their total (631 tons) with estimated production (760

tons) revealed an interception rate of 83%. This leaves only a quantity of hashish in circulation that was clearly too small (129 tons) for seizures in third countries and for supplying the European and extra-European market. However, the sources consulted (police, independent researchers, development agencies) agreed that the reduction in cultivated areas in Morocco had been significant over the last decade. The enigma was solved by field research, which showed that while acreage had indeed declined in Morocco, the decrease had been offset by the substitution of much more productive hybrid cannabis varieties. The Moroccan precedent should therefore prompt caution in the case of Colombia.

Indeed, if we subtract the seizures made in Colombia (669 tons) from the estimated production for the same year (1,400 tons), we can see that (if we trust the Colombian law enforcement agencies) there would only be 731 tons of pure cocaine left to supply a rapidly expanding world market. This is far too little even when taking Peru and Bolivia into account. This is also assuming that traffickers have accumulated stocks from which to draw in order to meet even American and especially European demand, which the EMCDDA and Europol tell us is probably underestimated in their latest report on cocaine ...

What Can Be Said for Certain

The contradictory nature of the data circulating on the global cocaine market could well lead to a degree of skepticism. However, despite the unknowns concerning actual production and consumption levels, there is no doubt that the cocaine market is currently growing significantly worldwide, and particularly in Europe, despite the historic seizures made in recent years. While these seizures should have led to shortages and thus higher wholesale and retail prices, accompanied by a deterioration in grades, in fact exactly the opposite is happening.

Cocaine is increasingly available and accessible, with prices tending to fall and rising yields. If we return to our original question, raised by the comments made by the Director of Belgian Customs regarding the interception rates of flows passing through Antwerp, we can assume that they are undoubtedly too low, and that he underestimates the effectiveness of his own services. One manifestation of this reality could be the recent emergence of cocaine production laboratories on EU soil, notably in Belgium, the Netherlands and, above all, Spain.

In April 2023, police there dismantled a production unit capable of producing 200 kg/day. This relocation of cocaine to Europe, almost a century later, would appear to be a response by traffickers to minimize the losses incurred because of the scale of maritime seizures. It's less painful to have a ton of base paste confiscated than a ton of pure cocaine. But at this stage, it's still only a modest hypothesis.

Notes

1. Olivier Rey, *Quand le monde s'est fait nombre*, Stock, 2016.
2. UNODC, *World Drug Report 2022*: <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2022.html>
3. EMCDDA, Europol, *EU Drug Market: Cocaine, 2022*: <file:///C:/Users/mgandilhon/Downloads/EU-Drug-Market-Cocaine-2022-FINAL.pdf>
4. EMCDDA, Europol, *EU Drug Market, in depth analysis*, 2016: [file:///C:/Users/mgandilhon/Downloads/TD0216072ENN%20\(1\).PDF](file:///C:/Users/mgandilhon/Downloads/TD0216072ENN%20(1).PDF)
5. Ce qui n'est pas le cas puisque sur la base d'échantillons prélevés sur des saisies, il semble que le Pérou s'affirme depuis récemment comme une source croissante du marché européen.
6. EMCDDA, *European Drug Report 2022*, Luxembourg, 2022: file:///C:/Users/mgandilhon/Downloads/20222419_TDAT22001FRN_PDF.pdf
7. Kenza Afsahi, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, "Le haschisch marocain, du kif aux hybrides," *Drogues enjeux internationaux* n° 8, OFDT, 2015: <https://www.ofdt.fr/publications/collections/hors-serie-international/le-haschich-marocain-du-kif-aux-hybrides-numero8-fevrier-2015/>
8. EMCDDA, Europol, op. cit., 2022: "The EMCDDA estimates that the EU cocaine retail market was worth at least EUR 10.5 billion (range EUR 7.7 billion to 12.8 billion) in 2020. This represents about a third of the illicit market in all drugs and makes cocaine the second-largest market, after cannabis. While this estimate is the best that can be achieved given current data availability, the method used is likely to underestimate the true size of the market, and this figure should be viewed as a minimum estimate."
9. Nicole Le Floch, "De quoi les saisies historiques de cocaïne en 2021 sont-elles le nom?" *Swaps* n° 101, 2022: <https://vih.org/20220517/de-quoi-les-saisies-historiques-de-cocaine-en-2021-sont-elles-le-nom/>
10. *Spanish Mega Lab Raises Questions About Cocaine Production in Europe*, *Insight Crime*, 19 avril 2023: <https://insightcrime.org/news/mega-lab-questions-cocaine-production-europe/>

Forty Years of Urban Revolts

Éric Marlière

The death of 17-year-old Nahel M., shot dead by police during a vehicle check in Nanterre on June 27, 2023, triggered a wave of indignation and a series of riots across the country. How is it that for over forty years we have witnessed young people from working-class neighborhoods committing urban revolts against the forces of law and order and institutions in a country that is nevertheless democratic?

Riot continuities

Most “urban riots” are triggered by the death of a young person, the result of a chaotic interaction with the forces of law and order. Scuffles between youths and police ensued over the following nights, resulting in injuries on both sides, and mass arrests that put the future of these young people in jeopardy. In the space of two or three nights, the housing estate was set on fire and some public property was vandalized: police stations and public buildings were targeted to point the finger of blame at the state. Finally, a silent march was organized by local activists and the family of the deceased to support their loved ones and call for calm, without however extinguishing the anger.

As with the “riots of 2005”, those in Villiers-le-Bel in 2007 and Sartrouville in 1991, the funeral march organized in Nanterre on June 29, 2023 did not put an end to the riot scenario. It spread to other working-class neighborhoods (sometimes to larger provincial towns with a reputation for calm) and more upscale city centers. The responses of the various governments are virtually identical each time - although, on this occasion, the government expressed temporary support for the family of the young man who died, their response boiled down to the usual condemnations: stigmatizing the young people, referring them to their “origins” and repressing them with a “curfew”, mass arrests with immediate appearances and admonishments of the parents¹.

The end of the working-class world

Previous generations of workers, from the metalworkers of the interwar period to the specialized workers of the Thirty Glorious Years, evolved in a difficult environment, sometimes in conflict with the police and various political authorities. They

¹ Yet other answers are possible: see Manuel Boucher, with Mohammed Belqasmi and Éric Marlière, *Casquette contre képis. Enquête sur la police de rue et l'usage de la force dans les quartiers populaires*, Paris, L'Harmattan, coll. “Recherche et transformation sociale”, 2013.

were perceived by the powers that be as a political, social, and cultural danger², but also as the future of industrial society.

Six factors account for the deterioration in their lifestyle since the early 1980s: the end of popular youth leadership, linked to the decline of trade unions and socialism; the political construction of a new internal enemy, the “youth of the housing estates”, particularly from North African and sub-Saharan immigration, often perceived as Muslims; the social relegation of the children of workers and immigrants, who can no longer become workers and are perceived as useless or even dangerous for national cohesion; the fact that the “middle classes” and the upper working classes have deserted the “neighborhoods”, reinforcing the stigma and sense of abandonment in working-class estates; repeated tensions with the police due to “exceptional treatment” in working-class neighborhoods, resulting in ritualized violence and stubborn personal grudges; a lack of political opportunities. As a result, residents and young people living in working-class urban neighborhoods see their future compromised.

Another new development since the 2010s has been the pitting of the working classes against each other: a caricature of the “good” white working classes, impoverished but silent, versus the “bad” working classes of the housing estates, impetuous yet “bottle-fed” by urban policies³.

A new generation?

A few nuances distinguish the riots of summer 2023 from previous riots. Firstly, social networks influenced the way images were disseminated and encouraged other young people from the “quartiers” to take part in the events, encouraging competition in violence and vandalism, including in a number of towns a priori unconcerned by the police “blunder” in Nanterre, such as Montargis in the Loiret region.

Secondly, artistic productions such as Ninho’s video clip for *25 grammes* (2023) and Romain Gavras’ film *Athéna* (2022) were mentioned by some of the teenagers we interviewed during the riot weekend. They bear disturbing similarities to the tragedy that took place at the end of June and are as much a part of the cultural repertoire of the teenagers we met as NTM, IAM or Assassin were for rap, and *Ma cité va craquer* (Jean-François Richet, 1997) or *La Haine* (Matthieu Kassowitz, 1995) for cinema⁴.

2 See Louis Chevalier, *Classes laborieuses et classes dangereuses pendant la première moitié du XIXe siècle*, Paris, Plon, 1958; and Henri Rey, *La peur des banlieues*, Paris, Presses de Sciences-po, coll. “Bibliothèque du citoyen”, 1996.

3 See in particular Christophe Guilluy, *La France périphérique. Comment on a sacrifié les classes populaires*, Paris, Flammarion, 2014. This thesis, put forward by the far right and now certain right-wing elected representatives, accentuates a prejudicial media view of the inhabitants of suburban HLM housing estates.

4 See Laurent Mucchielli, “Le rap de la jeunesse des quartiers relégués. Un univers de représentations

What's more, while state institutions such as police stations, schools and other public buildings that house youth support structures were once again attacked, we saw more intense attacks on certain businesses, symbols of consumer society and the financial capitalist world, such as PMU bars (bars where one can gamble) brand-name clothing stores and, more rarely, banks. While some youngsters looted with the intention of reselling, others pilfered basic necessities (milk, cereals), showing that the living conditions of some teenagers in these neighborhoods are rather difficult.

Some teenagers obviously joined the riots to share thrills with their friends and be part of a collective experience. Minutes show that some teenagers took part in the violence without knowing the event that triggered it, namely the death of a young person killed by the police following a refusal to obey. But the riot was seen as a political achievement by the protagonists, a far cry from daily failures or submission to institutions perceived as repressive⁵. Admittedly, these young people have no revolutionary aims and are not seeking to reform society, but they are expressing a desire to free themselves from economic and social constraints, between an elitist and humiliating school system and access to a first job, often unrewarding and poorly paid, that is always delayed⁶.

Repoliticizing youthful anger

The riots at the start of the summer come after a series of states of emergency that have weakened the legitimacy of institutions among the French, particularly the working classes: the crackdowns that followed the 2015 attacks, the *Gilets jaunes* movement, the handling of the Covid epidemic and pension reform. Attacks on town halls and elected officials, such as the ram-car attack on the home of the mayor of L'Haÿ-les-Roses, are seen as an expression of revenge against institutions that the working classes see as contemptuous of their difficulties⁷.

The riots are a revelation of the country's political situation: a denunciation, albeit violent or uncivil, of the way in which elected officials, whether on the left or the right, refuse to negotiate with working-class people facing growing economic and social difficulties. The riots reflect the despair of parents, the disappointment of a neighbor involved in a neighborhood association, or the bitterness of a grad-

structuré par des sentiments d'injustice et de victimation collectives", in Manuel Boucher and Alain Vulbeau (eds.), *Émergences culturelles et jeunesse populaire. Turbulences ou médiations*, Paris, L'Harmattan, coll. "Débats jeunesse", pp. 325-355.

5 See Romain Huët, *Le vertige de l'émeute. De la ZAD aux Gilets jaunes*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 2019.

6 See É. Marlière, "Les recompositions culturelles des 'jeunes de cité' à l'épreuve des déterminismes sociaux et des effets du chômage, de la discrimination et de la ségrégation urbaine", *Lien social et politique*, no. 70, Fall 2013, pp. 103-117.

7 See É. Marlière, *La France nous a lâchés! Le sentiment d'injustice chez les jeunes de cité*, Paris, Fayard, 2008.

uate sister, confronted with precariousness and discrimination. The repressive response, in the form of summary trials, minimum sentences and prison sentences for minor offences, illustrates the political determination to delegitimize popular anger. Why not listen to the activists and association leaders from the “neighborhoods” instead?⁸

The 2005 riots have been described as “*proto-political*”, “*infra-political*” or “*metapolitical*”.⁹ While the rioters’ motivations were not directly political, long-term economic and social issues underpinned their actions. Politicians should therefore pay particular attention to popular revolts if they want to put an end to the vicious cycle of urban riots.

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8 See Julien Talpin, *Bâillonner les quartiers. Comment le pouvoir réprime les mobilisations populaires*, Ronchin, Les Étaques, 2020.

9 See Gérard Mauger, *Lémeute de novembre 2005. Une révolte protopolitique*, Broissieux, Éditions du Croquant, coll. “Savoir/agir”, 2006; Denis Merklen, *Quartiers populaires, quartiers politiques*, preface by Robert Castel, Paris, La Dispute, 2009; and Alain Bertho, *Le temps des émeutes*, Paris, Bayard, 2009.

10 First published in *Revue Esprit* Nov 2023.

Male-on-Male Sexual Homicide: A Systematic Review

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ABSTRACT

Sexual homicide has been heavily studied, yet the majority of the studies have focused on male offenders killing female victims (MFSH), thereby neglecting male-on-male sexual homicide (MMSH), i.e., instances where an adult male offender murders an adult male victim. To summarize the current understanding of this crime type, a systematic review was conducted. The objective was to provide a clearer picture of MMSH, e.g., how common it is, its modus operandi (i.e., offending pattern), and demographic characteristics of victims and the offenders. Following PRISMA (2009) guidelines, a thorough search of four databases (PsychInfo, PubMed, Web of Science and ScienceDirect) was conducted yielding a total of 165 records. After an in-depth record screening (excluding duplicates and records written in non-English language) 116 records remained. Following a second screening process a total of four full-text empirical articles were eligible for inclusions. The summation of the studies suggests that; MMSH remains a low base rate phenomenon, that motivational differences and a new three-type classification are present within this group, and that differences in offending patterns also exist between MMSH and MFSH. Today's research collectively supports the presence of a suggestive heterogeneity both within MMSH but also within sexual homicide in general.

Keywords: Male Offender, Male Victim, Modus Operandi, Male-on-Male Sexual Homicide, Sexual Homicide

Homicidio sexual de hombre a hombre: una revisión sistemática

RESUMEN

El homicidio sexual ha sido ampliamente estudiado, sin embargo, la mayoría de los estudios se han centrado en delincuentes masculinos que matan a víctimas femeninas (MFSH), descuidando así el homicidio sexual entre hombres (MMSH), es decir, casos en los que un delincuente adulto asesina a un hombre adulto. víctima. Para resumir la comprensión actual de este tipo de delito, se realizó una revisión sistemática. El objetivo era proporcionar una imagen más clara de MMSH, por ejemplo, qué tan común es, su modus operandi (es decir, patrón delictivo) y las características demográficas de las víctimas y los delincuentes. Siguiendo las directrices de PRISMA (2009), se realizó una búsqueda exhaustiva en cuatro bases de datos (PsychInfo, PubMed, Web of Science y ScienceDirect) que arrojó un total de 165 registros. Después de una revisión exhaustiva de los registros (excluyendo duplicados y registros escritos en un idioma distinto del inglés), quedaron 116 registros. Después de un segundo proceso de selección, un total de cuatro artículos empíricos en texto completo fueron elegibles para su inclusión. El resumen de los estudios sugiere que; MMSH sigue siendo un fenómeno de tasa base baja, que dentro de este grupo están presentes diferencias motivacionales y una nueva clasificación de tres tipos, y que también existen diferencias en los patrones delictivos entre MMSH y MFSH. La investigación actual respalda colectivamente la presencia de una sugerente heterogeneidad tanto dentro de MMSH como dentro de los homicidios sexuales en general.

Palabras clave: Delincuente masculino, Víctima masculina, Modus Operandi, Homicidio sexual de hombre a hombre, Homicidio sexual

男性对男性的性凶杀：一项系统性综述

摘要

性凶杀已被深入研究，但大多数研究都聚焦于男性犯罪者杀害女性受害者 (MFSH)，从而忽视了男性对男性的性凶杀 (MMSH)，即一名成年男性犯罪者谋杀一名成年男性受害者。

为了总结目前对该犯罪类型的认识，进行了一项系统性综述。目的旨在更清晰地理解MMSH，例如其常见程度、作案手法（即犯罪模式）、以及受害者和犯罪者的人口特征。根据PRISMA(2009)指南，对四个数据库（PsychInfo、PubMed、Web of Science和ScienceDirect）进行了全面检索，总共产生了165条记录。经过一项深度的记录筛选（去除重复记录和非英语记录），剩下116条记录。经过第二次筛选后，共有四篇实证文章（全文）符合研究。研究总结表明：MMSH仍然是一种低基础率现象，该群体内存在动机差异和一项新的分类（分为三类），并且MMSH和MFSH之间也存在犯罪模式差异。本研究共同支持一种暗示性异质性的存在，这种异质性不仅存在于MMSH，还存在于一般的性凶杀。

关键词：男性犯罪者，男性受害人，作案手法，男性对男性的性凶杀，性凶杀

1. Introduction

Globally, the occurrence of sexual homicide is a low base rate phenomenon. Prior studies have estimated that sexual homicides comprise approximately one to five percent of all reported homicides annually (Chan, 2017, Chan & Heide, 2009; Chan & Heide, 2016; James & Proulx, 2014). There are however discrepancies in the reporting rates of sexual homicide which may, at least in part, be due to the inconsistent criteria used in classifying this offense (Chan, 2015; Chan & Heide, 2009). Although sexual homicide rarely occurs, it has been the subject of much research over the years. However, the majority of this research has focused on male-on-female sexual homicides (MFHS, e.g., Chan, Myers, & Heide, 2010; James & Proulx, 2014) thereby neglecting the male offender group who sexually murder male victims (henceforth referred to as male-on-male sexual homicide: MMSH). This is despite the fact that these two offender groups may differ in important ways.

A recent review of the sexual homicide literature (Chan & Heide, 2009), examined 32 published empirical studies, conducted between the mid 1980s to 2008, with the majority of these studies derived from North America. The review highlighted the commonness of comparative studies in the study of sexual homicide offenders and that sexual murderers have often been contrasted with other specific populations, e.g., non-sexual murderers and other violent offenders such as psychopaths and sadists who do not murder their victims (e.g., Stefanska, Beech, & Carter, 2016). The majority of the offenders in their review were adult male sexual offenders of which about half, rather than murdering a specific victim group,

murdered different victim types (i.e., adult women, elderly women, adult men, and children). In the review by Chan and Hide (2009), only six empirical studies from the mid 1980s were conducted on specific type victim types, and only one study was conducted on MMSH.

In view of the gap in the literature on MMSH, the present review aims to further its current scientific understanding by summarizing these studies focusing on its frequency, the modus operandi, typologies as well as the characteristics of the offenders and their victims.

1.1. Definition of Sexual Homicide

Over the past two decades, several definitions of sexual homicide have been proposed by scholars and practitioners (see Chan & Heide, 2009 for a review). Currently, the most widely used definition of sexual homicide in research is (or based on) the one by Ressler, Burgess, and Douglas (1986). This initial comprehensive definition of sexual homicide relies entirely on physical evidence readily available at the crime scene or obtained during the investigation. In order for a murder to be considered sexual, the murder has to include at least one of the following: (a) the victim lacks clothing, (b) exposure of the sexual parts of the victim's body, (c) the body is found in a sexually explicit position, (d) insertion of foreign objects into the victim's body cavity (anus, vagina, or mouth), (e) there is evidence of sexual intercourse, and (f) there is evidence of substitute sexual activity (e.g., masturbation and ejaculation at the crime scene) or of sadistic fantasy (e.g., mutilation of the genitals). Holmes and Holmes (2001) instead define sexual homicide more simply as a combination of lethal violence with a sexual element. In contrast, other studies (Meloy, Gacono, & Kennedy, 1994; Meloy, 2000) argue that for a crime scene to be classified as a sexual homicide, physical evidence of sexual assault or of sexual activity in the immediate area of the victim's body should be present, and/or a legally admissible confession from the offender indicating sexual contact during the murder should be obtained. The latest definition of sexual homicide was introduced by Chan (2015), in which one of the following criteria had to be met to be defined as a sexual homicide: (1). Physical evidence of pre-/peri- and/or post-mortem sexual assault (vaginal, oral, or anal) against the victim. (2). Physical evidence of substitute sexual activity against the victim (e.g., exposure of sexual organs or sexual positioning of the victim's body, insertion of foreign objects into the victim's body cavities, and genital mutilation) or in the immediate area of the victim's body (e.g., masturbation) reflecting the deviant or sadistic sexual fantasy of the offender. (3). A legally admissible offender confession of the sexual motive of the offense that intentionally or unintentionally resulted in a homicide. (4). An indication of the sexual element(s) of the offense from the offender's personal belonging (e.g., journal entries and/or home computer).

1.2 Classifications of Sexual Homicide

Several typologies of sexual homicide has also been previously identified (Beauregard & Proulx, 2002; Beech, Robertson, & Clarke, 2001; Clarke & Carter, 1999; Folino, 2000; Higgs, Carter, Tully & Browne, 2017; Kocsis, Cooksey & Irwin, 2002; Keppel & Walter, 1999; Meloy, 2000; Ressler, Burgess & Douglas 1988). Unfortunately, the various typologies all contain some important limitations (Beauregard, Proulx, Briend, & St.-Yves, 2005; Beauregard, Proulx, Briend, & St.-Yves, 2007; Beauregard & Proulx, 2007). These limitations may concern the number of offenders, victims or both, the source of data (e.g., interviews, surveys, police records and/or databases), the classification method used, and the type of sexual murderer (e.g., by combining serial and single-victim offenders, and/or mixing victim groups).

The most pioneering work in introducing a framework to study sexual homicide and its typologies, was the organized/disorganized typology, which was identified and developed by agents within The Federal Bureau of Investigation (Burgess, Hartman, Ressler, Douglas, & McCormack, 1986; Ressler et al., 1988). Based on a sample of 36 convicted sexual murderers, the FBI proposed a dichotomous typology, the Organized/Disorganized Offender. Using a mixture of crime scene behaviors and background variables (e.g., intelligence, childhood upbringing, familial structure), they developed behavioral profiles. Based on the offender's behavior at the crime scene and his choice of victim, law enforcement inferred personality, developmental, and lifestyle characteristics, which in turn could aid the investigation and apprehension of the offender.

The Organized Offender is the intelligent offender. He carefully plans his offenses, leaves very little evidence at the crime scene, and chooses victims he does not know (Ressler et al. 1989). It is believed that this well-defined script—referring to the offender's knowledge structure or sequence of decision making—represented the Organized Offender's deviant sexual fantasy to kill his victims—sexually sadistic fantasy. In contrast, the Disorganized Offender is believed to instead target familiar victims, not planning his attack and killing out of anger and rage (Ressler et al. 1986). According to the FBI, this disorganized type is unaware of his sexually deviant need to murder his victim. Instead, he acts violently at the time of the offense and situational factors (for instance, if the victim fights back) influence the lethality of the offense.

The FBI's classification has several strengths. For instance, it is readily operationalized, and its definition is broader than other definitions by suggesting that sexual homicide is not exclusively motivated by sadism or lust (Proulx, Beauregard, Cusson, & Nicole, 2007). Another strength is that this classification does not assume that sexual homicides are premeditated acts from the beginning. Instead, it allows for the situation to affect the offenders' behavior and to influence the outcome (Mieczkowski & Beauregard, 2010). As pointed out by Higgs et al. (2017), there are also numerous limitations apparent within this framework. For instance,

the FBI dichotomy has a weak methodology, e.g., a lack of standardized interview procedure and their categorization of offenders is based on the crime phase and crime scene behaviors. Another limitation is that the development of the typology contains a sampling bias in that they have an over-representation of serial murders. Those who commit one or two sexual homicides might differ markedly from those who commit multiple sexual homicides. Limitations such as these therefore collectively decreases the validity of any findings based on this typology (Beauregard & Proulx, 2002, Meloy, 2000; Salfati & Taylor, 2006). Nonetheless, the FBI typology has been partially supported by empirical research (e.g., Canter, Alison, Alison, & Wentink, 2004). For instance, similar to the FBI typology, Beauregard and Proulx (2002, see also Proulx, Beauregard, Cusson, & Nilcoe, 2007) found evidence for two types of sexual murderers—the sadistic type and the angry type, which in many respects resemble the FBI's Organized and Disorganized Offenders, respectively. On the other hand, additional research has identified additional types of sexual murderers (Beech, Fisher & Ward, 2005; Beech, Oliver, Fisher, & Beckett, 2006). For instance, unlike the FBI, Beech et al. (2006) identified three distinct types of sexual murderers: (i) the calculated pain infliction, (ii) the grievance driven murderers, and (iii) the rape plus murder group. Interestingly, both the calculated pain infliction and grievance driven groups shared resemblance both with the FBI's Organized/ Disorganized Offender types, as well as with Beauregard's typologies of a sadistic /angry offender type.

Taken together, the literature on sexual homicide suggests that there may be different types of sexual homicide offenders or different pathways to sexual homicide. This is supportive of suggestive heterogeneity within sexual homicide (Beauregard et al., 2005; Healey et al., 2016) in general, without a further inspection of e.g., the victim groups.

1.3 Classifications of Male-on-Male Sexual Homicide

Sexual homicide with male victims by male offenders corresponds to the same definition of sexual homicide as presented by Ressler et al. (1988). The first typology specifically for MMSH was presented in 1996 by Geberth. It suggested a six-type classification of what he referred to as homosexual homicide: (1) interpersonal violence-oriented disputes, (2) murders involving forced anal rape and/or sodomy, (3) lust murder, (4) homosexual serial murders, (5) robbery and/or homicide of homosexuals, and (6) homophobic assaults and gay bashing. Importantly, the last three types are motivated by power, financial gain, or hate, rather than sex.

In Geberth's (1996) study, interpersonal violence-oriented disputes were the most common type of sexual murder of men and they were often the result of disputes between partners, ex-partners, or love triangles. The murder may have been triggered by instances where ground rules were not respected by one of the men involved in the sexual activity. Also, these homicides may be committed in a

context of prostitution, where the prostitute or hustler denies being a homosexual and responds with extreme violence to this threat of his masculinity.

The second type of homicide identified describes homicides involving forced anal rape and/or sodomy. Although these murders were usually sexually motivated, there was no sexual gratification associated with the killing. Instead, death occurred mainly from the amount of force used to overcome the victim's resistance or to prevent identification.

Lust murder, the third type of homicide (Geberth, 1996), often entailed evidence of sadism and mutilation to the victim's genitals, and the crime was meticulously premeditated according to the deviant sexual fantasies of the offender. Also, the offender himself exhibits several characteristics in line with Hare's (1993) description of a psychopath i.e., cunning, superficially charming, and callous.

The fourth type of homicide identified was referred to as the homosexual serial murderers. These offenders hunt for vulnerable and easy to control victims, often children and prostitutes. This type of homicide involves lust murders, thrill killings, child killings, and robbery homicides which were homosexually oriented. They could be characterized by acts of mutilation and dismemberment of the victim's bodies in order to facilitate its transportation or simply to prevent identification of the victim. According to Geberth (1996), sex was secondary for this type of offenders. Instead, control and power over the victim were the main motivations. Three subtypes of homosexual serial murders have further been distinguished by Geberth (1996): (i) the homosexual serial killer who exclusively targets other male homosexual victims, (ii) the homosexual-oriented serial killer who attacks heterosexual and homosexual victims, and (iii) the male pedophile homosexual serial killer who attacks young boys and men.

In the fifth type, the robbery and/or homicide of homosexuals, the offenders hunted for potential victims engaging in high-risk behaviors (e.g., cruising), and they search in locations known to be frequented by homosexuals (e.g., gay bars, saunas). Some, either alone or in a group, would use homosexual prostitution as a vehicle to assault or rob a gay customer who is willing to pay to have sex.

The sixth type identified by Geberth (1996) was the homophobic assaults and gay bashing type. These incidents were performed by individuals showing an intense hatred for homosexuals.

As with the above stated definitions of sexual homicide, Geberth (1996) typology is not without limitations. First, the sample which was used to develop the typology was not described. Second, the variables included are limited to the crime scene, hence neglecting the pre-crime phase as well as the characteristics of the offenders. Despite the various limitations of the current typologies, they have advanced the research on MMSH and continue to help researchers and others to better understand conditions and/or factors that may be present in this crime

type. Nonetheless, the scant research remains a problem for furthering our understanding of this particular crime type. The aim of this review is to summarize the current knowledge of MMSH and thereby provide a clearer picture of this understudied crime type.

2. Method

This study was conducted in accordance with the PRISMA guidelines (Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, Altman, & Group, 2009). Articles published in English peer-review journals were included if they principally focused on homicide in general, and/or sexual homicide in particular. Although not all publications had to concentrate on the concept of MMSH, it had to be mentioned and to some degree explored in the study in order to be included.

The following four databases were used to identify all published studies from inception to January 1, 2019 (Appendix): PsychInfo, PubMed, Web of Science and ScienceDirect. The search made for each database included the terms “sexual homicide,” “sexual murder,” “lust murder,” “lust homicide,” “male-on-male sexual homicide,” “male-on-male sexual murder,” “sexual killing,” “sexual murder,” “homosexual murder,” “homosexual homicide,” and “male victim.” When permitted, “non-sexual murder,” “non-sexual homicide,” “child victim,” “boys,” and “girls” were terms that were excluded from the database search. Studies only focusing on sexual homicides in general and/or if it was impossible to extract any type of information on male victims killed by male offenders separate from female victims, were excluded.

Initially, all titles and abstracts of articles discussing MMSH were screened, and those deemed compatible with the objectives of the study were further reviewed. Information from included publications were extracted regarding the focus of the study, as well as data discussing MMSH with respect to rates, modus operandi (e.g., offending patterns including typologies), and offender-, and victim demographics. All included publications were then compared to each other.

3. Results

3.1 Study Selection

The study selection and inclusion are shown in the flow diagram (Figure 1). A total of 165 articles were initially identified and screened, of which five were deemed to be eligible for inclusion. One publication previously deemed eligible in the search was later excluded for failing to meet the objectives of the study. Four papers were included in the final review.




Figure 1. PRISMA flow diagram over study selection and inclusion.

3.2 Focus of Studies

The included publications in this study are original articles that principally focused on criminology and sexual abuse. Only one of the publications concentrated on the concept of MMSH, but it was mentioned and to some degree went viral in the remaining studies. The study’s characteristics and the most important findings of the included studies are presented in Table 1. The studies were conducted between 2007 and 2019 in four countries: two studies conducted in the USA, one in Canada and one in China. A total of 5,774 sexual homicide victims were included in the studies, of which 1021 (17.7%) were victims of male-on-male sexual homicide. The articles all had a different focal point regarding sexual homicide (e.g., the choice of weapon used and whether the offender mutilated the victims or not). The included studies (limited to their mentioning of MMSH) are presented below in chronological order.

Table 1. Study characteristics and main findings of the included studies

Author(S)	Focus of study	Type of article	Country	Data source	Year span	Sample Size	SH definition based on	Variables	Statistical approach	Study aim	Main findings
Beauregard & Proulx (2007)	Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology	Original article	Canada	Police reports, interviews, institutional files, autopsy reports, crime scene info	1998 – 2000	10 of 60 SH (16.7%)	Ressler, Burgess, & Douglas (1988)	Offender Demographics (i.e., age, marital status, academic degree, living situation, drugs/alcohol, sexual orientation) Victim Demographics (i.e., age, race, work type, living situation, drugs/alcohol, sexual orientation) Criminal Career Variables (2): Occupational problems, relational problems. Offender Criminal Antecedents (4): - property crimes, nonsexual violent crimes, sexual crimes, more than one type of crimes	Descriptive statistics of MSHO who murdered male victims	To improve the current knowledge of sexual murderers of men by describing a group of men who killed another man in sexual context. Based on this information they aimed to develop a new classification of male-on-male SH.	Proposed a new classification of three distinctive types of male offenders who murder male victims: the avenger, the sexual predator and the nonsexual predator. Their results are discussed in relation to routine activity theory (RA1).
Chan & Beauregard (2016)	Investigative Psychology and	Original article	USA	FBI's SHR Offender/victim demographics,	1976 – 2011	467 of 2472 SH (18.9%)	Burgess, Hartman, Ressler, Douglas &	Offender Demographics (i.e., age group, race)	Chi-square Automatic Interaction	To examine possible interactions between victim	MSHO choose weapon type according to some

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Offender Profiling	Original article	USA	characteristics of each homicide event	1976–2012	535 of 3160 SH (16.9%)	Chan (2015), Ressler, Burgess, & Douglas (1988)	Victim demographics (i.e., age group, race, gender) Murder weapon type (2): -Edge weapon (i.e. different types of knives) -Personal weapon (e.g., beating, asphyxiation, strangulation, drowning) Geographical Urbanness (2): -More populated (i.e. large and small cities, > 2500 citizen) - Less populated (suburban and rural areas)	Detector (CHAID), Conjunctive analysis (OR)	characteristics and the choice of weapon type by male SHO.	victim characteristics. An edge weapon (knife) was preferred by male SHO when their victim was a male victim, especially those who were from a different racial background. A personal weapon was preferred by MSHO when their victim was perceived to be physically weaker than they were (e.g., children/adolescents) of both sexes, especially those from a different racial background.
Chan, Heide & Beauregard (2019)	Sexual Abuse	USA	FBI SHR Offender data, offense data (demographics of offender & victims, characteristics of homicidal incident reports	1976–2012	535 of 3160 SH (16.9%)	Chan (2015), Ressler, Burgess, & Douglas (1988)	Offender demographics (4) (i.e., gender, age type, age group and race) Victim Demographics (4): (i.e., gender, age group victim type by age/gender, race) Murder Weapon Type (4): - Personal weapon (i.e. killing with hands), - Contact weapon	Cross tabular Chi-square (X^2) analysis, independent t-tests, Measures of association (Phi, Cramer's V)	Exploring the difference between male (N=3009) and female (N=151) SHO with respect to their use of weapons in killing their victims.	Male SHO used more personal weapons and female SHO used more firearms in their crime commission. Different trends were found in regards to murder weapon used by male and female SHO from different age groups. The type of weapon used by SHO was in part influenced by victim characteristics. Female SHO mostly

Chan & Li (2019)	Sexual abuse	Original article	China (regions: Shanghai, Wuhan, Guangdong)	A. Police data (i.e., crime data, death scene investigation records, suspect interrogation records, autopsy reports) B. Chinese online journal databases	1988 – 2018 (A): 2004 – 2018, B: 1994 – 2018)	9 of 82 SH (11.0%)	Chan (2015)	(i.e. blunt objects), - Edge weapon (i.e. knives) - Firearms (i.e. shotguns) Murder Weapon Group (2): - More physically demanding (i.e. personal/contact weapons) - Less physically demanding (i.e. edge weapon/firearms)	Offender Demographics (7) (i.e., age, sex, marital status, education, employment, previous convictions, previous sexual convictions) Victim Demographics (4): (i.e. age, sex, marital status, employment) Offence Characteristics (MO) (12): (i.e., nature of the homicide, time of day, offence location, previous sexual offence convictions, offenders primary motivation,	Cross tabular Chi-square (X ²) analyses and Fisher's exact tests; Measures of association (Phi, Cramer's V)	Exploring offending characteristics of male (N=30) and female (N=1) SHO who mutilated their victims and to compare their MO with non-mutilation sexual murderers.	used physically less demanding weapons, Males more likely to use physically more demanding weapons, consistent with the Physical Strength Hypothesis. When the victim is male and an adult, the probabilities of the victim to be murdered by a physically more demanding weapon was low. SHO who mutilate their victims were more likely to have previous sexual offense convictions. SHO who mutilate their victims were mostly motivated by sex and least motivated by financial gain. Victim abduction prior to the offense was more often reported in non-mutilation SH. No differences between M-FSH and M-MSH when comparing mutilated and non-mutilated SH cases
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3.3 Literature Review

3.3.1 Classifying Sexual Homicide Against Men

The descriptive study by Beauregard and Proulx (2007) introduced a comprehensive and research-oriented classification of MMSH. To qualify for the study, the offenders had to meet at least one criterion of the definition of a sexual homicide used by Ressler et al. (1988). Although their data did not allow for statistical analyses to be conducted, an exploratory analysis of 10 offenders successfully distinguished sexual murderers who murder males into three categories.

The first type, the Avenger, corresponded well to Geberth's (1996) interpersonal violence-oriented disputes and assaults type. These offenders were usually involved in prostitution activities and could be of any sexual orientation. The consumption of drugs and alcohol were important features of the Avenger. Before escalating to murder, he had often been convicted of property crimes as well as violent crimes. They also reported having experienced psychological, physical, and sexual abuse as children. The sexual activity requested by the client in a prostitution context, or a triggering event during or after the sexual exchange, suggestively triggered memory from the abuse, unleashing immense rage within the offender and resulting in the murder itself. This type of sexual homicide was suggested to be preceded by anger and often committed by strangulation or the use of a weapon (of opportunity, i.e., phone cord).

The Sexual Predator was instead mainly motivated by deviant sexual fantasies, and therefore corresponds to the lust murderer of Geberth's typology (1996). He is homosexual in his sexual orientation, and he presents criminal antecedents of sexual crimes, primarily against male children or adolescents. The sexual assault and the homicide are considered premeditated. In many cases the victim is an adolescent or young man (not necessarily of homosexual orientation), unknown to the offender. The offending process begins with the abduction and/ or confinement of the victim, and sadistic acts, e.g., mutilations, sodomy, and humiliation, are all performed during the crime. Expressive violence is found on the victim's body, and the crime committed often lasts more than 30 minutes and up to 24 hours.

The third type presented by Beauregard and Proulx (2007) was the Nonsexual Predator. This type corresponds to the robbery and/or homicide of homosexuals as previously described by Geberth (1996). The primary motivation to commit the crime is to rob the victim. It is therefore often described as a robbery that escalates into murder because of the victim's resistance. The authors conclude that this offender uses the visibility and the homosexual orientation of the victim to seduce him and to bring him to an isolated area where he will be able to commit his crime without interference. The victim is presumably selected based on his vulnerability, easy access, and visibility. The offender himself may or may not be

homosexual in orientation, and he may act alone or together with an accomplice. The violence is instrumental as it serves to commit the burglary and to overcome the victim's resistance (hence in order to achieve a goal), whereas the sexual contact instead serves to trap the victim. In contrast to the previous (Sexual Predator) type, the duration of the crime is typically short. In accordance with the first type of offender (the Avenger), he may use alcohol or drugs prior to the crime and these types of offenders often have diversified criminal careers (with an emphasis on property crimes). The authors suggested that homosexual men are victimized mainly because of their situational vulnerability and the theoretical framework of routine activity was suggested to be directly applicable to MMSH.

3.3.2 Choice of Weapon Used in Sexual Homicide

Based on Burgess et al. (1986) definition of sexual homicide as the "killing [of] another in the context of power, control, sexuality and aggressive brutality" (p.252), Chan and Beauregard (2016) hypothesized that the choice of weapon type made by (single-victim) male sexual offenders (being a personal weapon, an edge weapon or another weapon type) would, in part, be influenced by the characteristics of the victim. Of their total sample of male offenders, only a minority constituted male victims (18.9%).

They first examined the choice of using a knife (an edge weapon) to commit a sexual homicide. The results showed that the most important predictor was victim age, with male offenders being more likely to use a knife to kill an adult than a non-adult (male or female) victim. Results also showed that male offenders who target an adult male victim (MMSH) from a greater geographically populated area (i.e., cities with a population of at least 2,500) were more likely to commit the murder using a knife. Offenders targeting non-adult victims were more likely to use a different weapon during the crime. The second analysis on the choice of killing with their own hands (a personal weapon) showed that the most important predictor was the victim's gender (rather than age). In MFSH offenders were more likely to kill with their own hands as compared MMSH. Offenders who target a non-adult female (MFSH) were also more likely to kill with their own hands, as compared to adult MMSH.

Results furthermore revealed that offenders were more likely to use a knife on male victims, those of a different race and if the victim was a stranger non-adult (OR=2.41) or not a stranger adult (OR=2.18). The offenders were least likely to use a knife during the commission of the crime when the victim was male, non-adult, not a stranger but of a different race from the perpetrator (OR=0.24). For killing with their own hands, the most likely combination was that the victim was male, non-adult, not a stranger, but of a different race than the offender (OR=3.55). The least likely combination was that the victim was male, not an adult but a stranger and of a different race than the offender (OR=0.15). The geographical urbanness

of the offense was also examined. Focusing on the odds of a decision to use a knife, the most likely combination was that the victim was male, non-adult, a stranger, of a different race than the offender and from a more populated area (OR=7.24). The male offenders were the least likely to use a knife when the victim was a male, a stranger and of a different race than the offender, and when the crime was committed in a less populated area (OR=0.14). Concerning the decision to kill with their own hands, the most likely combination was that the victim was male, non-adult, not a stranger, of a different race than the offender and from a more populated area (OR=11.99). Male offenders were least likely to kill with their own hands when the victim was male, adult, a stranger, of a different race than the offender and when the crime was committed in a more populated environment (OR=0.05).

3.3.3. Gender Differences for Weapon Preferences in Sexual Homicide

A similar study was conducted a few years later by Chan, Heide and Beauregard (2019) using Ressler et al. (1988) and Chan's (2015) definition of sexual homicide. Their study also aimed to examine the choice of weapon used by comparing male to female sexual homicide offenders. Of their total sample of cases included in the study (3160) 535 cases constituted MMSH. Four weapon types were examined: personal weapons (i.e., killing with hands and feet, strangulation, beating with bare hands, asphyxiation, drowning and defenestration), contact weapon (i.e., blunt objects), edge weapon (knives), and firearms (i.e., handgun, shotgun, and rifle). The weapon types were also divided into two weapon groups: those more physically demanding (i.e., personal or contact weapons) or those physically less demanding (i.e., edge weapon or firearms). Results showed a significant group difference for the type of weapon that was used by a male versus female (single victim) offenders in murdering different sex of victims. Relative to female offenders, male offenders were more likely to use weapons that were physically more demanding (personal and contact weapons) in killing of victims of the opposite sex ($\Phi = -.10$). Female offenders were more likely than male offenders to use weapons that were physically less demanding (e.g., edge weapons and firearms) in killing victims of the opposite sex ($\Phi = -.42$). Further analyses indicated that male offenders ($B = 0.79$) were more likely to use an edge weapon in killing their victim, whereas male victims ($B = -.026$) were less likely to be killed by an edge weapon in sexual homicide. They also examined the effects of offender and victim demographics on weapons that were physically more demanding in killing their victims. Their results showed that male offenders ($B = 1.50$) were more likely to use weapons that were more physically demanding. These weapons were less likely to be used in cases of male and adult victims ($B = -1.13$, and $B = -.83$ respectively).

3.3.4. Mutilation of Victims in Sexual Homicide

The most recent study included in this review (Chan & Li, 2019) examined the offending characteristic of sexual homicide offenders who mutilated their victims,

comparing their MO with non-mutilation sexual homicide offenders. To be included in their sample, one of Chan's (2015) previously stated sexual homicide definitions had to be met. Of the total 82 sample of offenders, nine cases concerned MMSH. Of these cases, only three were identified as cases of mutilation (33.3 %) and six cases without mutilation, (66.7%). Of interest for the current study was that their results did not reach significant levels when comparing MMSH to MFSH mutilation and non-mutilation cases ($X^2 = .09$, $(SD=1)$, $\Phi/Cramer's V = .03$). Hence, their findings indicated that there are no differences between MFSH and MMSH concerning whether the body was mutilated or not. The article included no further discussion on the concept of MMSH separate from MFSH. However, overall, the most commonly used methods to mutilate the victim bodies (male or females) before and after the death was the following: most offenders (29%) slashed or cut the victim's erogenous organs (e.g., breasts, vagina, and anus). The slashing or cutting of the victim's non-erogenous organs (e.g., hands, feet, and other body parts) was also frequently reported (25.8%), followed by the postmortem mutilation act of necrophilia (e.g., raping the corpse, 19.4%), and acts to damage the body (e.g., burning and scattering foreign objects of the victims' body, 19.4%). Acts of overkill were the least reported (e.g., multiple stab wounds, 6.4%). However, existing literature suggest that mutilation is rarely observed in sexual killings where monetary benefit is the primary motivation. In this type of sexual homicide committed by males, sex is only used as a means to gain trust from the victim for financial gain, especially in MMSH, as pointed out above (Beauregard & Proulx, 2007; Chan, Li, Liu, & Lu, 2019; Geberth, 1996).

4. Discussion

The intent of this systematic review was to summarize the current knowledge of MMSH focusing on its frequency in order to identify the possible offending patterns as well as characteristics of the offenders and their male victims. The studies included in this review all discuss the concept of male victims to some extent but none of them provided detailed statistical analyses on this particular topic. In addition, this review consists of four studies therein reflecting the scant research on this crime type. Such limitations present a serious drawback for any conclusions to be drawn. For instance, although one of the four studies focused specifically on the concept of male victims, it was limited to a descriptive methodology due to their small sample size. In addition, none of the remaining three studies presented considerable information on the male victim type separate from females. However, an important point to be made is that the majority of the studies included in this current study were published after the year 2000, illustrating a growing interest in this particular crime. Notwithstanding these limitations the following could be concluded.

4.1. Frequency of Male-on-male Sexual Homicide

Sexual homicide is not a frequent type of crime and MMSH is even more rare (Chan, 2017; Chan & Heide, 2009; Chan & Heide, 2016; James & Proulx, 2014). This becomes apparent when focusing on the percentage of this crime type in relation to all sexual homicides reported in these articles. Of the total 5,774 sexual homicides reviewed in the four publications, 17.7 percent (N=1021) consisted of MMSH. This supports the traditional statement that the majority of victims in sexual homicides are female (and that the crimes are primarily committed primarily by men). Interestingly, one of the studies (Chan, Heide, & Beauregard, 2019) also reported the number of female offenders with female victims. Of their total sample (N=3160, of which 535 offenders were male who murdered male victims) only 17 cases consisted of female offenders who sexually murdered female victims. Hence, in a relative manner, 17.7% MMSH could here be regarded as a high number. Perhaps this is due to improved definitions of sexual homicide as well as the increased attention of MMSH in particular.

4.2 Modus Operandi in Male-on-male Sexual Homicide and in Contrast to Female Victims

The summation suggests that offending pattern within MMSH differs, that male victims (as compared to female victims) are killed in a particular way by male offenders and that offenders who murder males exhibit different motivations for committing this type of crime.

The studies by the above presented authors also point towards differences in offending pattern within sexual homicide in general, concerning what type of weapons male offenders are more likely to be used on male versus female victims (Chan & Beauregard, 2016; Chan, Heide & Beauregard, 2019). For instance, knives appear to be preferred by male offenders when targeting a male, especially males from a different racial background (interracial killings). Personal weapons were instead preferred by male offenders when their victim was perceived to be weaker than they were, such as children and adolescents of both sexes and again especially those from a different racial background (Chan & Beauregard, 2016). For adult male victims, more physical strength is presumably needed for the kill (in line with the physical strength hypothesis (Chan & Heide, 2008; Chan, Heide, & Beauregard, 2019)). Using a personal weapon, e.g., killing with their hands (or other types of physically more demanding ways) may therefore not be a practical option. Instead, weapons that require less strength to operate, such as firearms may be more viable in killing an adult man. It can also be concluded that when focusing on whether the victim's body was mutilated or not, there does not appear to be any difference between MFSH and MMSH (Chan & Li, 2019).

4.3. Demographic Characteristics of the Male victim and the Male Offenders in Sexual Homicide and in Contrast to Female Victims

The majority of the studies herein reviewed did not report offender and/or victim characteristics separately for MMSH and MFSH hindering an extensive depiction of such demographics. Nonetheless, male victims of sexual homicide appear to be older than their male offenders (Beauregard & Proulx, 2007) yet whether male victims of male sexual homicide offenders are older or younger than female victims remain unknown. The findings that the male victims are older than their male offender are however in line with studies on homosexual violence in that that victims of homosexual sexual homicide tend to be older than their offender (Tremblay, Boucher, Ouimet, & Biron, 1998).

The consumption of alcohol and drugs among most of the offenders described by Beauregard and Proulx (2007) acts as a form of disinhibition leading to offenders acting angry and violently, thus resulting in impulsive behavior. It is however also possible that these offenders use their intoxicated state as an excuse to commit the crime (Amir, 1971). The consumption of alcohol and/or drugs prior to the commission of the killings has been shown in previous studies on MFSH (Beauregard & Proulx, 2002). The majority of the offenders described by Beauregard and Proulx (2007) also appeared to have a criminal antecedent prior to committing the sexual homicide and almost all crimes committed by their offenders were premeditated. Such evidence is in line with previous studies on MFSH (e.g., Nicole & Proulx, 2005). The results by Chan and Li (2019), suggesting that no difference existed between MMSH and MFSH concerning whether the body was mutilated or not, further emphasizes similarities between MMSH and MFSH. Furthermore, offenders of MMSH appear to exhibit a variety of motivating factors, some of which were motivated by rage, other factors by financial gain or sadistic fantasies. Interestingly, revenge and profit are motivations that have not been found in MFSH. As noted by Beauregard and Proulx (2007), motivations such as revenge and profit appear to be context-related, for instance financial difficulties or prostitution. This stresses the importance of looking at the entire criminal event in sexual homicide.

5. Conclusion

The aim of this review was to summarize the current research on MMSH. The afore-mentioned studies herein reviewed collectively indicates different patterns of offending within a male victim group but also as compared to a female victim group. Hence, this review supports a suggestive heterogeneity within sexual homicide more generally and in particular MMSH. For a better understanding regarding the nature of and the degree of such differences, more research is needed on both MMSH and MFSH. Such improvement must also address the limita-

tions that still exists within this field of research. First, a byproduct of the lack of a standardized definition and inconsistent criteria used in classifying the offence (Chan, 2015; Chan & Heide, 2009), is the relatively few numbers of published empirical studies of MMSH. In addition, and already noted in the existing literature, most studies on sexual homicide have used female victims. This introduces a serious gender bias. Other research has used mixing victim groups (i.e., without separating male from female victims) which hinders reliable conclusions to be drawn regarding possible differences and similarities that may exist within MMSH, as well as between MMSH in contrast to MFSH. There is a tremendous value in studying offenders who target specific victim groups and compare them to each other. However, while mixing victim types may be necessary to increase power in the analysis, it limits the extent to which any conclusions can be drawn. Other issues concerning potential biases are introduced with the use of incarcerated sexual murderers (Beauregard & Proulx, 2007).

This field of research may furthermore benefit from studying distinctive sets of psychological characteristics, methods of killing and motivational and situation factors in both MMSH and MFSH. It may also be beneficial to clarify what specific mental issues, e.g., personality disorders and other maladaptive personality traits (Sturup, Rode, Karlberg, von Vogelsang, Rying, & Caman, 2018), are prevalent among offenders of MMSH as compared to MFSH. Hence, not limiting the research to the criminal event but also including the clinical descriptions of the offenders. When using clinical features of the offenders in both MMSH and MFSH (e.g., focusing on their personality characteristics, motivations, and *modus operandi*) descriptive clinical features should preferably be compared with a healthy control group consisting of a nonoffending population. Without such a population, it is not possible to conclude that the prevalence of aberrant offender characteristics in sexual homicide in general, MMSH as well as MFSH, significantly differ from the “normal” population. Future studies will hopefully also continue to investigate differences between sexual homicides committed by men on children (e.g., Beauregard, Stone, Proulx, & Michaud, 2008) versus men and how female sexual homicide offenders (Chan & Frei, 2013; Chan, Frei, & Myers, 2013) who target females differ from MMSH. In addition, it remains a question for future studies to address the frequency of sexual homicides by men against men in Europe, since the data from these studies originated from China, the USA, and Canada.

Conflict of Interest

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APPENDIX

As illustrated in Table 1A, a thorough search of four databases was conducted during identification. Collectively, 165 records were retrieved in the identification step.

Table 1A. Identification

Database	Advanced Search type	Included words	Excluded words	Time period	Document type	Text availability	Language	Subject	Age	Total records identified
PubMed	Title/ Abstract	Sexual homicide Sexual murder Lust homicide Lust murder Male-on-male sexual homicide Male-on-male sexual murder Sexual killing Thrill killing Homosexual homicide Homosexual murder	Children Boys Girls	1900-01-01 to 2019-01-01	Journal article	Full text	English	Human	19+	53
Science Direct	Abstract, keywords or author- specified keywords	Sexual homicide Sexual murder Lust homicide Lust murder Male-on-male sexual homicide Male-on-male sexual murder Sexual killing Thrill killing Homosexual homicide Homosexual murder	Children Boys Girls	1900-2019	Research articles	*	*	*	*	21

PsycInfo	Abstract (Title)	Sexual homicide Sexual murder Lust homicide Lust murder Male-on-male sexual homicide Male-on-male sexual murder Sexual killing Thrill killing Homosexual homicide Homosexual murder	*	1900-01-01 to 2019-01-01	Articles in scholarly journals	Full text Peer reviewed	English	Human	*	14 (6 identical)
Web of Science	Title	Sexual homicide Sexual murder Lust homicide Lust murder Male-on-male sexual homicide Male-on-male sexual murder Sexual killing Thrill killing Homosexual homicide Homosexual murder	Children Boys girls	1975-2019	Article (Early access)	*	English	*	*	77
Total number of records identified (Stage 1)										165

Appendix Table 2A illustrates the subsequent screening step. Based on the total records recognized in the identification stage ($N=165$) the records were first screened for duplicates ($N=46$) as well as records written in other than in English language ($N=3$). An in-depth screening of the remaining records ($N=116$) was thereafter conducted. This resulted in additional exclusions of records based on abstract content and a review of the method and result section ($N=109$). Once the entire screening process was completed, a total of four records remained.

Table 2A. Screening

Exclusion Type	Database				Total Exclusions
	PubMed ($N=53$)	Science Direct ($N=21$)	Psych Info ($N=14$)	Web of Science ($N=77$)	
Duplicates	9	0	0	37	46
Language	0	3	0	0	3
Content (abstract)	40	18	14	37	109
<i>Total Exclusions</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>74</i>	<i>161</i>
<i>Total Inclusions</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>3</i>	

“Forgive Me, It’s My First Time!”: Extending the Life-course Perspective on Crime in Explaining the Onset of Child Sexual Offending at an Elderly Age

Richard Aborisade

ABSTRACT

The life-course perspective focused on the role of turning points to explain desistance from crime in later life. However, the perspective has little consideration for factors that impact the onset of offending in older age. To address this, an exploratory and qualitative study examining the impact of turning points in later life offending was conducted. Twenty-seven participants who sexually abused underage girls at age 60 and above, and the social factors that pushed them into child sexual abuse (CSA) were explored. Adverse turning points such as loss of marital attachment, loss of steady income, and distance from children, influenced the onset of CSA. Also, evidence from this study suggests that older men conceive and strategize to rape and sexually abuse girls based on the perceived vulnerabilities of juveniles. Findings from this research highlight the need for the extension of existing theories on the age-crime relationship.

Keywords: Aging, Child sexual abuse, Life-course theory, Older offending

“¡Perdóname, es mi primera vez!”: Ampliando la perspectiva del curso de vida sobre el crimen para explicar la aparición de delitos sexuales infantiles en una edad avanzada

RESUMEN

La perspectiva del curso de vida se centró en el papel de los puntos de inflexión para explicar el abandono del delito en la vejez. Sin embargo, la perspectiva tiene poca consideración por los factores que impactan el inicio de la delincuencia en la vejez. Para abordar esto, se llevó a cabo un estudio exploratorio y cualitativo que exa-

mina el impacto de los puntos de inflexión en la delincuencia en la vejez. Se exploraron veintisiete participantes que abusaron sexualmente de niñas menores de 60 años o más, y los factores sociales que las empujaron al abuso sexual infantil (ASI). Los puntos de inflexión adversos, como la pérdida del vínculo conyugal, la pérdida de ingresos estables y la distancia de los hijos, influyeron en el inicio de la CSA. Además, la evidencia de este estudio sugiere que los hombres mayores conciben y elaboran estrategias para violar y abusar sexualmente de niñas basándose en las vulnerabilidades percibidas de los jóvenes. Los hallazgos de esta investigación resaltan la necesidad de ampliar las teorías existentes sobre la relación entre edad y delito.

Palabras clave: Envejecimiento, Abuso sexual infantil, Teoría del curso de vida, Delincuencia en la tercera edad

“原谅我，这是我的第一次！”：关于犯罪的生命历程视角扩展——解释老年对儿童的性犯罪的发生

摘要

生命历程视角聚焦于转折点的作用，以解释晚年犯罪的中止过程。然而，此视角几乎不考虑老年犯罪发生的一系列影响因素。为了研究这一点，进行了一项探索性的定性研究，分析了转折点对晚年犯罪的影响。对27名60岁及以上的、对未成年女孩进行过性虐待的参与者进行了探究，并探究了促使参与者进行儿童性虐待(CSA)的社会因素。不利的转折点（如失去婚姻依恋、失去稳定收入、以及与子女的疏远）影响了CSA的发生。此外，本研究的证据表明，老年男性基于对青少年的脆弱性的感知，构思并制定了强奸和性虐待女孩的策略。本研究的结果强调了“扩展有关年龄与犯罪关系的现有理论”一事的必要性。

关键词：老龄化，儿童性虐待，生命历程理论，老年犯罪

Introduction

Crime is usually associated with youth, and the age-crime curve is widely reported to peak in late adolescence with a steady decline in older age (Maschi & Dasarathy, 2019; Crookes et al., 2021; Chua et al., 2018; Far-

rington, 2019; Nobels, et al., 2020). Furthermore, theories of life course criminal offending have largely explained desistance from crime in older age based on biological factors (Rocque et al., 2015; Capald et al., 2016). However, recent studies and reports across the world indicate a rapid increase in the number of senior citizens’ involvement in criminal activities, which appears to run contrary to the assertion that age has a direct effect on criminal behavior. Studies that reported the rapid increase in older and geriatric offending cut across different countries including the United States (Merkt et al., 2020), Canada (Correctional Service Canada, 2019), Japan (Chua et al., 2018), the United Kingdom (Bows & Westmarland, 2018), and Australia (Trotter & Baidawi, 2015). It is noteworthy, however, that these studies largely focused on the global north with little attention paid to the sociocultural and economic peculiarities of the global south and how these could act as factors that impact elderly offending. Unlike biological explanations of desistance from crime in older age, which possess universal relevance, life-course theoretical perspective emphasizes social bonds and attachment that have sociocultural and economic underpinnings. It is, therefore, research-worthy to examine social factors that could drive the elderly into crime to establish environmental differences in geriatric offending. Drawing from the life-course theoretical perspective, this current study looks at the case of elderly men involved in child sexual abuse (CSA) as first-time offenders.

In recent years, reports on CSA involving elderly men have been on the increase (Bows & Westmarland, 2018; Carabellese et al., 2012), thereby challenging the old belief that age is a protective factor against offending (Greve, Leipold, & Kappes, 2018). The traditional belief and empirical reports that older citizens are usually victims of sexually-related crimes and passive offenders (Adedayo & Aborisade, 2018) are being challenged. Studies on the involvement of older adults in sexual crimes have mainly attributed violent crimes committed by them to mental diseases, with the most frequent diagnosis being dementia (Fazel et al., 2002; Higgins, Barker, & Begley, 2004; Chua et al., 2018; McAleer & Wrigley, 1998). These studies associated dementia in elderly sex offending with behavior defined as *hypersexuality*, which is related to having poor control of sexual impulses and lack of sexual inhibition. However, the attribution of older sex offending to dementia, psychotic disorder, depression syndrome, personality disorder and other psychiatric factors has left a considerable gap in explanations tending towards rationality and influence of social environment.

By examining the peculiarities of the social environment of the global south and its influence on the onset of sexual offending in older men, this study offers an opportunity to extend the life-course perspective on criminal offending. Specifically, the social factors and conditions that appear to push elderly men into CSA, rather than desisting from crime at such age, will be identified. Second, the impact of turning points in later stages of life course on the onset of criminal offending as

it borders on child sexual misconduct will be explored. Drawing from the case of Nigeria, a country in the global south with an apparent increase in the rate of CSA by elderly men, the social factors intersecting with the onset of elderly men's sexual offending against underage females will be explored and described. Accounts of some elderly men arrested or convicted of CSA in Nigeria, who pleaded for leniency as "first-time offenders" (Information Nigeria, 2014), suggest that the life course perspective can be extended to explain the onset of criminal offending at an older age. This trend also appears to reinforce the notion that social institutions are vital for patterns of criminal offending throughout life-course.

Life-Course Theoretical Perspectives and Elderly Offenders of Juvenile Sexual Abuse

In the late 1970s, criminological theorists and researchers started to realize that tracking the offending patterns of certain individuals over their lifetime would contribute greatly to the understanding of why individuals commit more crimes at certain points in their lives (Blumstein, Cohen, & Farrington, 1988; Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1982; Wellford, 1989). Using individuals as units of analysis, the models concentrated on the various aspects of the onset, frequency, intensity, duration/persistence, desistance, and other aspects of the criminal careers of individuals. Their focal point was mainly on why individuals reduce, or even stop offending after certain significant life events (e.g., getting married, having children, and getting a good job).

Sampson and Laub offer one of the most popular developmental theoretical models in which they emphasize the relevance of certain events and life changes that have the potential to influence the decision of individuals to commit (or not to commit) criminal acts. Although their model is premised on the social control framework it contains however, elements of other theoretical perspectives. Like other developmental perspectives, Sampson and Laub's model assumes that early antisocial variables among individuals, irrespective of social variables, are usually connected to later adult criminal offending. Also, they affirm that some social factors (e.g., poverty, social structure) appear to result in problems of educational and social development, which ultimately make individuals take to crime. This model also affirms the importance of delinquent siblings or peers in influencing the potential for an individual to engage in delinquent behavior.

Sampson and Laub (1995; 2003) affirmed that social attachment and relationships are both important factors that moderate offending at early childhood and throughout the life course. In this postulation, changes occur in respect of the propensity for criminal offending in ways that are usually unforeseen and subject to different "turning points." These turning points, which could come in the form of stable employment and marriage, are potential factors that strengthen social bonds to normative lifestyles. In these turning points, individuals also tend to ex-

perience a reduction in negative peer influence and establish conventional routines that eventually result in desistance from crime and delinquency (Laub & Sampson, 2003). Further to their model, Sampson and Laub strongly emphasize the influence of transitions, or special events (e.g., marriage, stable employment) as vital factors that change long-term trends in behavior, which are regarded as trajectories. They postulate that many individuals that have throughout the long-term been on the path of a particular behavior—for instance, serious, violent behavior—suddenly (or gradually) desist as a result of a transition or series of transitions.

The case of Nigeria offers an opportunity to extend the life course perspective by examining how turning points in later stages of the life course—for example, marriage, retirement, distance from children, and change of residence—can impact the onset of crime involvement. Although elderly engagement in criminality is still generally a rarity in Nigeria, there has been a gradual increase in media reports of older citizens’ involvement in violent crimes, such as armed robbery, gun running, ritual killings, and most especially, CSA (Aborisade, 2022). For example, in the northern part of the country where cases of child rape have been reported to be prevalent for a long while (Bugaje, Ogunrinde, & Faruk, 2012), a 70-year-old man had once been arrested for raping a three-year-old girl in Kano state (The New Humanitarian, 2008), while a 70-year-old man, Alhaji Mati Audu, was sentenced to death by an Upper Sharia Court for raping a 12-year-old girl (The Sun, 2020).

In the south-eastern part of the country, a 75-year-old man, Raphael Mbanyereude, aka Papa Okoye, was arrested for raping two underage sisters (aged two and four years) in Okija, Anambra state (Kanyi Daily, 2020). In one of the south-western states, a 65-year-old man named Ezekiel Adewale, was remanded in prison by a Chief Magistrate’s Court for allegedly raping an 11-year-old girl (Daily Trust, 2019). Within the Middle-belt region of the country, a 62-year-old man, Boniface Ankwuli, was found guilty and sentenced to six years in prison by an Upper Area Court in Taraba state for raping a 7-year-old girl (Information Nigeria, 2020). During the court proceeding, Boniface was reported to have pleaded with the judge to be lenient with him as it was his first offence. The highlighted cases of juvenile sexual abuse by older citizens effectively suggest that this threat has a national spread. Therefore, it invites empirical studies to holistically examine social factors that could be responsible for the growing trends of this threat.

The life-course perspective on crime has proven to be a dominant approach in explaining offending over age (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Sampson & Laub., 1995; South & Messner, 2000). Generally, the life-course perspective focused on the role of marriage and other turning points to explain desistance from crime in later life. However, the perspective has little consideration for factors that impact the onset of offending in older age. While the turning points may account for protective factors that engender desistance, there is a possibility that reversal from the turning

points portends a potential risk for offending in later life under certain conditions. This study presents an opportunity to advance the life-course perspective in examining how turning points in later stages of life-course, intersected by sociocultural and economic factors, can affect the onset of criminal offending of elderly men within the global south.

Methods

A qualitative method was adopted in this study because it is unexplored, emotive, and complex. Also, since the research aims to capture the breadth of the accounts of the offenders, this further informed the choice of the qualitative research approach.

Ethical Considerations

The study received full ethical clearance from the Faculty Ethics Committee of the author's university. Emphases were laid on the voluntary nature of the study from the recruitment through to the interview process, while attention was paid to any possible sign of distress from the participants during the interview. Before the interviews, the prospective participants were provided with the study information after which written or verbal informed consent were obtained at least two days before the interviews. Participants were given assurances of anonymity and confidentiality, as a result of which, access to all the data was restricted to only the author and it was securely held under the regulations of the author's university. Pseudonyms, rather than their real names, are used to refer to the participants in the analysis.

Procedures

Since the community of interest of the study was that of elderly men that committed CSA, the natural group that was approached by this study was made up of inmates of correctional centers who had been convicted of the crime. Three federal correctional centers located in Lagos, namely: Ikoyi, Kirikiri maximum, and Kirikiri medium correctional centers constituted the study locations. Inmates of these prisons who were 60 years and above at the time of committing CSA with females under the age of 15 were invited to be part of the study. Although the assistance of the prison officials was sought and obtained for the recruitment, the researcher ensured that only those willing to be part of the study were engaged. Also, prison management assisted the researcher by making available records of the prospective participants, so that only those whose first offence was CSA (which they were serving a term for at the time of the interviews), committed after they reached age 60 were admitted as study participants. At first, 27 prospective participants were identified, out of which 19 accepted the invitation for the study. Then, eight inmates who fit into the eligibility criteria of the study, but whose trials were

still ongoing, volunteered to be part of the study, as they already pleaded guilty to their CSA cases in court.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted using a topic guide developed from the findings of an earlier study on a related subject (Aborisade & Shontan, 2017). To keep to the tradition of qualitative research principles, the initial topic guide evolved. This was to enable insights gained from early interviews to inform subsequent ones (King & Horrocks, 2010). The author conducted all the interviews which ranged from 30 minutes to 75 minutes. They were all audio-recorded except for those two participants who refused audio recording. Transcription of the recordings was done verbatim, and the anonymized transcripts were imported into Nvivo 12 version (software that manages and organizes qualitative data). Overall, 27 interviews were conducted for elderly men who admitted they had sexual intercourse with girls below 15 years of age, and which was their first contact with the criminal justice system.

Sample Participants

Twenty-seven men between the ages of 63 and 78 years who reported that they had sexually abused girls between the ages of 7 and 13 years were interviewed. They were all above 60 years at the time they committed the offence of CSA and were arrested. Although the study was carried out in the city of Lagos within the South-western part of the country, the participants still formed an ethnically diverse group, with slightly more than one-third (11) identifying as Yoruba. Seven of the sample identified with Hausa, one of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, while the remaining indicated being Igbo (3), Nupe (3), Tiv (2), and Benin (1). Their level of education ranged from no formal education to post-secondary education with the majority having primary education and vocational training. Before their incarceration, they stated that they were mainly retirees of state and federal government establishments with about half of them taking up post-retirement employment as private security guards, gardeners, and farm workers. Meanwhile, six of them stated that they were yet to retire as at the time that they were apprehended; they received monthly incomes which ranged from N15,000 (\$39.4) to N30,000 (\$78.8). The monthly incomes were mere estimates as most of them were not sure of their actual monthly income.

In respect of their marital statuses, all the participants said that they were married at different points in their lives, but 18 of them were single at the time of the study (widowed (9), separated (6), and divorced (3)). The remaining nine participants indicated they were married at the time that they were arrested, while two of them indicated being married to more than one wife. All the participants had children from their marriages with the number ranging from two to nine. However, none of the separated and divorced participants had custody of their children before their offence/arrest, while only two of the nine widowers were liv-

ing with their children before their arrest. The majority of the sample interviewed had committed the offence in and were apprehended within Lagos state (15), while 12 of them were transferred to Lagos correctional centers after being apprehended outside Lagos.

Interview Protocol

In the semi-structured protocol adopted by the study, interviews were designed to explore the social factors and conditions that pushed elderly men into engaging in CSA as a first offence which ultimately brought them in contact with the criminal justice system, and the impact of turning points in later stages of life-course. Participants were asked to describe their offending history, sexual criminal history (including offences they committed without being arrested), the turning points of their lives and the impact of these turning points on them. Examples of these exploratory questions included: “Describe your childhood, touching on events you consider to be significant during this period?”; “Did you suffer any victimization as a child which remained in your memory till adulthood?”; “Tell us about the acts you considered offensive which you committed in the past?”; “In what ways have you engaged in any of the following in your past: sexual harassment, discrimination, intimidation, abuse and assault?”; and, “How did you get involved in sexual relations with a female child that you were arrested for?”

Analysis Strategy

In this current study, attention was focused on social factors that appeared to have driven elderly men into engaging in CSA, as well as the perceived impact of turning points in later stages of life-course on the onset of criminal offending. The study adopted an inductive thematic analysis approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006), which is an accessible form of analysis that is not restricted to any particular theoretical framework. The analysis started with the author picking 10 transcripts at random and reading through them while noting common and contrasting thematic elements among the samples and drafting a preliminary coding scheme. In this initial codebook, the tracking of participants’ descriptions of social push factors and conditions that aided their sexual offending, their use of normalizing and/or problematizing themes in these accounts, and information they shared about their perception of their sexual offence, were conducted. In enhancing the validity, two academics in social sciences were engaged to conduct an intercoder reliability check. Using the codebook, they both checked the same 10 transcripts that were initially checked by the author. All three coders then discussed discrepancies in their conceptualizations and made corrections to the coding schemes. Thereafter, all coders separately coded the remaining 17 transcripts. After this exercise, the coders met to resolve any discrepancies for all coders to agree on all applied codes.

Results

Twenty-seven participants who sexually abused girls under the age of 15 completed in-depth interviews between October 2020 and April 2021. The interview data was thematically analyzed, and four overarching themes were chosen, each with associated subthemes. These overarching themes were deviant history, turning points, sexual abuse, and vulnerability.

Overarching Theme 1: Deviant History

This overarching theme bordered on a reflection of the accounts of the participants regarding their history of crime and delinquent behavior from their childhood to adulthood, especially as it bordered on their sexual abuse history. These were separated and discussed in the following subthemes: childhood deviance, sexual deviance, deviance in adulthood, and desistance.

Subtheme 1a: Childhood Deviance. Participants engaged in various forms of deviance in their childhood. This includes stealing, truancy from school, lying, bullying, and street fighting. They mainly attributed their childhood deviance to peer influence, negative parenting, and social environment. “Well, at that time, you just wanted to do what others were doing; I had little knowledge about the implications at the time,” Amodu stated. Although 14 of the participants described their involvement in childhood deviance as intense, none of them had any contact with the police over their deviant activities. However, four of them stated that their deviant acts had consequences on their life-course as they were expelled from their secondary schools. Ojo (71 years), who beat up his teacher and was expelled from school, stated: “My father refused to send me to another school to complete my secondary education; he instead enrolled me to learn carpentry from his friend.” Aside from the four participants, none of the other participants reported experiencing remarkable adverse turning points from their involvement in childhood deviance.

Subtheme 1b: Sexual Deviance. The study samples were particularly requested to reflect on their engagement in sexually related deviance and crimes from their childhood to adulthood before the apprehension and contact with the criminal justice system. Only two participants admitted that they raped their fellow secondary schoolmates in their adolescence, while eight others stated that they engaged in various forms of sexual harassment of women and girls from their childhood to adolescence. As Adamu stated, “I remember my friends and I used to play this *game of dare* on the streets. We would dare ourselves to sexually harass females passing by. This included slapping their buttocks or touching their breasts while we ran off.” Adegbami added: “Sometimes, we would steal kisses from our female classmates or hug them by force.” The two participants that admitted engaging in rape in their adolescence attributed their sexual assault act to peer influence. One of them who was involved in gang rape stated:

...some girls were rude to my friends and me; then we decided to deal with them after school. We laid ambush for them, but three of the four girls ran off into the bush while we only got one of them. It was six of us on the girl and I was one of the four boys that raped her. I regretted my action then and that was the only rape I did in my entire life.

Ahmed, 68 years

Ahmed did not add his sexual abuse of a 13-year-old girl he was convicted of abusing, because he still held that the girl gave her *consent* for all the sexual intercourse he had with her. None of the participants admitted sexually assaulting any female in their adulthood.

Subtheme 1c: Deviance in Adulthood. Although none of the participants engaged in sexually related crimes in their adulthood, 14 of them, however, expressed that they committed various types of crimes for which they were never arrested when they became adults. They admitted to committing employee theft, fraud, armed robbery, corrupt practices, arson, counterfeiting, physical assault, identity theft, impersonation, and human trafficking. Despite their involvement in the listed crimes and deviant acts, none of them reported having contact with the police. Thirteen of the participants in this category stated that they were not career criminals but opportunistic offenders who acted out of ignorance. According to Adamu, "I only stole from my company any time our salary was paid late or when they deducted from my salaries." Salisu added, "I was only contracted by my boss who was a politician to go and burn the house of his political opponent; I did that just once for him." In their descriptions, it could be inferred that most of them were not the masterminds of the crimes they committed, rather they were accomplices. The only participant who admitted he took to criminality as a career indicated that he joined an armed robbery gang after he was retrenched from his civil service work:

I was introduced to it by a gang that accosted me, and wanted to steal from me, but because I did not have any money on me, they beat me up and advised me to join them. This was after I told them I just lost my job. I could not stand the rigor of armed robbery; after going on two operations with them, I left them and left Zaria city altogether for Sagamu, Ogun state.

Sanni, 67 years

Generally, the majority of the participants stated that they were too engulfed in their careers for them to be actively involved in criminal behaviors.

Subtheme 1d: Desistance. Since only one of the participants admitted to taking up a criminal career, and he stated that he only had a brief stint with armed robbery because of the rigor of the crime, he was asked to expatiate:

I was 57 years old when I lost that job. The gang I joined was made up of people who were 20 to 40 years old. I could not withstand the rigors involved. Although I was given all kinds of drugs to empower and make me fearless, the drugs were not just enough to make me fit into that kind of crime. During the second robbery operation which was my last, I almost fell off the bus as we made our escape from the crime scene. Maybe a life of crime was just not meant for me...

Sanni, 67 years

The rest of the 13 participants that owned up to committing occasional crimes and deviant behaviors stated that they did not have a definite period at which they desisted from such behaviors. Some of them admitted to engaging in some of the acts even after they had "sworn" never to engage in such behavior again.

Overarching Theme 2: Turning Points

This overarching theme reflected participants' accounts of the various turning points of their lives and the perceived impacts of these turning points on their vulnerability in engaging in CSA. These accounts were separated and discussed in the following subthemes: marital attachment, loss of steady income, distance from children, and change in residence.

Subtheme 2a: Marital Attachment. Five of the nine widowers claimed that they could not recover after the death of their wives, and it affected their morale and conduct. They admitted that their involvement in CSA may have been a result of their desire for female companions. Solomon offered some detail:

...she (his late wife) had really been the person putting me in check. I stopped drinking and smoking because of her insistence. She reduced my close friends to just two. She often picked the clothes I wear for me. In fact, I can say she was the organizer of my life. I started smoking and drinking months after she died. After she died, I had no one close to me. We had just two children and the two of them left the country in their childhood. The girl I was caught with is the one that kept me company and cooked my food...

Solomon, 71 years

Four of the widowers however said the death of their wives had no bearing on their sexual involvement with underage females. Ojo explained, "I was into other women while she was alive because she often denied me sex. Our relationship was not cordial even though we remained married till she died." On the part of Ali, he stated that he caught his wife cheating on him and that was the reason he started

having sex and molesting his stepdaughter. After his wife died, he kept sexually abusing his stepdaughter until he was reprimanded.

The nine participants who were separated (6) and divorced (3) at the time of their arrest also described their marriages as unstable. They identified causes bordering on infidelity, financial incapacity, irreconcilable differences, domestic violence, religious differences, and the decision to take a second wife as some of the reasons responsible for their separation and divorce. Four of those in this category indicated that they were into juvenile sexual abuse before they got separated from their wives, while another three stated that their choice for the underage was informed by their loss of confidence in grown-up women due to their unpleasant experiences with their ex-wives. The remaining two stated that having sex with underage girls was unplanned and therefore it had nothing to do with their marital experiences.

Six of the nine married participants stated that they had a cordial relationship with their wives but still engaged in extramarital affairs due to peer influence, denial of sex, physical distance from their wives, and lack of self-control. The other three stated that their CSA involvement may be connected to their unhappily married status. "I don't even have a fruitful conversation with my wife. I noticed that since I lost my job and had to take up some casual jobs, she has lost every bit of respect for me," Adesanya disclosed.

Subtheme 2b: Loss of Steady Income. Sixteen participants indicated that they had retired at the time they had been caught sexually abusing underage girls. However, only seven of them disclosed that they never had any sexual relationship with underage girls prior to their retirement. It was this category of participants that connected their loss of jobs and steady income to their sexual desires toward underage girls. Six of the seven participants in this category were in post-retirement jobs at the time of their arrest, while the only unemployed one stated that his children (who were not living with him) were fully responsible for his welfare. Danmole (69), who retired as a soldier and took up a job as a primary school security guard, explained: "When I left the service, it was like a totally new life, but I had few options for this new life. I had lived in the barracks for the larger part of my life. Unfortunately, I retired into almost nothing." Danmole was caught sexually abusing one of the pupils in the primary school where he worked as a security guard. The victim was waiting for her parents after school hours at the security post when Danmole assaulted her.

Six participants that indicated they were still working at the time they were arrested had pointed out that they had changed jobs over the course of their working years. As Musa stated, "I had been sacked, I had left some jobs because I wasn't paid on time, and I had been asked to go because the company ran into some problems." Musa eventually got a job at a government-owned agricultural insti-

tute where he worked until he was arrested. In connecting their sexual abuse of underage girls to their loss of steady income, participants claimed that "small girls are more affordable and less demanding"; "She sometimes gave me money, not big girls that will always demand"; "They don't deceive me; they collect money and come to me." Some participants who claimed to be in *mutual* sexual relationships with the underage disclosed that they started opting for underage girls after their income became unstable and reduced. According to Adamu, "I was not into such small girls when I was working for the government, but I can't afford big girls again."

Subtheme 2c: Distance from Children. Nineteen participants indicated that their children had ceased to live with them for upward of five years before they were arrested. Eleven of them lost custody of their children to their wives after divorce and separation, while five of them stated that their children were taken by relatives, friends, and significant others, after the death of their wives. The rest of the three participants in this category stated that their children left them to start homes of their own through marriages and job opportunities in distant places. In respect of the connection of their children's distance to their involvement in CSA, they attributed it to the need for house help, and the yearning for their children's attention, and companionship. Kabiru said, "Each day, I get home by 3 to 3:30 pm, and there was no one to welcome me home. My weekend was usually very dry. It was only these girls that came to keep me company." Kabiru was arrested and convicted for sexually abusing his neighbor's daughter.

Subtheme 2d: Change in Residence. One ex-military man and two ex-police officers who resided in the barracks during their working years in the force, as well as 13 participants who had to change their residences after retirement, described how their change of residence may have affected their morals. Aside from the ex-servicemen that left the barracks for private residences, the 13 participants left their initial residences due to their inability to afford the rent and moved to low-cost apartments commensurate with the drop in their income. Garuba explained, "I had to move from a two-bedroom flat to a single-room apartment since I lost my job. In the new place, I had to be sharing toilet, bathroom, and kitchen with my neighbors." Participants explained that the low-cost accommodation they rented after they could no longer afford to pay the rents of their previous apartments, put them in regular contact with neighbors, especially since they had to share conveniences with their co-tenants.

Overarching Theme 3: Sexual Abuse

This overarching theme reflected participants' involvement in the sexual abuse of underage girls and their pathways to the justice system. These were disaggregated and discussed in the following subthemes: offender-victim age gaps, types, frequency, and pathways to CJS.

Subtheme 3a: Offender-victim Age Gaps. All the participants claimed not to have been involved in dating, raping, or soliciting sex from girls younger than 15 years of age before they attained the age of 60. Amodu, who appeared to have committed CSA at the earliest age claimed to be 62 years at the time he had sex with a 13-year-old girl. This inevitably means that there was at least a 47-year gap between offenders and their victims in this study. Seventeen of them admitted to having had repeated sex with girls below 15 years before they were eventually arrested. Some of them volunteered the age gap between them and the victims of their sexual abuse. Ojo (71) stated that his first involvement with an under-15 years old girl was when he was 64 and he had sex with his housemaid's daughter, who was 11 years old. "I guess I was drunk on that occasion; my wife had been denying me sex weeks before then. But I grew to love it and had a couple of such girls after." Ojo was eventually caught at 68 when he raped a nine-year-old girl who hawked food for her mother. "She bled profusely and got hospitalized. She told her parents I was responsible, and here I am." Ojo's victim survived while the victim of Sambo, who suffered a similar post-assault injury, did not survive—she bled to death. "Her parents did not take her to the hospital on time. She was bleeding already before leaving my place. I warned her not to tell, but she did, and I was arrested. I was in police custody when information got to me that she died." Sambo was 67 at the time and the victim was 11 years old.

Subtheme 3b: Types and Patterns. Twenty-one participants claimed the sexual abuse acts that they got arrested for were consensual. One of them went ahead to say that the mother of the girl he was sexually involved with was aware of his relationship with her daughter. Abu (68) further claimed, "She asked her daughter to be coming to my place to help me with chores initially. When I later told her I would like to take her daughter as a wife, she said she had no problem with it." The said daughter was 13 years old when Abu was reported to the police by a social worker. Adamu, another participant, claimed that the mother of the girl facilitated their relationship:

...the mother was even the one that approached me about the availability of her 9-year-old daughter to run errands for me if I could be paying her N10,000 (\$25) monthly. Then anytime I told the mother I would marry her daughter; she would simply say it will cost me lots of money.

Six participants were arrested for violently abusing underage girls. Unlike the other 21, these six did not claim to be in a *relationship* with their victims. Three of the participants in this category claimed their attraction to their victims was "inexplicable" as they were under the influence of alcohol, drugs, and some "spiritual forces." Danmole (69), who assaulted a pupil of the primary school he worked at as a security guard, said "It was not the first time the girl would stay with me at

my post since the parents normally came late to pick her up. I did not know what just came over me."

Although a majority of the participants claimed that their sexual intercourse with the underage was consensual, some also claimed ignorance of the law prohibiting sexual intercourse with minors. However, all the participants eventually admitted that they had to apply some form of physical force while having sex with the girls.

Subtheme 3c: Frequency. Fourteen participants stated that they were caught and arrested with the first and only underage girl they had sexual intercourse with. While three of the 14 participants in this category claimed to have been caught during the first interaction of sexual intercourse they had with their victims, 11 offenders indicated that they had had more than one sexual intercourse interaction with their victims. Only 4 out of these 11 offenders stated that they counted the number of times they had sex with them, and it ranged from 4 to 10 times. The rest of them (7) simply responded with "a few times," "a lot of times," or "many times." Garuba explained, "It was just like a normal relationship now. I could not be counting the number of times we did it [had sex]."

Thirteen participants indicated that they had more than one experience of sexual intercourse with girls below 15 years before they were caught. Even though they all had their first sexual intercourse experience with an underage girl when they were above 60 years, some of them admitted that they engaged in sex several times with various girls aged 8 and 14. Ahmed explained, "well not all of them can be available when you need them, so you have to have more than one. Also, if we can have more than one adult wife, what is wrong with having more than one girlfriend?" This category of participants was not able to accurately say how many times that they had had sexual intercourse with the girls. However, they generally admitted that they had sex with such girls multiple times.

Subtheme 3d: Pathways to CJS. Twelve participants were apprehended by community members, parents, guardians, and social workers before being taken to the police station, while the remaining 15 were arrested by police officers upon their invitation. The arrest of 17 participants was based on the injuries sustained by the girls from sexual intercourse (one of them eventually died). Majekodumi admitted that "It was not our first time doing it. She did not even bleed at my place. I just heard her mother shouting and rushing to my place with some people." Five girls reported their victimization to parents, relatives, school, and teachers (one of the victims reported because the offender failed to fulfil his monetary promise to her). James explained, "I had earlier given her some money. I told her to wait till the end of the month on that occasion, but she simply could not wait." The parents of three girls found out about their daughters' sexual lives as a result of their behavioral changes and other signs after which they pressured the girls to disclose

their experiences. The final two participants were caught having sexual intercourse with their victims. Abu volunteered, "One of my neighbors came to my place and caught me doing it. The mother of the girl who gave her blessing for our relationship denied knowing about it and joined in with attacking me."

Overarching Theme 4: Vulnerability

This overarching theme reflected participants' perception of factors that contributed to the vulnerabilities of the girls. The main factors were discussed in the following subthemes: poverty, culture, perceptions of underage, ignorance and poor parenting, and environment.

Subtheme 4a: Poverty. Participants disclosed that poverty played a strong role in the vulnerability of the girls sexually abused by them. They stated that poverty was a part of the factors which made them settle for the girls, while it was also a factor that made the girls vulnerable to accepting their advances. The majority of the participants stated that they became sexually involved with girls that hawked goods around their neighborhood and those that served as their *helpers* in domestic chores. Akinola offered: "I normally bought various items from the girls that hawked even when I did not need or use those items. It was mainly a ploy to get close to them and make them my friends." Bello, who sexually abused a girl that always helped him with his chores, stated "I honestly never knew I would fall in love with her. We got close as I told her my life experiences. She was a good listener. I eventually saw in her a friend and lover." Participants gave different accounts of how the underage girls fell for their antics due to the exposure of the girls to all forms of child labor such as house help, hawkers of goods, laundry services, cooks, and errand girls, amongst others.

Subtheme 4b: Culture. Traditional cultural practices of most Nigerian communities prescribe that younger ones should revere and accord absolute respect to elderly people. Participants expressed how this made it easy for them to lure the girls into doing their bidding. Some of them particularly pointed out that they preferred younger girls for that reason. Bello said, "The girls do not put up much resistance because they hold a lot of respect for elderly men. Whatever we told them, they accepted, because they must have been trained to always obey those older than them." Bello's sentiment was shared by the majority of those that stated that they had consensual relationships with their victims. Kabiru added, "It is unlikely for a well-trained young girl to refuse the call of an elderly person within the neighborhood. So, getting the girls into your apartment under any guise is very possible." Participants also disclosed that cultural teachings dictate that a young person must not deny the advances of an elderly person. "It is wrong for a young girl or boy to contest the position of an elderly person. So, if I ask any favor or tell her anything, she will be more inclined to accept without arguing." The various accounts of the participants showed that this put the victims in a position of confu-

sion when dealing with the elderly men. Some of the victims could not physically resist the sexual overtures of the men because of the respect and honor they were socialized into according to elderly people.

Subtheme 4c: Perceptions of Underage. Participants indicated that they were attracted to underage girls because of their relative “innocence,” “commitment to relationship,” “sincerity,” and “youthfulness.” They also expressed preferences for underage girls because they perceived that they posed “less resistance” to being sexually abused, were readily available when they (abusers) had a sexual urge, and they served as “consolation” for their inability to get sexual partners from the community of adult females. According to Garuba, “I got tired of giving money to adult girls that would collect my money and deceive me. The girls were more honest, more straightforward.” They perceived that at their old age, and without having the kind of money that could be used to entice mature women, only the underage girls would accept them with their limited financial resources. Oloyede (72) explained further:

I am no longer physically attracted to getting adult women, nor am I wealthy enough for my money to make them listen to me, and I am also not attracted to elderly women of my age. So, I am left with these young girls that are not mature enough to make too many demands or prefer going after handsome men alone.

Subtheme 4d: Ignorance and Poor Parenting. Accounts of the participants on how they had initial contacts, repeated contacts, and sexual relationships with the girl victims indicate ignorance and poor parenting. In his own account, Majekodunmi, 68, stated that it was the usual practice for the mother of the girl he assaulted to leave her in his custody while she went to the market to sell her wares. This, according to him, demonstrated the girl’s vulnerability and his own temptation to sexually abuse her. “On the day I first engaged in sexual activity with her, she was the one that touched and held on to my manhood while she was sitting on my lap.” The girl that Majekodunmi was referring to was six years old at the time. Aside from parents leaving their young daughters in the custody of the elderly men, they release them as help, condone sexual comments made about their daughters, and do not properly supervise the movements of their daughters.

Subtheme 4e: Environment. The type of building and physical environment of the participants also facilitated contact with the victims. The majority of the participants stayed in buildings where rooms face one another and are lined up in wings. This gives room for multiple occupants that mostly share conveniences like toilets, bathrooms, and kitchens to interact frequently and reduces the privacy among occupants of the same building. Adesanya said, “Oftentimes, the girls came to wait for their parents in my room after returning from school until their parents returned from work.” Kabiru recounted, “Sometimes when I played a movie in my

room, the noise from my television set would be heard around the compound, and this would make these girls run to my room to watch the TV with me.” Houses within the areas are also built close to one another and interactions of children within such environment may be difficult to control by their parents except when in their rooms.

Discussion

This exploratory study aimed to examine the impact of turning points in later stages of life-course on the onset of criminal offending, with specific reference to child sexual misconduct. Further, the study set out to identify the social factors and conditions that appear to push elderly men into CSA, rather than desisting from crime at such an age. The findings demonstrated the relevance of certain events and life changes as potential influences on the onset of criminal offending by older men, as well as the sociocultural underpinnings of elderly men engaging in CSA in Nigeria. The life-course theoretical perspective affirmed that certain key structural turning points, such as the formation of attachment to marriage and employment, reduce the propensity for a person to commit crime (Sampson & Laub, 1995; Laub & Sampson, 2003). However, findings in this current study suggest that the structural turning points play key roles in the onset of offending in later life.

Laub and Sampson’s (2003) model assumed that early antisocial variables among individuals, irrespective of social variables, are usually connected to later adult criminal offending. This position appears to align with the findings of this study as the sample engaged in childhood antisocial behaviors and they reported that they desisted in early adulthood. However, their youthful antisocial behaviors did not remarkably include sexual deviance, as only a few of them engaged in sexually related offences. Although the study sample exhibited some sexually deviant behavior, they generally desisted from it in their early adulthood, as well as desisting from most of their other deviant acts.

Life-course theorists posit that the propensity for criminal offending changes in ways that are often not anticipated and are the results of turning points (Carpaldi et al., 2016; Laub & Sampson, 2003). The study found relevance for this position as life events and turning points influenced the initial desistance of the study sample from delinquent behavior. However, more profoundly, adverse turning points such as loss of marital attachment, loss of steady income, distance from children, and change in residence, influenced the onset of CSA in the study sample. Significantly, rather than playing roles in engendering desistance, marital attachment, as found in this study was weak, while instability prevailed among the married sample. Divorced and separated participants equally described how their troubled marriages influenced their sexual pervasion.

In the life-course perspective, employment serves as a turning point for desistance from criminal behavior (Mazerolle & McGee, 2020; Merkt et al., 2020),

but in this study, loss of steady income/employment was found as a relevant turning point that explains the onset in criminal offending in later life. Loss of steady income also appeared to have negatively impacted some participants' marriages to cause instability, and they claimed that this led them into engaging in child sexual offending. This also serves as an extension of the life-course perspective based on its apparent explanation of how it is rather the loss of marital attachment and loss of steady income that accounts for the onset of criminal offending than desistance. The study also found relevance in the connection between distance from children and change in residence to offending in later years.

Although the onset of juvenile sexual offending for the study sample may have been in their later life, the frequency, intensity, and persistence with which they engaged in the crime were remarkable. This appears to defy both biological explanations of desistance and life-course theoretical perspectives (Mazerolle & McGee, 2020; Moffitt, 1997). Unlike findings of CSA perpetrated by younger adults which usually suggest opportunistic offenders who deploy force to assault their victims only once or several times (Aborisade et al., 2018), the findings of this current study suggest that older men somewhat develop relationships with their victims and sustain abuse for a longer period. Apparently, without the criminal justice system intervening, the desistance of elderly men from CSA, as observed in this current study, appears indeterminate.

While life-course theories identified social factors such as poverty and social structure as facilitating negative developmental processes which make individuals take to crime at an early age (Capaldi et al., 2016; Laub & Sampson, 2003), this study found these factors to be active in making underage girls vulnerable to sexual abuse. For example, the study sample confessed to taking advantage of socialization lessons imparted to children to always respect elders and used this to sexually abuse them. The study found a high amount of time-alone spent with the victims, the use of young girls as street hawkers, and caregivers, as well as poor supervision of children by parents as factors that aided the vulnerability of underage females to be sexually abused by older adults. The outcome of this study also downplayed the argument of those that attributed sexual offending by older men to mental diseases such as dementia (Higgins, Barker, & Begley, 2004; Chua et al., 2018). In this study, participants' attraction and decision to sexually target underage girls were mainly based on their perception of young girls' amenability, availability, controllability, and physical weakness. Therefore, older sexual offenders in this study were found to have carefully planned and chosen their victims.

Implications for Theory, Policy, Practice, and Research

Findings from this research highlight the need for extension of the existing theories on age-crime relationships, which often draw on biological determinants in explaining offending patterns. There is a need for the life-course perspective on

crime to consider the wider context within which juvenile sexual offending by elderly men takes place. Although explanations on turning points in criminal offending as postulated by life-course theorists are partially supported in this current study (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Moffitt, 1997), findings equally highlight the need for the theory to be extended. These findings indicate that the life events and conditions—turning points—which explain desistance from crime at a later stage can be extended to also explain the onset of crime at a later stage. The power dynamics between elderly men and underage girls, especially within the Nigerian social structure, make the case for a revisit to the biological explanation of crime. In addition, the findings of this study show that life transitions in later life produce anomie feelings and experiences that could facilitate the onset of criminal offending. Further development of the life course perspective is required to reflect this.

In the 2003 report of the National Population Commission (NPC), Nigeria officially identified older people as a specifically vulnerable group. Consequently, a draft on “National Policy on Ageing” was presented by the Commission. However, since that time, the document has remained in draft form largely due to lack of the political will to ratify it. Findings from this study highlight the need for the policy to be ratified and the vulnerability of older people to crime addressed. Considering the effective roles that life turning points play in the onset of crime for older men, government and other stakeholders must commit to elderly welfare schemes and other measures that could help stem the tide of child sexual offending by older adults. Community-based education and programs aimed at creating awareness on the elderly sexual abusing of children, parental preventive responsibilities, and social control measures should be prioritized across the country. The government should also intensify efforts at addressing poverty, especially child poverty.

There is a need for further studies to triangulate the perspectives of child-victims, parents, and community members with that of offenders to be conducted. This will enable sexual abuse of underage girls by older men to be considered from multiple viewpoints. In doing so, we will have a broader understanding of CSA and sexual offending by older men, specifically around abuse tactics, vulnerability, disclosure, and help-seeking.

Conclusion

While previous studies have adopted biological, developmental, and life-course perspectives in explaining desistance from crime at older age, this study has attempted to extend the life-course perspective in explaining how loss of social attachments and adverse events influence the onset of crime at later life. This research has captured rich descriptions of CSA offenders in respect to the turning points which influenced their onset of juvenile sexual abuse. The findings indicate marital instability, loss of income and distance from children as important factors which impact on elderly offending. Poverty, ignorance, and poor parenting are fac-

tors which drive the vulnerability of underage girls into being sexually abused by older citizens. Although documented evidence on sexual abuse of children reports different patterns and types of abuse from adult offenders, abuse from elderly men appears more sustained with the potential to have a longer-lasting effect on the victims. Recognition of the peculiarities of elderly offenders and the predicament of underage victims in dealing with sexual abuse as a general concept should inform the measures aimed at arresting the trend and providing support to victims.

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The “Wave” Theory of Global Terrorism: Evaluation and Critical Assessment

Daniel Dory

David C. Rapoport, *Waves of Global Terrorism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2022.

Terrorism studies is a fairly recent disciplinary field, having only really emerged around the 1970s in the form of the Anglo-Israeli-American terrorism studies that is still dominant today. For a variety of reasons, as we have already mentioned, the development of this discipline has been rather complicated, not least because of the polemical nature of its subject and the difficulties of accessing data. As a result, researchers engaged in this field can only draw on very rare theoretical elaborations as a basis for hypotheses and research programs. This situation explains the importance of works such as Ehud Sprinzak’s on the sequential logic of terrorism; Crelinsten’s model of the interaction between terrorism and counterterrorism; and, of course, Rapoport’s “wave” theory, which is undoubtedly the best-known and most widely discussed. Its author, David Rapoport (b. 1929), is one of the pioneers of *terrorism studies*, having published a small exploratory book on the subject as early as 1971. Subsequently, this North American political scientist based at the University of Los Angeles accumulated publications on terrorism (notably from the angle of its religious motivations) and played a major role in the development (and ideological orientations) of terrorism studies, particularly through the creation and long-standing direction of the journal *Terrorism and Political Violence*. In other words, we are dealing with a leading author whose influence, abundantly relayed by a powerful “invisible college,” has left a lasting mark on the discipline, not only in its intellectual aspects, but also in its dominant orientations. An analysis of the book in which this researcher summarizes his work goes beyond the scope of the usual review. In fact, it is the state of current research in the history of terrorism that can be questioned through this text. This inevitably leads to a critical reflection on terrorism studies, insofar as they are largely influenced by the writings of David Rapoport. For these reasons, this Bibliographical Watch discusses in some detail several aspects of the “wave theory” that Rapoport presents to us in this book in a version that is most likely definitive.

Rapoport’s “Wave” Theory: Origins and Developments

It was in the wake of the September 11 attacks in 2001 that David Rapoport formulated, in two articles, a first, more or less complete version of his “wave” theory,

definitively including the fourth (religious) wave. This contribution was to have an enormous influence on the discipline of terrorism studies (and beyond), as it provided a simple and attractive model for intellectually structuring a history of terrorism that was then in full development. Moreover, continuing an approach that begun with his first publications on the subject, Rapoport provides an attractive pedagogical tool that can be illustrated with the following chart:




Fig. 1: Rapoport's schematic representation of the "waves" of terrorism.

In proposing this periodization of the history of terrorism (modern and/or global) into four waves lasting approximately forty years, Rapoport uses the notion of generation. By this, he means a similarity between the main objectives and modus operandi of the various organizations operating during the same period, and which share an "energy" that mobilizes them.

In the years that followed, Rapoport repeated the basic elements of his theory, with only marginal variations, in a series of book chapters that contributed to making it a kind of "shared knowledge" among specialized researchers. However, various aspects of "wave theory" have been the subject of debate and/or alternative proposals. In 2007, for example, Mark Sedgwick attacked the chronology proposed by Rapoport, placing greater emphasis on the influences exerted by groups (Italians, Germans, Chinese, and Afghans) who inspired imitators, than on the strictly ideological factors that motivated them. Two years later, Rasler and Thompson produced a partial validation of Rapoport's model, based on empirical data (from the ITERATE database) but at the cost of serious conceptual inaccuracies.

In 2011, a rather heterogeneous book was published, entirely devoted to discussing various aspects of Rapoport's "wave theory", with a particular focus on the religious facts associated with it, to which we'll return later. On a general level,

Marc Sageman’s contribution, based on the case of contemporary Islamism, emphasizes the contextual and social factors that produce notable evolutions within each wave. With Parker and Sitter’s article, which sees the history of “modern” terrorism as stemming from four ideologically based “strains” (socialist, nationalist, religious, and “exclusionary”), Rapoport’s schema is profoundly challenged. And this, even though motivational causality is also used here as a basis for typologies, leads to an impasse that we’ll discuss later. Finally, very recently, Radil and Castan Pinos have highlighted the absence of the territorial dimension in Rapoport’s approach and provided useful elements to remedy the situation. However, by uncritically adopting the foundations of Rapoport’s theory and the periodization associated with it, these authors do not engage in an in-depth discussion of the subject.

These few indications, which provide an insight into the background and current context of the debate surrounding Rapoport’s “wave theory,” allow us to turn now to the analysis of the book in which this elaboration undoubtedly finds its most complete formulation. Given the importance of the subject, we will briefly analyze the successive chapters of this work.

Definitions and Nature of Pre-global “Terrorism”

In the introduction to a work that purports to be scientific, it is customary for the author to set out as precisely as possible the nature of the subject under discussion. This usually involves a definitional and conceptual clarification, so that the reader knows, at least at the outset, what is to be discussed next. This exercise, no doubt tedious, is nonetheless essential when it comes to terrorism, given the polysemous nature of the term and the importance of the issues associated with its definition.

However, in the introduction to his book, Rapoport does not propose a clear, operational definition of terrorism, but proceeds by successive assertions without arriving at an explicit formulation. On page 3, for example, we read: “[t]error is violence employed for a religious or political objective and is not limited by the accepted moral norms that limit violence.” This vague and undecidable idea (who “accepts,” and who decides on morality), is completed a little further on by a legal normative consideration of little relevance in this context: “[r]ebels using violence to achieve a political or religious end are terrorists when they operate unfettered by military rules governing violence” (ibid.). Let’s quickly move on to the absurdity of distinguishing between political and religious motivations here, given that it’s not the theological aspect that is important here, but considerations that come under the geopolitics of religions—an issue that Rapoport clearly ignores. In short, Rapoport’s definitional effort is limited to asserting the extra-ordinary and immoral nature of terrorist violence, which has the advantage of being able to distribute the label “terrorist” widely to a wide variety of actors, depending on the polemical needs of the moment. It’s interesting to note that this definitional

vagueness is inherent in Rapoport's approach. It can be found in his early texts, particularly in a chapter devoted mainly to defining the specificity of the terrorist act. He insists precisely on the publicity aspect of the act and on the implications of the "atrociousness" that characterizes it yet fails to provide a clear definition. This lack of conceptual precision is echoed when it comes to defining the nature of "modern" and "global" terrorism, as these terms are equivalent for this author. Indeed, in *Waves of Global Terrorism* (henceforth WGT), we read: "... it was not until the terrorism of the 1880s that revolutionary activity transcended Europe and became global" (p. 2). The criterion for this "globality" is rather sketchy, as evidenced by the remarkably trivial note: "Global terrorism involves many states in various capacities and groups that cooperate in various ways" (WGT, note 1, p. 307).

After these introductory considerations, the first chapter is devoted to terrorism "before the global form." In so doing, Rapoport introduces the idea (a false one, in my view) that terrorism has existed, if not "always," at least since antiquity. We're dealing with a reality whose nature is constant (in its extra-ordinary atrocity and immorality), but whose form changes towards the end of the 19th century for various political and technical reasons, to which we will return later.

With this in mind, Rapoport begins by examining the case of three very heterogeneous series of religiously motivated actors, partly echoing the results of earlier publications on the place of "terrorism" in three religious traditions (Judaism, Hinduism, and Islam), and on the relationship between messianism and "terror." The first group or movement considered is that of the Jewish Sicars and Zealots of the first century AD, who committed political assassinations, mainly against Jewish dignitaries accused of complacency towards the Roman authorities of the time. In this case, as in that of the Assassins (from the Ismaili branch of Shi'ism, active between 1090 and 1275), the confusion between political assassination and terrorism is a source of serious misunderstanding. Indeed, if we set out to distinguish between these two forms of political violence, it is not the motives of the perpetrators or their *modus operandi* that should be of interest, but the identity of the victims.

This extremely important point has already been made in several publications, so there's no need to return to it here. At most, we can recall the basic distinction between personal identity (specific to a particular irreplaceable individual such as a king, important official, president, etc.), functional identity (linked to the victim's functions in a government institution, the Police, the Army, etc.), and vectorial identity (associated with the victim's ability to best convey, by means of his death and/or suffering, the message that the terrorist actor aims to communicate to various audiences). And according to this criterion, the only one that in my opinion allows us to distinguish the specificity of the terrorist act, it seems difficult to include Zealots and Assassins among the terrorists. At the very most, we can include them in a long "prehistory" that precedes the appearance of terrorism, to-

wards the end of the 19th century, precisely at a break with the practice of political assassination, as we shall see later.

The Crusades provide Rapoport with the third case of religiously motivated “terrorism.” Here again, no serious justification for this choice is offered, other than the author’s antipathy for this episode (which sometimes also attacked Jews), and the fact that the Crusaders committed “atrocities.” One might have expected a more substantial argument.

This is followed by developments in pre-global “secular terrorism,” which Rapoport sees as the action of violent mobs. Two North American cases are dealt with here: The Sons of Liberty (1765–1776), and the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan (1867–1877). Apart from the fact that these two episodes correspond to different geopolitical situations, it’s hard to see the point of including riots and crowd movements in the genealogy of terrorism. Indeed, even when they belong to the register of political violence (which is not always the case), riots, like guerrilla warfare (and/or small wars) obey their own logic, which is precisely what differentiates them from terrorism, whose communicational component is essential. Rapoport comes to a similar conclusion at the end of his essay on the subject (WGT, pp. 49–53), without drawing any theoretical conclusions.

This question leads directly to the all-important one of the origins of terrorism. The crux of the debate can be expressed simply by highlighting two contrasting positions. One (notably by Rapoport) asserts the permanence of “terrorism” since Antiquity (with cases from the Paleolithic having not yet been reported), with successive variations, the most important of which is the appearance of modern (and/or global) terrorism towards the end of the 19th century. The other, which is based on the most solid advances in the historiography of terrorism (and which I share), asserts that the emergence of terrorism marks an important innovation in the repertoire of political violence, and is the result of the convergence of a series of factors (ideological, political, and technical) which we will briefly discuss below. From then on, the debate centered on the moment when this invention manifested itself, its conditions, its explanation, and the analysis of its effects.

For his part, Rapoport makes his contribution to this debate, from the perspective of the “globalization” of terrorism, at the end of the first chapter (WGT, pp. 57–63). He rightly mentions the ideological influence of the French Revolution (but without drawing all the lessons from it in terms of changes in the form of warfare or the new importance of public opinion), as well as the consequences of several technical innovations. The roles of the popular press, railroads and steamships are mentioned, as well as the very important development of dynamite around 1866. But these factors are only hinted at, without the in-depth analysis that would have been welcome. In particular, the paucity of technical data (beyond *modus operandi*) is to be deployed throughout the book, when it would have been necessary to analyze in detail the transformations of the terrorist act during the

different “waves” or periods. These considerations provide a timely transition to the second chapter of the book, devoted to the “first wave.”

The First Wave (1879–1920s): “Anarchist?”

In this chapter, which deals with the emergence of “global” terrorism (and, in my opinion, terrorism in general), Rapoport addresses the cases of Russia, anarchism in the “West” and the expansion of nationalism in Europe and Asia.

Before commenting briefly on these different episodes, it is necessary to clarify Rapoport’s entire approach in this book. While the author bases his assertion of the specific character of “modern” terrorism on its “global” nature, this chapter (and those that follow) confines itself to presenting juxtaposed case studies that refer to as many singular geopolitical situations. This choice, which underlies a serious methodological error, results from the fact that Rapoport privileges the motivational (ideological) causes of terrorism over the analysis of terrorism itself, a fact to which we shall return. However, in order to (de)demonstrate the global nature of terrorism from a certain point onwards, we obviously need to start not from national cases, but from an analysis of the geopolitical situation at the global level. This implies a unified global chronology and a representation of the equally global distribution of acts, insofar as the available sources allow.

Once the appropriate global focus has been adopted, we find ourselves in the presence of facts that need to be discriminated according to definitional criteria that are as precise as possible, to arrive at an empirically robust periodization. But this is precisely what Rapoport fails to do satisfactorily, for on the one hand, he uses a definition of terrorism that is not very operational, and on the other, he focuses on ideological criteria that fail to capture the specificity of the terrorist act.

However, what we’re talking about here is of the utmost importance, as it involves locating the moment of invention of terrorism as a specific form of political violence. For Rapoport, this inaugural moment occurred in 1879 in Russia, with the founding of the Narodnaia Volia (People’s Will) group, one year after Vera Zaslitch’s assassination attempt on a high-ranking tsarist official. This statement is doubly problematic. Firstly, because this group, like the entire movement to which it belonged, carried out political assassinations characterized by the personal (and sometimes functional) identity of their victims, the most famous of which was Tsar Alexander II in 1881. But the difficulty in taking this crucial fact into account, and thus also in grasping the essential difference between political assassination and terrorism, stems from the fact that Russian revolutionaries proclaimed themselves to be “terrorists,” not least to distinguish themselves from common criminals. The conceptual trap set for the historian of terrorism is therefore formidable if he takes the discourse of his object to be the object of his discourse, without considering that self-designations must always be subject to rigorous criticism.

The second problematic aspect of Rapoport’s position on Russian anteriority stems from the fact that a simple chronology of political violence in the last third of the 19th century is not enough. For if we focus primarily on terrorist acts and actors, rather than their motivations, a third group inevitably emerges in addition to the Russians and anarchists: the Irish Fenians. This movement is relatively less studied in the field of the history of terrorism, although there are now a number of solid works highlighting its importance. As a result, this global perspective brings us face to face with three movements that used various forms of political violence, and which constitute the crucible in which the invention of terrorism took place, essentially at odds with the practice of political assassination. This pivotal moment, when a combination of technical, ideological, and political factors converged to invent terrorism, occurred between 1883 and the end of the 19th century. It is not possible to develop this point in detail here; at the very most, we can indicate that two attacks clearly mark this break in the repertoire of political violence. The first was the explosion of two bombs in the London Underground on October 30, 1883 (70 people injured), which marked a change in targets for the Fenians, who had previously attacked military, police, and government buildings. The second clear terrorist act took place in Barcelona, on November 7, 1893, at the Grand Théâtre du Liceu (20 dead). Parisian attacks followed, notably that which was perpetrated by Émile Henry at the Café Terminus on January 12, 1894 (one dead and 20 wounded), confirming the inclusion of terrorism in the repertoire of anarchist violence of the period.

Having clarified these points, we can return to Rapoport’s chapter on the “first wave.” The section on Russian revolutionaries contains useful factual information, notably on the relationship between attacks and pogroms (WGT, p. 73) and the background to the assassination of Alexander II. The treatment of the European anarchist movement, on the other hand, is extremely confusing and deficient, mostly viewed through a “Russian prism” that notably fails to consider the particularities of Italian, Spanish and French anarchism. Then, in order to illustrate the globalization of “terrorism,” the Armenian, Macedonian, Chinese and Indian movements (not anarchists, by the way) are mentioned. This is incorporated in the chapter’s conclusion, where it is pointed out that “[t]wo main themes inspired the First Wave: ‘equality’ and ‘nationalism’” (WGT, p. 107). This calls into question the very name of this wave, whose motivations are, in fact, very heterogeneous and whose ideological analysis is secondary to understanding the moment when terrorism was actually invented.

Finally, Rapoport puts forward three major reasons for the decline of this first wave: a) the inability of the organizations involved to achieve success; b) the reorientation of many anarchists towards syndicalism; c) changes in police practices (WGT, p. 103). The first reason refers to the fascinating problem of the “success” of terrorism, which has given rise to important works and which Rapoport

only skims over. The second factor, although factually valid, does not exhaust the subject, for if we take Rapoport's motivational perspective, we are forced to note the permanence of elements of anarchist ideology found, for example, in the German RAF and in today's radical ecology. Finally, the third point rightly emphasizes the need to consider terrorism within the complex of actors and relationships that structure it, and where anti-terrorist policies and practices are of the utmost importance.

The Second Wave: Anti-colonial (1919–1960s)

According to Rapoport, this wave began in 1919, in the wake of the Treaty of Versailles (and the Russian Revolution) which, by promoting the principle of self-determination for peoples, gave new energy to various nationalist and/or anti-colonial movements. The third chapter of the book focuses on the main actors of this period, whom Rapoport begins by referring to as "terrorist groups" (WGT, p. 113). This largely polemical designation is obviously problematic, and from the outset imposes a biased interpretative framework. For what characterizes the scientific analysis of terrorism is not the more or less arbitrary distribution of (in this case infamous) labels, but the investigation of the spatial-temporal conditions in which actors resort to terrorism as a function of tactical and strategic choices that need to be elucidated, and with effects that also need to be evaluated. This remark is neither trivial nor exclusively semantic but concerns the prerequisites for an effective analytical approach to terrorism.

The groups that make up the "second wave," starting with the Irish IRA whose Fenian antecedents are ignored, are virtually all those involved in the anti-colonial struggles of the time. Thus, in the course of a narrative that is more a superficial account of International Relations than a study of terrorism proper, the cases of Mandatory Palestine, the Algerian FLN, the Cypriot struggle, the insurrection in Malaya, and a few other conflicts are mentioned. In all cases, apart from some useful contextual information, the reader will search in vain for answers to the central question of why, in each time and place, insurgent actors choose to resort to terrorism rather than other forms of political violence. Or a complementary question: what place does terrorism occupy in the total repertoire of action of the group in question? Answering these questions would then have made it possible to consider the various *modus operandi* employed, as well as the (sometimes unexpected) results of these acts.

One important point distinguishes the "second wave" from the first (which, for Rapoport, is characterized—frankly—by assassinations): it is the pre-eminence of actions akin to guerrilla warfare (WGT, p. 144). Of course, rather than suggesting, as this author does, that during this period "terrorism" manifested itself mainly in the form of guerrilla warfare, this coexistence of different modalities of political violence would have merited a thorough analysis. This implied first

of all, clearly differentiating between them, which once again seems to focus on the identity of targets/victims: functional in the case of guerrilla warfare, which targets police, military, and other agents of the state; and vectorial in the case of terrorism. Armed with this basic criterion, it becomes possible to go beyond contextual commentary to analyze the various terrorist complexes that arise during this period and draw from them hypotheses and/or lessons that genuinely enrich our knowledge of the subject.

The Third Wave (1960s–1990s): The New Left

According to Rapoport, two events are particularly important in explaining the emergence of the “third wave”: the Cuban revolution (1959) and the Vietnam War (which ended in 1975). But this observation, which is true for most Latin American, North American (particularly the Weathermen) and West European groups of the 1960s and 1970s (German RAF, Italian BR...), is far less relevant for other entities included in this wave/period, which were part of different regional and local geopolitical situations. Thus, for example, the Palestinian movement (the PLO and its rival organizations), the Basque ETA, the Kurdish PKK and the Irish PIRA are only included in the wave at the cost of a sort of bricolage, where ideological and chronological criteria are loosely intertwined.

In this chapter, too, the contextual presentation of the various organizations, which is often largely irrelevant (see pp. 186-195, for example), is given priority over analysis of the concrete conditions of their recourse (or not) to terrorism. And yet, over the years, there have been many episodes that have allowed us to delve deeper into the relationships and differences between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, provided they have been properly defined. Thus, for example, the transition from rural to urban guerrilla warfare, following the resounding failure of Che Guevara’s adventure in Bolivia, certainly merited comment, particularly in order to characterize this form of political violence which (rarely) coexists with truly terrorist acts in Uruguay, Argentina, Germany, or Italy.

As for the *modus operandi* characteristic of this wave, Rapoport rightly mentions hostage-taking in various forms (kidnapping, static hostage-taking, and aircraft hijacking), without however integrating them into a discussion of their place in each group’s total repertoire of action. Here again, there was more to be said about the evolution of these different modes of operation, as a recent study of aircraft hijackings since the 1930s has shown.

The causes of the decline of the third wave are not convincingly explained, as shown by the very superficial treatment of the case of the Peruvian Shining Path (active in various forms since 1980), which nevertheless constitutes a kind of laboratory for research into terrorism.

The Fourth Wave (1979–2020?): Religious

The relationship between terrorism and religious facts is a subject that Rapoport has been working on for many decades, giving rise to a series of publications, the first of which is a pioneering exploration of the relationship between terrorism and three religious traditions (Judaism, Islam, and Hinduism). This article, which has had a major influence in shaping the analysis of “religious terrorism” within terrorism studies, sets out the author’s now constant approach to the subject, which is problematic in two respects. Firstly, by asserting the temporal continuity of the terrorist act, based on an imprecise definition, we return to the question (here poorly resolved) of the moment when the invention of terrorism takes place, as discussed above. Secondly, the immediate (in the sense of unmediated) connection between an ideological (and/or doctrinal) fact and the terrorist act. This methodological error ignores the filters that exist between these two orders of facts. Indeed, for religious (or other) ideas to motivate terrorist acts they must pass through at least three decisive filters: a) tactical and b) strategic choices; as well as an assessment (however good) of c) the geopolitical situation. Consequently, the study of religiously motivated terrorism is not primarily a theological discussion, but a reflection on the geopolitics of religions. It is not possible to develop this point here, but it is essential to mention it, as it directly concerns the limits of Rapoport’s treatment of this issue in the chapter of his book devoted to the “fourth wave,” the antecedents of which can be found in a number of important texts. Thus, after “Fear and trembling...” Rapoport offers a reflection on messianism as an ideological device that can (sometimes) motivate terrorist acts; a theme he then explores in depth in a detailed (and fascinating) study of the Zealots/Sicars who fomented the Jewish revolt in 66-70 CE. This chapter is, moreover, a further demonstration of the deep links that unite this author with the Jewish scriptural tradition, a fact rightly brought to light by Jeffrey Kaplan. This is followed by a study of Abd-al Salam Faraj’s *L’obligation absente* (1980), the inspiration behind the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which organized the assassination of President Sadat in 1981. Finally, the series of texts that precede the formulation of the “wave theory” includes an article on “weapons of mass destruction,” which have focused the attention of researchers and anti-terrorist measures in the wake of the Aum affair (1995) in Japan. Far from the prevailing alarmism, Rapoport provides a reasonable, well-argued analysis of the low risk posed by this type of attack.

Returning to the book we’re concerned with here, Rapoport (WGT, p. 187) points to three major events at the origin of the “fourth wave” in 1979. These, which become four a few pages later (WGT, pp. 216-220), are: 1) the Iranian revolution; 2) the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt; 3) the century changes to the Islamic calendar; and 4) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Significantly, Rapoport skips over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982) in just three lines, even though it is a major event in terms of its multiple local, regional, and global implications.

The body of the chapter contains, as usual, a juxtaposition of cases accompanied by contextual comments that have little or nothing to do with terrorism as such, and to which it is pointless to return. However, the inclusion of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in the religious wave comes as a surprise, no doubt because of the chronological arrangement adopted by the author, and more probably because of their recourse (in particular) to suicide bombing, which Rapoport considers to be the distinctive *modus operandi* of this wave.

The question of the end of this wave gives rise to interesting developments, insofar as following the generational sequence of around 40 years, “religious terrorism” should show signs of decline towards the 2020s. These considerations are also partly in line with the analysis Rapoport published following the attacks in Paris and Brussels (2015 and 2016), where the main explanatory factor was the differences in the estimated date of the Apocalypse between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. This raises once again the question of the relationship between persistent ideological motivations (in this case, jihadist Islamism) and recourse to terrorism, which depends on the tactical, strategic, and geopolitical filters mentioned above. However, the theoretical framework adopted by Rapoport does not allow us to see the problem in these terms; at most, he can suggest that, because it is rooted in religious communities, “religious terrorism” may last longer than expected, despite some signs (difficult to interpret) that it is running out of steam. In any case, the question of whether there will be a “fifth wave,” and what its dominant motivation will be, inevitably arises. This is the subject of the book’s concluding chapter.

The Fifth Wave (?-?): A Fragile Hypothesis

To fully understand Rapoport’s forward-looking conclusion, it’s important to realize that the question of the fifth wave has already been the subject of debate among terrorism researchers. Of course, the ambiguities of wave theory make it difficult to distinguish between periodization criteria based on ideological motivations, organizational forms, or characteristic *modus operandi*. What’s more, just because an ideology loses its appeal doesn’t mean that its capacity to motivate terrorist acts is mechanically reduced, as Marxism and anarchism, for example, demonstrate. In addition, considerations of the “fifth wave,” supposed to begin in the 2020s following the generational succession of 40 years, periodically reactivate an old debate and some controversies within the discipline of terrorism studies.

The old debate concerns the “newness” of certain forms of terrorism. Launched in the second half of the 1990s (notably in the wake of the Aum affair), this theme periodically resurfaces due to the poor historical culture of many terrorism studies specialists and a certain ambient intellectual laziness. This is despite some salutary clarifications, the benefits of which are neglected.

The controversies discussed here concern the predictive scope of scientific work on terrorism. The main disagreements concern the selection of variables

whose curves are to be “extended”: are we talking only about terrorist acts, or terrorist complexes (which is more fruitful), or even encompassing geopolitical situations? It goes without saying that these uncertainties are at the heart of the process of predicting the dominant features of the “fifth wave.”

In view of the foregoing, it is interesting to note the variety of “fifth waves” that have been envisaged in recent years. Firstly, Jeffrey Kaplan proposes the emergence of rather messianic “tribal” entities with mainly local interests, along the lines of the Khmer Rouge or the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army, while taking considerable liberties with Rapoport’s initial schema. For their part, Weinberg and Eubank confine themselves to noting (in 2010, i.e., four years before the emergence of the Islamic State...) a certain decline in “religious terrorism,” in line with what Rapoport’s theory tends to predict. Still on the subject of ideological motivations, the same year B. Gagnon suggested eco-terrorism as the dominant motivation for a fifth regional wave. This hypothesis was later taken up and developed by da Silva, who rightly emphasizes the almost total absence of any consideration of ecoterrorism in Rapoport’s work, a fact echoed in his book, where ecoterrorism is not even listed in the index. This blindness to an undeniable reality is undoubtedly a condition for Rapoport to be able to focus his conclusion exclusively on the “far-right threat,” as we shall see later. In 2011, J. D. Simon sees the fifth wave as characterized using advanced technologies (notably the Internet) by lone actors, without dwelling too much on ideological factors. The difficulty of finding valid (and verifiable) criteria for the new wave is clearly evident in a Spanish text with strategic intent and is largely reflected in a proposal based on the emergence of (essentially Islamic) “terrorist semi-states” from 2003 onwards (U.S. invasion of Iraq).

Lacking a consistent theoretical framework, and thus enjoying considerable freedom to propose largely polemical hypotheses, Rapoport concludes his book with a reminder of his definitional criteria for “waves,” suggesting that they do not really apply to “far-right” activism (WGT, p. 273). This doesn’t prevent him from devoting most of the chapter to this movement, making the crudest of amalgams between “populist” parties, “white supremacism” (the only really bad one), “hate” crimes (those committed by whites) and racism (still the work of whites). In short, developments that combine the clichés of the left-wing press with data from Soros-funded institutions. The problem is not that Rapoport expresses a detestation that can easily be explained on ethno-political grounds, but that he passes it off as scientific proposals, at the cost of conceptual shifts that allow ideas to be criminalized under the guise of research into terrorism.

The process is essentially based on two real-life cases that resulted in over 50 deaths: the attack in Norway by Breivik (2011), and that in Christchurch (2019). In both cases, we’re dealing with solitary actors with complicated backgrounds. This is fairly well known in the case of Breivik, but less so for Brenton Tarrant, who calls himself an “ecofascist,” a compound word whose first part is generally forgotten.

Without going so far as to formally confirm the existence of a fifth wave of extreme right-wing extremism, an idea already put forward by several authors, Rapoport imposes the idea in this chapter, which looks at the situation in Europe (resistance to migratory submersion) and the United States (the Trump effect). In this sense, the text corresponds perfectly to the thematic reorientation imposed on terrorism studies in recent years, diverting research funding (on which the careers of young researchers depend) towards the “far-right” threat, to the detriment of jihadism and, above all, radical environmentalism, which is undoubtedly an otherwise problematic movement.

In conclusion...

There are few cases where the analysis of a book simultaneously opens the field to the evaluation of an entire theory. This, however, is the case with Rapoport’s book, which synthesizes his entire contribution to what is supposed to be the history of terrorism, and whose periodization scheme has profoundly influenced the development of terrorism studies.

However, a detailed examination of this book leads us to disagree with Alex P. Schmid’s assessment that “[Rapoport’s] historical wave theory stands stronger than before.” There are at least two reasons for this. Firstly, because of the lack of specificity of the subject matter. For what Rapoport offers us is not really a history of terrorism, but a sometimes-problematic overview of the motivational causes that led certain actors to commit terrorist acts, based on tactical and strategic choices that are never explained. At most, Rapoport sheds light on a few geopolitical situations, but no causality emerges regarding the repertoire of action (violent or otherwise) available to the various actors involved. This shift in focus, made possible by the aforementioned definitional vagueness, will have lasting effects within terrorism studies, whose theoretical and methodological foundations have yet to be consolidated.

Secondly, even if we accept “wave theory” as a working hypothesis, as its undeniable didactic interest would suggest, we come up against the problem of validation criteria and variables. Indeed, the usual databases on terrorism only include cases from 1968 (ITERATE) or 1970 (GTD) onwards. It is therefore only possible to use them for a partial analysis of the third wave and a complete analysis of the next. Further, the preliminary quantitative and geographical explorations we have carried out do not really provide empirical confirmation of the existence of “waves” in terrorism. But the question merits further research by refining the variables and developing new sets of indicators. Another potentially promising line of research is emerging from recent work on the formation of so-called terrorist groups from 1860 onwards, for which we await further information.

The foregoing considerations demonstrate once again the enormous importance of historical knowledge for theoretically consolidating studies on terrorism.

Rapoport's book, in its own way, simply reiterates this obvious point, both in terms of its contributions and the debates it should provoke if terrorism studies is, at last, to embark on the road to becoming a normal scientific field. It is, in any case, from this perspective, which goes beyond pure (and indispensable) scholarship, that the present analysis has been undertaken.

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Notes

1. Voir notamment: Daniel Dory, "Les *Terrorism studies* à l'heure du bilan," *Sécurité Globale*, N° 22, 2020, 123-142; Daniel Dory, "Un nouveau manuel de *terrorism studies*: acquis et limites," *Sécurité Globale*, N° 32, 2022, pp. 63-73.

2. Voir, pour une approche synthétique de cette démarche: Ehud Sprinzak, "The Process of Delegitimation: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism," in Clark McCauley (Ed.), *Terrorism Research and Public Policy*, Routledge, London-New York, 1991, pp. 50-68.

3. Voir notamment: Ronald Crelinsten, *Terrorism, Democracy, and Human Security*, Routledge, London-New York, 2021. Nous avons rendu compte de ce livre important dans: Daniel Dory, "L'antiterrorisme : approches critiques et avancées théoriques," *Sécurité Globale*, N° 29, 2022, pp. 69-81.

4. David C. Rapoport, *Assassination and Terrorism*, CBC Merchandising, Toronto, 1971.

5. À titre d'illustration de ce fait, on peut citer l'éditorial de Rapoport figurant dans le N° 3, Vol 29, 2017 (p. 393) de *Terrorism and Political Violence*, suite à l'élection de Donald Trump. Ce texte présente un *Président Donald J. Trump Symposium* qui a été réuni apparemment à la hâte en veillant à son homogénéité ethnique (Kaplan, Rosenfeld et Barkun) et idéologique (sionisme de gauche associé au Parti Démocrate). Il y exprime, sans aucune fioriture, la haine de cette frange du milieu académique envers ce Président et son électorat en des termes que l'on trouve rarement dans une publication qui se veut scientifique. Ce document est donc très utile pour comprendre la politique éditoriale de cette revue, l'une des plus importantes dans le domaine des *terrorism studies*.

6. Il s'agit de: David C. Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," *Current History*, december 2001, pp. 419-424; David C. Rapoport,

“The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” *Anthropoetics*, Vol. 8, N° 1, Spring/Summer 2002 (en ligne).

7. Sur l’influence persistante de cette théorie dans l’historiographie du terrorisme, voir par exemple: Carola Dietze, “Introduction. Writing the History of Terrorism,” in: Carola Dietze & Claudia Verhoeven (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of The History of Terrorism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, pp. 1-30; et Bernhard Blumenau & Tim Wilson, “The History of Terrorism,” in: Diego Muro & Tim Wilson (Eds.), *Contemporary Terrorism Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, pp. 137-156. Ces derniers auteurs n’hésitant pas à écrire que “Rapoport’s work has become *the* dominant account of the evolution of modern terrorism” (p. 149). Voir également nos précédentes Veilles bibliographiques consacrées à l’histoire du terrorisme, et en particulier: Daniel Dory, “L’Histoire du Terrorisme: un état des connaissances et des débats,” *Sécurité Globale*, N° 25, 2021, pp. 109-123; Daniel Dory, “Apports récents à l’histoire du terrorisme: enjeux et limites,” *Sécurité Globale*, N° 31, 2022, pp. 47-60.

8. On retrouve, en effet, dans les premiers écrits de cet auteur consacrés au terrorisme des anticipations évidentes de la “théorie des vagues.” Notamment dans le petit livre cité en note 5; et David C. Rapoport, “The International World as Some Terrorists Have Seen It: A Look at a Century of Memoirs” [1987], in: David C. Rapoport (Ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, Frank Cass, London, 2001, pp. 32-58. Dans ce dernier texte les documents qui sont à la base de l’analyse sont distribués en trois périodes qui anticipent les trois premières “vagues” identifiées par la suite.

9. Notion expliquée notamment dans: David C. Rapoport, “Terrorism as a Global Wave Phenomenon: Overview,” *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 2016, (en ligne).

10. Parmi les textes les plus cités on peut mentionner: David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in: Audrey Kurth Cronin & James M. Ludes (Eds.), *Attacking Terrorism*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, 2004, pp. 46-73; David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terror,” in: Jussi M. Hanhimäki & Bernhard Blumenau (Eds.), *An International History of Terrorism*, Routledge, London-New York, 2013, pp. 282-310.

11. Marc Sedgwick, “Inspiration and the Origin of Global Waves of Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 30, N° 2, 2007, pp. 97-112.

12. Karen Rasler & William R. Thompson, “Looking for Waves of Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, N° 1, 2009, pp. 28-41.

13. Jean E. Rosenfeld (Ed.), *Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy. The Four Waves theory and political violence*, Routledge, London-New York, 2011.

14. Marc Sageman, "Ripples in the waves," in: Jean E. Rosenfeld (Ed.), *Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy. The Four Waves theory and political violence*, Routledge, London-New York, 2011, pp. 87-92.

15. Tom Parker & Nick Sitter, "The Four Horsemen of Terrorism: It's Not Waves, It's Strains," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 28, N° 2, 2016, pp. 197-216. Dans le même volume on trouve une discussion (confuse en raison d'un flou définitionnel persistant) sur le sujet ainsi qu'une réponse de Rapoport défendant ses positions sans apporter vraiment d'éléments nouveaux.

16. Steven M. Radil & Jaume Castan Pinos, "Reexamining the Four Waves of Modern Terrorism: A Territorial Interpretation," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 45, N° 4, 2022, pp. 331-330.

17. On a présenté les différentes strates définitionnelles du terrorisme (polémique, juridique et à vocation scientifique) dans diverses publications. Notamment: Daniel Dory, "Le terrorisme comme objet géographique : un état des lieux," *Annales de Géographie*, N° 728, 2019, pp. 5-36.

18. David Rapoport, "The Politics of Atrocity," in: Yonah Alexander & Seymour Maxwell Figner, *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, The John Jay Press, New York, 1977, pp. 46-61.

19. Ce qui pose incidemment la question de savoir comment cette permanence s'accorde avec le caractère changeant des normes morales et juridiques en fonction des lieux et moments historiques...

10. David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, N° 3, 1984, pp. 658-677.

11. Notamment: David C. Rapoport, "Messianic Sanctions for Terror," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 20, N° 2, 1988, pp. 195-213.

12. Sur ce cas on lira avec profit: Stewart J. D'Alessio & Lisa Stolzenberg, "Sicarii and the Rise of Terrorism," *Terrorism*, Vol. 13, 1990, pp. 329-335.

13. Voir, par exemple: Daniel Dory & Jean-Baptiste Noé, *Le Complexe Terroriste*, VA Éditions, Versailles, 2022, p. 13.

14. Rapoport reprend ici en grande partie l'argumentation de l'article antérieur suivant: David C. Rapoport, "Before the Bombs There Were the Mobs: American Experiences with Terror," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 20, N° 2, 2008, pp. 167-194. Article republié avec de légères modifications dans: Jean E. Rosenfeld (Ed.), *Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy. The Four Waves theory and political violence*, Routledge, London-New York, 2011, pp. 137-167.

15. Sur quelques aspects importants de la généalogie de la Petite Guerre/guérilla, on lira avec profit: Jean-Marc Marill, “La guerre révolutionnaire en France au XVIIIe siècle,” *Stratégique*, N° 128, 2022, pp. 43-64.

16. Voir les Veilles bibliographiques publiées sur l’histoire du terrorisme dans cette revue.

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18. Nous avons exploré cette approche pour les années 1970-2018 dans: Hervé Théry & Daniel Dory, “Espace-temps du terrorisme,” *Conflits*, N° 33, 2021, pp. 47-50.

19. On notera, non sans ironie, que Rapoport dans un compte rendu ravageur du livre de Walter Laqueur traduit en français sous le titre de *Terrorisme* (PUF, Paris, 1979), reproche (à juste titre) à ce dernier son imprécision conceptuelle. Voir: *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 73, N° 1, 1979, pp. 293-294.

20. La littérature sur les “terroristes” russes est considérable. Ses orientations générales sont bien synthétisées dans: Anke Hilbrenner et Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, “Introduction: Modern times? Terrorism in Late Tsarist Russia,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Vol. 58, N° 2, pp. 161-171; et Martin A. Miller, “Entangled Terrorisms in Late Imperial Russia,” in: Randall D. Law (Ed.), *The Routledge History of Terrorism*, Routledge, London-New York, 2015, pp. 92-110.

21. Ce qui vaut notamment pour des termes politiques/polémiques comme “gauche morale » ou “République Populaire Démocratique de Corée”...

22. Notamment l’article fondamental de Lindsay Clutterbuck, “The Progenitors of Terrorism: Russian Revolutionaries or Extreme Irish Republicans?” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, N° 1, 2004, pp. 154-181. Voir aussi: Niall Whelehan, “Modern Rebels? Irish Republicans in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in: Carola Dietze & Claudia Verhoeven (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Terrorism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022, pp. 503-518; Fearghal McGarry, “Po-

litical Violence in Ireland,” in: Richard English, *The Cambridge History of Terrorism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2021, pp. 254-283; lire en particulier les pp. 257-265 sur la campagne d’attentats à la bombe entre 1881 et 1885.

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24. On trouve une bonne analyse de cet attentat et de son contexte dans: Ángel Herrerín López, “1893: año clave del terrorismo en la España de la Restauración,” *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, Serie V, T. 20, 2008, pp. 71-91.

25. Voir: John Merriman, *Dynamite Club. L’invention du terrorisme à Paris*, Tallandier, Paris, 2009. On trouvera aussi quelques informations intéressantes, malgré l’imprécision conceptuelle qui nuit à la démonstration, dans : Gilles Ferragu, “L’écho des bombes: l’invention du terrorisme “à l’aveugle” (1893-1895),” *Ethnologie française*, Vol. 49, N° 1, 2019, pp. 21-31.

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28. Pour une première approche voir: Daniel Dory, “L’efficacité du terrorisme en questions,” *Sécurité Globale*, N° 20, 2019, pp. 157-168.

29. Sur ce dernier point voir notre étude exploratoire Daniel Dory, *Ecoterrorisme? Comprendre et évaluer la menace*, Les Cahiers de Liberté Politique, Versailles, 2023.

30. Voir notamment: Richard Bach Jensen, “The International Campaign Against Anarchist Terrorism, 1880-1930s,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, N°1, 2009, pp. 89-109. Pour une actualisation sur le thème : Daniel Dory, “L’antiterrorisme en perspective historique: quelques éclairages récents,” *Sécurité Globale*, N° 27, 2021, pp. 189-199.
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The War through the Lens of Mathematics

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ABSTRACT

This article discusses the application of mathematical models, specifically Lanchester's models in the context of warfare, to predict battle outcomes by considering factors such as the number of soldiers and their effectiveness. We review the use of these models for various historical battles and even in the context of contemporary conflicts, such as the Russian aggression in Ukraine but also in diverse areas, including animal behavior and strategy video games. These models provide valuable insights into battle dynamics, but they have limitations, particularly in accounting for the spatial arrangement of armies and the variability in an army's effectiveness based on morale and weapon types.

Keywords: Lanchester's Models, Warfare Mathematics, Battle Outcome Prediction, Military Strategy

La guerra a través de la lente de las matemáticas

RESUMEN

Este artículo analiza la aplicación de modelos matemáticos, específicamente los modelos de Lanchester en el contexto de la guerra, para predecir los resultados de la batalla considerando factores como el número de soldados y su efectividad. Revisamos el uso de estos modelos para diversas batallas históricas e incluso en el contexto de conflictos contemporáneos, como la agresión rusa en Ucrania, pero también en diversos ámbitos, incluido el comportamiento animal y los videojuegos de estrategia. Estos modelos proporcionan información valiosa sobre la dinámica de la batalla, pero tienen limitaciones, particularmente a la hora de tener en cuenta la disposición espacial de los ejércitos y la variabilidad en la efectividad de un ejército en función de la moral y los tipos de armas.

Palabras clave: modelos de Lanchester, matemáticas de guerra, predicción del resultado de la batalla, estrategia militar

数学视角下的战争

摘要

本文探讨了数学模型的应用（特别是兰彻斯特模型在战争情境中的应用），通过考量士兵数量及其有效性等因素来预测战斗结果。我们述评了这些模型在不同历史战役中的使用，甚至在当代冲突情境下的使用（例如俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略），以及在不同领域的使用，包括动物行为和策略视频游戏。这些模型为战斗动态提供了宝贵见解，但它们也有局限性，特别是在考虑军队空间布局以及基于士气和武器类型的军队效能的差异性这两方面。

关键词：兰彻斯特模型，战争数学，战斗结果预测，军事战略

In war, numbers alone provide no advantage. Sun Tzu (6th century BC - 5th century BC) in “The Art of War.”

To determine the outcome of a battle, military strategists have long relied more on mathematics than crystal balls. Since each conflict has its own characteristics, seeking a single model for all confrontations is futile. However, it would be tedious to list all possible approaches. Let’s focus on the early works on the subject to understand their utility and limitations.

There is a long tradition between mathematics and war. Archimedes is often presented as the first great scientist to have used his scientific knowledge to build war machines. During the siege of Syracuse in 212 BC, it is said that he built giant parabolic mirrors to ignite enemy sails by concentrating the sun’s rays. Although the anecdote is certainly not true, it illustrates one of the first uses of science in warfare. On the other hand, the Greeks knew that war is better waged with mathematics as part of the train. Plato’s “Socrates” explains that the commander needs arithmetic and geometry for displaying his troops optimally (Republica 525b). While World War II is very well known (Manhattan project, Enigma code, etc.) World War I was also an active period for mathematicians.

Frederick William Lanchester (October 23, 1868 - March 8, 1946) was a polymath who became interested in the influence of modern weapons on the outcome of conflicts as early as 1914 [4]. He considered that the method by which combat losses are computed is one of the most critical parts of any combat model. The Lanchester equations, which state that a unit’s combat losses depend on the size of its opponent, are widely used for this purpose. In modern warfare, each weapon can eliminate multiple adversaries. To model the number of deaths in a

battle, it's necessary to consider not only the number of soldiers but also firepower. This raises questions: Is it better to increase the number of soldiers or firepower?

What are the expected losses in a conflict? Can we estimate enemy losses? The first model by Lanchester (known as the linear model) is suited for ancient battles and has little practical significance.

The two models Lanchester (1916) conceived are called the linear law and the geometric law. The linear law is described as a series of one-on-one duels on the battlefield, most applicable to ancient warfare or area fire. In this scenario, the attrition ratio of the two forces is independent of the force ratio. The geometric law, associated with modern warfare, describes combat where multiple units of a force can focus their aimed fire onto single targets. In this concentrated fire model, the attrition that a force suffers is proportional to the number of enemies.

Lanchester's geometric model was initially developed to simulate aerial combat (a major innovation during World War I) and focuses on the number of surviving soldiers in a battle. He also extends the theory to include heterogeneous force composition, naval warfare, and other battle types.

Lanchester's geometric model was initially developed to simulate aerial combat (a major innovation during World War I) and focuses on the number of surviving soldiers in a battle. Even if it is fundamental to know the number of soldiers at a given time, it is crucial to consider the rate of change. The objective of Lanchester's model is to calculate the evolution of the number of soldiers over time and, ultimately, the number of surviving soldiers. From a mathematical perspective, the concept of a derivative with respect to time begins to emerge, i.e., the rate of disappearance of an army as a function of time. As the number of soldiers decreases, this derivative must be negative. Furthermore, this decrease depends on the effectiveness of the opposing army. In the end, if we consider two armies A and B, and denote $A(t)$ and $B(t)$ as the number of soldiers at time "t," and α and β as the effectiveness of armies A and B, we obtain a system of differential equations where the derivative with respect to time of $A(t)$ is the product of β and $B(t)$ (with a negative sign); similarly, for the derivative of $B(t)$. (See image 1).

$$\frac{\delta A(t)}{\delta t} = -\beta B(t)$$
$$\frac{\delta B(t)}{\delta t} = -\alpha A(t)$$

Image 1. System of differential equation from Lanchester's model

Solving this system of equations is relatively straightforward. In the conventional approach, $A(0)$ and $B(0)$ represent the initial strengths of the two armies at the beginning of the battle. For simplicity, let's assume that the battle ends due to a lack of combatants. If camp A wins the battle at time T , then $B(T) = 0$, and it can be demonstrated that the number of survivors is:

$$A(T) = \sqrt{A^2(0) - \frac{\beta}{\alpha} B^2(0)}.$$

If camp B wins the battle at time T , $A(T) = 0$ and

$$\sqrt{B^2(0) - \frac{\alpha}{\beta} A^2(0)}$$

Before discussing the applications and limitations of the model, let's see what this model teaches us. First, it's evident that the influence of efficiency is linear, while the number of soldiers at the beginning of the conflict has a quadratic influence. The statement that quantity is more important than quality probably stems from this criterion. The Lanchester square model is a continuous model of time and state in practice, often regarded as a kind of mean-value model. This implies that it's better to be more than twice as numerous as to be more than twice as efficient. The "3:1 rule" in ground combat stipulates that an attacking force should have a 3-to-1 advantage over a defending force to succeed. This rule originated from operations research. Let note that the logic behind this model deteriorates as the number of operational units decreases, and it certainly collapses when the number of operational units is reduced to zero.

This model describes combat between two homogeneous forces using long-range weapons such as tanks, revolvers, and machine guns. Both fight under the assumption of complete tactical information. Complete tactical information means that an arbitrary operational unit is always capable of detecting at least one of the many hostile operational units because it can kill. In addition, it is assumed that all the operational units on each side can share information fully and coordinate their firepower among the hostile operational units. In fact, firepower is the only limiting factor. This assumption may be completely unrealistic, as it is difficult to identify many modern combat situations where the assumption is respected by both sides. For example, very few army operations are carried out with complete tactical information on both sides. It also doesn't account for the spatial arrangement of armies, and the effectiveness of an army varies based on morale and types of weapons. Furthermore, the deterministic nature of the model means that the same conditions will always yield the same result. Current models prefer simulations that provide probabilities of victory.

Economic and military growth require investment. The more you invest, the faster you grow. The more the state invests in the military, the less it can invest in the economy. Military expenditure has the opportunity cost of reducing

economic expenditure. Based on these assumptions, some authors proposed to extend Lanchester model with the growth of a nation's resources as a function of the amount of its resources invested in economic growth as well as the amount it invests in military preparations for combat.

In Lanchester's model both sides apply the same type of tactics and firing techniques; the battles are symmetric. Asymmetric engagements occur when the two sides apply different tactics. One such asymmetric combat situation occurs when regular forces of a state fight guerrillas or insurgents who apply irregular warfare tactics. A different manifestation of asymmetry in Lanchester models is when the two sides employ profoundly different tactics. Consider an aimed-fire situation where a homogeneous Blue force is engaged in battle with a heterogeneous Red force comprising n units that are different in terms of fire-effectiveness and vulnerability. Lin and MacKay showed that the optimal tactic for Blue is such that Blue should not spread out its effort but rather concentrate all its fire on one Red adversary at a time. At any given time, Blue should concentrate its fire on the adversary for which the "product" of its vulnerability and threat is the highest.

The asymmetric models apply to irregular warfare where well-organized, military forces of the state confront low-signature guerrilla fighters. These models focus on the asymmetry in information and its impact on battlefield outcome. Another crucial component in irregular-warfare scenarios is the civilian population who, on the one hand, are subject to violent actions by the guerrillas, and on the other hand, may be a source of support and provider of hiding places for the guerrillas' fighters. This question was studied by Kress in [9].

Lanchester's equations essentially model the attrition between two opposing forces. They capture a duel, force-on-force, situation. However, recent, as well as some historical, conflicts involve more than two opposing forces. The Bosnian Civil War (Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia, NATO), the Iraq Civil War (Coalition Forces, Sunni Militia, Shia Militia), and most recently, the war in Syria (Assad Regime Forces, Free Syrian Army, Hezbollah, Kurds, Russia, Turkey) are just a few examples of such multilateral violent conflicts. Two recent papers extend the classical Lanchester theory to the case where the attritional conflict comprises more than two players. It is important to note a profound difference between two- and multiple-player Lanchester models. In a two-player (force-on-force) conflict, the Lanchester models are purely descriptive; they simply capture the attrition on both sides as a function of the initial strengths and the attrition rates of the two players: Blue and Red. No decision is required, by either player, during the engagement. However, in a multiple-player conflict, each player has to decide how to allocate its strength among the other adversaries so as to maximize its own chances to be the victor. This decision, common to all other players, leads to a prescriptive model where each one of n players ($n > 2$) has to dynamically allocate its existing strength among its $n - 1$ adversaries.

Kress et al. [8] studied this question as a differential game where each player wishes to maximize its own surviving force minus that of its enemies. The outcome of the analysis is surprising: either a player is strong enough to win over the other players combined in a coalition against itself, or all players are locked in a stalemate that leads to their mutual demise. In the case of three players, this conclusion stands in contrast to sequential-engagement scenarios in which the weakest player can achieve an advantage.

Lastly, for those familiar with differential equation systems, they might have recognized in Lanchester's model a simplified version of the Lotka-Volterra equations. This model, called the predator-prey model, deals with the interaction between two species, one being a predator and the other its prey. It was introduced a decade after Lanchester's work.

In Lotka-Volterra's model, prey are assumed to have an unlimited source of food and to reproduce exponentially if they are not subject to predation. The rate of predation on prey is assumed to be proportional to the frequency of encounters between predators and prey. The variation in the number of preys is given by its own growth minus the predation rate applied to it. Similarly, the variation in the predator population is given by the growth of this population, minus the number of natural deaths. Predators thrive when prey is plentiful, but eventually exhaust their resources and decline. When the predator population has declined sufficiently, the prey that has benefited from the respite reproduce and their population increases again. This dynamic continues in a cycle of growth and decline. This model was used for guerrilla [10]. The growth term reflects guerrilla recruitment, which depends on the interaction between guerrilla forces and the population they control while predation reflects losses of guerrillas by either death or capture or defection to the regulars. At the same time, the regular recruitment rate is the rate of increase of the regulars if there were no guerrillas and the predation is losses to guerrillas, depending on the interaction of the guerrillas with the regulars.

Despite all its limitations, this model has been successfully applied to various situations [2]. Lanchester's laws have been used to explain the characteristics of battles among a variety of animals that fight in groups, including termites, ants, birds, and chimpanzees [3]. Among the proposed implications, one can mention investment in offspring, decision rules on when to engage in combat, and differences in size between native and non-native species. Today, it is also widely used in strategy video games whenever there are battles, such as in *Age of Empires*, for instance, or to model the outcome of a game like *StarCraft* [6].

Lanchester's model has been applied to various historical battles, including the Battle of Trafalgar, the Battle of Kursk in 1943 involving German and Soviet tanks, the Battle of Berlin, the Battle of the Bulge during World War II, and the naval conflict in the Atlantic during which German U-Boats inflicted damage on

Allied convoys. In a 1954 article, Engel applied Lanchester's model to the Battle of Iwo Jima.

The battle was towards the end of the war and the Pacific Theater campaign. The data in this paper covers the force attrition from the 19th of February through the 26th of March 1945. Japan was on the defensive at the strategic as well as the operational levels. The island was used by the Japanese military throughout the war as a waypoint and relay for communications, aircraft, and supplies between the Japan mainland and the rest of the Southwest Pacific.

The source of the data is the daily casualty recordings from the historical accounts and official records from the battle of Iwo Jima. This information was compiled during the operation by the U.S. Marine Corps Historical Division. The American army would lose around 26,000 soldiers (including 7,000 deaths). Such detailed casualty data for the Japanese forces is not available, however, and the only usable data regarding Japanese force size over time is that there were 21,500 at the start of the battle (D+0) and approximately zero at the end of the recorded fighting (D+35). D+28 is the official end of the battle as declared by the operational U.S. Marine command at the time; and, although there were some residual Japanese forces deep within buried tunnels and bunkers that were exposed over the following days, weeks, months, and even years, they were relatively low in number and are generally not considered for the analysis of the data.

This battle aligns with many of the assumptions of Lanchester's model since the island was isolated, and the Japanese defenders were nearly all killed. The island was attacked by approximately 73,000 American soldiers (54,000 on the first day, 6,000 on the second, and 13,000 on the sixth day). It's relatively easy to reconstruct the dynamics of the model and estimate the parameters. The Japanese efficiency was 0.0577, while the American efficiency was 0.0106. Therefore, there was an efficiency ratio of 5.4 between the two armies. It's also possible to reconstruct the dynamics of the battle and explore what would have happened with different scenarios. For example, if the Americans hadn't sent reinforcements on the second and sixth days, there would likely have been an additional 7,000 casualties, and the battle would have lasted 66 days instead of 36. That's a one-month difference. Conversely, if all troops had been landed on the first day, it would have saved 2,000 lives (and one day of battle). Finally, it would have taken at least 31,300 Japanese soldiers to withstand the American assault.

Today the current European military landscape is heavily influenced by the Russian aggression in Ukraine, and we can already see the application of Lanchester's model to this conflict [5]. The balance of power in the War in Ukraine is very similar to that in the American Civil War. In 2022 Russia had about 4:1 advantage in population. Based on these numbers, Ukraine has about as much chance of winning the conflict as the Confederacy did. But this prediction comes from a very simple model, and reality can deviate from it due to several factors

(such as morale, munition production, skills, logistics, etc.). Depending on how important these factors are, the prediction could be substantially different. In other words, we have alternative predictions resulting from different assumptions—finding out which of these alternatives matches the data best is what the scientific method is about. Math gives a model, but life can be more complicated.

Although addressing the challenges posed by heavy artillery in terms of target location and trajectory calculations demanded expertise in mathematics, World War I revealed numerous technological and military advancements that also hinged on meticulous mathematical analyses. Whether it was keeping an airplane airborne or facilitating its descent, various mathematical problems needed solutions. Additionally, the advancement and refinement of technologies like sonar or wireless telegraphy, along with the practical military application of cartography and meteorology on a daily basis, demanded mathematical skills that, while not necessarily groundbreaking, were nonetheless scarce among the enlisted personnel. On the other hand, human interactions supply many phenomena, which can be modelled and analyzed with applied mathematics. Lanchester's model is one of the most famous models for the role of the military strategy (and the linked decision problems) during a conflict between two or more armies. Even if hardware of weapons systems is fundamental, the behavioral aspects of combat are also very important and historical data offer rich opportunities for studying the effects of tactics.

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How Israel's Military Doctrines Have Changed

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On July 12, 2006, following rocket attacks on Israeli territory, Hezbollah sent a commando into Israel, killing eight soldiers and kidnapping 11 others. Despite the fact that Hezbollah was a member of the Lebanese government, and the military involvement of Iran, which supplied heavy weapons and soldiers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, this attack triggered a military response that lasted 33 days.

The attack came at a time when the Israeli army had been conducting Operation Summer Rains against Hamas militants, starting on June 28, 2006. This had followed the kidnapping of the French Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit as well as the rocket attacks that had targeted the town of Ashkelon. The hostage was released in October 2011 in exchange for a thousand Palestinian prisoners, most of them Hamas military officials.

These two operations seem to have served as a dress rehearsal for the October 7 Pogrom. But amnesia, a certain form of arrogance, and the weakening of Israeli power in conflict with its civil society, had made us forget the lessons of 2006.

Israel wanted to avoid being drawn into a dynamic of permanent attrition on its northern border, similar to that along the border with the Gaza Strip. At the same time, they were preparing for a large-scale conflict, both in the north and in the Gaza Strip. Both challenges could be overcome by adopting the principle of a "disproportionate" strike against the enemy's weak points, while neutralizing the enemy's missile-launching capabilities.

In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, Tsahal was to act immediately, decisively and with exceptional force in relation to the enemy's actions and the threat it posed. Such a response was intended to inflict damage to an extent that would require a lengthy and costly reconstruction process. The strike had to be carried out as quickly as possible, prioritizing the destruction of assets over the search for individual launchers, targeting decision-makers and the powerful elite. In Syria this meant targeting the Syrian army, the Syrian regime, and the Syrian state structure. In Lebanon this referred to Hezbollah's military capabilities, the economic interests, and power centers which support the organization.

Israel did not wish to be drawn into a war of attrition with Hezbollah, and therefore did not wish to limit its response to actions in response to an isolated incident. On the contrary, it needed to make it very clear that the State of Israel would not accept any attempt at destabilization along its borders, but also had to be prepared for deterioration and escalation, as well as large-scale confrontation.

This approach also applied to the Gaza Strip, by hitting Hamas hard and refraining from playing cat-and-mouse with the Al Qassam brigades' rocket launchers by imposing a ceasefire on the enemy.

After days of hesitation, marked by stupefaction and anger, three operations now seem to be led by the war cabinet, more or less in agreement with the General Staff and the civilian and military intelligence services.

Operation Nily "Netzach Israel Lo Yeshaker" (The Eternal One of Israel does not lie, named after a Jewish espionage network which had supported the United Kingdom in its struggle against the Ottoman Empire in Palestine from 1915 to 1917, and whose aim is to physically eliminate the masterminds and perpetrators of the October 7th massacre, on the model of the hunt for Nazi criminals or Operation "Wrath of God" against the Munich hostage-takers in 1972) began with a single (provisional?) obligation not to intervene in Qatar.

Operation Amalek: an operation that was named after an enemy people of Israel, defeated by Joshua. According to the Bible, they were always fierce against the Hebrews, who regarded them as a cursed people. God ordered King Saul to exterminate them. After their defeat, he forgave Agag, their king, but his disobedience caused him to lose his crown. He was succeeded by David. The current operation is characterized by a methodical invasion of northern Gaza, with concentric movements and incursions. The question of intervention south of the Wadi Gaza still remains.

Operation Dahiya: named after the southern Shiite district of Beirut, Dahieh Janoubiyé, which was home to a Hezbollah stronghold before being razed to the ground by Israeli aircraft in 2006. It also reminds Muslims of the 10th of the month of Dzul hijja, celebrating one of Islam's greatest feasts, marked by the offering of "bloody victims". These sacrifices are known as dahaya, "immolation".

The doctrine of the same name was formulated by Israeli General Gadi Eizenkot, commander of Tsahal's northern front, in an interview with Reuters: "What happened to the Dahiya neighborhood will happen to all the villages that serve as a base for fire against Israel. [...] We will use disproportionate force [on these areas] and cause great damage and destruction. From our point of view, these are not civilian villages, but military bases. [...] This is not a recommendation, but a plan, and it has been approved. [...] Attacking the population is the only way to hold back Nasrallah".¹

1 Reuters, le 03 octobre 2008.

In the familiar fog of war, and its uncertain and often “flexible” laws, Israel is responding at the cost of high civilian and military casualties to a major and barbaric aggression. But it has not yet found the post-war mechanism. Quite the contrary, in fact.

Using mechanisms invented over fifteen years ago and which failed to prevent the 7th of October, Israel is avenging its dead in the same way that France, America, and Great Britain avenged theirs after the Bataclan or Nice, or 11/09...

Curiously, negotiations for the release of the hostages seem to be progressing in this context because, much to the chagrin of Westerners and their dominant cultural assumptions, both sides are speaking the same language, that of force.

But when the collateral damage far outweighs the main objective, when the time for vengeance has passed, what room is there for justice and peace to be built?

After all, we must save the main target - the Abrahamic Accords - from the great architect of these operations, Iran.

And allow the Palestinians to find a homeland, a state, and a reason to break out of the cycle of despair and hatred.

Shah Mat: Iran's Victory

Alain Bauer

Since 1979 and the accession to power of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime, Westerners have never missed an opportunity to underestimate Iran's capabilities, regularly forgetting that this was the Persian Empire and that despite its strong religious dominance, Iran has remembered this.

It resisted the war that had been waged against it through its enemy Iraq, and gradually gained dominance over local Shiite militias by launching attacks and special operations all along the Shiite Arc (Lebanon and Yemen, with success, and Bahrain without success). Furthermore, by extending its influence with the support of its African trading posts and by enlisting Hamas under the flag of Jihad (thus reviving the protection granted by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to Ayatollah Khomeini before his exile in France), the Iranian regime has managed to hold out despite the detestation of its own population and has become a major player in global chaos.

Between the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the death of Ariel Sharon, the West, neighboring Arab countries, and Israel have done everything in their power to destroy the Oslo Accords and the Wolfensohn Plan, which envisaged the creation of a "Dubai over Gaza." The signing of the Abraham Accords, which lacked only the Saudi initials, made it possible to imagine a lasting peace process from above.

Now that he has managed to smoke out his partners in the name of a reconciliation that we can now see is a sham, the Iranian chess player has succeeded in an exceptionally complex operation, avoiding diplomatic criticism while launching a military-terrorist operation of which he can only be the beneficiary, whatever the outcome.

By putting an end to Israel's alleged absolute superiority over its territory by ruining the trust that existed between the Jewish people, Tsahal, and the Netanyahu government, and by using the internal political crisis invented by Israel's Prime Minister to avoid personal legal proceedings at the cost of his own country's security, Iran has paved the way for a combined operation. Prepared, trained and in part supervised by its special forces, which broke the Maginot Line set up in Gaza, it took control of major military and intelligence installations for several dozen hours, massacred civilians in a modern pogrom reminiscent of Oradour, Boutcha, or the Bataclan, and escaped with over two hundred hostages. Iran thus destroyed a myth. Since 1973, Israel had promised not to be surprised again. Internal divisions—arrogance yesterday in the face of Hezbollah, today in the face of Hamas—have now ruined for a long time to come the trust that held the country together.

The attack on October 7th settled nothing. Military and political disagreements between the military and politicians, the deterioration in IDF morale and resources, and technological fetishism have made it impossible for three weeks to define a policy that goes beyond vengeance and revenge—the awakening of public opinion to the issue of the hostages and their rescue, the weight of moral stakes, and disturbed political power in Jerusalem, which have hesitated between impossible negotiation, necessary incursions, potential invasion, and untenable occupation. For a long time, bombardments served as a mask for these unthinkable hesitations in the military history of Israeli armies. The unleashing of heavy operations from 10/27 onwards, despite the rather effective but piecemeal mediation of Qatar, the alarms of Egypt and Jordan, and the concerns of the American Godfather and the West, indicates that what remains of the ruling power has chosen to flee forward, thinking, thanks to a partially reconstituted intelligence network, that it is better to apply the “Hannibal” directive (according to which it would be better to save a nation than one or more individuals taken hostage) than to play for time.

Since, in the logic of Hamas, there are no real civilians or combat zones, and everything can be used as a hiding place or screen for structured underground installations, the Israeli strikes against Gaza could, in the short term, only revolt far beyond the Arab street. A dead child, Jewish or Palestinian, remains unbearable—and Hamas knows this better than anyone.

Israel has been unable to obtain more than a few moments compassion from the fires of hatred that have been burning for so long in Gaza, the West Bank, and the Arab world, as well as in many other parts of the world. The results of the vote on the Canadian amendment to the resolution submitted to obtain a ceasefire in Gaza, without any mention of what preceded the Israeli military operations, is a demonstration of this, and sheds light on Israel’s traditional position that, in the final analysis, the country can only count on itself. While the main resolution obtained 120 votes in favor, 14 against and 45 abstentions (with a totally disjointed European vote: France, Spain, and Belgium voted in favor of the text; Germany, Italy, and Finland abstained; Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary voted against), the Canadian text, which targeted Hamas, obtained only 88 votes in favor, and 55 votes against.

The days of consensus in the fight against terrorism and crimes against humanity are long gone. The immense work that enabled the consciences of the world to establish the Nuremberg Tribunal against Nazism and the ICC also fell victim to October 7th.

Everyone lost. The UN, Israel, the Jews, the Westerners, the Arabs, the Palestinians, the people of Gaza, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the present or future signatories of the Abraham Accords, and humanity.


China is watching.

Iran has won. Checkmate.

Alain BAUER


Professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers.

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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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