

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON CRIMINOLOGY

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
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Introduction

There have been very recently two very exciting developments in the evolution of this journal that add appreciably to its uniqueness as a publication. They powerfully demonstrate just how international the study of criminology is. Perhaps we should not be surprised about this as we live in a world that technology is shrinking every day, but they are really exciting innovations. The 2023 international conference will be in September in Paris, and connects with the French National Strategic Conference, which is open to the public. For more information, please visit ipsonet.org/conferences/crim-conf/. The second development is the release of *Revue de Recherche sur le Renseignement*, the new journal focusing on French intelligence studies, available at revuederecherche.org. The *International Journal on Criminology* is a truly international effort as this newest issue again illustrates.

To help support this initiative, there are numerous resources offered by Policy Studies Organization and Westphalia Press. The Westphalia Press books are a growing part of our unfolding plan to provide the best resources for teachers, researchers, and students. The books published by the Policy Studies Organization's Westphalia Press under the growing Library of Criminology, whose editorial board Alain Bauer heads, is at westphaliapress.org/library-of-criminology/. In addition, the conferences and videos are available at ipsonet.org/conferences/

Our concept of a journal is that with all the improvements in technology, for example the hybrid conferences, a journal has the potential to become much more than printed pages. It becomes a gathering place for those interested in the subject matter, a rendezvous where the best contemporary thinking can be found. We have been really amazed, even startled, at how hybrid conferences have enlarged the constituencies of our conferences and enabled the participation of many who previously wanted to attend but for whom distance was a barrier. We anticipate far more developments. This is just a beginning.

Because of the international nature of evil, drugs and scams being but two sad examples, *International Journal on Criminology* from its inception has been a transcontinental and multinational effort. Surely if a problem crosses boundaries then solutions need to cross boundaries. We would like to warmly invite your comments and your participation, and hope that you will help us make future issues and future conferences exemplary. We want a dialogue, not a monologue.

Paul Rich

President

Policy Studies Organization, Westphalia Press

The Unexpected But Previsible Return of War

Alain Bauer

ABSTRACT

In international relations, as in criminal or terrorist affairs, what seems new often turns out to be what has been forgotten. Amnesia has become our main enemy. We are gradually obliterating history, geography, perspective, and discovering that the present remains brutal.

Keywords: War, Russia, Ukraine, Europe

El inesperado pero previsible regreso de la guerra

RESUMEN

En las relaciones internacionales, como en los asuntos criminales o terroristas, lo que parece nuevo a menudo resulta ser lo que se ha olvidado. La amnesia se ha convertido en nuestro principal enemigo. Vamos borrando poco a poco la historia, la geografía, la perspectiva, y descubrimos que el presente sigue siendo brutal.

Palabras clave: Guerra, Rusia, Ucrania, Europa

意外但可预见的战争回归

摘要

在国际关系中，就像在犯罪或恐怖主义事务中一样，看似新鲜的事情往往一直被遗忘。失忆症已成为我们的主要敌人。我们正在逐渐抹去历史、地理、视角，并发现当下的现实仍然是残酷的。

关键词：战争，俄罗斯，乌克兰，欧洲

Nothing can excuse the premeditated attack of the Russian power against Ukraine. But denouncing it is not enough to analyze, understand and, above all, to react. The usual triptych of imprecations, incantations, and lamentations only serves to mask political impotence.

After 1945, in spite of painful decolonization, wrested independence, and terrorism of all kinds, a fragile peace had managed to guarantee international borders. This interlude, from the Yalta summit (in Crimea) to the fall of the Berlin Wall, ended under the blast of bombs and in the blood of the fighting in Europe. History remains tragic and, from this turning point, another world will be born, new demarcations will emerge, new stakes will be imposed for the survival of freedoms and democracies.

While the flow of data and information has become so abundant and so fast that we no longer have time to master its meaning, while alternative truths (called fake news) are submerging the information system everywhere, while there is no longer any absolute and common truth, while beliefs and distrust are multiplying—will Europeans, lost between the transhumanist promise and the unstructured Metaverse, finally become a real power? They have failed to consolidate power since the European Defense Community project was established in 1954?

OF AMNESIA IN GEOPOLITICS

In international relations, as in criminal or terrorist affairs, what seems new often turns out to be what has been forgotten. Amnesia has become our main enemy. We are gradually obliterating history, geography, perspective, and discovering that the present remains brutal.

Cold war and/or hot peace: in 1989, the liberal democracies experienced their epiphany. Westerners believed in the rightness of their model and in its copy and paste diffusion. Faced with the dismemberment of the Warsaw Pact, the Atlantic Alliance had a doctrinal and moral corpus that was to dominate. The Soviet debacle in Afghanistan balanced the American disaster in Vietnam, and the accounts seemed to be in balance. Détente is taking hold, borders are opening up, and freedom is progressing. A world of globalized carefree people satisfying their consumerist cravings is taking hold. But already, the fall of the Berlin Wall was followed by the destruction of Tiananmen Square. And a new, unexpected adversary, albeit one cooked up in the back rooms of Pakistan with the help of Western services, is preparing to take the field.

The matrix of the chaos to come has been established since 1979. Three events, whose connections are not understood, follow one another: the fall of the Shah of Iran, the attack on the Great Mosque of Mecca, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Each one has local, regional and international consequences. But their accumulation creates the conditions for a major upheaval.

The appearance of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders (improperly named Al-Qaeda) accompanied the outbreak of the Algerian civil war following the interruption of the electoral process that gave victory to the Islamic Salvation Front. Both movements have as their backbone veterans of Afghanistan who fought the “red” enemy. The eschatological vision of their struggle changes the traditional profile of terrorism as another means of waging war.

THE REVENGE OF HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY

Everywhere after 1989, the straight-line borders imagined by the victorious great powers of 1945 are breaking down. A new world is emerging in pain. Then, first in Yugoslavia, the door of the freezer that had frozen the Pandora’s box of nations, peoples, tribes, and confessions reopened. Nostalgic impulses and identity passions intermingle, where the colonizer (especially British, but not only) had cut up ethnic groups that aspired to reunify (Pashtun, Kurdish, Peul, ...), but also, where national constructions had left wounds infected by separatist or irredentist impulses (Basque Country, Catalonia, Ireland, Scotland, without forgetting curiosities such as the Falklands, Ceuta and Melilla, or Gibraltar).

Europe is confronted with the break-up of Yugoslavia, a country that is a symbol of the non-aligned. In the Balkans, the stigma of the four-year siege of Sarajevo (1992/1996), or of the 78 days of NATO air sorties bombing Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbia in 1999 in order to spare Kosovo from ethnic cleansing, is still present.

Throughout these three decades, war has been waging on various fronts and in various forms, from classic confrontation to hyper-terrorist innovation—until, in the strict sense of an armed conflict between two nations, with the aggressor also hitting the cities, it made its return to the heart of the Old Continent. And that it puts an end to an enchanted parenthesis of half a century. We are living in a historical and geographical cycle of vengeance.

THE EMPIRE UNTHOUGHT

We reread the theoretical essays on war: Ratzel and the struggle for vital space, Mackinder and the centrality of the world pivot, Schmitt and the need to designate the enemy, Mahan and the predominance of the maritime axes, Fuller and the superiority of the Blitzkrieg. Without forgetting the French: Aron for whom there is no instance superior to the States since each of them holds the monopoly of legitimate violence and, in the absence of a supreme arbiter, has the right to resort to it. And for whom: “Any change in the international system leads to a change in international relations”; or Duroselle, whose historical, empirical, realistic, and methodical enterprise endeavors to discern the role of ideas and regularities on the international scene, concluding from the inevitable confrontations that “[A]ny empire will perish.”

We reread their successors who try to renew the genre in the light of the collapse of communism. Some describe the effects of the phenomenon: Luttwak about the different levels of strategy or Nye about soft power. Others try to decipher it. In 1992, inspired by Kojève's theses, Fukuyama declared that the "end of history" had come with the ideological victory of Western liberalism, whose supremacy did not mean the absence of conflict. In 1996, Huntington announced the "clash of civilizations," considering that after having been predatory and then ideological, future wars will see the confrontation of a few large blocks determined by their cultural and religious identity. In 1997, Brzezinski drew the "great chessboard" on which a world based on the preponderance of the United States allied with Europe, rich but powerless, would depend in order to limit the multiplication of competition. The same author had indicated that it was necessary to detach Ukraine from Russia because together they formed an Empire, whereas separated, they were only States.

The authors of these concepts, centered on the questions of hegemony, power, and neutralization, intend to reorganize the planet. None of them, or almost none of them, sought to establish universal peace, which they considered utopian. Their reflections are confirmed by the mutation induced in 2001 by the terrorist attacks against the pillars of American power. They show the limits of nuclear deterrence. Unable to prevent recurrent attacks, nor to retaliate with the ultimate weapon, the United States conducted conventional operations that ultimately led to the withdrawal from Kabul in 2021, the humiliating images of which evoke the departure from Saigon in 1975.

However, one should always listen to the leaders of authoritarian regimes. They have a habit of saying openly what they want, where they want to go, and even how. Russia's Putin, China's Xi, Turkey's Erdogan, but also America's Trump or Brazil's Bolsonaro have in common that they spend their time announcing—shouting when necessary—their alternative vision to the decadent globalized society whose weaknesses they condemn, but whose democratic vitality they fear.

Each of them has a geographical representation of their territory, often ancient, quite distant from that of our school textbooks, which delineates their fundamental claims. One by one, the old empires are waking up, whether they are Persian (Iran), Ottoman (Turkey), Han (China) or Slavic Orthodox (Russia). Tehran in Lebanon first, Ankara in the Caucasian file, Beijing in Hong Kong while waiting for Taiwan. Moscow in Ossetia, Transnistria, Crimea, after having intervened in Belarus and Kazakhstan, invades Ukraine. They make maneuvers that recompose the idealized space of their national novel, and on which, since the first term of Barack Obama, the U.S. administration has broken its teeth several times.

UKRAINE: A PURULENT CASE STUDY FOR MOSCOW

In the Ukrainian question, the evidence of strategic imperatives tends to blur the prevalence of energy resources. However, they also explain the rivalries that embrace a country larger than France (600,000 km²), almost as populated as Spain (44 million inhabitants) and with a rich European history. Founded by the Varegues, Vikings from Scandinavia, baptized by Byzantine missionaries in 988, a powerful state under the reign of Yaroslav the Wise (1016-1054), Kiev Rus, also known as Ruthenia, is the common heart of the Slavic world and, tossed between empires, never ceases to want to regain its independence.

Today, as during the Second World War, the riches of its soil provoke covetousness. This “breadbasket,” which includes nearly a quarter of the arable land in Europe, also contains the coal mines of Donbass, the iron deposits of Krivoi-Rog and manganese of Nikopol, notable coal, uranium and potash mines, while the powerful hydroelectric power plant of the Dnieper (10 billion kilowatt hours) responds to the steel and industrial center around Donetsk. The country also controls the water supply of Crimea, which sheds light on why Russia is so keen to maintain its control over this territory inextricably integrated into its economy.

After 1989, during the period of retraction of the USSR, which had become the CIS, the tacit agreement prevailed that the borders of the Atlantic Alliance would not move. But, from the end of the Gorbachev presidency and during the Yeltsin mandate, Russia expressed its opposition to the movements considered aggressive in terms of NATO expansion.

For its part, Ukraine declared its independence in 1991 and in 1992, through the Treaty of Tashkent, renounced the arsenal that had briefly made it the third nuclear power in the world. In 1994, along with Belarus and Kazakhstan, it signed the Budapest Memoranda in which the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia guaranteed the territorial integrity and security of the former Soviet republics in exchange for their ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 2009, these guarantees were reaffirmed by the United States and Russia—then forgotten in 2014.

In the meantime, in 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, deployed anti-missile systems on the periphery of Russia and announced its intention to acquire Prompt Global Strike capabilities, thus calling into question Russia’s second strike capability and thus its deterrent force.

NATO, under the impetus of Washington, launched its enlargement plan (MAP) to the East. The first three countries joined in 1999, followed by seven in 2004, two in 2009, and two more in 2017 and 2020. Since 1949, the Atlantic Alliance has grown from 12 to 30 members and has succeeded in integrating, in a quarter of a century, almost all the armies of the founding nations of the Warsaw Pact.

In Moscow, if the changeover in question can be accepted, as well as the neutralization of Kazakhstan, the slightest pivoting of Ukraine or Belarus cannot be envisaged. However, Russia is acting on the pretext of spontaneous or provoked local conflicts. Moldova was cut off from Transnistria in 1992. The Chechen desire for independence was settled in blood in 1994–1996, then in 1999–2000 (with the curious support of the United States). Georgia suffered the dissidence of Abkhazia and Ossetia and then the intervention of Russian forces in 2008, while the separatists of Donbass were supported in their armed struggle from 2014, in a sort of dress rehearsal for the “special military operation” against Ukraine in 2022. For 20 years, Vladimir Putin has not ceased to warn that he would do everything to loosen up what he considers to be a vice-like grip. He was indignant about this during his speech in Munich, in February 2007, at the Conference on Security Policy. He was vindictive, accusing the United States of “stepping outside its borders in all areas,” of jeopardizing “the security of all” and “international law,” of dangerously pursuing an “arms race” and of making the world “less reliable” than it was during the Cold War.

After starting to modernize its military, destabilizing its adversaries in the field of cyber warfare, mitigating the effect of sanctions by getting closer to its other friend/enemy China, and waiting for the decisive moment, it will have decided by itself to go on the offensive. For the Western world, the use of violence is the ultimate signal of incompetence. This is not the case in the Slavic world, which sees it as a suitable means to the end. We remember Grozny.

THE PRIMAKOV-GERASIMOV DOCTRINE

Since 2013, Russia has used and abused the “hybrid war.” Cancelling the distinction between peacetime and wartime while combining hard and soft power, this strategic concept allows the Kremlin to test the postures and reactions of the Western camp, whose apathy encourages it, at the next blow, to outdo itself. We owe it to General Valery Gerasimov, but it is part of a long tradition. It was born from a particular dimension of the strategy of the Byzantine Empire, with the “telluric” one that Leo Tolstoy lends to the Russian soul in his little-known opus *The Physiology of War: Napoleon and the Russian Campaign*, and it has its first draft in *The Evolution of Conflicts*, the collection of lectures of 1920 by General Alexander Svechin, a tsarist rallied to the Bolshevik cause. He also inherited the Primakov doctrine, which guided Russian foreign policy for more than two decades. Born in Kiev, Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Prime Minister from 1996 to 1999 under President Yeltsin, Yevgeny Primakov postulates that a unipolar world dominated by the United States is unacceptable and that Russia must counterbalance the hegemony of the United States by promoting the emergence of new powers such as China or India, guarantee its primacy and maintain its control over the post-Soviet space, and oppose the expansion of NATO.

By adopting the political axis of the Primakov doctrine, the confrontation with the West, the Gerasimov military doctrine maximizes it. By applying it to the terrain of war, it affirms the importance of hybrid tools while confining them to their instrumental value and keeping military power as an indispensable catalyst: nuclear weapons remain the ultimate guarantee of strategic independence. Thus, it is possible to successfully conduct a battle despite the threat of nuclear fire and by preventing escalation.

As Dmitry Adamsky analyzes in RDN, “geopolitical competition did not end with the Cold War, it changed its form.” And as Thibaut Fouillet specifies, this “form” is that of “an integral strategy whose originality rests on a coordinated use of means of all kinds (civil, technical) and, for military means, on a modernized and info-enhanced conventional apparatus [...] using the totality of available functions (immaterial fields of disinformation, cyber, proxies, etc., and also material fields of deep strikes) to produce sufficient tactical and operational effects to paralyze the enemy’s ability to react.”

The implementations of the Gerasimov Doctrine, from Georgia in 2008 to Syria from 2015 to Ukraine since 2014, have been calibrated to rule out excessive risk taking. As the Georgian test showed, the conventional tool was outdated in terms of technology, communication, and mastery of complexity; Russia invested heavily, albeit in a targeted manner, to try to catch up. The current leaders seem to be more influenced by the example of Crimea, but the model they ultimately choose will have crucial consequences for the future of the world under the watchful eye of China.

FROM TWO FRONTS TO ESCALATION

Since 1989, Russia has been fighting on two fronts. Externally, Moscow has tried to limit the damage of the post-Cold War unipolar moment, during which its role in the international arena suffered unprecedented marginalization. The Kremlin has continuously tried to move the international order towards multipolarity in order to secure a role in the concert of great powers.

At the same time, competition with the West has taken place on the domestic scene. According to Moscow, the West, since the end of the Soviet Union, has tried to impose its values on Russia, perceived as a tool of geopolitical subversion. Thus, the Kremlin has considered external and internal competition as two aspects of the same global geopolitical confrontation with the West.

However, with the arrival of Vladimir Putin in power, the strategic competition with the West has constantly escalated from confrontation to war, in the literal sense of the term— and on European soil.

The war has thus turned out to be total. Before the war, during the war, the same pursuit has animated and continues to animate this radical conflictuality. It

was a war of repositioning that upset the life and destiny of Europe.

It remains to be seen what China will learn from this for Taiwan, and much more widely. Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping outlined their vision for the world order at a summit on December 15, 2021, displaying a united front against the West.

“Today, some international forces, under the guise of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights,’ are interfering in the internal affairs of China and Russia, trampling on international law and the recognized norms of international relations,” Xi Jinping said. “China and Russia should increase their joint efforts to more effectively safeguard the security interests of both sides.” And not without giving his support to Vladimir Putin for the security guarantees that the latter demands on the western flank of Russia. The two leaders also expressed their fundamental disagreement with the creation of new military alliances in the Pacific and Indo-Pacific basins such as the Aukus (Australia, Great Britain, United States) or the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, United States).

On February 4, 2022, in Beijing, was published a long statement adopted jointly by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the opening of the Winter Olympics. It enacts and proclaims a “new era,” a “new global model” for the twenty-first century by advocating “sustainable development for the planet, dialogue, justice, freedom, equality, mutual trust and democracy as a universal human value exercised in all spheres of public life.” Behind these proclamations lies the common affirmation of another model of governance that challenges that of liberal democracy. In a communiqué, published the same day and dedicated to “the promotion of international law,” the two foreign ministries of Russia and China denounce the Western stranglehold, according to them, on international relations. They condemn the UN General Assembly which judged illegal the annexation of Crimea by Moscow and the Court of Arbitration in The Hague which denies Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea.

In an exchange of goodwill and mutual support, the declaration stresses that “democracy is not one size fits all,” that a country “can choose the forms and methods of exercising democracy that best suit it,” which is to China’s advantage. In return, China supports Moscow on the non-expansion of NATO and its demands for security guarantees in Europe. This is a turning point for Beijing, which had refrained from recognizing the annexation of Crimea and had not supported Moscow in the war in Georgia.

The communiqué also affirms the concept of the indivisibility of security, which has been much used by Moscow in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, and which states that the security of some cannot be organized to the detriment of others. The vision of Internet governance, artificial intelligence, or the cosmos is also revealing. Both countries commit to deepening their cooperation in the security of information technologies and, while advocating for an “internationalization”

of Internet governance (by which they mean a non-American governance), they clearly state that they will refuse any hindrance to their sovereignty over the regulation of these networks.

IS FRANCE, THE LAST INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR POWER IN WESTERN EUROPE, PREPARED?

Paris has taken note of the changes underway. In the “strategic vision” that he published (a rare exercise), General Burkhard, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces [CEMA], explains that it is now a question of “winning the war before the war,” the continuum “peace/crisis/war” no longer being relevant. At the heart of this revision is the notion of relativity associated with the temporality of hostilities. This establishes a new grammar of war, the keys to which he provides.

Hobbes already noted in *Leviathan* that “war exists as long as the will to fight is sufficiently proven.” This invites us to revisit the legal delimitation that governs international law, which stems from the Treaty of Westphalia, that is, the legitimacy of a political authority to declare war and sign peace. Hobbes adds that the relevance and actuality of a war also lies “in a recognized disposition to fight for as long as there is no assurance to the contrary.” This then invites the reintegration of two aspects often absent from the military equation: the economic and psychological dimensions of conflict.

General Burkhard concludes that it is necessary to “prepare our military strategy in the light of three notions: competition, which has become the normal mode of expression of power in many fields (economic, military, diplomatic, legal, cultural, etc.), contestation, which challenges the commonly accepted rules in order to seek to impose a *fait accompli*, and confrontation.” Taking into account the current world disorder, “Two actors can thus find themselves at the same time in competition in one field and in contestation in another. They can also be in contention only in a given geographical area and in competition in the rest of the world.”

French armies must therefore “contribute to the knowledge of the capabilities and intentions of the various competitors and permanently propose relevant military options to the political decision-maker, contribute to removing uncertainty and preventing the imposition of a *fait accompli*, and detect the weak signals that make it possible to anticipate the shift towards confrontation.”

Given that this competition is taking place in a growing number of environments and fields of conflict, conducive to hybrid and circumvention strategies, which combine military and non-military, direct and indirect, regular and irregular modes of action, often difficult to attribute, but always designed to remain below the estimated threshold of response or open conflict, “French forces must therefore be able to counter them by learning to control them, while respecting

the principles on which our actions are based.” This implies strengthening intelligence and analysis capabilities and broadening the spectrum of capabilities. All this while taking into account the hypothesis of a “high intensity” engagement.

The Armed Forces “contribute to the exercise of responsibilities and to France’s ambition to be a balanced power, while being able to lead operations in coalition, actively participate in the national power strategy from the stage of competition, where the interests of different actors are already confronted, notably through indirect or hybrid strategies, and offer the political power a very wide range of military options combining controlled effects in all environments and fields of confrontation, with particular attention to action in the exo-atmospheric and cyber environments and in the information field, in order to influence the determination of our adversaries by imposing favourable power relations.”

However, for General Burkhard, this redefinition also implies an overhaul: “The French Armed Forces must be organized in such a way as to be able to deal with strategic surprise, while being resilient beyond the only permanent postures of nuclear deterrence, safety and protection, and permanently capable of responding to any situation that would threaten France and its interests, if necessary in a high-intensity confrontation.”

In the end, the triptych borrowed from General Poirier in *La Crise des fondements* must be placed in its strategic context—that of the Cold War. Now, Poirier himself has shown the relative usefulness of the atomic bomb—it can only reduce one kind of threat, the invasion of the national territory, but cannot crush a delocalized financial attack or terrorism.

From now on, the strong are confronted with the strong, the weak with the strong and the strong with the crazy.

The Burkhard strategy does not forget the effects in the immaterial fields. It wants to integrate two largely forgotten aspects: cooperation and coexistence. These are complementary and indispensable phases of strategic thinking, which must be interwoven because of the overlap between them: cooperation and coexistence. This is the essential question posed by General Burkhard’s strategy: how to avoid confrontation? Climbing to extremes? Paroxysmal war?

In the geostrategic context of the Cold War, the notions of land border defense and nibbling land actions extended into the depths of geophysical space, well beyond the political border. Nevertheless, “the practical French border” was delimited by the “Iron Curtain.” This practical border was the real military border. Ultimately, there was an extension of the notion of the physical border due to limited purpose actions beyond the theoretical border of France.

On a strictly land level, this strategy brings a paradigm shift in the understanding of the notion of border. Concomitantly with violence, there is a transfer from the physical dimension to the psychological dimension. This is why, from the

time of the so-called “peace,” strategic thinking must apprehend the roundabout ways, still called peripheral or hybrid, of a future war whose preliminary forms are economic, ideological, subversive, clandestine, and indirect.

In this paradoxical and perilous phase of “war under threat,” the French armies have leaders, personnel, doctrine and equipment around which they maintain their operational preparation—which they do not yet have the right or the need to use. “Avoiding confrontation” then means gaining the upper hand by winning the intellectual battle. This battle consists of defining the threshold of aggressiveness, which is to say, the analysis of a situation in an autonomous and permanent manner, the dilemma of which is to react too early and too strongly, one runs the risk of making escalation inevitable, and to react too late and too weakly, one is exposed. The Burkhard strategy addresses both of these issues.

SI VIS PACEM ...

War, through its historical nature, intrinsically combines two dimensions of time in a variable manner: repetition and innovation. Faced with these two constraining logics, the strategic state registers delays and accelerations. War remains linked to a variable iteration between repetition and singularity. Are we giving ourselves today the means that the singularity of the moment demands?

Saved from the accounting blindness of Treasure Accountants by the resolute team of Jean Yves Le Drian, then Minister of Defense, will the French Armed Forces be able to implement such a strategy of adaptation to the new situation after the difficult episodes of Afghanistan and the forced withdrawal from Mali? In any case, after the resilience of General de Villiers, who held the same position of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the lucidity of General Burkhard’s vision allows us to believe in a real leap forward. This is precisely what the new world disorder ratified by the war in Ukraine requires.

But will this newfound vision, this budgetary effort, be enough to make up for lost strategic time? Because from now on we will also have to relearn how to win the war during the war. This is the new strategic task at hand. It confronts the specific temporality of war.

The strategic act that General Burkhard describes as “harder conflict” and “high intensity” must redefine our relationship to time. The notion of “high intensity” or “major engagement hypothesis” implies developing a culture of speed. In fact, the information flows available to approach the phenomenon of war are combined in a new way and from a variety of perspectives. This culture must lead to the concept of command speed. And this, not without keeping in mind that long time, as well as slow time, are also weapons.

Yesterday, before a “conventional” war, armies had an alert time, that is, a relatively long period before engaging in combat (Alert time = T decision +

T preparation + T training + T deployment). For the First World War, we can estimate an alert time of four years. For the Second, about ten months—it is the “phony war.” In 1990, during the Gulf War or in 1999, during the intervention in Kosovo, it was reduced to six months. The alert time depends on the threat, on the enemy. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Beslan massacre, the conflict in Syria, the annexation of Crimea, the Bataclan massacre, or the offensive of Azerbaijan and Turkey in Nagorno-Karabakh, the alert time is now almost zero. Tomorrow, the French armies will have little or no time to react. The means made available to them or not will determine the preservation of our independence and our rule of law.

A REASON FOR HOPE

Once upon a time, a great military power was faced with a guerrilla war. While everything pointed to an imbalance of forces in favor of the regular army, the guerrillas won. And this time has happened many times: in turn, and among others, Indochina, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.

By accelerating the feeling of national unity within a new resistant country, Ukraine, by promoting the appearance of a new heroic figure, the “servant of the people” Volodymyr Zelensky, Vladimir Putin’s Russia may have just created a new Afghanistan. Imagined in the Kremlin as liberators applauded in the streets of Ukrainian cities, Russian soldiers are discovering themselves as hated invaders. Moscow will perhaps succeed in its *Anschluss* in Kiev. But the military victory, more difficult to achieve than expected, will come at the price of a moral disaster in the Slavic world and an unprecedented disavowal for the Kremlin.

The world disorder will not stop. Nor will the virulent revival of empires. The next conflicts are publicly announced. The intentions are not hidden.

France and Europe have little time left to decide on the future they want to build. The war in Ukraine is only the beginning.

In the chaos of the Russian invasion, it is the violent rebirth of empires that is needed.

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Global Mafias

Clotilde Champeyrache

ABSTRACT

Mafias, the highest form of criminal organization, are a “glocal” (global and local) actor, controlling part of the globalized economy and small territories. Mafias are economic actors in search of profit, but also political actors in search of power.

Keywords: Mafias, Crime, Geopolitics

Mafias globales

RESUMEN

Las mafias, la forma más alta de organización criminal, son un actor “glocal” (global y local), controlando parte de la economía globalizada y pequeños territorios. Las mafias son actores económicos en busca de ganancias, pero también actores políticos en busca de poder.

Palabras clave: Mafias, Crimen, Geopolítica

全球黑手党

摘要

作为犯罪组织的最高形式，黑手党是“全球和地方性”（glocal）的行动者，控制着一部分全球化经济和小部分领土。黑手党是寻求利润的经济行动者，也是寻求权力的政治行动者。

关键词：黑手党，犯罪，地缘政治

The mafias, specific forms of criminal organizations,¹ are geopolitical actors in their own right. However, their relationship with the territory is often perceived in an ambivalent way: mafias present a double face that is a priori antithetical. On the one hand, they are regularly represented in the form of a tentacled octopus: this image refers to the problem of globalization and its economic flows—including illegal ones—and therefore introduces a dimension of modernity. On the other hand, mafias are often also associated with territorial control: this is the traditional, even folkloric, imagery of Corleone. This time the dimension is archaic and refers to the question of established reputation, to the accumulation of stocks, to the search for power in the long term.

Both images correspond to myths and realities. Neither of them exhausts the relationship between mafias and territory. The two dimensions are subtly coupled and remind us of a specificity of mafias that is too often forgotten: they are economic actors in search of profit but also political actors in search of power. Taking these two aspects into account is fundamental to overcoming some of the main pitfalls of the anti-mafia fight.

1- Mafia and territory: between globalization and territorial sovereignty

The Italian (Sicilian Cosa Nostra, Neapolitan Camorra and Calabrian 'Ndrangheta), Japanese (Yakuza), and Chinese (Triads) mafias are characterized by their involvement in global trafficking, in particular through their control of a large part of the massive flows of trade by sea. Economic globalization accelerated in the 1990s, including for the illegal economy, which has become largely internationalized and industrialized. However, there is no sudden change and recent internationalization of the mafias. In the 1920s, Cosa Nostra was already involved in the international trafficking of morphine and opium. This position was reinforced during the Fascist era with the emigration of many mafia members, particularly to the United States. This gradually led the Sicilian mafia to occupy a dominant position in heroin trafficking between Asia, Europe, and America. The trial of the Pizza Connection from 1985 to 1987 underlined the internationalization of trafficking, but also the business relations between various criminal organizations.

Even if the Camorra derives significant resources from heroin trafficking, the 'Ndrangheta from the cocaine trade, and the Yakuza from methamphetamines trafficking, drugs are not the only commodities affected by this globalization. The accumulation of activities is in the nature of mafias. Other illegal markets participate in the quest for profits by these criminal organizations. Triads and Yakuzas

1 The Italian Penal Code defines them in article 416 bis and specifies that they use the “strength of the associative bond” to create conditions of subjugation and omerta and that they practice illegal but also legal activities while disrupting electoral processes.

exploit human trafficking. Cosa Nostra is illustrated in the reports of the *Direzione Investigativa Antimafia* in the trafficking of archaeological works. Triads, Yakuza, and Italian mafias are involved in the illegal reprocessing of waste internationally. Counterfeiting is also a sector that has become largely industrialized thanks to the acceleration of globalization. The health crisis has highlighted the problem of counterfeit medicines and health products (masks, hydroalcoholic gels, etc.).

But globalization does not make mafias a-territorial subjects—quite the contrary. On the one hand, mafias know perfectly well how to exploit the political fragmentation that accompanies globalization. This fragmentation is reflected in different legislations. For example, Italian mafias have seized the opportunity to use Malta and the loopholes in its legislation on online gambling to launder dirty money. On the other hand, mafias make trade-offs between territories in order to choose the best locations for their operations. Merchant ports are fundamental targets to control in order to manage the routing and placement of illegal goods. Cross-border areas are also particularly prized because they make it possible to exploit differences in legislation and provide hiding places (goods and men) in the event of police operations. As for the cities, it is not necessarily the most important demographically, politically and economically that are targeted first. Secondary cities that are particularly well served by road, rail, or river networks are strategic. The city of Duisburg in Germany, where six Calabrian mafiosi were murdered in August 2007, is a perfect example. Finally, mafias systematically maintain a link with their original territory. Mafias are not unitary and centralized structures but rather federations of families,² each of which is attached to a territory over which it exercises real sovereignty. This initial territory retains its legitimacy even in the context of globalization: a real rear base, it is the place where external strategies are driven and is decisive in the sharing of new territories. In this sense, globalization does not erase territorial referents. The mafias do not relocate; they articulate territories and thus distinguish themselves in part from legal internationalized economic actors. Antonio Talia³ makes these territorial interconnections very concrete by travelling along the 104 kilometers of the Calabrian coast between Reggio Calabria and Siderno. He shows how the ‘Ndrangheta families project themselves: those of Montebello Jonico in Hong Kong, those of San Luca in Germany, those of Platì in Australia, those of Siderno in Canada, etc. He also explains how mafia organizations share territories: for example, the ‘Ndrangheta reigns over Toronto, Cosa Nostra over Montreal.

The integration of mafias into globalization should not make us forget that mafias are synonymous with territory. The two dimensions are not contradictory. They do not oppose an old mafia (which would be linked to the control of

2 See Maurizio Catino (2019): *Mafia Organizations: The Visible Hand of Criminal Enterprise*, Cambridge University Press.

3 Antonio Talia (2019): *Statale 106: viaggio sulle strade segrete della ‘ndrangheta*, Minimum Fax.

an essentially limited territory) and a new mafia (which is fully integrated into globalization and freed from any territorial reference). The mafias combine the two dimensions because the economy (including internationalized ones) is a significant source of power (to be printed on a territory). Territorial sovereignty remains a basic operating principle of any mafia. This fact must be understood in order to really grasp the organizational chart of the various mafia organizations. Even though coordination/regulation bodies may oversee the whole system, mafias function in networks or federations of clans or families. When a “cupola” exists, it has a regulatory role to manage possible conflicts between families or clans and to coordinate activities that go beyond the framework of a single family and its territory. In no case do vertical structures replace horizontal ones. The Italian justice system has concluded that the ‘Ndrangheta is characterized by a “horizontal-vertical” structure, and the *Direzione Investigativa Antimafia* specified in 2015 that there were 166 *locali* (groupings of families with contiguous territories) in Calabria with around 10,000 members; the same report counted between 100 and 150 mafia families in Sicily with between 2,000 and 3,000 members each.

The importance of the territorial dimension goes back to the birth of the mafia phenomenon. Even mafia myths are imbued with this dimension. For example, the founding story of the Montalbano brothers (a myth that attempts to create a filiation between the three original Italian mafias) narrates how three Spanish knights in disgrace joined Italy and then separated to found the three criminal societies: Osso going to Sicily, Mastrosso to Campania, and Carcagnosso to Calabria.

In concrete terms, this territorial rooting is expressed in several ways. The initial and essential activities of any mafia are by nature territorialized: they are “protection” (however deviated it may be) and intermediation. They both presuppose and entrench the territorial presence of the mafia and are materialized by the generalized practice of racketeering. The demand for the payment of this fee, disconnected from any effective service, symbolically places the mafia in the field of the exercise of territorial sovereignty. The mafiosi, whether Italian, Japanese or Chinese, also present themselves as justices of the peace, people able to mediate and resolve conflicts. They thus propose an alternative form of justice that gives them legitimacy and even visibility: the population knows who to turn to in a mafia territory.

Territorial control is also achieved through the infiltration of the legal economy. The latter is targeted for itself. It is not a secondary objective linked to the need to launder dirty money from trafficking. The mafias create businesses or take control of existing businesses to increase their control of the territory. Labor-intensive sectors with high territorial visibility are infiltrated first: construction, agriculture, and mass distribution are the most obvious examples. Through these legal but mafia-owned businesses, criminal organizations create jobs, distribute income, raise seemingly clean money and are able to condition the territory—not

only economically, but also politically (via public contracts) and socially (by building legitimacy around this legal-mafia economy).

2- The link between globalization and territorial anchoring: a worrying capacity for projection

Mafias have developed with globalization; at the same time, they are still anchored in their territory of origin. Does this mean that they manage territories in two different ways, thus presenting a double face? They would behave like standard organized crime to manage extraterritorial economic flows: presence throughout the world would thus be motivated by the quest for profit. Extraterritoriality would then be limited to the logistical support of globalized trafficking. This is the case, for example, of Tommaso Buscetta in South America, where he managed drug trafficking on behalf of Sicilian families. At the same time, the mafias would really behave like mafias in the territories where they were born: their capacity for conditioning would then be limited to a geographical area that is ultimately circumscribed and difficult to extend. These two possibilities exist. However, they should not make us forget another configuration: the mafia's capacity to carry out territorial re-creations. In other words, the mafias—and more specifically the 'Ndrangheta—are also capable of recreating new territories under their control outside their original cradle. The conquest of these new territories clearly means that the existing mafias are able to colonize territories, that is, to behave as mafias outside the historically mafia territories. This has been criminally identified by the justice system in Italy. In other countries, some cases are alarms to be taken into account. The variety of areas involved lends credence to the idea that there is no territory that can be considered naturally immune. Immunity is an illusion.

Mafias may, in a fairly simple logic, seek to expand their territory to contiguous areas. Expansion is then simply linked to geographical proximity. This is how the Ercolano-Santapaola family of Catania in Sicily ended up gradually extending its hold over the neighbouring province of Messina. The shift under mafia control of a territory previously considered virtuous is acted following the 2017 Operation Beta. In the same way, the Calabrian mafia has established itself in Basilicata, a neighboring region, thanks to the economic expansion that took place there in the 1980s.⁴ But the ability to colonize new territories is not exclusively the result of a kind of spillover into neighboring lands. Other Italian regions have also undergone such processes even though they do not share borders with mafia areas. In these cases, migration processes play a major role. Diasporas bring—even involuntarily—a mafia substratum by favoring the export of criminal reputation. Confronted with mafia representatives, migrants—who sometimes have also left their country of origin to avoid criminal pressure—know who they are dealing with and can re-

⁴ See Maria Chiara Calò (2022): *Le mafia in Basilicata. Genesi, evoluzione e rapporto col territorio*, PhD Thesis Università degli Studi di Napoli – Université Paris 1.

produce outside the country the conditions of subjection and omerta that, according to the Italian Penal Code, characterize any mafia. This has allowed the mafias, especially the Italian ones, to establish themselves far from their territory of origin, and not only to accompany their illegal business logistically, but also to establish a control over these territories. In these processes, Italy is not the only one affected.

The trajectory of the small town of Bardonecchia in Piedmont was undoubtedly the first to draw attention to this colonizing capacity of the mafias. In 1995, Italy was shocked when, for the first time, the Italian justice system dissolved the municipal council of a northern Italian town.⁵ Investigations revealed that a Calabrian mafioso, Rocco Lo Presti, had taken control of both illegal and legal activities (especially construction) in the city and was able to influence the decisions of the city council. Sent to Bardonecchia to serve his sentence as a “forced stay” (*soggiorno obbligato*),⁶ Rocco Lo Presti seized the opportunity offered by this forced migration to establish mafia control over the city on behalf of the Mazzaf-ferro ‘Ndranghetist family. This first warning about the mafia’s capacity for territorial conquest, however, is not fully understood. Thus, in 2013 the Court of Genoa concluded in a trial involving mafia members that, even if the affiliation to this specific criminal organization is effective, the activities carried out in the territory of Liguria do not fall under mafia activities *stricto sensu* since they are not inserted in a mafia territory.

The Aemilia investigation, which concluded in 2015 and gave rise to several trials, some of which are still ongoing in Emilia Romagna, changes the situation. Here again, the sending of a mafioso from the Grande Aracri family on an obligatory stay favors the establishment of the ‘Ndrangheta in a region that was previously a symbol of education to legality in Italy. A strictly mafia migratory flow was then grafted onto the previous Calabrian migratory chains. The non-mafia Calabrian community established in Emilia Romagna knows the reputation of the new criminal arrivals. They have little or no resistance to intimidation and racketeering. The Calabrian mafia also set up a system of false invoices in exchange for extortion, which convinced the entrepreneurs and merchants—Calabrian or not—to pay. The local productive fabric was quickly corrupted, with no notable manifestations of resistance on the part of the non-mafia population and (almost) no violence on the part of the mafia. The political sphere also yields to temptation: in 2016, for example, the city council of Brescello is dissolved for ma-

5 Italian legislation has allowed since 1991 (Legislative Decree 164/1991) to dissolve any local public administration when “concrete, unambiguous and above all relevant” elements prove links of a direct or indirect nature between mafia associations and the administrators of these local entities. The application of this law has mainly affected municipal councils and, in the first few years, only Sicily, Calabria and Campania.

6 It is a device designed to remove some convicts from their home area in order to cut them off from their criminal substrate. It has contributed to send many mafiosi to small northern cities. In doing so, it has favored the implantation of criminal subjects in territories previously spared from mafia crime.

mafia infiltration. The trials concluded to date recognize the Mafia presence in Emilia Romagna and the deployment of all the characteristics of the Mafia association. These sentences make Emilia-Romagna a land of mafia. They also highlight the presence of individuals affiliated with Cosa nostra and the camorra who cooperate with the 'Ndranghetists. Finally, they highlight the ability of the 'Ndrangheta to think strategically about the territory: the new areas of establishment are integrated into the organization's organizational chart. The *locali* created outside Calabria are subject to a request for authorization and are attached to a family and therefore to a specific territory in Calabria: they are therefore external projections, emanations of the Calabrian clans.

Outside Italy, there are disturbing configurations. Since the crime of mafia association is not recognized outside Italy, there are no convictions for mafia in the Italian sense. However, the ability of individuals known to be affiliated with mafia organizations to carry out both legal and illegal activities, to maintain links with the political sphere and even to influence the expression of the vote has been identified. As early as the 1950s, police investigations conducted in Australia and Canada in conjunction with Italian law enforcement agencies revealed the presence of the so-called "Siderno group," named after a Calabrian town. In America, 'Ndrangheta affiliates carry out various activities in connection with drug trafficking, illegal gambling, extortion, but also in the legal economy directly linked to their rear base in Calabria.

The murders in Duisburg in August 2007 shocked Germany and Europe. They reveal the lasting presence of the Calabrian mafia in the country. Of course, this presence is linked to drug trafficking. But it also highlights the existence of several restaurants and legal activities owned by individuals known to the Italian police. Moreover, one of the victims had just been affiliated with the 'Ndrangheta: such initiation rites cannot be held in neutral territories. Many elements point to a real mafia presence in Germany that goes beyond the mere logistical support of drug trafficking. The 2018 "Stige" operation shows that some Calabrian restaurant owners in Germany are under pressure to choose their suppliers. This is a characteristic of the territorial conditioning specific to mafias.

For France, questions also arise. The "Svolta" operation conducted in 2012 by Italy primarily concerns Liguria. But developments in the investigation identify a construction company in Menton as being owned by the Pellegrino family of Bordighera. The company will be liquidated by the Italian justice. It shows that the Calabrian mafia is not merely involved with drug trafficking but also infiltrates a key sector of the legal economy, a sector that allows to establish links with the local political sphere. The company had also won a public contract for the renovation of the Menton House of Justice.

What these different cases have in common is that they were detected late (or even partially detected outside Italy). The source of this late detection is an

attitude of denial on the part of the population as well as of the forces of order and justice. Attention is focused only on illegal trafficking, which reduces the behavior of mafias to that of a standard criminal organization. It is also too often assumed that the legal sphere is able to defend itself against serious crime. Two worlds would coexist, the legal economy and the criminal economy, without the latter being able to pervert the former. However, one of the main explanations for the late detection is the acceptance, or even complicity, of the legal world: the trajectory of Emilia-Romagna is particularly revealing of the way in which many established entrepreneurs have considered the Calabrian mafia to be not an economic opportunity rather than a threat.

3- Challenges in the fight against the mafias

The specificities of mafias, the possibility that such specificities fully unfold outside the territories of origin, challenge the fight against the mafias, especially at the international level. These challenges are at least three in number and concern the need to clearly define what a mafia is, the ambiguities of the legal world and the importance in this respect of confiscating criminal assets.

Italy is the only country in the world to have legally defined what a mafia is in Article 416-bis of the Penal Code. Since then, it has been pleading for other countries, especially in Europe, to adopt this definition—without result. However, this would allow the police and the justice system to get out of the too often biased representations of the phenomenon. Among these biases is the idea that mafias are a purely Italian product and therefore incapable of being exported as such outside their regions of origin. Or even, the mafia is assimilated to standard criminal organizations: the focus is then put on illegal markets only (primarily drug trafficking), reducing the logic to that of profit maximization. As Anna Sergi and Alice Rizzuti point out: “The search for power, subjugation, and territorial intimidation (the mafia method) is almost never considered abroad, because it does not necessarily help to carry on what essentially are believed to be economic opportunities.⁷ The definition of organized criminal groups adopted at the time of the United Nations Convention of Palermo in 2000 does not make it possible to apprehend the real threat posed by the mafias. Adopting a specific legal definition of mafia associations would not call into question the existing tools but would fill a gap in the perception and therefore in the fight against a particular form of organized crime.

Another difficulty relates to the ambiguities of the legal world in the face of the criminal thrust, especially when it targets the legal economic sphere and the political sphere. Anti-mafia investigations show that the late detection of the

⁷ Anna Sergi, Alice Rizzuti (2022): “Anti-mafia Cross-border: Conceptual and Procedural Asymmetries in the Fight against Italian Mafias in Europe,” *Policing*, paac047 ([Anti-mafia Cross-border: Conceptual and Procedural Asymmetries in the Fight against Italian Mafias in Europe | Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice | Oxford Academic \(oup.com\)](#))

mafia's conquest of new territories is partly due to the complicit attitude of agents in the legal sphere. Some businessmen, entrepreneurs, accountants and politicians see contiguity with mafias as an economic opportunity rather than a reprehensible act. The logic of short-term profit prevails over legal and moral considerations. For cases of active complicity on the part of non-affiliates who have favored the mafia organization, Italian legislation has introduced the jurisprudential notion of "external assistance in mafia association." In Japan, too, legislation has become tougher to hit those who do not denounce the Yakuza, to the point that paying racketeering is now penalized. These legal advances make it possible to take into account the "grey zone," in which criminal interests and the interests of legal agents converge. This is all the more important as the dominant economic discourse (that which makes cost-benefit analysis the cursor of individual choices) tends to trivialize offences and breaches of the law as soon as the gains likely to be derived from them are greater than any estimated costs.

This point also argues in favor of increased recourse to asset investigations and confiscation of criminal assets, where the emphasis is still too often placed on monitoring financial flows alone. Globalization makes flows (material and immaterial) increasingly elusive. Moreover, the identification of "suspicious" financial flows relies on the reporting obligations of certain professions confronted with such flows. However, cases such as the FinCen affair in 2020 have shown the limits of this exercise. In a highly competitive context marked by the imperative of speeding up the processing of transactions, banking and financial institutions have no strong incentive to hinder flows even when they are suspicious. By confiscating assets, we are attacking stocks, i.e., the accumulation and materialization of flows. We also attack not only the profit dimension but also the power dimension of the mafias: companies, buildings and others are tools used to control the territory; restoring them to legality contributes to breaking the mafia's conditioning capacity. Finally, the patrimonial investigations are the fruit of the efforts of the law enforcement agencies and the justice system, that is to say, of people whose commitment to the service of legality is decisive.

Thirty-Five Years of Antiterrorist Policies in France

Alexis Deprau¹

ABSTRACT

The current era is characterized by an unprecedented multiplication of legal standards. This multiplication is unanimously denounced as a source of complication in everyday life for individuals and as a cause of paralysis for administrations themselves.

Keywords: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Legislation, Security, State of law

Treinta y cinco años de políticas antiterroristas en Francia

RESUMEN

La época actual se caracteriza por una multiplicación sin precedentes de normas jurídicas. Esta multiplicación es denunciada unánimemente como fuente de complicación en la vida cotidiana de los particulares y como causa de parálisis para las propias administraciones.

Palabras clave: Terrorismo, Contraterrorismo, Legislación, Seguridad, Estado de derecho

法国三十五年的反恐政策

摘要

当前时代出现了前所未有的法律标准倍增。这种倍增被一致谴责为个人日常生活复杂化的来源，也是行政当局自身出现（工作）瘫痪的原因。

关键词：恐怖主义，反恐，立法，安全，法律状态

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“The current era is characterized by an unprecedented multiplication of legal standards. This multiplication is unanimously denounced as a source of complication in everyday life for individuals and as a cause of paralysis for administrations themselves.”²

Although Professor Chantebout’s remark was intended to deal with the defense field, it is not too much to think that this application concerns other fields, particularly that of security.

After two years of state of emergency (end of 2015- end of 2017), the legislator wanted to incorporate measures into the internal security code, for application outside of exceptional situations. The October 30, 2017 anti-terrorism law is a sign of an even stronger integration of law of exception elements into ordinary law.

If the declaration of the state of emergency were intended to be temporary, the high level of the terrorist threat, but also of radicalization, called for strong means to combat these threats. For all that, it is not inappropriate to ask two questions about this law, the answers to which were provided by Professor Olivier Le Bot:

“Does the law really bring the state of emergency to an end by incorporating into ordinary legislation the provisions that resulted from it? Does it establish, on the contrary, a ‘permanent state of emergency?’”

An examination of the provisions reveals that the new powers conferred on the administration are, compared with the state of emergency regime, subject to stricter conditions and surrounded by greater guarantees.³

This law has thus incorporated into ordinary law powers inspired by or derived from the state of emergency, with the stated aim of confining the measures to the field of anti-terrorist measures. More precisely, it takes up—admittedly with modifications—the provisions of the state of emergency, while participating in a reworking of the terms (not without borrowing the novlanguage dear to George Orwell). Thus, “protection or security zones” become “protection perimeters,” “administrative searches” are called “sites,” and house arrest becomes an “individual measure of administrative control and surveillance,” not to mention other surveillance measures and the closure of places of worship.

In any case, the measures included in the law of October 30th, 2017, are designed “to enable public authorities to anticipate and prevent acts of terrorism sufficiently in advance. [...] The law of October 30th, 2017, is clearly in line with [an ultra-preventive logic], which was approved by the citizens (the majority of whom were in favour).”

2 B. Chantebout, “La multiplication des normes juridiques, obstacle à l’efficacité de la défense?” *Droit et défense*, n°97/2, 2nd quarter 1997, p. 4.

3 O. Le Bot, “Un état d’urgence permanent?” *RFDA*, 2017, p. 1115.

France has put in place a legal response to terrorist threats, leaving the legitimate question of anti-terrorist legislation open, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In other words, is there a piling up of anti-terrorist legislation? And if so, is this stacking effective, or does it not suffer from inconsistencies? If not, should the legislation be supplemented?

We do not pretend to provide ready-made answers. But these questions nevertheless call for us to reflect on the subject, even if it means “breaking down open doors,” through the fruit of a modest legal and political science study, which must not leave room at any time for partisan opinions or axioms, apart from that of common sense, and the need to face up to a real and persistent danger, where the protagonists know perfectly well how to use the strategy of double talk, of dissimulation (or *taqiya*).

As early as in 2006, the General Secretariat of National Defence (SGDN, which became the SGDSN in 2010) warned that “to be effective, a judicial system for fighting terrorism must combine a preventive component, the purpose of which is to prevent terrorists from acting, and a repressive component, intended to punish the perpetrators of attacks, their organizers and their accomplices.”⁴

Fifteen years after these words, and especially thirty-five years after the beginning of the anti-terrorist legislation, let us try to see what assessment can be made today.

Continuous legislation from 1986 to the present

Nota Bene: The author apologizes in advance for the exhaustive list of anti-terrorist legislation, given the importance of specifying the numerous texts adopted for the subject of the study.

Already under the Third Republic, laws had been passed to fight against anarchist terrorists, including the response to the anarchist attack committed by Auguste Vaillant in the Chamber of Deputies. The latter voted on December 12, 1893, and then the Senate on December 18, the “scélérates laws” or “shameful laws.” The law of December 12, 1893, tightened the law on the freedom of the press of July 29, 1881, while the law of December 18, 1893, codified the association of criminals, allowing “heavy sentences, up to the death penalty, for anyone who is convicted of making or possessing an explosive device, or any product used.”⁵

Closer to home, with the explosion of several bombs in the Galeries Lafayette and Printemps stores on 7 December 1985, and a series of bloody attacks—

4 SGDSN, *La France face au terrorisme*. Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme, Secrétariat général de la défense nationale, La Documentation française, Paris, 2006, p. 53.

5 J. Merriman, *Dynamite club. The invention of terrorism in Paris*, Ed. Tallandier, Paris, 2009, p. 139.

six in September 1986 alone—France decided to react with its first anti-terrorist legislation under the Fifth Republic. The Chirac Government (including Charles Pasqua) decided to set the main guidelines in the fight against terrorism, by passing the law of 9 September 1986 on the fight against terrorism.

This law has drawn procedural consequences from these tragic events: extension of the duration of police custody to four days, postponement of the lawyer's intervention to the 72nd hour of custody, increased penalties, criminalization of apology for terrorism, compensation for victims of terrorism, authorization of house searches even without the suspects' consent, and penalties exemption for criminals who prevent an attack from being carried out.

The Act of July 22, 1992, reforming the provisions of the Penal Code relating to the punishment crimes and offenses against the nation, the State and public peace, included acts of terrorism in the new Penal Code, making them specific and more severely punished offenses.

On December 16, 1992, the law relating to the entry into force of the new criminal code and the simplification of certain provisions of criminal law and procedure maintained and specified the derogatory procedure applicable to acts of terrorism.

The year 1995 was the subject of numerous texts, starting with the government's Vigipirate plan, which defines the distribution of responsibilities and the principles of State action in the fight against terrorism.

On January 21, 1995, the law on security policy and programming (LOPS) added numerous provisions aimed at developing the use of video surveillance. Above all, this law inserted in Article 410-1 of the Criminal Code a definition of the fundamental interests of the Nation, which can now be seen in the light of national security (even if it is not yet defined).⁶

One month later, on 18 February 1995, the law on the organization of jurisdictions and civil, criminal, and administrative procedure extended the statute of limitations for terrorist crimes and offenses.

The Act of July 22, 1996, to strengthen the repression of terrorism and offense against persons holding public authority—or entrusted with a public service mission and containing provisions relating to the judicial police—introduced the offense of criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking.

Then, the Act of December 30, 1996, on pretrial detention and night-time searches in terrorism cases authorized night-time searches in flagrante delicto investigations, preliminary investigations or during the investigation.

A year later, the law of December 29, 1997, aimed at facilitating the trial of

⁶ See on this subject, A. Deprau, "De la nécessité d'une définition de la sécurité nationale," *Sécurité globale*, n°23, 2020/3, pp. 17-26.

acts of terrorism made it possible to relocate, if necessary, the specialized courts to places other than Paris.

The Act of 15 November 2001 on daily security strengthened the powers of judicial police officers in the area of identity checks to combat terrorism (vehicle searches in port areas and airfields), and of private security guards whom, provided they are authorized by a State representative, may carry out searches and palpations in cases of strong suspicion. The “body search” may be extended to “anatomical probes,” but only in a police station or gendarmerie-type establishment. The offense of financing terrorist acts has also been created, and provision has been made for the general confiscation of all the property of persons guilty of terrorist acts.

The law of August 29, 2002, on the orientation and programming of internal security (LOPSI) devoted an article to the strengthening of the fight against the terrorist threat and organized crime, to make intelligence research and exploitation more effective by strengthening collaboration between services and intelligence training, and to develop institutional cooperation at the international level. The law also provided for the creation of a new computer database, known as the Application de rapprochement, d'identification et d'analyse pour les enquêteurs (ARIANE), which in 2008 would bring together information from two files, the système de traitement des infractions constatées (STIC) and the système judiciaire de documentation et d'exploitation (JUDEX).

The following year, the law of March 18, 2003, for internal security aimed to facilitate investigations by making certain rules of police procedure more effective. For example, it allowed police officers and gendarmes to visit vehicle safes in certain circumstances and under the supervision of the judicial authority, gave judicial police officers jurisdiction at least in the departments, and made criminal investigation files more useful, in particular the National Geographic Fingerprint File (FNAEG).

The Act of March 9, 2004, adapting the justice system to changes in crime (known as the Perben II Act) created new investigative possibilities applicable to terrorism and organized crime: special inter-regional courts, extension of the status of repentant or “guilty plea,” telephone tapping during the investigation. The “Perben II” law also aimed to categorize the different types of offenses: offenses committed in an organized gang, offenses committed in aggravating circumstances, and serious and complex offenses where terrorism is included.

With the law of January 23, 2006, on the fight against terrorism and various provisions relating to security and border controls, a six-day period of police custody was authorized in the event of a risk of attack. In addition, the law requires television operators, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and any public establishment providing access to the Internet, such as Internet cafés, to keep connection

data for one year. Access to these logs by police authorities is no longer subject to the authorization of a magistrate, but simply to a senior police officer appointed by the National Commission for the Control of Security Interceptions (CNCIS, now CNCTR). This law is important in that it established a legal framework for the coordination of intelligence services and judicial police services such as the *Unité de coordination de la lutte antiterroriste (UCLAT)*, or for the *Gendarmerie* with the *Bureau de la lutte antiterroriste (BLAT)*.⁷

The Act of December 1, 2008, extended the application of Articles 3, 6, and 9 of the Act of January 23, 2006 until December 31, 2012 (instead of December 31, 2008). These provisions concern identity checks on board cross-border trains, the administrative requisitioning data relating to electronic communications and access by counter-terrorism services to certain administrative files.

In 2011, this was followed by the laws of March 14, 2011, on the orientation and programming of internal security (LOPPSI), which allows for the capture of computer data, as well as the law of April 14, 2011, on police custody, which reinforces the presence of the lawyer in police custody, including for terrorism-related police custody. This type of custody is specific in that access to a lawyer may be postponed either for compelling reasons related to the circumstances of the investigation, or to allow the collection or preservation of evidence, or to prevent a personal attack, for a maximum period of 72 hours. In addition, the maximum duration of police custody (48 hours under ordinary law) may be extended by a magistrate (liberty and custody judge or investigating judge, depending on the procedure), or even extended to 96 hours (4 days), including for minors aged 16 and over who are involved “as perpetrators or accomplices in the commission of the offense.” Exceptionally, it may be extended to 144 hours (6 days) if there is a serious risk of imminent terrorist action in France or abroad, or if the requirements of international cooperation make it imperative.

The Act of December 21, 2012 on security and the fight against terrorism extended until December 31, 2015, the surveillance, for preventive purposes, of connection data (internet, geolocation, detailed telephone bills), which expired on December 31, 2012. It also made it possible to prosecute French nationals abroad who have committed terrorist acts, but also French fighters present in terrorist training camps abroad.

The law of November 13, 2014 reinforcing the provisions relating to the fight against terrorism provided for the banning from the territory of suspects who are candidates for jihad and created an offense of individual terrorist enterprise.

This text has changed the legislation on current responses to terrorism by developing new administrative measures: restriction of freedom of movement,

⁷ Order of 31 March 2006 taken for the application of Article 33 of Law n°2006-64 of 23 January 2006 relating to the fight against terrorism and bearing various provisions relating to security and border controls, *JORF*, n°86, 11 April 2006, p. 5 418, text n°2.

strengthening of repressive provisions such as the apology of acts of terrorism, or holding on to automated data processing.

Following the attacks of November 13, 2015, the decree of November 14, 2015, was adopted to declare a State of Emergency. With a duration of 12 days, its extension required a law, but several laws were passed for a two-year application:

- The first extension came with the Act of November 20, 2015, which extended it for three months from November 26, 2015.
- A second extension was voted by Parliament with the law of February 19, 2016, for a period of three months from February 26, 2016.
- A third extension was passed with the Act of May 20, 2016, for a period of two months.
- Following the attack in Nice on July 14, 2016, a further extension of the State of Emergency was granted on July 21, 2016, this time for six months. In addition to extending the State of Emergency, the text toughened the penalties for the criminal offense of criminal conspiracy in relation to a terrorist undertaking and excluded those convicted of terrorism-related offenses from the sentence reduction credit scheme. It made it possible to close places of worship where statements constituting incitement to hatred or violence are made.
- The State of Emergency was further extended on December 19, 2016, for an effective period until July 15, 2017.
- Finally, the last law extending the State of Emergency was passed on July 11, 2017, to apply until November 1st, 2017, as the State of Emergency was then enshrined in ordinary law, with the law of 30 October 2017 strengthening internal security and the fight against terrorism.

It should be noted that it was during the State of Emergency that the law of June 3rd, 2016, reinforcing the fight against organized crime, terrorism, and their financing, and improving the effectiveness and guarantees of criminal procedure was also promulgated. This law was intended to strengthen the effectiveness of the fight against organized crime and terrorism by giving judges and prosecutors new means of investigation: possible night-time searches of homes in matters of terrorism and in cases of risk to life, use of proximity technical devices to directly capture the connection data necessary to identify terminal equipment or the subscription number of its user (IMSI catcher). The text provides for the reinforcement of access controls to places hosting major events (Euro 2016, etc.). It also aims to improve the protection of threatened witnesses and tightens the conditions for acquiring and holding weapons. It also created a specific in crimination for the trafficking of cultural goods coming from terrorist groups' theaters of operation.

Still under the state of emergency, there was the law of February 28, 2017 on public security, aimed at reinforcing the legal security of interventions by the forces of order. It provides a modernized and unified framework for the use of weapons by police, gendarmes, customs officers and soldiers, reinforced protection of the identity of security forces, and the strengthening of sanctions for acts of rebellion, threats, or refusal to obey.

The law of October 30, 2017, strengthening internal security and the fight against terrorism marked the end of the State of Emergency, while bringing the application of several measures of the state of emergency into common law. This text also provides for a new criminal offense, measures to combat radicalization and to promote the policy of repentance. It perpetuates the system for consulting data from the Passenger Name Record (PNR) and extends the possibilities for checks in border areas.

The law of August 20, 2020 introduced security measures against perpetrators of terrorist offenses after their sentence. The text, which was a parliamentary initiative, if security measures could be ordered against persons convicted of terrorist offenses on their release from prison. However, this security regime was censured by the Constitutional Council (see below).

Finally, the law of December 24, 2020, on the extension of Chapters VI to X of Title II of Book II and Article L. 851-3 of the Internal Security Code aimed to extend various counter-terrorism measures (contained in the law of 30 October 2017) which Parliament had authorized to be implemented until 31 December 2020 (administrative closure of places of worship, surveillance measures, the so-called “algorithm” intelligence technique).

In addition to the anti-terrorism legislation, the legislator has also provided measures to respond to the terrorist response, with the laws related to intelligence, such as the law of July 10, 1991, and especially the intelligence law of July 24, 2015, which will be apprehended next.

Late and half-hearted reactions

Certainly, because “the terrorist phenomenon [...] is by nature protean, shifting, evolving, and difficult to grasp,”⁸ anti-terrorist legislation may be a step behind. But this element cannot be the only justification for late reactions.

In previous developments, we have said concerning the application of terrorist measures that “far from speeches and the fear of words, the response must be to take what can be done to avoid the tragic. Let us remember that tragedy is always too late.”⁹

8 P. Chaudon in “Terrorism and Freedom,” *Constitutions*, 2012, p. 403.

9 A. Deprau, “La restriction de la marge de manœuvre des radicalisés et terroristes en France,” *Sécurité globale*, n°23, 2020/3, p. 15.

This maxim can unfortunately be applied to anti-terrorism legislation. The 1986 law was enacted following a wave of attacks in 1985 and 1986; the 1995 measures were enacted after the 1994 Air France flight hostage-taking by the GIA, and after the 1995 series of attacks; as have laws since 2012, including most notably the July 21, 2016, law that followed the July 2016 Nice attack.

So this could be seen as a belated piling on of anti-terrorist legislation, because it is the object of a reaction, of emotion. Let us be clear. These laws could have been passed earlier. Politicians have long been aware of a groundswell of terrorism on French soil. For example, the Renseignements généraux (now the SCRT) have been monitoring the suburbs since the mid-1970s, originally with the aim of assessing the threat of radical groups within the new immigrant population that has settled there. Thus, “as early as 1975, a lot of information came back from social workers, showing that over the years, the risks have increased. Typical of the specific way in which the RG work, these data are not evaluated to their true extent.”

Of course, some will argue that there is a political “game” that comes into play, and that the executive and/or the parliamentary majority (if there is a cohabitation) decides at the time on the follow-up to be given in the legislative work. But what is damaging is the failure to consider the feedback from agents in the field, which is otherwise made official in parliamentary reports or in the annual report of the Parliamentary Delegation on Intelligence.

Moreover, the political discussion leads to a new drafting of the text of the law, even if it means removing important provisions (if they are not subsequently censured by the constitutional judge).

In a recent example, the bill against separatism was renamed the bill to strengthen respect for the principles of the Republic, since the term separatism was removed from the text. Similarly, not included in the original text, an amendment was reintroduced on the prohibition of the wearing of the veil by young girls.

Far from partisan discussions and procrastination, anti-terrorist legislation must not be a communication effect, nor a political weapon for electoral purposes, but a relevant tool in the face of a real, cold, and hard-hitting threat, with an intelligent and patient enemy to achieve its ends: attacks, but also a strategy of concealment to apply the Sharia, and eventually the world caliphate. In this respect, this cunning enemy understands the rule of law is a double-edged instrument that does not serve him well.

Anti-terrorism legislation potentially curbed

French anti-terrorist legislation is effective, but it is held back (in particular) by constitutional jurisprudence, whose decisions may legitimately be subject to misunderstanding given the threat. The Constitutional Council will argue that it must

reconcile the contested measures with the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law.

Thus, in the law designed to strengthen the repression of terrorism and offenses against persons holding public authority, an offense of association of criminals in relation to a terrorist undertaking was introduced. The legislator had wished to include in the list of terrorist acts the offense of aiding the illegal entry or residence of foreigners. However, in Decision No. 96-377 DC of July 16, 1996, the Constitutional Council censured this provision, considering that the legislator had “vitiating its assessment with a manifest disproportion.”

Closer to home, the Constitutional Council was seized by the Council of State of a priority question of constitutionality concerning the offense of habitual consultation of terrorist internet sites. In its decision n°2017-682 QPC of December 15, 2017, it declared the provisions of Article 421-2-5-2 of the Criminal Code unconstitutional, as they infringed on the exercise of freedom of communication in a way that was not necessary, appropriate, and proportionate.

On March 29, 2018, the Constitutional Judge was seized for four priority questions of constitutionality (QPC), supported in particular by the League for Human Rights (LDH). In these cases, the Constitutional Council made some reservations on the interpretation of¹⁰ administrative measures to combat terrorism. Thus, in response to the fear of the petitioners of seeing the generalization of controls based on race in the protection perimeters (created on the model of the protection or security zones of the state of emergency), it insisted on recalling that the checks should exclude “any discrimination.” Regarding individual control and surveillance measures (former house arrest), the Constitutional Council required that the right to lead a normal family life be respected and that the ban not exceed a cumulative duration of twelve months.

Lastly, in Decision No. 2020-805 DC of August 7, 2020, on the law introducing security measures for the perpetrators of terrorist offenses on completion of their sentence, the Constitutional Council was asked to review the security measures that could be ordered against persons convicted of terrorist offenses on their release from prison. This system was censured by the Constitutional Court. In the opinion of the latter, it did not ensure a balance between, on the one hand, the prevention of breaches of public order and, on the other, the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms (freedom of movement, the right to privacy and the right to lead a normal family life).

Of course, rule of law is essential to the proper functioning of our nation’s political system, to avoid arbitrariness, to ensure respect for equality before the law and to ensure the separation of powers. However, was it not the European Court

10 The technique of reservations of interpretation allows the Constitutional Council to declare a provision in conformity with the Constitution, provided that it is interpreted or applied in the manner it indicates.

of Human Rights which itself admitted that the margin available to the respondent State to choose the means of safeguarding national security is very wide, and that it is therefore up to the State to judge the reality of the “imperative social need” implied by the concept of necessity.¹¹

Should anti-terrorist legislation therefore be supplemented?

This question had already been asked in 2015 during a debate, where David Bénichou, then vice-president in charge of the investigation at the anti-terrorist unit of the Paris TGI, had provided some elements of an answer.

For him, the anti-terrorist legislation did not need to be supplemented, “because it was already in 2012 that we could identify the beginnings of the tragedies of 2015.”¹² For him, the points that deserved to be updated were related to the absence of a legal regime for the seizure of electronic correspondence already sent or received, outside the classic framework of the search, but also the refusal by the government to relax the administrative authorization regime for the conditions of implementation of the judicial technique known as computer data capture.

Moreover, he proposed two solutions. First, rethink the intelligence/judiciary relationship: “Break down the barriers between counter-terrorist intelligence and pool its technical and human resources with the judiciary. Intelligence has significant resources and few powers. The judiciary can do a lot but does not have the means.”¹³

Secondly, “rethink the methods of neutralizing terrorists: on the judicial mode, the scale of sentences (only long sentences allow for social protection and a re-involvement of individuals), post-sentence monitoring (surveillance measures and control); on the administrative mode (the issue of disqualifying French bi-national jihadists from nationality, preventing them from returning rather than fixing them on our territory); finally on the military level by reflecting on a link between justice and armed forces (neutralization by force of individuals acting beyond the reach of judicial authority).”¹⁴

This was done regarding intelligence gathering techniques with the Intelligence Act of July 24, 2015, which provided the specialized services with a legal framework concerning the tools necessary for operational intelligence (according to a procedure defined by the law) with the aim of protecting national security.¹⁵ On this basis, it has been possible to prosecute cases of terrorism with clear and precise information on the motivations of terrorists or the evidence of their

11 ECHR, 26 March 1987, *Leander v. Sweden*, application no. 9248/91.

12 D. Bénichou in “La lutte contre le terrorisme,” *Constitutions*, 2015, p. 21.

13 *Ibid.*

14 *Ibid.*

15 A. Deprau, *Renseignement public et sécurité nationale*, thesis defended on 29 November 2017 at the University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas.

involvement. As for the military response to terrorism, France today effectively responds thanks to our armed forces, as well as to the special forces, sometimes by means of extrajudicial executions on well-defined targets, the “High Value Targets” (HVT).

It is no longer a question of providing additional legislation, but of participating in the strengthening of police and intelligence resources (human, technical, and financial).

In this regard, it should be recalled that surveillance and prevention of terrorism has necessarily increased, even though the 2008 reform (substituting the Central Directorate of Domestic Intelligence for the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance, and the Central Service of Territorial Intelligence for the General Intelligence) was detrimental to intelligence. Since most of the personnel were assigned to domestic intelligence, territorial intelligence lost all the agents who dealt with informers. This reform was a dry loss of several years for the recruitment of new informants and knowledge of networks, which was the matrix of the intelligence operated by this service.

To return to the subject, there is no longer any need to supplement anti-terrorist legislation. What is needed today is not more laws, but additional human resources, whether to carry out effective surveillance, to process the data collected, to participate in cryptography or data decryption, but also for the offensive side (in addition to the preventive side) of the knowledge and anticipation function, i.e., the intervention function.

To this end, in addition to increasing the strength of the National Police, the Gendarmerie nationale and the intelligence services, an increase in the number of special forces personnel would be welcome, both for the human military intelligence of the 13th Parachute Dragon Regiment (13th RDP) and for the action intelligence provided by the Action Service of the General Directorate of External Security, or for the 1 Marine Infantry Regiment (1 RPIMa), the commandos and the police, and for the action intelligence provided by the Action Service of the Directorate General of External Security, or for the 1st Régiment parachutiste d’infanterie de marine (1st RPIMa), the commandos of the French Navy and the commandos of the Air Force.¹⁶

In our view, anti-terrorist legislation does not need to be supplemented. It is political choices that must be made, to allow for anticipation and a coherent response, the purpose of which is to protect the members of the French population. Let us remember that choices must be guided by common sense and not by ideology. For example, the Valls government refused the list of names of terrorists because it was given by the President of the Syrian regime, or the closure of embassies by political choice, whereas these embassies are necessary relays for foreign

16 And for the other special units that were not mentioned by the author.

intelligence. Thus, as early as February 2012, three months before the departure of Nicolas Sarkozy from the Elysée Palace, France closed its embassy in Damascus, to the great displeasure of the operational staff: “We had to unravel everything in the emergency room, move the archives, and cut off all contacts according to the procedure in force. The French agents kept in touch for a few months with their Syrian counterparts before being asked to work at a distance, far from the war zone, from Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey in particular.”¹⁷

If terrorism is based on ideology, the anti-terrorist response cannot be the fruit of any ideology, nor of overkill, of “securitization” (a term dear to the Anglo-Saxons) leading to a security drift. On the contrary, it must correspond to a necessary and coherent response, full of common sense, considering the feedback (and even the alerts) from the police and intelligence services, while not forgetting to reinforce their resources.

17 DUBOIS (C.) and PELLETIER (E.), *Où sont passés nos espions?* Albin Michel, Paris, 2017, p. 69.

Birth and Expansion of Jihadism in the Sahel: Impressions and Feelings of a Filmmaker

Thomas Fisch¹

ABSTRACT

AQIM, ISGS, GSIM, ISWAP... so many acronyms for so many different ideologies and political programs. The only thing they have in common is that they wage holy war in the name of a rigorous and intolerant Islam. These groups have gathered and then renamed themselves, but there are mainly three, united according to ethnic and historical criteria.

Keywords: Jihadism, Culture, Ideology, Poverty, Conflict, Globalization

Nacimiento y expansión del yihadismo en el Sahel: impresiones y sentimientos de un cineasta

RESUMEN

AQIM, ISGS, GSIM, ISWAP... tantos acrónimos para tantas ideologías y programas políticos diferentes. Lo único que tienen en común es que hacen la guerra santa en nombre de un islam riguroso e intolerante. Estos grupos se han reunido y luego se han renombrado, pero son principalmente tres, unidos según criterios étnicos e históricos.

Palabras clave: Yihadismo, Cultura, Ideología, Pobreza, Conflicto, Globalización

1 After studying cinema in Paris, Thomas Fisch discovered the African continent with a first trip to Cameroon. There he observed the initiation rituals of secret societies and animist cults. A little later, he discovered the great spaces of the Sahel and met the nomads. For more than 15 years now, his documentary films have taken him from southern Algeria to Niger, passing through Mali and Mauritania. But it is in the study of the Wodaabe Fulani of Niger that he has specialized, living among them on regular field trips.

萨赫勒地区圣战主义的诞生与扩张： 一个电影制作人的印象与感受

摘要

AQIM、ISGS、GSIM、ISWAP等诸多首字母缩略词被用于描述众多不同的意识形态和政治计划。其唯一的共同点是以严格和不容忍的伊斯兰教的名义发动圣战。这些集团聚集在一起，然后重新命名，但根据族群和历史标准进行联合的集团主要有三个。

关键词：圣战主义，文化，意识形态，贫困，冲突，全球化

Not a week goes by without the press reporting a terrorist attack in Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger—a geographical area that specialists call the Sahel-Saharan strip.

The public still remembers the murder of six French aid workers in Niger while they were visiting the giraffe reserve of Kouré, 60 kilometers south-east of the capital Niamey. This was in August 2020. The attack was claimed by the Islamic State.

A year earlier, on the 1st of July 2019, armed gangs from neighboring Mali attacked the Inates barracks in the Tillabéry region, west of Niamey. Officially, the authorities counted 18 dead among the Nigerian armed forces.

This event had deeply shocked Nigerian opinion. That country seemed to finally realize how serious the jihadist threat was, as it was getting dangerously close to the capital and was no longer contained to the country's margins.

Under the term “armed gangs” or “armed terrorist groups” (ATG in military parlance), a multitude of individuals with the most diverse motivations are hidden. Adept at marketing terror, they each have their own label, their own brand of affiliation:

AQIM, ISGS, GSIM, ISWAP ... so many acronyms for so many different ideologies and political programs. The only thing they have in common is that they wage holy war in the name of a rigorous and intolerant Islam. These groups have gathered and then renamed themselves, but there are mainly three, united according to ethnic and historical criteria.

- Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Since Abdelmalek Droukdel, the emir of AQIM was killed by the French army in June 2020, Iyad Ag Ali has taken over. AQIM is now composed mainly of Tuaregs.

- The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, led by Amadou Kouffa, of the Fulani ethnic group.
- And finally, the Islamic State in the Great Sahara or DAESH, composed of Arabs from Mali and led by Adnan Abou Walid Sahraoui.

Among these three leaders who dominate the jihadist scene, some want to expand the jihad beyond regional borders to establish a Caliphate. Others want to limit themselves to a local or national level.

They are now engaged in a fierce struggle for control of these territories and to establish their spheres of influence.

While the attacks have so far been of a military nature in Mali, they are targeting civilians more in Burkina Faso and Niger. Consequences of this lack of security straddles these three countries—in 2019, 4,000 people have been killed, and half a million people have had to leave their place of dwelling according to the UN, making this part of Africa an uncontrollable powder keg.

Under the banner of Islam and this armed struggle are gathered Tuaregs, Fulani, Arabs, Berabiches, Algerians, Burkinabes, Malians, Nigeriens, Saharawis—actors with such diverse ethnic, cultural, and political profiles that it is complicated to understand the situation deeply.

Of course, it is easy to find articles on the subject in the press and on the Internet. Some offer the ultimate equation to explain the increase in terrorist attacks and the motivations of those who commit them. I do not question the knowledge of the authors of these articles. However, I think I can offer an additional point of view based on my observations in the field, as I have been travelling in the Sahel-Saharan strip for more than fifteen years.

Indeed, I am a documentary filmmaker. For the needs of my films, I have travelled through Mali, Mauritania, the Great South of Algeria, Chad, and especially Niger.² I made several films on the culture of the Wodaabe Fulani, one of the last nomadic peoples to live in the bush. Then I became interested in the informal cross-border economies, commonly called “trafficking,” and how the fall of Muammar Gaddafi would transform the exchanges in this region.³

For more than fifteen years, I have seen these African societies change, their fault lines becoming blurred as if by a heat haze clouding the horizon. I regularly hear stories of terrorism and jihadism from my African friends. And what they tell me sheds new light on one way of understanding the rise of this phenomenon in the Sahel.

2 *Le Monde est un Cheval* (2005) and *La saison des Non-Pluies* (2007), films by Thomas Fisch. Broadcast by TV5 Monde and RTBF.

3 *Rifles and Amulets* (2012), film by Thomas Fisch. Broadcasting at the Namur Festival.

Indeed, Jihadism cannot be explained solely through a Manichean Western reading grid, in the sole light of ethnology, economics, or ecology. It is the intersection of several movements, identity-based, political, and historical, which cause violence.

Jihadism is not new in Africa. For centuries, it has been waved as a counter-attack against the colonial oppressor or against any government deemed corrupt. In the 19th century, the Sokoto Caliphate in northern Nigeria and part of Cameroon and the Peul Empire of Macina in Mali showed the unifying role of this Koranic holy war. What torments us now are the Jihadists who claim to be part of this new Muslim Internationalism, or Pan-Islamism. One of its most representative and well-known factions is AQIM: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

To explain its expansion, we need to consider several factors that intersect over decades.

In the 1960s, the former French colonial empire in Africa was dismembered. New countries appeared on the map: Algeria (1962), Mali (1960), Niger (1960), Upper Volta (1960), etc.

In Mali and Niger, the management of the country was transferred to the sedentary black populations, already educated by the former guardian power. During the colonial era, it was easier for the French administration to educate and train populations that were attached to a village or a circumscribed area. The power is thus left to the Bambaras, Songhaïs, Haoussas, Zarmas, and others, many of whom were the former slaves of the Tuaregs, nomadic populations of the North.

For these groups of farmers or merchants, it is a revenge offered on a platter after centuries of servitude, as well as a reversal of values and society. The newly formed centralized state deliberately left the Tuareg and the North to fend for themselves. The former lords of the desert were marginalized, left without stable access to health care, education, water, et cetera. In the 1970s and 1980s, several episodes of drought decimated their herds and reduced their former prestige to dust. The young people will have no other choice than to go into exile or to join Gaddafi's army in Libya. They would later return, armed with military experience that would help them launch protests and rebellions—from 1990 to 1996 in Mali and Niger, in 2006 in Mali, then from 2007 to 2009 in Mali and Niger, and finally in 2012 again in Mali.

Each time, peace agreements have been signed, and the situation has been stabilized. The Tuaregs have been integrated into civil society, into the administrative bodies, and sometimes to the top of the democratic institutions. Saharan tourism has developed since 2006. The Dakar Rally was the high point, bringing the cities of Agadez, Timbuktu and Gao, former caravan stops, out of oblivion. The locals would call this period the golden age of Saharan tourism, a source of foreign currency for their families and a way to move up the social ladder.

At the same time, in the north of the Sahara, in the 1990s, Algerians who had left to fight in Afghanistan alongside the Mujahideen returned to their country, bathed in Wahhabi ideology, notably through contact with Bin Laden, totally convinced of the greatness of their fight against the *kouffars* and apostasy. Here again, the experience of arms has been put to good use with the foundation of the AIG and later the GSPC.

Bin Laden sent one of his ideologues to establish contacts with different groups of Muslim fighters in Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Mali. The armed struggle advocated by Al Qaeda is spreading to conquer Africa. The GSPC and the AIG are the 'proto-cells' of the Jihadist groups that we know today. Their real rise dates from 2007, when the GSPC changed its name to AL Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.⁴

During all this time, the Tuaregs of Mali have not forgotten their autonomous aspirations, and even the impossible dream of independence that remained in the papers of Jacques Foccart, General de Gaulle's Mr. Françafrique. A proverb says, "Who wants to dine with the Devil uses a long spoon." To find the financial and military means necessary for their fight, it is simple to ally themselves with the former Algerian armed groups and to espouse the Jihadist cause. But the Tuareg front has since split along clan and ideological lines into former jihadists, moderates, and radicals.

In the early 2000s, structural adjustments imposed by international donors led to the liberalization and privatization of public services, including education. Free primary schooling almost disappeared, leaving the *madrasas* or Koranic schools with a free hand.⁵

In my early travels in Niger, the streets of Niamey were filled with itinerant preachers from neighboring Nigeria. Only a bunch of ragged kids would listen to them, laugh at them, and throw rocks or rotten fruit at them. Then, stealthily, a poison infiltrated their minds. Women put on clothes to cover their hair and hide their forms. The open-air bars where one could listen to music and flirt closed, one after the other. Mosques replaced them, financed by businessmen anxious to redeem themselves as good Muslims. The preaching of the *imams* has also changed. Wahhabi Islam, imported from the Middle East, ousted Maliki Islam, which had been established here for centuries and had until then been guaranteed a certain tolerance.

In 2009, I arrived in Mali. Bamako was then one of the most festive and dynamic capitals on the continent. Culture, music, and fashion were all happening there every night. Since then, the music has died down; the loudspeakers have

4 Jérôme Lacroix Leclair and Pierre Pahlavi, *L'institutionnalisation d'AQMI dans la nébuleuse Al-Qaïda*, Les Champs de Mars review n°24.

5 Aminata Traoré, *L'Afrique humiliée*, published by Fayard.

been taken down, except for those in the mosques. There too, their number increased exponentially until there were no more bars, discos, or places to enjoy life. The followers of Wahhabism have imposed their obscurantist silence on the city.

Faced with a failing state that no longer fulfils its role of protecting the most disadvantaged, nor the continuity of public services, the religious community donates a contribution that is seen as valuable, even precious, for society. It is an aggregator of resentment and a vector of social peace for poor populations that are permeable to his message.

Jihadism feeds on poverty. It recruits its soldiers there.

Since the end of the caravan rent, the destruction of the cotton industry in Mali, and a massive rural exodus, the main source of income has been a subsistence economy and small jobs in the informal sector. The main source of income is a subsistence economy of small jobs in the informal sector, such as selling cigarettes by the piece, ambush tailoring, shoe-shining, stealing motorcycles, and panning for gold.

There is gold all over the Sahelian strip. Often, the gold panning sites are illegal or just tolerated by the authorities. Thousands of people find themselves digging for their fortune. In 2018, the government of Niger shut down these mines and put a bunch of gold miners out of work. Under pressure from the European Union, on the pretext that these places were a crossing point for illegal migrants who then continued across the Sahara and the Mediterranean.

So, what can you do but go back to your old criminal activity, stay unemployed or join the ranks of the Islamist fighters? Because with the promise of \$100 a month, a Kalashnikov, a motorcycle, and a tank of gas, you are ready to join any cause. The rhetoric of Jihadism fills an existential, religious, and economic void among the younger generation.

Another basis of the economy is cross-border trade: smuggling cigarettes, gasoline, and weapons. In 2012, I went to film small arms dealers in southern Niger, on the borders of Chad and Nigeria. They were mostly Fulani herders, nomads. They told me three things. The first was that their need for weapons was motivated by ethnic tensions with other groups, sedentary ones, and against cattle rustlers. Second, the fall of Gaddafi in Libya six months earlier had disrupted traditional trafficking routes and automatic weapons were beginning to flood the black market. Thirdly, because of climate change and the increasing scarcity of pastures and wells, competition with the sedentary population was fierce. This led to conflicts between different ethnic groups over increasingly limited resources.

Playing on porous borders over a vast territory that is impossible to control completely by failing governments, Jihadism has built its local base on this trafficking. It levies a tax on each convoy. Cigarettes, petrol, drugs, foodstuffs and everyone benefits from this, from certain Tuareg groups to corrupt state officials.

Mokhtar Benmokhtar, a historical figure of the AIG and then of AQIM, got rich thanks to smuggling (hence his nickname of Mister Marlboro) and then in hostage-taking for ransom. As a refugee in Mali, he married a woman from the powerful Berabiche tribe. Thus, he secured their unwavering support and their interest in his trafficking.

In Timbuktu, in 2009, friends were telling me the story of “Air Cocaine.” A Boeing 727 had landed with a cargo of cocaine at the Sinkrébaka site, in the middle of the desert, 200 kilometers north of Gao. The case made headlines. The plane had been rented in Venezuela, registered in Saudi Arabia, and was flying with a license from Guinea Bissau. The cargo was emptied onto trucks, some of them escorted by men in uniform, and it then headed for the Mediterranean coast before arriving in Europe. Of course, the armed jihadist groups had taken a commission on the way.

The investigation was suppressed by the Malian state—some high-ranking politicians were involved. It was known that several flights had taken place between Colombia and Mali.

This is also what globalization is all about: the growing consumption of cocaine in Europe has allowed the creation of new supply routes through Africa and the enrichment of numerous intermediaries, including jihadist cells.

Since then, the types of trafficking have diversified. The most lucrative ones are still hostages and clandestine half-grants. Each link in the chain takes its commission. And the negotiators for the release of prisoners do not act only out of the goodness of their hearts. In 2010, AQIM’s fortune was estimated at 150 million Euros, thanks to ransoms paid, among other things—a fortune that allows the purchase of weapons and buys the silence of many people.

The foreign policies of our governments, the injunctions of international donors, globalization, poor governance of local elected officials, global warming, the scarcity of resources for herders and farmers and community rivalries are all breeding grounds for Jihadism in the Sahel.

It makes use of these factors. It offers a comfortable illusion to people who no longer expect anything from a centralized state that has abandoned them. It offers a semblance of order and the transcendental experience of belonging to the Ummah, the Muslim community.

Engaged in asymmetric warfare against the militaries of several national armies, feeding on anti-imperialist resentments, relying on small criminal groups, and exploiting inter-ethnic tensions, it will surely expand. Bin Laden had insisted on the need to win hearts and minds to his cause.

But in my opinion, it will not succeed in unifying the different ethnic groups of Mali, Burkina, Nigeria, or Niger.

The Malian Amadou Kouffa and his Macina Liberation Front were said to rally all the Fulani in the sub-region to him. I have my doubts.

Amadou Kouffa, whose real name is Amadou Dialo, defends only the interests of his community, the Peul herders of Mali. Even if he has an image of a vigilante among them, he is not in favor of the expansion of Jihad and the destruction of the Malian state.

Since his first preaching, which was recorded on cassettes and passed on under the mantle, he has brought back to him the nomadic breeders who were oppressed by the militias of the sedentary farmers. With them, he founded the Macina Liberation Front, in homage to the Macina Peul Empire of the 19th century. Then, as his power of nuisance grew, he renamed it the Group of Support for Islam and Muslims to gain more visibility.

Amadou Kouffa did try to send emissaries to Niger, particularly to the town of Ingall, to enlist the Fulani in the region—in vain. The security forces intercepted them.

The theocratic political system desired by these jihadists will sooner or later come up against the impossibility of exercising absolute control over nomadic groups. Always quick to move in search of new pastures for their animals, the nomads often disregarded religions that were too restrictive. As Ibn Khaldun describes,⁶ the city is the empire of constraint, and the city dwellers are more subject to power and its institutions. It is a delimited space that is easy to regulate, a place where the police of morals, an Islamic police force, can be exercised.

Nomads live without walls or gates. Because of their mobility, they escape a “policed” society with absolute control over the individual.⁷ Whether they are Foulbé Fulani from the south of Niger or Woddabe Fulani from the north, I have not seen any of them embrace Wahhabi Islam. They keep the habit of pre-Islamic ceremonies like the Guéréwol, for some, the Soro for others. Singing and dancing are part of their identity. And there is not even one of them who would want to give it up.

Tuaregs or Peuls, nomads want to avoid the dispersion of family property by preserving its direct transmission, even if it means admitting it through women. Their societies are matrilineal. Women have a privileged place in them, which is in contradiction with the Charia model.⁸

So, what does the future hold for jihadism in West Africa? The Covid crisis has certainly slowed its expansion somewhat. I hypothesize that the finances of armed terrorists have been impacted by the global economic crisis and the slowdown in the movement of goods and people.

First, kidnappings of Westerners for ransom are less profitable, simply because there are fewer potential targets to kidnap.

6 Ibn Khaldun, *the Prolegomena*.

7 Wadi Bouzar, *Saisons Nomades*, ed. L'Harmattan.

8 Edmond Bernus, *Touaregs Nigériens*, ed. L'Harmattan.

Secondly, drug routes are more closely monitored, and convoys are intercepted. However, there are still taxes levied on the passage of migrants.

Then, with the drop in oil prices linked to a drop in world demand, the funds coming from the Gulf countries, whether private or institutional, will dry up.

Recent clashes on the borders of Côte d'Ivoire and Benin, and an attempt to infiltrate eastern Senegal, show the jihadists' desire to externalize the conflict beyond the Sahel-Saharan strip. This push is coming down from Mali and Burkina Faso towards the coastal regions of the southwest. It aims to seek access to the sea, to cargo ports like Cotonou, and to piracy in the oil and gas-rich Gulf of Guinea, like Daesh in Syria, which lives off oil trafficking with Turkey.

The Sahelian jihadist nebula has suffered some military setbacks against the Barkhane and Takouba forces. To continue its struggle and its supply of weapons and communications equipment, it must now diversify its sources of income.

Of course, this is all guesswork at this point. Let's leave the future alone. Let's focus on the present and a little on the past.

The imposition of a caliphate would be a new form of colonialism since it is a reported Islam. It would be a cause of social, economic, and cultural regression, as well as a factor of depersonalization. And the urban youth of Bamako, Ouagadougou, or Niamey, accustomed to mobile phones, the Internet, social networks, and freedom, will not let themselves be dominated.

History has shown that the Sokoto Caliphate and the Macina Fulani Empire, built on the Jihad in the 19th century, collapsed after 50 years of existence, victims of internal tensions, rivalries, and the refusal of the conquered populations to live under an overly strict religion.⁹

No empire lasts, no matter how theocratic. The bad days will end.

9 Amadou Ampaté Ba, *L'Empire du Macina*, published by Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines.

Thirty Years of Jihad in Perspective, the Observations of Domestic Intelligence

Isabelle Jouandet ¹

ABSTRACT

For a variety of reasons, including its history, sociology, democratic values, and its presence in Africa and the Near and Middle East, France has been chosen as the anchor point and bridgehead for waging holy war in Europe.

Keywords: France, Terrorism, Jihad, Islamism

Treinta años de yihad en perspectiva, las observaciones de inteligencia doméstica

RESUMEN

Por una variedad de razones, que incluyen su historia, sociología, valores democráticos y su presencia en África y el Cercano y Medio Oriente, Francia ha sido elegida como punto de anclaje y cabeza de puente para librar la guerra santa en Europa.

Palabras clave: Francia, Terrorismo, Yihad, Islamismo

正确审视三十年圣战：国内情报观察

摘要

鉴于各种原因，包括其历史、社会学、民主价值观及其在非洲、近东和中东的存在，法国被选为在欧洲发动圣战的锚点和桥头堡。

关键词：法国，恐怖主义，圣战，伊斯兰

Foreword

This selective chronology covers the period from the 1980s to the 2000s, which was marked by the emergence, entrenchment, and deployment of Islamism in France:

France, Europe's target country – Weaving the Islamist web

For a variety of reasons, including its history, sociology, democratic values, and its presence in Africa and the Near and Middle East, France has been chosen as the anchor point and bridgehead for waging holy war in Europe.

Recognizing and fighting infidel Muslim states, striking at and dividing ungodly Western societies from within, destroying the sin of coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims; these are the watchwords that permeate the totalitarian discourse of jihad. In Europe, France holds the grim record for the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated on its soil, as well as for the number of nationals who have left to join the Islamic State. In fact, our country is exposed to a double threat: that of the multiplication of individual suicide attacks and that of a more unprecedented scale of attacks prepared and committed by militarized assailants.

Most counterterrorism actors agree that *a new generation of jihadist actors* has emerged, and that *the nature of the terrorist threat has changed*² after a period of lull (1996-2012). In fact, the *change in the nature of the threat* is mainly due to the fact that the risks associated with warfare in foreign lands are now exposed in tight flows. Terrorism is a revolutionary and archaic means of warfare that has plunged Africa and the East into bloodshed for decades. Jihadist groups resort to it in these regions of the world and, according to a long-standing strategy, export it through networks that have been established beforehand in the target countries. In a general climate of confrontation rather than coexistence between Islam and other civilizations, the failure of Westernization and the demographic explosion have incubated the eggs of the new holy war. The jihad, in its rage to win, was exported to the West in the wake of events which, from 1979, precipitated its evolution: the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, the signing of the Camp David agreements and the taking of the Great Mosque of Mecca hostage by a group of Islamist fundamentalists.

From the groundswell of yesterday's radical Islamism³ to its impulses that transcend borders today, jihadist aspirations and strategies do in fact show a certain continuity. The thought of *a single generation of the Koran* called to achieve the restoration of a pure and authentic Islamic order still prevails by reference to the doctrine of the ideologue Sayyid Qotb.⁴ The strategic choices advocated by *the architect of the global jihad*, Abu Musab al-Suri, have been adapted to modern contexts through a *decentralized global Islamic resistance* fight.⁵ The jihadist shock suffered in France is a result of this decentralization implemented in our

country for more than three decades. The recent wave of attacks and the current persistent threat of terrorist acts are thus the culmination of a long gestation of Islamist activism observed on French soil since the 1980s. Before being a land of offensives, France was the privileged target of an infiltration strategy of Islamist movements declined in several tendencies, to the most radical Islamic fundamentalism. To know Islam is to know “*the vast earthly scarf where several hundred million men have found and should deepen their “site of truthfulness.” “That the scarf is ‘mubawwâçid,’*” as it is said in the Koran.⁶ That the scarf is therefore long and colorful because if all Muslims aspire to faith, there is far from the *bazari* of Tehran to the pious pilgrim of the *Maghrebian* marabouts or to the Senegalese of great confraternity. The Muslim community of France, the *Umma*, does not escape this fragmentation of Islam and the power rivalries expressed in its name by the Arab-Muslim states; its very composite character and its numerical representation which positions it as the second religion in our country is enough to make it a stake of conquest.

The jihadist continuum: identifying terrorism from outside, a refocusing of domestic intelligence missions

Jihadist activism on French soil was revealed by a wave of deadly attacks perpetrated between 1982 and 1986.⁷ The national security services⁸ of the Ministry of the Interior were confronted with a new expression of terrorism. Until then, terrorism on French soil had been the result of political violence driven by mainly “purely French” secular organizations and causes—revolutionary, anarchist and socialist, nationalist and separatist—identified and relatively circumscribed in their nature and scope of expression. The jihadist phenomenon imports into France its fragmentation of nature, this intrinsic complexity where politics and religion, ancestral rivalries and geostrategy intermingle. In addition to the difficulty of identifying the movements of this nebula, there is also the difficulty of identifying the inspirers, Arab-Muslim states, foreign revolutionary organizations, and jihadist groups. These instigators are most often located in foreign countries, and it is therefore necessary to determine the relays, structures, and individuals in a position to perpetrate subversive activities on the national territory.

This new terrorist threat has led to a strengthening of prevention and a refocusing of the missions of the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (DST) and the *Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux* (DCRG). Historically in charge of counter-intelligence, the DST carries out missions related to defense, directed towards research, prevention and the fight against all activities inspired or supported by foreign powers that could threaten the security and safety of the country (and its economic and scientific heritage). By decree of December 22, 1982, a specific section was created for the surveillance of the Muslim world and domestic counterterrorism. For its part, the DCRG was already in charge of the

fight against political violence and the surveillance of foreign colonies on national territory.

Its general mission of information and education is to evaluate, at present and in the future, the nature and importance of subversive risks. In this perspective, it is particularly important to control the legality of representative structures and to identify any signs of radical drift. For this mission, the RG Directorate centralizes, cross-references, and analyses the information it receives from its territorial services. To anticipate risks, its priority objectives were reoriented at the beginning of the 1990s towards the fight against terrorism, the fight against urban violence and the observation of social events that might to encourage them.

These two internal security services are provided with additional anti-terrorist resources. The DST, in addition to a large documentation and archive center, has highly specialized technical resources, in particular a radio communications police force that enable the localization of clandestine transmitters and, since 1986, an IT department. DST investigators have repressive powers, while RG police officers are specialized in the strict search for information and the realization of prospective analyses on risk-carrying organizations, groups and individuals; the information gathered is transmitted to the DST and to the *Unité de coordination de la lutte anti-terroriste*, UCLAT, for possible follow-up action.⁹ Although the DST has much more efficient technical resources than the DCRG, the latter has a much wider territorial coverage and comparatively three times the number of staff.¹⁰ This territorial network allows it to provide local intelligence as close as possible to the realities. This is an asset that leads the DCRG to spontaneously claim its competence to deal with the jihadist phenomenon.

Apparently anecdotal but nonetheless serious (and not without consequences for the future), to carry out this mission, it is first necessary to overcome the blockages within the *Direction* itself. Indeed, some of its managers oppose the work of general information, which they believe is inoperative in the fight against terrorism, to that of intelligence to identify individuals who are dangerous to approach with human and technological resources. To this strict distinction between intelligence and general information, they add the argument of a separation between “open environment” and “closed environment,” general information being confined to the exploitation of open sources.

In order to counteract Islamist terrorism, the strategy to be implemented therefore questions two security logics that can nevertheless be considered as complementary: the first one, a logic of short-term action, which is already applied by the DCRG’s “Research” subdirectorate (perpetuated by the future DCRI / DGSI¹¹), consists of targeting research on the “*top of the spectrum*,” i.e., the most dangerous individuals to be identified and, if necessary, to be reported for questioning; the second one, inscribed in a logic of long-term consolidation security and advocated by the “General Information” subdirectorate, wants to broaden the investigation.

It intends to identify the very nature of the phenomenon, its origins, its causes, its actors, its manifestations; it is a question of understanding the risks of its evolution and of preventively putting in place the necessary safeguards to counter them. At the end of a difficult internal debate (reopened and discarded during the reorganization of domestic intelligence in 2008), the desire to combine the strengths of these two main sub-directorates finally took hold: in 1986, the DCRG launched its first large-scale survey of departmental services.

A first national survey revealing the jihadist strategy: “Nizam la Tanzim,” i.e., a system, not an organization

Following the series of attacks that shook France in 1985-1986, the DCRG launched a first investigation on the whole national territory. The objective was to carry out a more precise inventory to establish a cartography of the principal radical Islamist hotbeds; it is necessary to detect the faults which allowed their establishment or could support it in the more or less long term, and to determine their means of activity and influence.

In this perspective, an estimate is made by each RG departmental service based on evaluation data, if not exhaustive, at least indicative of the jihadist reality in France. Considering the geographical distribution of the Muslim population,¹² estimated at around 2,500,000 people, and distinguishing the foreign population and its main nationalities¹³ from Muslims of French nationality,¹⁴ the investigations mainly target: the representative structures, their leaders, their financing, their means of activity and propagation, the numerical importance of memberships and their audience. The range is wide and includes organizations specific to the cult, which aggregate religious associations, places of worship (established or “wild”) and Islamic centers; structures of associative groups related to culture, sports, leisure, etc.; other structures of activity, such as corporatist associations. For all these structures, the research also focuses on the existence of external influences exerted by Arab Muslim states, foreign revolutionary movements and active Islamist movements—fundamentalists—by noting their possible connections.

The findings of this first national survey, confirmed by other censuses of the same type,¹⁵ this time focused on the main geographical areas where Muslim populations live, reveal first the extreme diversity and vulnerability of the Umma. Its composition does not allow to grasp a homogeneous vision of Islam in France; it is more accurate to see the existence of sub-cultures or sub-communities that share the field of Islamic culture in it.

This very disparate character of the Muslim populations appears to be both weakness and strength, weakness eager for strength one might say. The various currents of Islam manifest themselves in two main forms of expression, modernist, and fundamentalist, with the weight of nationalism remaining as a dominant

factor and fundamentalism on the margins. A heterogeneous coalition where ambitions clash and dogmas compete, the Muslim community in France reproduces on a reduced scale the fevers of the Muslim world. France is thus sucked into this vast movement of fundamentalist uprising where Islam allows to universalize under its banner a same wave of different peoples and to lead them by watchwords.

This expansionist achievement is based on multiple causes; they are certainly of a religious and spiritual order, but they are also, and above all, of an ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural order. In the Arab world, calls for revolt in the name of Islam are based on the resentments of proletarian peoples; in France, jihad led by the various fundamentalist currents bases its discourse on the eradication of the moral heritage bequeathed by the West, which is denounced for its cultural domination and economic exploitation. The absence of a collegial representative structure of the Umma favors the interventionist wills of foreign states wishing to take control of it—mainly Algeria, Saudi Arabia—as well as the fundamentalist thrusts of the Libyan, Iranian, and Turkish branches, determined to make it the springboard of Islamization in Europe.

The *French Council of the Muslim Faith* (CFCM) has not escaped these tensions. Impelled since 1990 by the French public authorities, the CFCM was born in April 2003 after more than a decade of efforts marked by the will to constitute the broadest possible representative base of the tendencies of Islam and to adopt a double political recognition: recognition of the presence of Islam by the Republic and acceptance by the representatives of the cult of the laws of the Republic, in particular of the principle of secularism. A representative body of Islam in France that appears to be a strong symbolic and institutional stake for the various components of the Umma and is therefore immediately confronted with its divisions and rivalries.¹⁶ A windfall for the most radical Islamists who rushed into the cracks of these power struggles.

The interference of state control games allows the breakthrough of fundamentalist factions encompassed in a movement with blurred contours where confessional antagonisms (Sunnism/Shiism) and political divergences (Saudi Arabia/Iran) give way to temporary consensus of opportunity. This phenomenon is illustrated, among other things, by the failed attempts at unity made by the Grand Mosque of Paris, the most important Islamic center in France with about 2,000 faithful and 42 affiliated places of worship in the provinces. Algeria intends to exercise its authority over the Umma and to impose itself as its official representative to the French authorities. It justifies this ambition by the bonds of history and the number of its nationals on our territory.

Its seniority¹⁷ gives it a certain prevalence, but the interference of the Algerian government is denounced by French Muslims (for a long time grouped around the Mosque of Paris) and the Moroccan community. The strongest opposition to Algeria's hegemonic aims is, however, that of Saudi Arabia, which claims to be

the guarantor of *Dar al-Islam* throughout the world, where it seeks to impose the values of Wahhabism. The near non-existence of a Saudi community on French territory does not prevent it from exerting its influence, notably through international Islamist organizations.

The control of the native Muslim populations, but also those who have emigrated, is carried out through NGOs, such as the World Islamic League (WIL) founded in 1962 in Mecca by Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia, or through collegial structures, such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which brings together some forty Muslim states from various political backgrounds, yet under the control of the largest financial contributors: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.¹⁸

In France, Saudi Arabia's action is essentially focused on taking over the Great Mosque of Paris (and its satellite places of worship). This plan is marked by the financial aid of the Parisian office of the World Islamic League, which ensures the creation in December 1985 of the principal opposition organization to the Mosque of Paris, the *National Federation of Muslims of France* (FNMF). This organization, open to all components of the Muslim community, displays *its sovereign independence from any foreign influence* and asserts its desire to oppose nationalist influences. Intentions contradicted by the facts; in addition to the financing of its activities by the World Islamic League, its head office is in the premises of the Parisian office of the League.

This Federation, which gathers about a hundred Islamic cultural associations, presents above all a great heterogeneity: it gathers as well French converts gathered within the association *Vivre l'Islam en Occident* (created in December 1984 by Yacoub Jacques Roty, who is also the President of the FNMF), as fundamentalist associations. Among these, the Islamic Group in France (GIF) established in Paris since 1980, emanating from the *Islamic Tendency Movement* (MTI) which corresponds to the Tunisian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, aka the ultra-Islamist opposition to the regime of President Bourguiba. The GIF has a large geographical representation in France, having kept an important hold on the *Association of Islamic Students in France* (AEIF), the organization from which it originated.

The AEIF, created in 1963 in Paris, is representative of the two main trends of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Europe, the sympathizers of the Syrian Issam El Attar¹⁹ and those of the MTI. Constituted by a network of associations established in the major university cities (Strasbourg, Toulouse, Nice, Lyon, Marseille, Montpellier, Bordeaux, and Nancy), the AEIF advocates a pro-Khomeinist and anti-Zionist fundamentalist ideology.

Its orientation is clearly expressed during its national Congress of June 28, 29, and 30, 1987: *it is by an Islamic training of the young students that these prob-*

lems (difficulties of insertion of the young people in the socioeconomic life) *will be solved by helping to an awakening which will lead to overthrow the too lax governments to create the Islamic State by regrouping all the Muslim countries.* Its active militancy can incline some of its members to the terrorist drift, as shown by the discovery on December 18, 1986, of a large stock of weapons and explosives at the home of its former secretary general in Aulnay-sous-Bois (93). Slightly on the fringe of the GIF and the AEIF, in the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood but increasingly receptive to Iranian theses, many fundamentalist associations with a religious or cultural vocation are deploying important propaganda in the Paris region and elsewhere in France.

The constitution of a cascade of associations aiming at widening the field of fundamentalist influence to the largest number of Muslim communities. In this perspective, the GIF targets mainly the populations originating from the Maghreb and the Near East. To this end, it advances masked through its links with a whole network of militant organizations or sympathizers of the Muslim Brotherhood, some of which are close to Iranian circles. At the same time, the GIF has created new structures to present a moderate image, but these are contradicted by signs of radicalism. Thus, the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), created in 1983, which in 1987 groups together twelve associations, some of which appear as real fundamentalist bastions.

Its façade of honorability allows it to achieve a large audience (1,500 faithful at its annual congress in 1987) and testifies to its desire to impose itself as a reliable interlocutor with the French authorities. Especially since the UOIF intends to participate in the Council of reflection on the Islam of France launched in 1990 by the Minister of the Interior (prelude to the CFCM); initially composed of six members representative of the communities of the Umma, this council has for vocation to collect their proposals on the organization of the Muslim worship.

A double language because if some of its releases condemn the attacks perpetrated in Paris or demand the release of the French hostages in Lebanon, the speeches during its meetings make the apology of the holy war. Served by a solid financial vitality, in which the office of the World Islamic League participates, the UOIF appears, to say the least, to be one of the closed fields where the various nationalist and religious sensibilities, both Maghrebi and Middle Eastern, interpenetrate and are torn apart.

As a composite microcosm, agitated despite the unanimous dream by contradictory theological currents and nationalist interests, the Umma presents a certain porosity; its internal struggles create the fragility of a critical mass that is exploited by a minority but particularly active fundamentalist fraction. The result is a dynamic, shifting process that evolves in time and space through a game of inter-community competition and inclusion. The global observation inscribes the Islamic radical phenomenon in a circular logic; this one puts in place mechanisms

of enclosure and intercultural exclusion based on an apparent will to normalize the relations between the communities but whose underlying discourses continuously feed a strategy of power struggle.

The Islamic radical phenomenon: a circular logic

Alongside the interventionism of Arab-Muslim states and the activism of the Muslim Brotherhood, other lines of force, at once horizontal, vertical, and oblique, favor fundamentalist intersections: the Libyan axis and the Iranian line. Libya, whose interest in Islamic immigration to France is far greater than the size of its community there, intends to bring the *Revolution of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya*. Its influence is mainly exercised through two para-governmental organizations. One, the association *Représentation du Congrès du Peuple Arabe*, created in Paris in 1981,²⁰ whose head is the ex-director of the Parisian office of the Libyan press agency Jana, ensures the international propaganda to all national communities of the Umma.

This association gathers several extremist political organizations representing various Arab countries: Syrian Nationalist Party, Gathering of Egyptians in France, Party of Progress and Socialism of Morocco, Tunisian Popular Unity Movement, Lebanese Communist Party. The other one, the Association for the Call to Islam or *Dawa*, created in Paris in 1983, is the French representation of the association of the same name which is based in Tripoli with *the aim of developing the influence of the Muslim religion in the world*. Its Parisian manager, cultural attaché at the Libyan embassy's popular office, tries to rally various Muslim associations by providing them with financial aid. Among them, the Union of Islamic Associations in France, the UAIF created in 1982 in the movement of the mosque of Mantes La Jolie, whose president is a Moroccan totally infatuated with the Libyan politics. The UAIF gathers about fifteen satellites associations but loses however some of its influence on the profit of the Iranian movement.

Following the example of the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Libyan branch appears to be more and more under the Iranian yoke, the Khomeinist revolution going beyond theological and national cleavages. The Iranian influence is exerted on the structures of the other Islamic movements essentially through its embassy. The latter coordinates Tehran's propaganda in France and ensures the financing of cultural and religious associations and places of worship. Associations of Iranian students, such as the Islamic Association of Iranian Students in France, or the Association of Islamic Students in Paris, play an important role both in the field of intelligence on Khomeini's opponents who have taken refuge in France, and in that of the takeover of the Umma. Until December 1983, the main part of the subversive activities of the Iranian and Lebanese fundamentalists took place at the Jean Bart Iranian Cultural Center in Paris (6°).

Following its administrative closure and the expulsion of three Iranian diplomats, the meetings were held in private apartments in the Tokyo Tower in Paris (13°) occupied by leaders of Islamist opposition movements to the regime in their countries of origin, Iraq, and Egypt. A period of transition before the constitution of a new associative structure, Ahl El Beit, which will be until its dissolution by administrative decision in June 1987 the nerve center of the pro-Khomeinist fundamentalists. But in anticipation of this new dissolution, the association *Solidarité Internationale des Pays Sous-Développés* was created in April 1987.

Its leaders, in close relationship with the Iranian embassy, ensure the continuity of the Iranian action. Its declared aim, to *express and develop solidarity with the oppressed and forgotten in prisons*, brings together certain clandestine movements such as the *Islamic Tendency Movement* (MTI, the Tunisian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) or the *Islamic Youth Movement of Morocco* whose leader, sentenced to death in absentia in Morocco, lives in the Paris region. The Iranian strategy combines false diplomacy and secrecy to ensure its propaganda and the recruitment of a militant elite that crosses several nationalities of the Umma.

Alongside the activity of declared associations, Iranian agents scattered throughout Europe ensure the collection of information likely to help in the establishment of the Islamic nation, notably through the surveillance of Iranian opposition circles, the observation of the activity of the different Islamic confessions, and the analysis of the regime and the political life of the host country. In France, alongside members of the Iranian embassy, these Iranian agents are most often scholarship students who actively participate in the recruitment of future Jihad fighters had among the immigrant population. The impact of the Iranian ideology is noticeable among militant Islamist networks, Muslim Brotherhood, Libya, and Turkey.

Turkish Islamists are essentially represented by the *organization Tendance Nationale Union Islamique en France*, created in Paris on February 20, 1987, which gathers about 2000 members distributed within sections constituted in the main geographical zones of implantation of Turkish immigration (Paris region and the East of the country). This association is an expression in France of the *National Salvation Party*, a religious movement in opposition to the government of Ankara which favours the establishment of a regime modelled on the Iranian state. It launches real calls for violence against impious nations.

Its members distribute leaflets in the mosques of the North-East region of France calling for armed combat and multiply the acts of threats and intimidation against the local Muslim population. The Umma undergoes this radicalization expressed daily by a whole panoply of pressures which go from the obligatory wearing of the chador for the women to the prohibition of frequentation of the French businesses. Such processes illustrate the strong will of the fundamentalists to isolate the immigrant Muslim community by exacerbating the thought of a difference and a proper identity.

Beyond the confusion caused by the proliferation of Islamic networks, their nature and origin, we observe a policy of federative action orchestrated around a common objective: the Islamization of French society. In this perspective, the Islamic conquerors of all persuasions agree on a strategy to be deployed in stages. The first phase consists in the setting up of structures of worship and proselytizing deployment aiming at a crystallization of the immigrant identities around Islam and at a weakening of the republican balances. This first operation was based on a network of associations and gathering places that were gradually expanded over time by targeting categories of the population where militants could be recruited and “dormant networks” of future fighters could be formed.

A polymorphous explosion of meeting and prayer and of indoctrination or recruitment structures

The structural fragmentation of Islam in France allows the emergence of *de facto* powers revealed by a real explosion in the number of cultural or religious Islamic associations as of the law of October 9, 1981, which abrogates the restrictive regulations for the constitution of foreign associations subject to prior authorization that can be revised by decree.²¹ This new legislation allowed them to benefit from the provisions of the law of 1901 relating to freedom of association; it was mainly under this regime that associations managing places of worship were created, of which 706 were counted in 1986 by the *Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux* (Central Directorate of General Information), 530 of which were located in the provinces.²² The gathering of immigrant communities under the different banners of Islam is done through these associative networks, which set up structures of meeting and exchange by the creation of places of worship, mosques, Koranic schools, but also a multitude of prayer halls often improvised in places of concentration of Muslim population.

The place of worship establishes a community link between the various components of the Umma. Its constitution adopts two main schemes: the first one is based on the regrouping of an ethnic-national community which endows itself with a place of worship often coupled with a Koranic and language school. The means of operation are based primarily on contributions from the faithful, financial contributions from their country of origin²³ and provisions for aid from the State or local authorities. Of moderate obedience, these places of worship are visited by Islamist preachers who distribute their propaganda publications. The second pattern concerns the members of national Islamist associations where members of religious movements of fundamentalist tendency meet. Their financing, which is partly opaque, comes from national organizations and federations of associations, from private, individual, or state donors, generally through international Islamist leagues.

National censuses carried out by the DCRG note a rapid increase in the number of places of worship in France: from 33 in 1971, 83 in 1977, nine years later there were 817, of which 542 were located in the provinces and 275 in Paris and the Paris region; these figures are constantly increasing, 1,035 mosques in October 1989, 1,600 in 2004.²⁴ These counts remain largely underestimated since they only concern fixed and public places, which are themselves of very unequal importance: mosque-cathedrals or Islamic centers offering various community services, and local mosques or neighborhood prayer halls. To this estimate, one must add the clandestine oratories—improvised rooms in private apartments, building cellars, back stores of grocery stores, butcher shops or Halal tea rooms, without ignoring the importance of oratories in immigrant homes, factories, universities, and in religious action the role of Islamic bookshops.

Thus, these figures do not include places of worship installed in migrant hostels, which mainly welcome immigrants from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. However, SONACOTRA alone has equipped 80% of its 300 hostels managed throughout France with places of worship and the residents are free to invite outsiders to attend. The same policy of openness is applied by other semi-public associations managing homes (AFRP, AFTAM, ASSOTRAF, SOUNDIATA). The fundamentalists of the *Tabligh* and the Islamists, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranians quickly perceived the development of these prayer rooms in the hostels as a relay for their cause; their proselytizing increased with frequent visits by itinerant imams, which are redoubled during the religious holidays.

Another parameter to consider is the installation of prayer rooms (and related time arrangements) in companies. This evolution is marked in the automobile factory in the Paris region with a high concentration of Muslim immigrant workers. In the conflictual social context marked by the strikes at the Renault factories in Billancourt (1981) and Talbot and Citroën (1982), Islam already appeared as a cement of mobilization. Since then, on the lookout for all the circumstances likely to favor their advance, Islamist militants have infiltrated the working-class environment by playing on the declining influence of union representation.

As Islam does not distinguish between the profane and the religious, the Islamist brotherhoods adapt their proselytizing discourse to the concerns and expectations of their targets. From this point of view, any meeting place is of interest; thus, the fundamentalist movements carry out a dynamic action by creating their own cultural centers or places of worship but also by infiltrating any other place of prayer. The methods implemented by each faction are identical to those developed in their associative influence.

Islamist activism relies on networks whose organization differs according to the movement. The Muslim Brotherhood as well as the pro-Khomeinist Turks have established a centralized system composed of pyramidal structures linking associative groups and places of worship to ensure an important influence in the

provinces. The Libyan militants adopted an identical organizational scheme but without managing to extend their network outside the Paris region, their audience being considerably limited to the benefit of the Iranian cause. The Iranian Islamists differ from other fundamentalist currents in the methods they use to control associations and places of worship. They do not create federations or associations but seek to develop, most often through the intermediary of the Iranian embassy, an action of infiltration of any Muslim structure established in France.

Their influence, which is growing within the Muslim Brotherhood, Libyan, and Turkish organizations, is also noticeable in non-grouped associations and autonomous places of worship, whether they are mosques or prayer rooms in universities, factories, or immigrant homes. To overcome the pitfall of nationalism, which remains a priority identity factor, Iranian Islamists are concentrating their policy of entry into religious structures with a fundamentalist vocation. The challenge is more important because fundamentalist Islam is clearly on the rise in the migrant *milieu*, where the association *Foi et Pratique*, created in Paris in 1972 (called *Invitation et Mission pour la Foi et la Pratique* since February 1986) has succeeded in overcoming the divisions between nationalities of origin by asserting its ideological independence.

French branch of a vast and powerful international Islamic movement, the *Jama'at al Tabligh* (People of the Message),²⁵ the fundamentalists of *Foi et Pratique* refer to the genesis of the Islamic faith, privileging the example of the primitive Muslim community of Medina to advocate a very dogmatic and rigorous Islam. The preachers of this pietistic Pakistani movement travel around France and are often well received by religious leaders, which favors their contact with the local Muslim population.

The first dimension of jihad is therefore to ensure its influence on the greatest number of people, hence the importance of this proselytizing tactic, which has been widely deployed in France since the 1980s and 1990s. To widen their audience, the various Islamist organizations pay particular attention to communication.

Covering the “Umma” target: the bludgeoning of a diverse communication

Less developed than the associative and cult networks, the communication network reflects both the divisions of the Umma and the various ambitions for its control. The visits of the places of reception of Moslem population are the object of actions of propaganda supported on the speeches of the big figures of the militant Islamic call, diffused in the form of books, booklets, leaflets, or phono and video cassettes. The Muslim Brotherhood ensures the diffusion in Arabic, French and English of the moralist and pietistic texts of the founding fathers of the Brother-

hood, interpreted and enlightened by the radical ideas of the Egyptian theologian Sayid Qotb. Another best-seller, the work of the Pakistani theorist Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi, the first Islamist of the twentieth century to advocate the return to jihad.

Leaflets of ideologists of the *Islamic Tendency Movement* (ITM) are widely distributed as well as the monthly *Al-Ghuraba* published in London by the *Association of Muslim Students in the United Kingdom and Ireland* in collaboration with the *Union of Islamic Associations in Europe* or *Al Dawa* published by the *Islamic Center of Austria*. This last example shows the extent of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which however oscillates between different state influences. Thus, the weekly *Al Mouslimoun* published in Saudi Arabia, distributed in France, opens its pages to the ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood, which also distributes *Al Muslim*, the organ of the Islamic party of Libya, *Al Alam*, and its supplement *Al Islami*, published in London which propagates the ideology of the Iranian revolution.²⁶

Iran is not to be outdone, and through its embassies in Paris and Geneva it regularly distributes works from Tehran, Qom, Beirut, and Tripoli.²⁷ Finally, some pro-Khomeinist associations periodically publish booklets denouncing the Shiite pressure in Iraq. A proliferation of Islamist works further abounded by publications from Libya distributed in France by a company located in Rome.²⁸ The field of communication marks the leadership of Iranian thought, which again goes beyond the antagonism between Shiites and Sunnis as well as nationality cleavages. This observation is confirmed from time to time during common operations of leafleting; thus, in April 1987, a leaflet entitled "In the name of God" is widely distributed in the mosques and places of prayer of the Lyon conurbation.

Signed by six Islamist associations from different tendencies, Muslim Brotherhood, Iranian, Iraqi Shiite, Lebanese, this leaflet denounces a German documentary dedicated to the 8th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution of Iran broadcast in FRG and captured in Eastern France. The pro-Khomeinists Turkish Islamists relay this distribution in particular in the mosques of Mulhouse. The diffusion of phono and video cassettes is also part of the arsenal available to the Islamist communicators. These recordings come mainly from Iran and include chanted verses from the Koran, preaching by the renowned Egyptian Sheikh Abd al-Hamid Kishk²⁹ and a famous text from the tenth century by the theologian El Karaouani which gives the instructions for holy war. A bludgeoning of Islamist propaganda that passes through all means of information, including the most modern of the time.

The Muslim Brotherhood set up a Minitel service, the *Journal Télématique d'Information Arabo-musulmane*, which provided practical (economic, social, legal) and religious information³⁰; a directory of places of worship and Islamic associations in France was provided, as well as recommendations for religious practice. The field of local radio stations remains under the control of Arab states, mainly Algeria, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. A few stations opposed to the Algerian and Saudi

para-governmental radios have been set up in the “Beur” movement but without any real audience. As for the Islamist organizations, they do not have a very developed radio activity.

The beginning of the 1990s changes the situation with the arrival of the Internet in France. Amplifying megaphone for jihadist propaganda, it is also a new space for the logistical exchanges of various terrorist groups. In the early days of the Internet, it was mainly radical Algerian groups that transposed their war to it. Algerians emigrated or exiled in the United States, Canada, England, or France follow on the network the diffusion of Jihad News and the evolution of the political situation in Algeria, version *Armed Islamist Group* (GIA). The contributions are long, argued and documented. Corruption, the attitude of Western countries towards the Arab world, the policy of the IMF and the World Bank towards Third World countries, and the *unacceptable* refusal of change in the spheres of Algerian power are all scrutinized.

The GIA's communiqués, issued mainly from San Diego in the United States, seek to reach out and bring together the Algerian community beyond their borders. Algeria-net is one of the networks that is distributed through private messaging on the Net, where one only needs to register with an e-mail address. The GIA has spoken with several voices on the Internet before distancing itself from some of its spokespersons who are engaged in a real information war by interposed electronic messages. Islam Report, broadcast from California by the *American Islamic Group*, is one of its Islamist propagandas bulletins that claims to have direct sources of information. But if some of this information is authenticated by the Islamist groups, such as the “letter to Chirac” in sent to the French President at the end of August 1995 and enjoining him to convert to Islam, or the threats made to France of new terrorist attacks, others are contested; for example, on January 29, 1996, the alleged communiqué of operations of the GIA announcing the liberation of several regions of Algeria and the institution of the Islamic law by several governors.

Propaganda, intoxication, manipulation—we are in the middle of disinformation and some observers even suspect servers like Islam Report of being a CIA or Mossad office in charge of sowing confusion in the Islamic community. Realities or deceptions are delivered in bulk to the sole discernment of Internet users and this information, objective or not, often contains more emotion than reason. In this, the Internet is formidable and participates in the manipulation of minds; it helps to constitute in the same cult a vast thinking envelope of a global brain joining the sublimation of the jihadist ideology.

However, if the virtual jihad is a formidable additional weapon for its export to the heart of democratic societies, it cannot replace the necessary meetings of people for its effective realization. The Islamist movements know this and continue to activate the field work. On the occasion of the distribution of various Islamist publications, the preachers of the *Tabligh* or the Iranian recruiters propose train-

ing courses related to religious, mainly in Qom and in Pakistan. In 1986, the case of the recruitment of young immigrants in the district of Montbéliard (25) by the leaders of the SONACOTRA mosque in Bethoncourt is an illustration of this: the leaders of the Islamic Religious Assembly of Montbéliard, identified as Shiite fundamentalists, indoctrinated young Turkish and North African immigrants who were sent on training courses to Pakistan.

In fact, the mere typology of associations reveals the main Islamist levers in the life of the Muslim community in France and shows the difficulties of a rigorous classification of the different components of this nebula; a grouping recognized as moderate can have subversive branches and vice versa, the change from one tendency to another can take place progressively or brutally. Fundamentalists feed “a system, not an organization” where radical minorities navigate in symbiosis with each other, each group feeding off the other and the rejections of the other. The bridges are multiple, the logics at work intertwine to achieve a common goal: the conquest and liberation of lands to impose the law of Islam on the greatest number. In the 1980s and 1990s, France was already a land of action for the jihad, which went far beyond the borders of Africa and the East. In the first place, the radical Islamist strategy aims to cut the Umma in half.

This objective requires the creation of more and more representative structures and gathering places to deploy militant proselytism, logistical exchanges, and where to recruit future soldiers of Islam. Its realization is based on two operations which, like their networks, merge: the first consisted in insidiously weaving a jihadist web throughout the national territory, targeting mainly the cultural and religious domains in order to reach the Umma. Once this first foundation was consolidated, the second operation, which was partially initiated, consisted in the deployment of the web accompanied by the targeting of Muslim youth. The overall and final objective is to set up networks of reserve fighters ready to make the supreme sacrifice at the opportune moment decided by the jihadist leaders. France thus appears as a land of action of the jihad through its battles conducted in the shadow of a war of conquest in which time is the ally.

France, land of action—From the deployment of the Islamist web to the terrorist tilt

The events of 2015 confront our country with terrorism on a massive scale with six simultaneous attacks that bloodied the heart of Paris. Under the shock of the massacre perpetrated at the Bataclan on November 13, 2015, the entire country was suddenly projected in a state of war against a blind terrorism, terribly deadly. The President of the Republic announced a state of emergency throughout the metropolis and the closure of borders. This exceptional regime between the normal situation and the state of siege reinforces the powers of the administrative authority to deal with *imminent danger resulting from serious attacks on public order or from*

events which, by their nature and seriousness, have the character of a public calamity. Imminent danger can also be considered a calamity because if the terrorist act is not a natural disaster, it has the same unpredictable character in its occurrence.

The powerlessness to counter these threats is said by the heads of the security services, who since the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the Hyper Cacher ten months earlier feared a *complex attack*. In the aftermath of these attacks, the observation is bitter: the attacks planned outside our borders, organized in Belgium, mark the failure of external intelligence as well as that of internal intelligence insofar as they occurred on our soil. From onwards, France continues to be an epicenter of jihadist terrorism. Synchronized assaults, carried out according to a carefully elaborated plan and with sophisticated weapons, claimed by the Islamic State and an al-Qaeda network, have been followed by numerous individual attacks with knives (or with a ram car); their perpetrators, most of them unknown to intelligence services, do not have an identified allegiance to a terrorist group.

Then should we consider that these acts go beyond the jihadist networks by identifying them as lone wolves, psychologically fragile personalities, or disaffected young people who dream to be *negative heroes*?³¹ The absence of claims by a jihadist group should not exclude the impact of the Islamist movement on the radicalization of these individuals. Islamists politicize the resentments of populations and address individuals first and foremost through active proselytization designed to sow and root their discourse. Observed in France since the 1980s and 1990s, this strategy appears to be perfectly thought out and orchestrated through fundamental preaching and the specific action of Islamist socio-educational structures established throughout the country.

The intensification of terrorist acts, now part of the jihadist strategy of chaos, has its origins in the roots of these movements, whose different networks are structured and intertwined according to the international situation. The complexity of the threat, reinforced by the link between the inspirers and sponsors abroad and individuals and organizations established on national territory, questions this past and raises questions about the adaptability of the national security system.

A double hold on the Muslim youth: fundamentalist preaching and Islamic socio-educational proselytizing

Following the example of the strategy of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which focuses its militant action on those “left behind,” fundamentalists and Islamists are investing in the difficult neighborhoods of the suburbs with a strong North African presence.

Since the 1980s, the *Tabligh* movement has developed in France by exploiting the disillusionment of the “Marche des Beurs” and political organizations (MIB, SOS Racism). *Tabligh* does not target an educated public but a deprived im-

migrant population and applies the principle of an “Islamization from below.” At first, its association *Foi et Pratique* concentrated its activities in Paris and the Paris region in the neighborhoods where its own mosques and prayer places were located.³² It managed to create real Islamic enclaves with their own economic, social, and cultural structures. The most significant example of this Islamization (along with that of the rue de Tanger in the 19th arrondissement) is that of the Belleville district, notably the perimeter of the Omar Mosque (11°); little by little, French shopkeepers under the pression of Muslim customers are being led to give up their businesses to Islamist buyers who are converting them into bookstores, cafés, grocery stores, halal butchers.

In addition to this desire to create “Islamic villages” in the capital, *Foi et Pratique* also wanted to spread throughout the country, where it quickly established numerous branches. The strong participation of faithful, mainly of Maghrebin origin, in the gatherings organized by *Foi et Pratique* marks the constant importance of its audience: 2,000 people gathered in Creil (60) in 1984, 6,000 in Lille (59) in 1985, 2,000 in the castle of Villemain in Grisy-Suisnes (77) in 1987.

In many ways, *Foi et Pratique* illustrates the intertwining of the various Islamist currents. The independence displayed by its leaders is contradicted by the financial support it receives from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia contributed to the acquisition of the Villemain castle; converted into a Koranic school, these buildings host Islamic training courses and serve as accommodation centers for foreign preachers and imams, the main source of inspiration for Pakistanis. The doctrine advocated by the *Tabligh*, this time under the influence of Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, led to the radicalization of several Parisian association leaders and provincial section leaders.³³

Some are in contact with the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and actively participate in the functioning of this movement from France; under the pretext of religious training courses, young French *Tablighis* undergo military training in Pakistan and Libya before joining the Algerian maquis. In fact, between Islamization and operational support, the line is often very thin. The radical fringe of the *Tabligh* dangerously flirts with the pro-Iranian Muslim Brothers and with the Turkish fundamentalists of the *Tendance Nationale Union Islamique en France* (TNUIF) movement, known as Erbakan.³⁴ However, the Turkish organization, until now rather withdrawn, is also making a sensitive rapprochement with the pro-FIS organizations.

The fundamentalists of the *Tabligh* and the Muslim Brotherhood are very active in the sensitive social housing districts. Regarding *Tablighis*, one regularly observes incursions of six to ten preachers, some of them from abroad, who come to meet young people, question them about their difficulties before offering them educational support and economic aid, in particular employment in one of the many businesses managed by the faithful. The *Tablighis* also visit young delin-

quents or drug addicts in prisons and hospitals where they teach them a literal and rigorous practice of Islam that can modify their social condition in France. They reinforce the young people in their revolt against a corrupted Western society, without moral values, offering them no possibility of insertion and carrying the hope in another model of existence based on the refusal of “foreign” values for the return to the only truth, the life in Islam.

The discourse is buoyant, as evidenced by the many examples of redemption, such as those of the leaders of the *Minguettes* ZUP in Vénissieux, who were particularly prominent during the slow clashes of 1981 and 1982 between young (often delinquent) immigrants and the police. The Islamists and fundamentalists, under the guise of moral guidance of the youth of difficult neighborhoods, are developing actions to occupy the social and political terrain. This very active proselytizing, especially in “sensitive” neighborhoods, is most often tolerated by the authorities because their actions apparently pacify the cities.

But beyond the rhetoric of integration and prevention, their interventions feed the communal withdrawal of a provocative and even deeply anti-institutional fringe of youth. Exploiting the global context of the rise of urban violence, fundamentalists are seizing on the gaps in social cohesion to Islamize the “Beurs.” The progression of insecurities, the permanent oscillation between collective revolt and common delinquency, between implosion and explosion of the violence of the cities, opens a diversified field to the tactics of conversion to a militant Islam.

Alongside the *Tabligh*, other Islamist organizations, encouraged by the effectiveness of proselytizing by religious associations, began to invest in socio-educational associations at the end of the 1980s. This approach resulted in a steady increase in the number of associations for young Beurs until 1992, when this phenomenon became more popular. The recrudescence observed is explained by the amplification of the activities of radical Islamists on all fronts with a progressive specialization of their structures. In 1995, the DCRG counted more than 210 associations with fundamentalist tendencies or risks established at the local level. Of great structural diversity, autonomous associations or those attached to national organizations, the type of individuals who gravitate around this, present different profiles: fundamentalist religious, notorious delinquents or members of terrorist movements.

Overall, these associations are located at the confluence of all Islamist tendencies but also at the heart of social issues such as the rise of common law delinquency in the suburbs and urban violence. Their societal positioning to encourage a return to Islam is mainly based on three kinds of activities: the most frequent are cultural, sports and leisure activities. As a prelude to Islamization, the teaching of the Arabic language constitutes the main part of the cultural activities; sports activities are mainly oriented towards team sports, such as soccer ball, combat sports and martial arts; leisure activities are divided between the organization of

vacations, of which the Turkish COJEP has made a specialty, and more classic outings. Then come the associations that help the integration of young people and, in priority, the school support that allows to keep the little brothers on the right track and to take over from parents overwhelmed by their cultural difference. Finally, Islamic associations, especially in large urban areas, are dedicated to the fight against delinquency and drugs.

The methods used here again play on several levels. The Muslim Brotherhood, through its associations, seeks to create a Muslim lobby able to put pressure on the public authorities to impose its identity claims. They want to interfere in local politics by presenting a consensual and constructive facade. The approach consists of federating a Muslim electorate. Several organizations, notably the *Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France* (FNMF), the *Union des Jeunes Musulmans* (UJM) and the association *Les Jeunes Musulmans de France* (JMF), supported by the *Union des Organisations Islamiques de France* (UOIF), are calling on young French Muslims to register on the electoral rolls as of the 1995 municipal elections.

The French nationality progressing with the generations of the Umma with a birth rate much more important than that of the “native” French, the Muslim Brotherhood aims in the long term to deeply influence the French politics. This will of the FNMF and the UOIF is also expressed through their active participation in the entry of Islam to the table of the Republic during the whole process of the establishment of the French Council of the Muslim Cult. Daily, the *Tabligh* as well as the Muslim Brotherhood clearly seek to claim a certain legitimacy both from public authorities and from their co-religionists. In order to do so, they try to create a hierarchy within the suburbs through associative leadership and to impose themselves as privileged interlocutors with the public authorities, notably by playing the role of mediators capable of canalizing the violence—violence that they sometimes trigger themselves.

In highly degraded neighborhoods, where drug addiction and drug trafficking are part of the daily violence, the presence of a militant Islam imposed by a small core of young adults introduced into community life leads to punitive actions against petty criminals, drunken youth, heroin dealers, or their clients. A real parallel police force is set up, often with the approval of Muslim families, scandalized by the rise of all kinds of abuses and dissatisfied with the response of French authorities.

In the early 1990s, there were many examples of violence inspired by an apparent concern for moral order, but which revealed obscure rivalries for control of the market for cannabis and were in fact triggered by leaders with the profile of converted delinquents. The frontier between Islam and delinquency often appears blurred, as the dismantling of support networks for armed groups in Algeria has shown, revealing this growing interpenetration of common law and Islamist activities. The profile of the most virulent proselytizers shows a correlation between the

judicial past of these individuals and their radicalism, since on average one in five is known to the police, often for intentional violence, and half of the common law leaders are also known for their links with the radical Islamist movement.

In 1998, the DCRG reported the presence of this local proselytizing in 216 neighborhoods.³⁵ There are numerous tangible signs: the actions of social workers³⁶ are undermined by the most violent young people; the frequentation of prayer halls by young people and the attendance at Islamist congresses or conferences are increasing; with the refusal of secularism, difficulties are growing in the school environment (rejection of female teachers, refusal of co-education, wearing of the veil by young girls, refusal of the teaching of certain subjects, history, natural sciences, sports, etc.); small shopkeepers or industrialists established in sensitive neighborhoods are victims of harassment (expressed in various forms, assaults, pressure, racketeering and reprisals, etc.). In some neighborhoods, the successful establishment of Islamist leadership structures is accompanied by deliberately provocative and violent anti-institutional behavior. Young “Beurs” claim their religious affiliation by means of vengeful graffiti celebrating the “martyr” Khaled Kelkal, the GIA, or the FIS, by burning the tricolor flag or shouting their hatred of the French, or even by physically attacking people; 28 neighborhoods were the scene of this type of action in 1994/1995, and 71 in 1997/1998.³⁷

As it stands, militant Islamism, far from integrating young “Beurs” by fighting against delinquency and urban violence, only provides a facade of appeasement masking the takeover of sensitive neighborhoods by a rigorist Islam that is constantly progressing. This progress is based on various strategies of influence patiently applied in time and space.

The art of war or the indirect strategy of radical Islamists

As an example, the examination of the associative nebula of the *Union des Jeunes Musulmans* (UJM) of Lyon illustrates these combinations of strategy; this organization includes practically all types of individuals and associations as well as presenting a panoply of the means of action to which the jihadists have recourse. Its creation brings it from the outset to the confluence of fundamentalist currents. Formed in 1984, declared in the Prefecture of the Rhone in December 1987, the UJM was born from the will of the pro-Khomeynist Shiites to establish in France a movement of gathering of the youth of the Umma. The embassy of Iran, the leader of the Iranian movement of the Rhone, as well as a French intellectual converted to Islam and member of the Center of Study and Islamic Documentation, notorious organ of propaganda of the Khomeynist word, are Presidents of the UJM.

Among the other currents which take part in this creation, one notes various local associations professing a radical Sunni Islam and national organizations of the movement of the Muslim Brothers, such as the Association of the Islamic Students in France (AEIF) or the Union of the Islamic Organizations in France

(UOIF), this last organization being used as link between the followers of *Foi et Pratique*, the Iranian and Turkish fundamentalists. Initially, the UJM, which did not have its own premises for preaching, frequented the Errahma mosque in Villeurbanne; set up in the building of a disused factory, it brought together about 200 adherents, most of whom were of Moroccan and Tunisian origin. Its leaders, in relation with the fundamentalists *Foi et Pratique* of the Omar Ibn Khatab Mosque in Bron, lean towards the Iranian fundamentalist theses. Members of the UJM are also present in different places of worship managed by pro-Khomeynist Turkish extremists gathered in the section of the organization *Tendance Nationale de l'Union Islamique en France* (TNUIF), located in Villeurbanne.

Like the *Association des Étudiants Islamiques en France* (AEIF), the UJM pursues an elitist policy to create a leadership capable of managing the Muslim community. It explicitly aims to raise the level of education of young "Beurs" with the dual purpose of infiltrating the public administration and investing the local political level. With this objective in mind, the UJM launched the "Committee of One Hundred Thousand" in 1995, which set the objective of registering young Muslims on the electoral lists. Its central structure is limited to around thirty members, each in charge of specific sectors: teaching, administration, organization of seminars, meetings, or religious vigils.

Based in Paris (6°), it has two branches in Vénissieux and controls forty-six associations in Lyon and the Lyon suburbs, some of which even federate other organizations. For example, the "Aube" association in Vénissieux, which brings together 15 or so associations covering all aspects of local Muslim life (cultural, educational, integration assistance, etc.), has established itself as an essential intermediary with the municipality. The UJM has therefore a very wide local representation and ensures daily exchanges with its satellites, especially through its bookshop Tawhid which serves as a permanent office. Present on all fronts, religious, socio-educational, anti-racism, humanitarian, the UJM cultivates a facade of a moderate Islam and violence in the ban leagues. This is the front side.

On the other hand, the UJM is against any compromise with the republican laws, preventing the integration of the "Beurs" whose religious orientations it radicalizes. Its annual congress, where radical groups of various tendencies meet, constitutes one of the most important events of the Islamist world in France; its audience grows rapidly, 300 people in 1992, 2,000 in 1993, 3,000 in 1994. Benefiting from a good logistic organization, each of these congresses tackles the various aspects of the integration of Muslims in France. A thematic presentation a priori moderate but which gives place to often stormy interventions stigmatizing the *cultural rape of the West*. At the time of the congress of 1994, the French authorities are strongly denounced for their refusal of integration and assimilation of the Moslem; the Minister of the Interior, Charles Pasqua, is denounced for *his racist security policy*.

These accusations are regularly repeated, notably through the distribution, from January 1995 onwards, of a liaison and information bulletin entitled “Jeunes Musulmans” (Young Muslims) which accuses the French state of *waging war on the most peaceful of religions*, and of infringing human rights daily by stigmatizing Muslims in France. This radicalism is also expressed during specific demonstrations: in Lyon in 1987, protesting the publication of Salman Rushdie’s *Satanic Verses* and in 1988, during a pro-Palestinian rally gathering 400 people chanting anti-Israeli slogans; in Grenoble in 1995, in support of the young high school student Shérazade Ben Larbi who was expelled from her school, where the UJM mobilized 2,000 demonstrators, during the controversy over the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in schools.

The non-exhaustive example of the UJM shows the dynamism of militant Islamist action which uses a consensus of different fundamentalist currents to inscribe the jihad in the very heart of society in the apparent respect of republican rules, a respect which is in fact very relative. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood or the Iranian Islamists, the *Tablighis’* project is confined to the religious sphere. Theoretically opposed to violent action, the religious radicalization advocated by these fundamentalists serves, however, sometimes as a passage to terrorism by abounding in the all-out proselytizing strategy of Islamism.

The goal remains to reach the greatest number of Muslims to recuperate from this target the most fragile individuals, often young delinquents in disarray ready to switch from one violence to another. The amateurism of the *modus operandi* of the terrorists illustrates the mode of recruitment which is based on mental manipulation much more than on technical combat training. The weapons of radical Islamism are human bombs, and their strategy is to increase their number tenfold by actions concentrated on a sectarian type of indoctrination.

Export of clandestine armed networks—Constitution of dormant networks: the terrorist shift

Radical Islamization in France is strongly linked to issues of external geopolitics against a background of rivalries between Arab-Muslim states. In the tangle of different terrorist networks, three major families of actors emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. The pan-Arab Marxists, whose attacks on French soil in 1982-1983 caused 13 deaths and 164 injuries, embodied Arab nationalism in the name of the Palestinian cause. The myth of the *elusive* international terrorist *Carlos*, who claimed responsibility (among other things) for these attacks in the name of the Organization of the Arab Armed Struggle, still feeds the fantasy of the magnificent hero among the “Beurs.” Other movements took action in France during the same period: the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (Asala), which claimed responsibility for the attack on Orly airport in July 1983, killing 8 people

and wounding 56 others, and members of the Lebanese armed opposition, including the former leader of the Lebanese Revolutionary Army Faction (FARL), who was responsible for the assassination of two American and Israeli diplomats in Paris in 1982. These actions remain sporadic, which does not prevent them from having an impact on the psychology of young Muslims men.

Islamist terrorism in France from 1980 to 2000 was the result of a background war orchestrated by its two other major families: state terrorism, which plunged into the intricacies of the divisions of the Arab world, where Iran played a central role, and the Algerian terrorism of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The fundamentalist movement is articulated around these two major poles, characterized by numerous bridges between networks and the adoption of complementary strategies. Thus, this period is marked by the establishment on the national soil of terrorist networks with complex ramifications that interpenetrate, link and, or un-link. The development or infiltration of Muslim structures of reception and influence, religious proselytizing, and the recruitment of future fighters, characterizes almost all of them. The common objective is to turn France into a terrorist breeding ground, a sort of army of kamikaze reservists to be used more particularly in periods of international tension.

Iran, which promotes the export of the Islamic revolution in the countries of the Middle East, while encouraging resistance to *the Western cultural invasion*, makes France above all a rear base of propaganda and recruitment, its privileged terrorist target remaining the godless governments of certain Arab states. However, this policy does not exclude the perpetration of terrorist acts on French soil, either to eliminate opponents of the Khomeini regime who have fled to France, or to put pressure on the French government in its positions in the Middle East. Thus, we find the hand of Tehran in the assassination of Chapour Bakhtiar, a refugee in France in 1979, where he led from Paris the National Resistance Movement of Iran which fights non-violently the Islamic Republic on its territory.³⁸

The release and deportation in May 2010 of one of his assassins dispatched by the Mullahs' regime, Ali Vakili Rad, who had been sentenced in 1994 by the Court of Assizes of Paris to life imprisonment, causes great concern in French political circles. Many observatories denounce an inadmissible bargaining between Paris and Tehran, the Minister of Interior sending back to his country the Iranian Ali Vakili Rad, a few hours after the release of the French student Clotilde Reiss who was detained in Iran since 2009. The Iranian will to influence French politics is also particularly sensitive and motivates its activism in the constitution of clandestine networks. In the mid-1980s, DST reports estimated that there were several dozen Iranian terrorists in the Paris region. They are most often from student circles, but there is a tendency to widen their recruitment targets, mainly young French immigrants or those who have been living in France for several years. These young people constitute the dormant networks, and their characteris-

tics and their strength lie in their apparent assimilation into our society. The Saleh Fouad affair is revealing in many ways of these Iranian maneuvers.

Fouad Ali Saleh, known as “Ali the Tunisian,” was the presumed organizer of thirteen attacks that killed 13 people and injured 303 others in Paris between December 1985 and September 1986, known as *Black September*.³⁹ The dismantling in March 1987 of this Maghreb terrorist network linked to Hezbollah illustrates the long-standing roots of its members, without any particular description: the Saleh couple were both born in Paris, he is Tunisian but his wife has French nationality; his close accomplice, Mohamed Al Mouhajer, is a naturalized French citizen by marriage, and the first five members arrested, all Tunisians, had long been working regularly in our country, as cab drivers, cooks, and merchants.

Iran clearly appears to be the instigator of such a network through the theological and military education given to Saleh Fouad and his friend Al Mouhajer during stays of three years in Qom. Thereafter, Saleh Fouad exercised activities of proselytism in the Iranian Cultural Center Jean Bart in Paris. During his hearings, he told the investigators that he had perpetrated these attacks to force the French government to change its policy towards Tehran, notably denouncing France’s support for Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran. He confirmed this during his trial by declaring: *the fortress of Islam is Iran. Your country, by helping Iraq, is fighting Iran, so it is an enemy. Our main objective is to bring France back to the raison through violent actions.*

The Saleh network, of which 18 members have been identified, is a thread of a vast web woven throughout Europe, the investigation having revealed the existence of links between this group and two other terrorist networks, one established in the Federal Republic of Germany (the Hamadei case), the other in Italy (the Khodr case).⁴⁰ Involved in 1985 in the hijacking of a TWA plane from Athens to Beirut, the Hamadei brothers are part of the Lebanese network to which holds Fouad Saleh. The investigation reveals the presence of Abbas Hamadei in Paris in December 1985 during the commission of the explosive attacks on the Printemps and Galeries Lafayette stores. The kidnapping of two German citizens in Lebanon in 1987, the day after the arrest of Mohamed Ali Hamadei, and then of four others in 1989 during the trial, marks once again the desire of the Hezbollah movement to blackmail the political authorities into releasing Mohamed and Abbas Hamadei, who were arrested in Frankfurt in possession of explosives.

During the trial, the Bonn government publicly acknowledged that it had yielded to pressure from the hostage takers. During his hearing, Chancellery Minister Wolfgang Schäuble said that German politicians *decided not to extradite* (the U.S. extradition request is mainly for Mohamed Hamadei, his brother Abbas is a German citizen by marriage) *after weighing all the risks considering the threats to the hostages, which influenced our decision.* Beyond the evidence put forward on the actions of Mohamed Ali Hamadei within the terrorist cells of Hezbollah,

it exposes the key role of this movement in the organization of attacks. Multiple hearings and confrontations show that these attacks are fomented in close collaboration with the Iranian regime, which serves as material, political, and ideological support, and Syria, which appears to be an obligatory passage for terrorists. The trial also proves the existence of the specific Lebanese network of Iranian inspiration, directed by Ali Fouad Saleh to act on the French territory. The fate of the Lebanese brothers ends up in a compromise between the kidnappers, Iran, and Syria on one side, and the FRG on the other.

This case also reveals the interweaving of actors and terrorist movements. Anecdotally, one of Saleh Fouad's lawyers is the wife of the terrorist Carlos, Isabelle Coutant-Peyre. But above all, this network reveals once again the connections between Shiite and Sunni groups, between Iran, Lebanon, and the Muslim Brotherhood: close links between Saleh have been established with Shiite agents of the Lebanese Hezbollah, the person concerned having renamed himself in Lebanon in October 1986, while the other Tunisians arrested belong to the Muslim Brotherhood movement of the MTI. Finally, the violence of Fouad Saleh's declarations during his trial in February 1990 and his Third Worldist remarks revised by the most fanatical Shiism give the full dimension of the jihad: *The West has no right to exist! The crimes you have committed for centuries justify your total annihilation!* At this stage, knowing that the interested party also attended the mosque of the movement *Foi et Pratique* of the street Jean-Pierre Timbaud in Paris (11°), one can only fear the fundamentalist contagion of a part of the Umma.

Iran works in this sense by its double action: the setting up of clandestine armed networks and its infiltration of associative structures of various tendencies and intertwined. Another rather eloquent example: the discovery in December 1986 of a large stock of arms and explosives in a box belonging to a pro-Khomeinist Lebanese national installed in France since 1969; general secretary in 1978 of the Association of Islamic Students in France (AEIF, close to the Muslim Brotherhood), then in charge in 1980 of the *Association Culturelle et Culturelle de Toulouse* in connection with the Association of Students of Strasbourg, the Association of Muslims of the Alpes Maritimes, and the GIF, all these associations being grouped together in 1987 within the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), which, let us recall, sits on the French Council of the Muslim Cult under the aegis of the Ministry of the Interior.

These various fundamentalist movements in the shadow of the big Iranian brother and under the manna of the Saudi gold represent more than 20 associations with a socio-educational vocation⁴¹ closely or remotely linked to the armed Islamist movements, those belonging to the nebulous Algerian FIS or belonging to the Tunisian movement En Nahda and its radical branch, the Tunisian Islamic Front. These organizations find a favorable echo, especially among young Algerian immigrants, often motivated by resentment of colonial history. Established first in

Ile-de-France and on the Mediterranean coast, these associations are a threat, both in terms of the organization of rear bases for the above-mentioned movements and in terms of recruitment and training activities for fundamentalist fighters. This is illustrated by the example of the attack in Marrakech in August 1994 by seven young French “Beurs” of Algerian and Moroccan origin, all of whom were members of two martial arts associations in Orléans (45) run by Islamists, or the involvement of the *Association Éducative des Musulmans de France* in Orly (94) through its leaders in an arms trafficking network dismantled in November 1994.

The story of Khaled Kelkal, a petty thug who became a member of the GIA after his Islamization in prison⁴² and his childhood friends from the Vaulx-en-Velin housing projects, is another example. It all started in the early 1980s, with the first March for Equality, the *Vaulx-en-Velin* riots, the first rodeos. A suburban gang, some of whose members slipped into delinquency before uniting around Islam and forming the Lyon operational commando responsible for the attacks in the summer of 1995, which left 8 dead and 152 injured.⁴³ A path that foreshadowed those of Mohamed Merah, Amedy Coulibaly and the Kouachi brothers: homemade jihadists, young people with a history of delinquency, almost all of whom had spent time in prison, all of whom had been de-Islamized and had become hardcore Muslims after an initiatory trip to a Middle Eastern country or to regions of war, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Their revolt is activated by international context events that feed a series of representations among young “Beurs.” For another example, some of them will leave to fight in the Balkans where the massacre of Srebrenica symbolizes the persecution of the Muslims, victims of the Serbs.

The observation of this past shows how, under the effect of contextual and structural factors, the jihadist phenomenon has progressively taken root in French society. The intensification of terrorist acts on our soil that we are experiencing today has its roots there, as does the perpetuation of a recurring parameter: jihadist networks, all tendencies combined, tend to structure themselves and to interweave around the most powerful groups. These amalgams are however shifting according to the conjuncture. Thus, the planetary spectacle of the events of September 11, 2001, revived the fighting spirit and favored the globalization of Islamist terrorism, manifested by a crescendo in attacks.

The roots of a strategy of chaos

Several interrelated factors explain the rise of jihadism in Western countries rate. The rise of groups such as al-Qaeda, and more recently, the Islamic State and Boko Haram, has been facilitated by chaotic geopolitical contexts that offer terrorist groups many opportunities for expansion. The multiplication of terrorist attacks, which have also become much more deadly, reflects this evolution. Regarding the last decades, it marks above all the affirmation of an ideology and the outcome of a jihadist strategy patiently applied in the target countries, of which France has

long been a part. The strategy of chaos, theorized by al-Qaeda executive Abu Jihad al-Masri in the text entitled *The Administration of Savagery*, published on the Internet in 2004, echoes the fanaticism of the terrorist Fouad Ali Saleh expressed 15 years earlier by his exalted declarations on the end of the West in the name of a god of vengeance. This text, which expresses a hatred of Jews, Christians, apostates, democracy, and its values, also reminds us of the killings in Toulouse and Montauban perpetrated between March 11 and March 19, 2012, by the French-Algerian Islamist terrorist Mohammed Merah, who caused the death of seven people, including three soldiers and three children from a Jewish school.

The Salafist nebula, strengthened by the success of Al Qaeda on the *American devil*, is progressing all over the world. In France, it is largely taking over from the *Tabligh* in the suburbs by sucking in fundamentalists or by fraternizing with other Islamist movements. Thus, in 2006, Ay man al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden founded a base of operations in Algeria to serve as a springboard for activities through the North African diaspora in France, where fundamentalist relay groups have been established since the 1980s and 1990s. Since that time, France has served mainly as a reservoir of jihadists fed by the various currents of a rigorous traditionalist or more radical Islamization without determining the time for the operational. The future has shown this: in May 2013, the man who stabbed a soldier in the La Défense district of Paris went through the *Tablighis* networks; in October 2014, four young Frenchmen from Lunel in the Hérault region sent to wage jihad in Syria were killed during Syrian army bombings in the city of Deir ez-Zor.

Islamist violence in France signals a new dimension of warfare that is growing, following, again and again, the curve of conflicts between Arab-Muslim states. The strategic opportunities that must be seized are the openings that the various terrorist groups create in response to the various pressures exerted by and between these states, making the battlefield somewhat fluid. France has thus long been one of the meeting places, a fallback zone but also a springboard for jihadist conquest. Terrorist groups are developing modalities of action there: exporting clandestine networks intended to fight in war zones and encouraging the individuals constituting the dormant networks to act alone on French soil, notably through suicide attacks that are intended to be particularly murderous triers.

These are the “lone wolves” in charge of knife attacks or handmade bombers. This phenomenon is not recent—let’s say it has been consolidated with the rise of jihadist forces and formalized with the organization of these forces. For example, a secret al-Qaeda document discovered by German police in 2011 that dictates to its lieutenants in Europe to target and recruit lone men and then encourage them to commit attacks in their countries of residence along the lines of the one perpetrated on July 14, 2016, in Nice.

In fact, never has our country been confronted with such a diffuse and massive jihadist phenomenon, where fanatical individuals blindly strike defenseless

targets. Faced with such an elusive threat and, the director of the CIA declared in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks: *this war will be carried out by intelligence, not by the pure projection of power. The challenge will not be to defeat the enemy militarily.* In France, the entry into force of several key measures of the intelligence law adopted in July 2015 makes up for the lack of legal framework for French intelligence and defines the modalities of action and control—authorization of special investigative techniques for the services, real-time computer surveillance, sounding of private places—and the establishment of an operational headquarters for the prevention of terrorism.

These measures seem insufficient, as the intelligence services remain overwhelmed by the pace of the attacks. The jihadist phenomenon, which is both multifaceted and hidden, is still as difficult to qualify and measure, one of the major challenges being to identify before the event a jihadist reality that thrives in the shelter of an Islamism with many variants. The reinforcement of procedures and the reorganization of intelligence services underpinned by the necessary implementation of a global strategy for the protection of the territory are reshaping the anti-terrorist system but are still struggling to stay one step ahead of the terrorists. One of the reasons for this is the weakening of human intelligence on the ground following the reform of the organization of domestic intelligence in 2008. However, territorial intelligence as practiced in the decades 1980–2000 was an indispensable forecasting tool for the knowledge of the jihadist risk.

Gathering scattered information, exposing the system, and transmitting it: the importance of proximity intelligence in the fight against terrorism

Faced with the emergence of Islamist terrorism, the first objective of domestic intelligence is to understand this new enemy. This approach led to the first national investigation launched by the DCRG in 1986: the territorial network of this service made it possible to explore the jihadist reality locally and, consequently, to establish a national diagnosis of its components, its strengths, its strategies, and factors of evolution.

The feedback from all corners of France of information obtained from the closest actors, witnesses or involved in this phenomenon, reveals the tricks set up by the Islamist militants, the which with the patience of the spider weave their web on the whole national territory. To the web woven by the radical Islamists, the DCRG opposes a counter-web aiming to thwart its deployment. In this perspective, the priorities are to identify the elements at risk, groups or individuals, and to establish a cartography of their meeting places and exchanges proselytes and, or, logistic (finances, weapons, “hideouts”). The main Islamist centers are regularly monitored and a system combining several security logics is put in place. This

system consists of detecting causal chains upstream and blocking connections and physical links between terrorist networks or channels.

A constantly updated compilation, examination and prospective analysis is carried out based on information gathered from the field. This method makes it possible to establish a picture of the terrorist threat, its origin, its actors, and its activities. The surveillance of radiated individuals who are subject to a special file ("fiches S") is of course necessary, but it represents only a tiny response to the jihadist phenomenon, which in France is based on structures grouping together hundreds, even thousands of individuals. Organizational networks that develop one after the other, sometimes overlapping or intersecting, and where moderate groups can have extremist fractions, and vice versa. In the 1990s, the ideological violence that spilled over the Internet did not alter the effectiveness of these measures, which complemented technical intelligence, which found its limits in surveillance and intervention in the field.

In addition to the application of this security approach, which consists of reducing terrorist opportunities by increasing the risks of identification and arrest for their perpetrators, this proximity intelligence is working to support mediation, accountability, rapprochement, and socialization actions carried out by Muslim leaders, local elected officials, and social actors in the micro-territories of the suburbs. Particular attention is paid to identifying the factors that are likely to encourage radicalization among young people. Parameters of evolution common to certain suburbs are listed, serving as *clues ref rents* to the proselytizing development and the installation of the Islamist presence.

These developments go through the following stages: progressive sanctuarization and communicating criminal vessels with connections between drugs and urban violence; installation of the omerta with the development of an underground economy, criminal activities legitimized by their authors, an associative drift due to mafia interests, the failure of political organizations to establish themselves (Movement of Immigration and the Suburbs, MIB, SOS-Racism, etc.); and a communal drift characterized by a break in dialogue and identity. At this last stage, the proselytizing Islamist and a militant activism tinged with delinquency appear in broad daylight.

This knowledge of the jihadist phenomenon is essentially based on the territorial capacity of intelligence, combining local investigation and national processing of information. This capacity was dismantled in 2008 by the reform of the organization of domestic intelligence. The merger of the two previous domestic services (DST and DCRG) into a Central Directorate of Domestic Intelligence (DCRI) broke up the DCRG's network system and thus eliminated the counter-strategy, "network against network," opposed to the jihadists. The reasons for this decision to reform, however, do not stem from the inefficiency of the internal intelligence methods of the time. On the contrary, they were largely due to political

discomfort in the face of the diagnostic of worsening violence and the related phenomenon of Islamization of the suburbs. “Killing the messenger” is the response of successive political leaders to the DCRG, suspected of seeking to destabilize the government(s) through overly alarmist forecasts.

The decline of the RG thus began in the early 2000s with a clear political brake on the pursuit of its investigations, particularly regarding the monitoring of sensitive neighborhoods where Islamism flourishes. This situation was publicly denounced by the head of the DCRG’s Cities and Suburbs section in these terms: *the government broke the tool because it was scary*.⁴⁴ In fact, the disgrace of the RG is reflected in their being sidelined before the final blow, which comes against a backdrop of political-police ambitions. The new head of the DGSI, a fervent opposing as early as 1986 at the initiative of the DCRG to take up the Islamist question and a fierce supporter of a research focused mainly on the identification of radical individuals, chose thereafter to leave the tool to the scrapyard. This is how the security counter-web is defeated despite its effectiveness. An efficiency that cannot exclude the necessity of a national protection strategy that must be global with the services qualified today as first rank.⁴⁵

The urgency of the situation is assessed in terms of the recent past and the near future. Given the state of socio-demographic forecasts, we cannot expect a spontaneous reversal of the trend in the years to come. *The Art of War* by the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, written two millennia ago, is very relevant today. This text bears astonishing similarities with the jihadist methods based on an indirect strategy, full of cunning, knowledge of the adversary, psychological action, of the designed to leave to the shock only the role of the coup de grace struck to a helpless and terrorized enemy. A resonance with *the horror* and *dread* expressed by the head of state on Friday, November 13, 2015, at the very moment when the terrorist attacks are underway in Paris.

The Art of War also states the vital importance of countering the enemy’s strategy: *when one tiger guards the ford, ten thousand deer cannot cross it*. But to keep the ford and to make intelligence an efficient tool of knowledge, we need to put the jihadist phenomenon back in its duration and to grasp the reality of its mutations which is its essence. A reinforcement of human intelligence close to the realities on the ground should be considered to stem the jihadist wave, knowing that the proliferation of Islamist organizations and the tangle of their activities, which are carried out on a continuous basis, require relentless surveillance of proximity.

Endnotes

- 1 Isabelle Jouandet has spent her entire career in the police force, working for the Central Director of the RG. For 25 years, she conducted investigations and wrote reports on political violence and radical Islamism, as well as on related subjects (sectarian aberrations, urban violence, etc.).
- 2 Government Site - Action against terrorism - Updated November 19, 2020. Terrorism operates on several fronts: across borders and within the country itself. The nature of the terrorist threat has changed significantly, particularly with the continuing evolution of the forms of terrorist acts. Nearly 2,000 people are, in one way or another, involved in violent religious radicalization or in jihadist recruitment networks. To ensure the security of the French people, the government has supplemented the legal arsenal and put in place an unprecedented reinforcement of resources and personnel in the police, justice, army and intelligence services. <https://www.gouvernement.fr/action/l-action-contre-le-terrorisme>
- 3 The Islamic radicalism that emerged in the wake of pan-Islamism was nourished by the failures of modern-progressive Arab nationalism. Popular Islam is the bearer of more radical forms of pan-Islamic activism, which began in Egypt in 1928 with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan Al Banna. Another center of Muslim activism was Iran, where fundamentalist activities began to develop in the 1940s. The consolidation of strong regimes in these countries led to a relative lull. Fundamentalism suddenly reappeared at the end of the 1970s, reinforced by two spectacular successes of Islamist revolutionaries: the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt.
- 4 Sayyid Qotb, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was executed in 1966 under the Nasserite regime. Considered a martyr of Islam, one of his essays published in 1964, *Signs of the Trail*, remains a founding text of reference for the Jihadists. In a break with the Muslim Brotherhood, radical Qutbist thought differentiates between those who obey the exclusive wisdom of God and those of the jāhiliya—the period of pre-Islamic ignorance—which includes not only pre-Islamic peoples, but also non-Muslims, especially in the West, and Muslim peoples who do not live entirely under the sharia.
- 5 Three generations of jihadism represented by one man. The call for “*global Islamic resistance*” is made by Abu Musab al-Suri, nicknamed “The Syrian,” known as the “architect of the global jihad.” After publishing a first book on the failure of the “Islamic revolutionary” movement in Syria, this jihadist theorist published a booklet in 1991 that foreshadowed the *Call to Global Islamic Resistance, a book that was posted on the internet in 2005*. Musab al-Suri has a slogan: “nizam la tanzim,” which means “a system, not an organization.” His career is revealing of the interpenetration of the movements of the jihadist nebula: affiliated with the Organization of the Fighting Vanguard of the Muslim Brotherhood, military training in Iraq and Syria, participation in the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan where he met Osama Bin Laden and became one of the executives of Al Qaeda (an organization from which he later distanced himself),

participation in the drafting of the Al Ansar bulletin of the Algerian Islamists. His lectures, recorded on cassettes, have toured the world, but he does not limit himself to theoretical teachings. He also gives practical courses—from close combat to handling explosives—in training camps in Afghanistan.

6 *L'Islam au défi* by Jacques Berque, Gallimard (1980).

7 Reminder of the main attacks:

- August 9, 1982: six dead and 22 wounded in the shooting of the rue des Rosiers in Paris. On Monday, August 9, 1982, at lunchtime, a shooting by an armed group broke out in Jo Goldenberg's restaurant in the heart of the Marais district. The gunmen threw a grenade into the restaurant and machine-gunned the crowd. An anti-Semitic attack never claimed. On June 17, 2015, the alleged mastermind of the attack was arrested in Jordan.

- July 15, 1983: 8 dead and 56 injured at Orly airport. Claimed by the Armenian Secret Liberation Army (Asala), this suitcase bomb attack was motivated by the non-recognition of the Armenian genocide. The suitcase, deposited by a Syrian-Armenian, exploded on the luggage conveyor belt at Orly airport.

- Between February 1985 and September 1986, thirteen terrorist attacks shook France. This series of events ended with the attack of the street of Rennes in Paris. In total, these repeated terrorist attacks caused 13 deaths and nearly 300 wounded. The wave of attacks is attributed to the Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Near Eastern Political Prisoners (CSPPA), an organization close to Hezbollah.

8 The prevention and repression of terrorism is mainly the business of a few specialized services: the *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (DST), the *Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux* (DCRG), the *Renseignements Généraux of the Préfecture de Police*, the *Division Nationale Antiterroriste of the Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire* (DNAT), and the *Bureau de Lutte Antiterroriste of the Gendarmerie Nationale* (BLAT). In terms of foreign intelligence, the DGSE is obviously directly involved in the fight against terrorism. At the end of the 1980s, a relative specialization took place. The central directorate of the judicial police, notably the DNAT, and the gendarmerie are more specialized in domestic terrorism. On the other hand, from 1986 onwards, the intelligence services and the DST, from 1982 onwards, focused on the fight against Islamist terrorism. The original mission of the DST, classical counterespionage, explains this inclination. For a long time, Islamist terrorism was mainly an external threat, whether it was the 1985-1986 attacks or later those of 1995-1996. As for general intelligence, the priority objectives have been reoriented towards the fight against terrorism, the fight against urban drift and the general observation of society to better anticipate threats. This refocusing of missions is accompanied by an ambitious reform of working methods in order to make the RG a true domestic intelligence service on a par with the DST. More decentralized than other services, the RG has developed regional centers to fight radical Islam in the 22 regions of metropolitan France. The mission of these centers is to monitor certain prayer halls and other places that are conducive to fundamentalist or fundamentalist proselytizing. Prisons have also been the subject of an

in-depth study by these services.

- 9 Placed under the authority of the Director General of the National Police, the UCLAT, created on October 8, 1984, coordinates, leads and directs the actions of the active directorates and services of the National Police and the Gendarmerie in the fight against terrorism.
- 10 The DST has seven regional directorates, distributed by military region and defense zone throughout the country, in [Lille](#), [Rennes](#), [Bordeaux](#), [Marseille](#), [Metz](#), [Lyon](#), [Tours](#), and four detachments, [Antilles-Guyana](#), [Reunion](#), [Polynesia](#), and [New Caledonia](#). The DCRG has at least one service per department, increased to one service per arrondissement for the largest districts.
- 11 On July 1, 2008, the DST merged with the DCRG to form a new directorate called the *Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur* (DCRI) and then the *Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure* (DGSJ) in 2014.
- 12 Estimating the numbers of the Umma remains difficult, as the 1978 law on information technology and freedom prohibits the mention of religious affiliation on census forms. This limits the evaluation of the number of French citizens of the Muslim faith and that of foreign populations with diverse religious allegiances whose emigration map does not necessarily overlap with that of their country of origin. On the other hand, the estimate is more accurate for foreign populations, almost all of whom profess the Muslim religion of their countries. Most of them practice Malikite Sunni Islam; a strong Algerian minority and a Tunisian core adhere to Kharidjism. Shi'ism, which is not very well represented, is divided mainly between pro and anti-Khomeinists, and includes several communities: Druze, Alawites, Ismailis, Nizarites, Baha'is, Bohoras, Khojas, etc. Some Sufi groups are reported, especially among converts.
- 13 According to the 1982 statistical census and the 1983 forecast of the Ministry of the Interior, the Muslim immigrant population is mainly made up of North Africans: Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians; Black Africans: Senegalese, Sudanese, Cameroonians; Turks; and to a lesser extent, nationals from the Near and Middle East: Iranians, Lebanese, Syrians; and Southeast Asians: Pakistanis and Comorians.
- 14 Muslims of French nationality are grouped into three main communities: Algerian repatriates or French Muslims; second-generation *beurs* (children of Algerians born in French Algeria before 1962 or on national territory after January 1, 1963); and French converts to Islam.
- 15 In particular, censuses conducted in 1990 on the major cities of France: Paris and its regions, Marseille, Lyon, and Lille.
- 16 The CFCM is an association governed by the law of 1901, placed under the aegis of the Ministry of the Interior, which has the role of representing the Muslims of France before the state authorities and of taking charge of issues related to the organization and management of their religion. the construction of mosques, the training and status of imams (9 out of 10 imams come from abroad), the institution of Muslim squares in

cemeteries, the organization and management of the market for hallal meat, the regulations around the annual sacrifice of the sheep are all questions of management of the cult that can be put to this new body.

- 17 The creation of the Muslim Institute in Paris represents the first official recognition of Islam by the French Republic. The instigator of this decision, Marshal Lyautey, had the law of August 19, 1920, voted allocating a financing credit to the Society of Habous and Holy Places of Islam presided over by the chief of protocol of the Sultan of Morocco and made up of seven active members including two representatives for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia and one representative for Senegal. At the end of decades of legal battles, the Algerian State, which ensures an important financing of the Institute, becomes the owner of the place of worship and takes the control of the managing company and of the Muslim Institute which is the depository of the religious and administrative power of the Mosque.
- 18 The Islamic World League (IWL) is a Muslim NGO founded in 1962 in Mecca by Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia in opposition to the Arab League of Nasser. The IWL has an observer status at the UN. It is a member of several world organizations, the most important of which are: the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, the International Islamic Conference, the International Council for Islamic Assistance and Preaching, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. There are other inter-Islamic organizations that intersect and compete around the world. The most important of them are located in Saudi Arabia: The League of the Muslim World in Mecca, the World Organization of Islamic Science in Riyadh, the World Federation of International Arab Islamic Schools in Jeddah. Founder of the main international leagues, Saudi Arabia is in direct competition with other organizations of the same type sponsored by States such as Libya (League of Islamic Call).
- 19 Issam al-Attar, second supreme guide of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, symbol of the resistance to President Hafez al-Assad.
- 20 French branch of the "Congress," founded in Tripoli in December 1977 during the summit of the firmness organized by the Libyan government, which brings together representatives of Libya, Syria, Algeria, Iraq, South Yemen, and the PLO to decide on the constitution of a unified Front, called "Front of the firmness," and the freezing of their relations with Egypt.
- 21 Repeal of the decree-law of April 12, 1939 (or title IV of the 1901 law) including a special regulation for the constitution of foreign associations subject to a prior authorization of the Minister of the Interior, authorization that can be withdrawn at any time by decree.
- 22 This number only concerns cultural and religious associations. Muslim associations with a corporatist character which can also manage places of worship are not considered.
- 23 The main cases of funding from foreign states come either from the countries of origin

of the faithful (Algeria and Morocco for the most part), or from Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf States.

- 24 According to 2015 data from the Ministry of the Interior and Cults, there are **2,450** mosques “*mostly located in large population areas and mostly in the Paris region (459 mosques), then in the Lyon region (319) and around Marseille (218).*”
- 25 *Tabligh* is a transnational mass preaching movement born in India in 1927. Its founder Muhammad Ilyas advocated a pure individual practice close to the life of the Prophet and a strictly literal interpretation of the Koran around six founding principles: belief in Allah, the only God, prayer duties, profession of faith, knowledge of God, personal devotion to others and preaching. Spreading in India and Pakistan, it became the most widespread of the Islamist movements at the end of the 1960s. It was then exported to the West and set up its base in the United Kingdom, the former colonizer, where today half of the mosques are run by the *Tablighis*.
- 26 These books are on sale at the bookshop of the *Groupement Islamique de France* (GIF) in Paris (11^e) which also publishes two episodic bulletins, *El Hakika* and *El Rissalat*.
- 27 Among the publications most widely distributed in France through the Iranian embassies in Paris and Geneva: *Le Message de l'islam*, a cultural, political, and general information magazine published by the Islamic Thought Foundation in Tehran, is widely distributed in places of worship. A monthly magazine for young people, presented in the form of comic strips, is distributed mainly in the universities of Bouches-du-Rhône. Also from Iran, the fundamentalist publication *Islam Cagrisi*, produced in Turkish, is sent to Turkish cultural associations. From Qom, the magazine *The Roots of Religion*, and from Beirut the brochure of the Muslim People's Movement of Iraq.
- 28 From Libya, the main publications are the cultural and Islamic magazine *Rissalat Al Jihad* published by the Association of the Islamic Appeal as well as two Arabic-language dailies, *La Marche Verte* and *La République*. A bilingual magazine (Arabic–French), *Al Mottamar*, is distributed by the association of the same name close to the Representation of the Arab People's Congress, which is based in the 13th arrondissement of Paris; its director of publication is a journalist correspondent of the Libyan radio station Saout Al Arab.
- 29 Author Gilles Kepel writes of the Sheikh's fame: “In the last years of Anwar Sadat's presidency, it was impossible to walk through the streets of Cairo without hearing Kishk's stentorian voice. If one got into a shared cab, the driver would listen to one of the sermons recorded by Sheikh Kishk. Kishk was heard in Cairo, Casablanca, and the entire North African area of Marseille. A magazine financed by the Saudis had nicknamed him the “star of Islamic preachers ... With his incomparable vocal cords, his panoramic Muslim culture, his phenomenal capacities of improvisation and his acerbic humor dedicated to the criticism of infidel regimes, military dictatorships, the Camp David agreements with Israel or the complicity of al-Azhar...” So great was his fame, that the Ministry of Waqf had to build several annexes to the mosque to accommodate the

crowd on Fridays. In 1981, however, even these shelters proved insufficient to accommodate the approximately 10,000 people who regularly came to hear him.

- 30 As of 26/02/1987, the Averroes Foundation for Scientific Research (FARS), located in Paris (10°), whose president is the secretary general of the GIF, and the S.A. Vegapress (Paris 1°) manage the operation of this Minitel service.
- 31 Journal Le Monde of 09/01/2015, Tribune by sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar: “*Radicalized youth who dream of themselves as negative heroes.*”
- 32 Established in the mosque of Omar Ibu el Khtah (11°), the association *Foi et Pratique* also manages the mosque of Ali (9°), the mosque of Abou-Bakr (11°), and places of prayer in Seine Saint Denis and in the Yvelines.
- 33 The founder of *Foi et Pratique*, Imam Mohammed Hammami, was expelled in February 2012, because of his anti-Semitic preaching. In 1986, the association *Foi et Pratique* directly controls 20 places of worship. We observe a pro Khomeinist radicalization of the person in charge of the mosque of Omar (headquarters of the association) and members of the castle of Villemain (77) as well as sections of Colmar, Lyon, Perpignan, and Mulhouse.
- 34 Imam Erbakan whose political party, the Refah Partisi, advocates a return to Islam according to a doctrine close to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. His electoral successes in Turkey (1994) have an exemplary value within the Turkish youth of COJEP. In France, the TNUIF has a highly structured network of associations, with some twenty associations located mainly in Alsace-Lorraine and federated within COJEP.
- 35 Report established by the “Urban Violence” section of the DCRG. The neighborhoods most at risk are those already affected by a process of ghettoization (departure of native French citizens, multiplication of associations with ethnic or religious connotations), particularly those located in the Lyon area and in Toulouse, Lille, Orleans, Nantes, Saint-Etienne, La Courneuve, and Nanterre.
- 36 Many local elected officials, social workers, and association leaders testify to the failure of the aid provided (allocation of credits, rooms, organization of activities, trips, etc.), which are scuttled by young extremists.
- 37 For this assessment, only actions targeting the symbols of the French Nation (the flag, the military, the war memorials, the Marseillaise, the French people) were considered and not actions targeting the institutions of the State (national education, the police, etc.).
- 38 On July 18, 1980, Chapour Bakhtiar escaped an assassination attempt at his home in Neuilly-sur-Seine, which cost the lives of a neighbor and a policeman, and seriously injured another. Anis Naccache was sentenced to life imprisonment for this attempt, before being released and deported in July 1990. Eleven years later (August 6, 1991), Bakhtiar and his secretary were stabbed and then had their throats slit with a knife by three assassins dispatched by the mullah’s regime to his home in Suresnes. Nine men

are suspected of being involved in this operation, including the alleged organizer, the advisor to the Iranian Minister of Telecommunications. One of the arrested assassins, Ali Vakili Rad, was sentenced in 1994 by the Paris Court of Assizes to life imprisonment with an incompressible security period of 18 years. During his trial, he admitted to having been sent by the Iranian government to kill Chapour Bakhtiar. Ali Vakili Rad will be released on May 18, 2010, and sent back to Iran, a few hours after the release by Iran of the French student Clotilde Reiss.

39 The attack of the street of Rennes perpetrated on September 17, 1986, in front of the store Tati in the 6th district of Paris, makes 7 dead and 55 wounded. It was the last and most deadly of a series of thirteen attacks that began in February 1985 and left thirteen dead and nearly 300 injured: explosion of a bomb at the Marks & Spencer store on Boulevard Haussmann (1 dead and 14 injured, February 23, 1985), two explosions in the basement of the Galeries Lafayette and on the first floor of the Printemps Haussmann (43 injured, December 7, 1985), an explosion on the first floor of the Claridge hotel shopping mall on the Champs-Élysées (1 dead, February 3, 1986), an explosion in the basement of the Gibert-Jeune bookstore, place Saint-Michel (5 injured, February 4, 1986), explosion in the Fnac-Sport store in the Forum des Halles (22 injured, February 5, 1986), an explosion in the Point Show gallery on the Champs-Élysées (2 dead and 29 injured, March 20, 1986), an explosion in the cafeteria of the Casino store in the Les Quatre Temps shopping center in La Défense (54 injured, September 12, 1986) http://dictionnaire.sensagent.leparisien.fr/Attentat_de_la_rue_de_Rennes/fr-fr/-cite_note-3 .

40 The brothers Mohamed Ali and Abbas Hamadei were involved in 1985 in the hijacking of a TWA plane to Beirut during which a passenger was coldly shot by the hijackers. The arrest of Mohamed Ali Hamadei, in Frankfurt on January 13, 1987, came the day after the arrest at Milan airport of another Lebanese, Bachir El-Khodr, found in possession of 10 kilograms of plastic. The West German police discovered on January 28, near Beckingen, in Saarland, a cache containing about twenty liters of methyl nitrate, a high-powered liquid explosive. The cache was indicated to investigators by Abbas Hamadei, who was arrested on January 26 at Frankfurt airport.

41 According to the DCRG census in March 1995.

42 A small-time thug from Vaulx-en-Velin, sentenced in 1991 to four years in prison for complicity in ram car robberies, Khaled Kelkal met Islamist clerics during his sentence; he learned Arabic and became radicalized, joining the ranks of the GIA.

43 On July 11, 1995, Khaled Kelkal was involved in the assassination of Imam Sahraoui, one of the founding members of the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) in disagreement with the GIA, and of his assistant, at the Khalid ibn al-Walid Mosque, rue Myrha in Paris (18^e). On July 15, 1995, Kelkal participated in a shooting against gendarmes in Bron with his friend Karim Koussa. On July 25, 1995, he was involved with Boualem Bensaïd in the group that planted a bomb at the Saint-Michel-Notre-Dame station on line B of the Parisian RER; this attack left eight people dead and 117 injured. On August

17, 1995, he was involved in another attack at Place de l'Etoile in Paris, where a bomb injured 17 people. On August 26, 1995, he was involved in the attempted attack against the Paris-Lyon TGV line. Despite being hunted down, Khaled Kelkal managed to carry out two more attacks: on September 3, 1995, a defective bomb exploded in the Richard Lenoir market in the 11th district of Paris, injuring 4 people; on September 7, 1995, a bomb placed in a car parked in front of a Jewish school in Villeurbanne injured 14 people. On September 29, 1995, Khaled Kelkal was shot dead by the police in Vaugneray near Lyon.

44 In *Le Figaro* of February 1, 2002, the former commissioner of the RG, Lucienne Bui Trong, who created the “Ville et Banlieues” section, declared on this subject: *“Everything changed in January 2000. Everything confirmed the overall deterioration in the housing estates (...) this information was not politically correct (...) The forecasting tool that some people are now calling for does exist, but they prefer to put it in the closet (...) those who are now calling for more transparency are the very ones who did everything possible to hide the reality.”*

45 Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure (DGSE), Direction du renseignement militaire (DRM), Direction de la protection et de la sécurité de la défense (DPSD), Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (DGSI), Direction nationale du renseignement et des enquêtes douanières (DNRED), and cellule de traitement du renseignement et d'action contre les circuits financiers clandestins (TRACFIN). France continues to rely on the Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Antiterroriste (UCLAT) created in 1984 to ensure operational coordination within the national police force, on a National Intelligence Coordinator established in 2008 and placed under the President of the Republic, and on an Operational Staff for the Prevention of Terrorism (EMOPT) created in June 2015 within the Ministry of the Interior. Since January 1, 2020, the UCLAT has been attached to the director general of internal security and the EMOPT has been integrated into the UCLAT since June 2018.

Is the Military Operational Decision Making Approach Applicable to Managing the Covid-19 Crisis?

Joël Prieur

ABSTRACT

Drawing from his dual experience in the army and in fire departments - which are also major actors of the French medical emergency services - General Joël Prieur attests to the success of military methods in the field of civil defense. Observing the current (mis) management of the COVID-19 pandemic, he considers their extension into the wider health services. According to him, the state's «silo» organizational model is not well suited to deal with crises, defined by urgency and uncertainty, and neither is its traditional method of decision-making process focused on expert consultations and functional lead meetings. He suggests public administration, in particular health agencies, could benefit from the military model, based on an efficient organization in emergency operational centres (EOC) and a proven operational decision-making process (MDMP). This model could restore the state's agility and efficacy that it currently lacks in times of major crises, as recently pointed out by General Lizurey, former director of the Gendarmerie in his report to the Prime Minister four months after the beginning of Covid crisis.

Keywords: Crisis management, Decision making process, MDMP, COVID-19, Inter-ministerial action

¿El enfoque de toma de decisiones operativas militares es aplicable a la gestión de la crisis de COVID-19?

RESUMEN

Basándose en su doble experiencia en el ejército y en los departamentos de bomberos, que también son actores importantes de los servicios de emergencia médica franceses, el general Joël Prieur da fe del éxito de los métodos militares en el campo de la protección civil. Al observar la (mala) gestión actual de la pandemia de COVID-19, considera su extensión a los servicios de salud más am-

plios. Según él, el modelo organizativo de “silo” del estado no es adecuado para hacer frente a las crisis, definidas por la urgencia y la incertidumbre, y tampoco lo es su método tradicional de proceso de toma de decisiones centrado en consultas de expertos y reuniones de líderes funcionales. Sugiere que la administración pública, en particular las agencias de salud, podrían beneficiarse del modelo militar, basado en una organización eficiente en centros operativos de emergencia (EOC) y un proceso de toma de decisiones operativas (MDMP) probado. Este modelo podría devolverle al Estado la agilidad y eficacia que actualmente le falta en tiempos de grandes crisis, como señaló recientemente el general Lizurey, exdirector de la Gendarmería en su informe al presidente del Gobierno a cuatro meses del inicio de la crisis del Covid.

Palabras clave: Gestión de crisis, Proceso de toma de decisiones, MDMP, COVID-19, Actuación interministerial

军事行动决策方法是否适用于管理2019冠状病毒病危机？

摘要

凭借在军队和消防部门（这也是法国医疗急救服务的重要行动者）的双重经验，Joël Prieur将军证明了军事方法在民防领域的成功应用。通过观察当前对2019冠状病毒病（COVID-19）大流行的（错误）管理，他考虑将其扩展到更广泛的卫生服务。他认为，国家的“单一”组织模式不太适合应对由紧迫性和不确定性定义的危机，同样不适合的是其传统的决策过程方法，后者聚焦于专家咨询和职能领导会议。他暗示，公共行政部门（特别是卫生机构）能从军事模式中受益，该模式基于应急行动中心（EOC）的高效组织和经过验证的行动决策过程（MDMP）。正如国家宪兵署前署长Lizurey将军在COVID危机开始四个月后向总理提交的报告中指出的那样，这种模式能恢复国家目前在重大危机时期所缺乏的敏捷性和效力。

关键词：危机管理，决策过程，MDMP，2019冠状病毒病，部际行动

Introduction

The endless pandemic of the coronavirus shows to what extent decisions at the highest level are complex when a “real crisis” occurs, one of those that the French Society of Disaster Medicine (SFMC) qualifies as a catastrophic accident with major effect (ACEM). The COVID-19 pandemic corresponds indeed to this concept of major crisis defined by Professor R. Favre as “*a destructive and brutal reversal of the pre-established order of a natural or human group*”.

Decisions at the level of a Head of State are taken in conditions made terribly uncomfortable by the lightning scope of the phenomenon and the mysterious and evolving nature of the virus, and are worked out in restricted circles of ministerial advisers, after consultation with scientific experts from the competent units (no less than 8 in France). Shaped by centuries of centralism, our presidential political system leads to a strong personalization of power and in turn induces high expectations from the population, which rarely feels compassion for the ultimate decision-maker, a human being, a mere mortal, who has to act under sometimes inhuman conditions. However, even more than in the personality or intrinsic qualities of the leader, it is in the organizational model of the technostructure that surrounds him that we must look for the deep causes of adaptation or maladjustment of the decision-making process to major crisis situations.

1 - The limits of the “functional” model in times of major crisis

In the functional organization model, which is still largely dominant in all the world’s administrations, each department (or ministry) works on its own field. It is a vertical and thematic organization, built in organ pipes, where the synthesis of the strategic level is the sole responsibility of the authority placed above the pipes: a head of state or government, or even a minister. This person, even if well surrounded, knows that he or she will ultimately have to take responsibility for decisions, which is why we will refer to him or her here as “the leader”, regardless of his or her official title, whether civilian or military. The functioning of this strategic decision-making level is often opaque¹, whereas the administrations that are subordinate to them at least have the merit of publishing their organizational charts. Each function (ministry) is a more or less closed world, jealous of its prerogatives, which is why this model is often described as a “silo” organisation.

- Advantages of the functional model: In normal times (“peacetime”) the advantages of this model (its solidity, its reassuring specialization by “trades”, etc.) outweigh all others. This is particularly true in the departmental organization.

¹ “The essence of the ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer, and sometimes even to the decision-maker. Allison GT, Zelikow PD. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd edn, New York, Longman, 1999.

- Disadvantages of the functional model: In times of crisis (“wartime”), this model does not stand up well to the pressure of urgency and uncertainty, which the military calls the “fog of war”. When the crisis reaches a certain threshold of severity and complexity, the decision-making exercise becomes superhuman, and no brain, whatever its cognitive and psychic capacities, can manage the avalanche of informations and emotions that overwhelm the decision-maker in a crisis situation. This leads to avoidance strategies, wasted time, failures, aberrant decisions and mishaps. Added to this is the difficulty of coordinating verticalities, due to the reluctance of silos to work in synergy. To get an idea of the dysfunctions of a functional governmental model in a major crisis situation, the reader can refer to the report of the audit commissioned at the end of March 2020 by the French Prime Minister, who was anxious to quickly learn the lessons of the real health “blitzkrieg” he had just undergone (Lizurey report², available on the internet). Another disadvantage of the functional system is its bureaucratic rigidity, which can be a demotivating factor, by weakening zeal and sometimes discipline, especially at the lower levels. This phenomenon can be summarized as follows: *“I do what I can with what I have (obligation of means). After all, the solution is the boss’s problem (obligation of results)”*.

There is, however, an alternative example of strategic decision-making that overcomes the cumbersome “silo” functioning of the administrative organisation, optimises the classic process of the directorial round table (“1 chief + his advisors”), and above all avoids the risk of exhaustion that threatens the decision-maker when the crisis starts to last. Inspired by the military, this model is based on an original organization ³(the CO) and on a specific method of elaborating operational decisions ⁴(the MDMP).

2 - In times of crisis, the operational centre stands between the chief and the silos

The EOC is an organization with variable geometry (from 6 to 60 people), permanent or temporary, but whose organizational and operational principles remain identical, whatever the nature of the crisis, which gives it a certain universality⁵.

2 Report of the mission on the quality control of health crisis management. Prepared by Richard Lizurey, Army General recalled to active duty, with the support of Amélie Puccinelli, Inspector of Administration-June 2020.

3 Emergency Operational Center (EOC) for English-speaking readers

4 Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)

5 In 2010, during the major earthquake that devastated the island of Haiti (280,000 dead - 300,000 wounded - 1.3 million homeless), the heads of international relief columns or NGOs with a military culture had no difficulty in blending into the American command system inspired by the NATO model used in Western armies.

The cells of an EOC are formatted and specialized to answer 4 main questions, those which precisely assail any decision-maker when he is confronted with a major disaster situation, namely :

1. What is it about? What am I facing (nature/gravity)?
2. What can i do? What are the possible solutions?
3. Can I afford it? With whom? with what? how?
4. And then? What effects? what consequences?

This results in the following flowchart, which is used as a basis in all military-type EOCs and derivatives.




Figure 1: Basic organization of a EOC around a leader who coordinates the cells to answer the 4 fundamental questions of the MDMP (BSPP Model)

The different cell leaders composing a EOC are not representatives of a function (a silo). Their purpose is to relieve the brain of their leader (the “general”) by taking on each of the 4 fundamental questions (Figure 1). They are answer givers, not advisors. It is then up to them to train their teams, with advisors and experts as a second line. They act and interact with each other under the guidance of a EOC leader, who coordinates the work of the cells, organizes, enforces the method, and sets the pace.

To dare to use a medical metaphor in front of my friends at the SFMC, it is nothing less than a kind of encephalization of the staff. Just as a brain functions in an immediate way on certain specialized cervical areas, permanently interconnected and devoted to the search for an effect to produce, the EOC acts in the same way. It is in this delegation of the cognitive mechanisms of decision making that the EOC model breaks with the “directorial table” model.

When the crisis occurs, the EOC is activated and it stands between the “chief” and the rest of the functional structure (the silos). At the same time, each silo sets up a mirror structure to facilitate the conduct of crisis management through better understanding and the introduction of a shared culture.

However, this more agile organization can only work with strict work rules.

3 - The method of reasoning guarantees the effectiveness of the decision-making process (MDMP)

The EOC cells work in a formal and methodical way according to the 3 phases of MDMP :

1. **Analysis:** The purpose of this phase is to provide information on all the known elements that characterize the phenomenon generating the crisis, and to deduce the consequences. It also establishes the list of basic actions to be carried out as a precautionary measure (“reflex” measures). This phase covers the general framework of the action, the mission, the study of unfavourable and favourable factors. This analysis phase ends with an initial summary which, after evaluation of the factors studied, makes it possible at this stage to determine a “**major effect**”⁶ to be achieved.
 2. **The study of possibilities:** This phase aims to develop and propose operational solutions. The EOC must imagine 2 or 3 modes of action that meet the major effect, respecting the constraints identified in the previous phase. The comparison of these modes of action (advantages - disadvantages - risks) is carried out in the presence of the general.
 3. **The decision:** This last stage of the process aims to choose the most appropriate course of action, adjusting it if necessary. This crucial phase leads to a final plenary meeting, in the presence of the general, who has all the information at his disposal and who decides (sometimes in front of all the EOC cell leaders).
- Advantages: taught in practically all war schools in the Western world, the effective EOC/MDMP model is, to our knowledge, the only one capable of dealing with the constraints of uncertainty and urgency that characterize the management of a major crisis, because it forces us to stick to the four fundamental questions (see above). It is a solid model, which holds up in the storm. The effectiveness of the analysis phase, which is broad and deep, is unanimously recognized. During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic,

6 Contrary to popular belief, the military method places more emphasis on the spirit of orders than on their application to the letter. The fact that the “major effect” is known right down to the lower echelons thus makes it possible to avoid a blind and bureaucratic application of orders. In the army, the obligation of result takes precedence over the obligation of means.

and if the crisis management had applied the MDMP, the systematic review of the available resources, including those outside the Ministry of Health (Army Health Service, fire and rescue services, private medical sector, large groups managing old people's homes, first aid associations, etc.) would probably have allowed for a better coordination of all the available resources, and it would have decided on effective protective measures more quickly. The intellectual discipline of MDMP's decision-making process would then have allowed for operational solutions free of bias. Indeed, since the EOC cell chiefs are not representatives of a function, they are freer to explore avenues that would have been more or less censored, or even biased, by functional managers, who are more concerned with their own houses than with the general interest. For example, the decision to sideline the private hospital sector during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic (4,000 reanimation beds according to the President of the Confederation of French Medical Unions) should have been argued. However, the rigour of the process does not restrict the imagination, the brainstorming of the EOC often reveals fertile personalities, and "out of the box" solutions are not rare. Finally, we will give credit to this model for its subsidiarity, especially when it comes to taking action, to which we will return later. While this cardinal principle is commonly claimed by the ministerial organisation, it is interpreted differently in the military model, which, as we have seen, thinks in terms of "effects to be achieved", where the spirit prevails over the letter. This principle of subsidiarity transfers responsibility for implementation to the actors on the ground, while ensuring that they are given a certain amount of freedom of action, but always in accordance with the famous triptych dear to the military: "one leader - one mission - one means".

- **Disadvantages:** unsustainable over the long term, this model is immediately opposed to the highly thematic organization charts of the silos, whose managers are reluctant to be demoted to the second line in the decision-making process. Its implementation therefore requires a strong will on the part of the chief, but also a selection and a specific (and restrictive) training of the heads of cells. As a result, and with the exception of the armed forces and certain "operational" services (fire and rescue services, civil defence, gendarmerie, etc.), this alternative model is unknown to senior civil servants in France, and is therefore absent from their training at the École Nationale d'Administration. To be honest, the formalism inherent in military culture sometimes overburdens this reasoning process, which claims to be agile, and the strong discipline that reigns in a EOC can appear unbearable to the uninitiated. Teamwork at full speed excludes individualistic behaviour and is not without effects on the psyche. Unlike the advisors on the tour de table, who are concerned but not necessarily involved, the officers of a EOC never evolve "in a comfort zone", especially the cell leaders when they go through the big oral presentation. They

are under a lot of pressure, which means that they have to be relieved, and therefore double the teams.

4- The implementation of orders, a crucial step in the process

In the Army as elsewhere, once the decision has been made, the first difficulty in taking action is that of mediation between the EOC and the functional verticalities of the silos. This crucial step in the process is the responsibility of the EOC chief, whose orders constitute the staff' output. There are two types of orders:

- “orders to...” addressed to each of the functional managers. They are the expression of the decisions of the highest level (context, idea of manoeuvre, effects to be obtained, distribution of missions, objectives to be achieved, etc.). The major effect, the central element of the MDMP, is explicitly described under the heading “intention”, according to the famous formula *“in order to..., I want...for that...”*, a real bravura piece of the officers' competition. Here is an example (which will remind the reader of one of the first polemics on the question of surgical masks): *“in order to limit the circulation of the virus by saliva projection, I want to make up for the insufficiency of strategic stocks of masks, for that purpose, I temporarily encourage the generalization of all circumstantial or improvised solutions covering nose and mouth”*. This clarification of the major effect to be produced in the orders thus consecrates the primacy of the spirit over the letter. These operational orders are called upon to follow one another in time⁷ as much as necessary and at each important change of situation, which gives rise each time to a restart of the process;
- the “orders of...” These are drawn up by the heads of each of the silos, who, as we have seen, are required to organize “mirror” interfaces at their levels to implement the top decisions in accordance with the principles of the MDMP and the EOC organization.

The triptych “**leader - mission - means**”, on which the military bases the effectiveness of the implementation of orders, is often mocked from the outside for its extreme simplicity (its “simplism”), which would naively lead one to believe that the combination of these three factors would be sufficient to ensure the success of an action. I will not comment on this judgment, but I would like to point out that this triptych has its equivalent in the business world, under the name of management by project⁸. I have often taken part in crisis meetings in ministerial or interministerial training, and I have always been struck by the lack of interest in the question of “how”, which is precisely the question to which the “Means/Resources” unit of the EOC must respond. In France, the answer to this question

⁷ Operation Orders (or OPOs in NATO jargon).

⁸ Delisle L. The organizational and functional structures of firms. (November 13, 2013). Bachelor's degree program in Organizational Sciences. Université Paris-Dauphine.

is too often to pass on the responsibility for implementing orders without always questioning the feasibility of the decisions taken at the meeting. In France, it is agreed that the will of the executive should be communicated to the competent administrations, where “*everyone knows what to do*”, and from where the solution on the ground will flow. In times of crisis, and given the degree of thickness and complexity that our bureaucracy has now reached, I would argue that this way of looking at taking action is, quite simply, magical thinking.

Inspired by the three famous principles of warfare decreed by Marshal Foch (“*economy of means - concentration of efforts - freedom of action*”), who knew a lot about desperate situations, the military model does indeed push for simplification, and it is destructive of complexity. But the latter may have another explanation, relating to the degree of personal involvement of those responsible for implementing orders. Indeed, the triptych “one leader - one mission - one means” severely exposes the leaders responsible for their application⁹. The judicialization of the exercise of responsibilities has come to the fore, and it is indicative of the Administration’s appetite for complexity. In 2019, France broke a record for normative production with a volume of consolidated law in force amounting to some 84,619 legislative articles and 233,048 regulatory articles. This normative profusion makes it increasingly difficult to identify “*who does what*” by introducing confusion into the silo and diluting responsibilities.

5 - Is the MDMP model exportable outside the military world?

No one knows exactly who invented MDMP¹⁰, today taught in all western armies, but this method has long since crossed the borders of the military world. Logically, the civil defence world was the first to be interested in it. The MDMP and the organization in EOC have been taught for thirty years to senior officers of civilian fire brigades at the National School of Fire Brigade Officers (ENSOSP) in Aix-en-Provence, which has been able to adapt this tool with intelligence, by ridding it of all its military heaviness. The command of the Paris Fire Brigade (BSPP), the third largest fire brigade in the world and the main public ambulance service in the capital, of course operates on this model. Its actions include participation in fast-moving crises, as for the wave of “mass shooting” type terrorist attacks that plunged our country into mourning in 2015¹¹. Since then, the MDMP has

9 J. Prieur . Criminal liability in civil security. *Inflexions* 2010/3 (n°15)

10 However, military history buffs know that this method was developed by the Prussian general staff in the middle of the 19th century. Aware that the great pre-established plans do not resist beyond the first days of war, the Germans have always preferred the initiative to planning, and the “major effect” to fussy orders. This was particularly successful for them later on (wars against Austria in 1866, against France in 1870, at the beginning of the 1st and 2nd world wars etc.). In spite of its superiority, the American army tested its effectiveness at its expense in 1944-1945. It in turn adopted this method of reasoning (MDMP) and then imposed it on NATO.

11 On the evening of the multiple and simultaneous attacks of November 13, 2015, which plunged

gradually penetrated the walls of hospitals (at least those with emergency services), where it now appears in the training courses of the Directors of Medical Rescue (DSM) and in some SAMUs, without the Ministry of Health ever having expressed the wish to do so, nor ever having imagined its application for its own ministerial¹² crisis unit.

The interest of this method has also attracted the attention of certain large private companies, at least those familiar with risk. Let's mention here the case of Electricité de France (EDF), which has put its trust in the military model for the management of crises that regularly occur on its distribution network (storms, technological accidents, collapses etc.). Producing 80% of its electricity from one of the largest nuclear power plants in the world, perhaps EDF has also come to this conclusion in view of the catastrophic crisis management of the major accident at Chernobyl in 1986?

How can we not mention in passing the fascinating experiment that the FMCS has been conducting for two years in Romania. Its government, still very much marked by a strong planning culture and a bureaucracy inherited from the communist period was at the same time anxious to give back agility to its emergency chain. Romania asked our honourable learned society to organise, in three weeks, the training in MDMP and EOC of senior fire brigade officers commanding emergency operations (COS) and medical directors of emergency medical services (DSM), while opening up to inter-service collaboration (police, gendarmerie, NGOs, etc.). The "thinking outside the box" of the French method and its holistic vision of crisis management always surprise our trainees at first, but the intellectual conversion is made very quickly, by dint of concrete exercises (in classrooms) and situational exercises (on the field).

However, it should be recognized that, in our country, this model is not easily exported beyond the Ministries of the Army and the Interior. It is regrettable that the Ministry of Health is not included in this category. For the moment confined to the world of the "operational", the application of the MDMP and the organization in EOC would in fact impose the return to school of a few experienced senior civil servants, probably not very enthusiastic about the prospect of questioning themselves after reaching the top of the hierarchy (a common occurrence in the army).

However, a hope appeared ten years ago, which proves that the question of the applicability of the MDMP to the senior civil service was once raised at the highest level of the State. During the feedback from the 2009 health crisis known

Paris into horror, the first situation analysis produced by the BSPP CO was carried out 30 minutes after the first explosion. For at least 3 hours, the OC of the Paris fire brigade was the only one to usefully inform the entire state apparatus...

12 Cf. the Lizurey Report's comments on the Ministry of Health and Solidarity's Health Crisis Centre (CCS) during the first phase of the Covid 19 crisis.

as “H1N1”, a sort of dress rehearsal for the one that is sweeping the world today, the French government, aware of its weaknesses in terms of crisis management and the lack of synergy between its “silos”, set up the Inter-ministerial Crisis Centre (CIC), which was presented as the State’s highest decision-making body. The CIC was inspired by the EOC military model, whose architecture it clearly took over, with the notable exception, at least until March 2020, of the “Means/Resources” cell (see explanations above). When the Covid crisis broke out in January 2020, the absence of a head of the EOC forced the Prime Minister’s chief of staff to coordinate the cells himself, almost full-time, throughout the first wave of contamination, when he probably had other things to do with the Head of Government. Moreover, this half-hearted EOC never applied the MDMP, due to the lack of senior officials trained in the method, and its staff worked at the limits of physical and psychological exhaustion. It is a pity that this body, although placed between the Head of State and the ministerial organ pipes, has not been able to find its feet, due to a lack of preparation and political will, as it should logically have been at the centre of the governmental decision-making process for crisis management (cf. Lizurey report¹³).

In conclusion, a brief review of organizational models

Organizational science defines social systems built to achieve a certain type of objective, which implies a formal goal, a division of tasks, organizational charts, a set of rules for evaluating activity, and of course a decision-making mechanism. The latter is largely determined by the very architecture of the structure in which it is embedded. Indeed, the formal framework in which the decision-maker evolves obliges him to deal with the solutions proposed by the advisors. Choosing them is a test, and adapting them to the field always poses a problem of implementation, especially when the event is new, brutal and complex.

In the functional organization model, which still prevails in the ministerial world, each department (or function) works on its own area. The synthesis is done at the level of the chief, who is also the decision-maker. In this vertical model, decision-making remains a personal responsibility and is rarely collegial. This construction is organized as a pyramid and is highly hierarchical. However, nothing is simple: time is not the same from one function to another, the different levels of the structure do not always correspond to each other, and the resources of the silo remain under the responsibility of the functional leader, who is often the only one to know them, which gives him a certain assurance when he is called to the management table. Whatever the disadvantages, we will nevertheless recognize a

13 “An insufficiently interdepartmental CIC, which did not allow for the involvement of other key players in crisis management... The superposition of structures with similar roles / blurred and partially overlapping jurisdictional boundaries, made the sharing and circulation of information for crisis management more complex.” etc...

certain effectiveness of the functional model in the event of a major crisis, because it at least respects the place and the role of the leader. But there is worse...

To compensate for the rigidity of this hierarchical model, the business world invented, in the libertarian wave of the 1960s, the matrix organization¹⁴. This consists in adding horizontal layers of responsibility to the verticality of the classic functional model, for the sake of transversality and flexibility. Applicable in the competitive sector, this system is based on an internal functioning of a precision worthy of watchmaking, and knows only one absolute limit: that of the income statement. As these tyrannies do not exist in the Administration, the transcription of the matrix model in the State services proves to be of mediocre performance. In the public sector, the matrix organization chart most often degenerates into a “noodle dish” organization. However, it is this matrix model that is at work in the organization of public health in France, which strives to cross vertical chains (central administration, regional health agencies, etc.) and horizontal chains (social security, local authorities, etc.). In case of a major crisis, the matrix organization becomes a real misfortune, and the Covid health crisis, at least in the first months, offers a striking example. The adoption of this disastrous model is certainly also explained by the importance of the legal risk¹⁵, because the matrix organization, as we have seen, has an appreciable advantage, that of making it almost impossible to identify responsibilities and to keep the judge at a safe distance.

14 Delisle L. Les structures organisationnelles et fonctionnelles des entreprises - Organisation matricielle et impact sur les projets.

15 The contaminated blood crisis, a political and financial scandal that affected several countries in the 1980s and 1990s, probably accelerated the phenomenon (the “responsible but not guilty” attitude).




Figure 2: “Noodle” organization of the public health system in France in 2020

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Intelligence and Analytical Approaches for the Crime-Gang-Terrorism Nexus

John P. Sullivan and Nathan P. Jones

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the range of intelligence challenges and approaches to addressing the cross-cutting issues of crime, gangs, and terrorism. These approaches include fusion centers, terrorism early warning, and analysis/synthesis approaches. Tools potentially included within these approaches include red teaming, transaction analysis, intelligence preparation for operations (IPO), social network analysis (SNA), as well as automated open-source early warning tools and datasets to support a range of analytical activities, information-sharing, and the production—or co-production—of intelligence.

Keywords: intelligence, crime, gangs, terrorism

Inteligencia y enfoques analíticos para el nexo crimen-pandillas-terrorismo

RESUMEN

Este documento analiza la gama de desafíos y enfoques de inteligencia para abordar los problemas transversales del crimen, las pandillas y el terrorismo. Estos enfoques incluyen centros de fusión, alerta temprana de terrorismo y enfoques de análisis/síntesis. Las herramientas potencialmente incluidas dentro de estos enfoques incluyen red teaming, análisis de transacciones, preparación de inteligencia para operaciones (IPO), análisis de redes sociales (SNA), así como herramientas y conjuntos de datos automatizados de alerta temprana de código abierto para respaldar una variedad de actividades analíticas, información, el intercambio y la producción —o coproducción— de inteligencia.

Palabras clave: inteligencia, crimen, pandillas, terrorismo

针对犯罪-团伙-恐怖主义关系的情报与分析方法

摘要

本文探讨了关于犯罪、团伙和恐怖主义的交叉问题的一系列情报挑战与应对方法。这些方法包括情报融合中心、恐怖主义预警和分析/综合方法。这些方法中可能包含的工具包括红队、交易分析、行动情报准备（IPO）、社会网络分析（SNA），以及自动化开源预警工具和数据集，用于支持一系列分析活动、信息共享、以及情报的生产或合作生产。

关键词：情报，犯罪，团伙，恐怖主义

Intelligence is essential to understanding, anticipating, and interdicting transnational organized crime, gang violence, and terrorism. These intersectional illicit activities demand crosscutting, multilateral intelligence to support prevention, enforcement, and ultimately prosecution of the spectra of complex interaction among a range of non-state actors—including criminal enterprises, mafias, gangs, and criminal armed groups (CAGs), and insurgents—and terrorists.¹ These activities have numerous interlocking motivations among a range of actors across multiple potential jurisdictions. These actions range from street crime, through extortion and street violence to further criminal enterprises, through political and insurgent objectives.²

The intersection between criminal and political objectives results in a range of operational challenges including high intensity crime, riots, street violence (at the level of civil strife) to criminal insurgency and terrorism (approaching the levels of non-international armed conflict).³ Multiagency, multijurisdictional (and multilateral) intelligence to support a range of civil and military counter-gang, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism operations are essential. Similar missions involve humanitarian and disaster response, such as response to wildland fires, pandemics, and climate security issues—including climate disasters such as climate-related conflicts.⁴ This paper discusses the range of intelligence challenges and approaches. These approaches include fusion centers, terrorism early warning, and analysis/synthesis approaches.⁵ Tools potentially included within these approaches include red teaming, transaction analysis, intelligence preparation for operations (IPO), identity intelligence (i2), social network analysis (SNA), as well as automated open source early warning tools and datasets to support a range of analytical activities, information-sharing, and the production—or co-production—of intelligence.

Multi-agency, all source, all phase intelligence fusion challenges and approaches

Developing the intelligence needed to effectively address the range of threats and scope of intelligence, from criminal through humanitarian concerns, involves decision support for street crime (intelligence-led policing),⁶ addressing gangs, transnational crime, and what is often called ‘all hazards’ including counterinsurgency, riots, pandemics, and climate change.⁷

Addressing this range of threats and their impact on communities requires calibrating foreign and domestic intelligence while building links to metropolitan and state (or provincial) and local public safety agencies in federal nation states. Essentially, this means linking national intelligence enterprises with a range of law enforcement and public safety agencies (multi-agency intelligence), including public health agencies and medical providers. This is often achieved through the establishment of fusion centers at state and local levels.⁸ The national network of fusion centers has been controversial and has been criticized as being ineffective.⁹ This criticism persists. In large measure, the perceived ineffectiveness of fusion centers can be linked to the lack of detailed doctrine (or network protocols) for operating, limited training, and ineffective oversight.¹⁰ These issues deserve detailed assessment and analysis, though that depth of analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. The analytical tools that support effective analysis are the main thrust here.

Another framework, which preceded and influenced the fusion center approach, is the terrorism early warning (TEW) group model, initially developed in Los Angeles in 1996.¹¹ The TEW concept involved linking a network of regional/metropolitan fusion centers to co-operatively develop intelligence.¹² Under that framework, the fusion process involved more than information-sharing and focused on the production of intelligence. The distributed development of intelligence through participation in an intelligence/early warning network is called the ‘co-production of intelligence.’¹³ Related concepts include ‘Strategic Early Warning for Criminal Intelligence (SEWS)’ developed by Criminal Intelligence Service Canada.¹⁴

SEWS relies upon a three step indications and warning process for strategic early warning. Step 1 defines ‘threat perception’; Step 2 involves ‘evaluation and monitoring’ (i.e., development of a Sentinel WatchList); and Step 3 involves ‘assessment and warning’ (i.e., Sentinel Assessment) for dissemination to the law enforcement community (See Figure 1).¹⁵ The SEWS process relies upon assessment of likely future scenarios the development of scenarios which then assess a range of possible indicators to drive hypothesis testing.¹⁶ Finally, assessments of likelihood (ranging from severe, high, medium, low, to nil) and a description of possible indicators are shared with practitioners (intelligence consumers).





Figure 1: Strategic Early Warning Process. Criminal Intelligence Service Canada¹⁷

Similar frameworks are employed for conflict and crisis early warning for humanitarian situations, disasters, and conflict disasters. Early efforts in this regard include the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS).¹⁸ Conflict early warning and disaster early warning systems are also being explored worldwide. Indeed, disaster early warning is an integral component of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.¹⁹

All, of these early warning frameworks can be informed by the work of Col. John Boyd and his conceptualization of the decision cycle, commonly known as Boyd's Cycle or OODA Loop for Observe-Orient-Decide-Act the major components of his model (See Figures 2 and 3). In the TEW model, Boyd's work provides a foundation for assessment—that is the foundation for the analysis and synthesis function embedded in Boyd's Orientation phase became a central component of the TEW analytical tools described in this paper. First, analysis is breaking things down into their component parts; while synthesis involves combining numerous elements of a situation or related data to understand a situation (including forecasting future trends and potentials).




Insights:

Note how orientation shapes observation, shapes decision, shapes action, and, in turn, is shaped by the feedback and other phenomena coming into our sensing or observation window.

Also note how the entire "loop" (not just orientation) is an ongoing many-sided implicit cross-referencing process of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection.


Figure 2: The OODA Loop (Boyd's Cycle) as captured by Chuck Spinney.²⁰



... an interactive process of many-sided implicit cross-referencing projections, empathies, correlations and rejections

Figure 3: Expanded view of Orientation Phase of OODA Loop.²¹

The first major tool described here is the ‘Transaction Analysis Cycle’ developed by Sullivan. The Transaction Analysis Cycle (Figure 4) provides a means of sensing potential threat activity in a non-linear fashion to enable on-going assessment of unfolding situations.



*Figure 4: Transaction Analysis Cycle.*²²

Essentially:

Individual transactions (such as acquiring finances, expertise, acquiring material, munitions or capability, recruiting members, conducting reconnaissance, mission rehearsal, conducting an attack, etc.) have signatures that identify them as terrorist or criminal acts, or consistent with the operations of a specific cell or group. These transactions and signatures (T/S) can then be observed and matched with patterns of activity that can be expressed as trends and potentials (T/P), which can ultimately be assessed in terms of a specific actor’s capabilities and intentions (C/I). At any point, the analytical team can posit a hypothesis on the pattern of activity and then develop a collection plan to seek specific transaction and signatures that confirm or disprove its hypothesis. The transaction analysis cycle provides a common framework for assessing patterns, hypotheses, and social network links among a range of actors within a broad spatial and temporal context, making co-production of intelligence and situational understanding viable.²³

This approach can assist in the development of ‘geo-social’ analysis such as mapping criminal networks through social network analysis or developing ‘Identity Intelligence’ (i2).²⁴ Network configuration, key hubs and actors (including relationships and roles, financial and logistical activities) are core elements of analysis in both transaction analysis and i2. Within the i2 framework, **AC²E** or “*Attribution* (who is it/who did it); *Connections* (nodes, position); *Context* (what does it mean in relationship to everything else?); *Exploitation* (what can we do with it?)” key questions.²⁵ Sources for gaining this information include traditional intelligence disciplines: human intelligence (HUMINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), measure and signals intelligence (MASINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and criminal intelligence (CRIMINT or ILP). Both open-source intelligence (OSINT) and social media intelligence (SOCMINT), as well as epidemiological intelligence (Epi-Intel) need to be added to this armamentarium.

Intelligence Preparation for Operations (IPO) is another tool employed in the TEW model. IPO adapts the military Intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace to the civil environment. It provides a common tool set for developing situational understanding and course of action development. Its four steps are:

- **Step 1: Define the OpSpace** (that is define the operating environment, including named areas of interest (NAIs) and critical infrastructure;
- **Step 2: Describe OpSpace Effects** (that is develop the geosocial picture and memorialize them in response information (or target) folders that describe population, terrain, weather, and place them in context. Cultural features, geospatial mapping and intelligence, cyber intelligence (CyberINT), and organizational dynamics are described;
- **Step 3: Evaluate OPFOR (PTEs) & Threats** (that is develop playbooks through adaptive red teaming to describe the potential opposing forces (OPFOR) or potential threat elements (PTEs), including gangs, mafias, criminal armed groups (CAGs), types of threat vectors (e.g., Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosives, drones, cyber, combined arms, etc. and influences). Tools here include deep indications and warning (deep I&W) and Epi-Intel (for biosecurity issues);
- **Step 4: Determine OPFOR & Friendly COAs** (that is develop actionable intelligence communicated through mission folders that measure alternative courses of action for both the OPFOR and Friendly forces. This includes integrating resource status (restat) and situation status (sitstat) conducting operational net assessments (ONA), threat assessments, and issuing advisories alerts and warnings.

These steps exploit a range of sensors (data inputs, including people and technical means, such as video (CCTV), automated license plate readers (ALPRs),

CNRN detectors, and overhead imagery (including commercial feed and drones). The goal is to scan, monitor, and forecast or in Boyd's framework: observe, orient, decide, and act. The operational tempo determines the focus varying from indications and warning (I&W) through operational net assessment (ONA). Both current and future operations are relevant, and the analysis should identify centers of gravity and decisive points for action. The framework must consider deception and counter-deception, swarming and counter-swarming, limit group think, and moderate decision analysis pitfalls and dynamic including 'mirror imaging.' Finally, it considers all facets of the event horizon, including threats and potentials, capabilities and intentions, and ONA. The IPO framework relies upon all source, all phase fusion. IPO is described graphically below (Figure 5).




Figure 5: Intelligence Preparation for Operations (IPO).²⁶

The IPO process was developed through a series of expert consultations and field tested through a series of analytical red teaming exercises and wargames.²⁷

Academic and open source (OSINT/SOCMINT) approaches

Social network analysis (SNA) stems from many social science and mathematical disciplines utilizing notions of graph theory, statistics, sociology, computer

science, and the socially embedded nature of humans to understand groups networks, organizations, etc. It is more broad than social networks like Facebook, though social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and private messaging applications, can be rich sources of data for the study of licit and illicit networks.²⁸ As Everton and other SNA scholars describe, SNA assumes that the behavior of actors is influenced by the structures of the social relations in which they are embedded.²⁹

Shortly after the 911 attacks by al-Qaeda, Arquilla and Ronfeldt identified new networked threats in a seminal edited volume and *First Monday* article on the Netwar concept which postulated that both bright (Legal) and dark (illicit/illegal) will take advantage of new networked forms of organizations in their competition with hierarchies.³⁰ If illicit actors are increasingly using technology and networked forms of organization, then a natural way to study and garner intelligence on them is through social network analysis.

SNA focuses on actors that are of the same type, such as people. In 2-mode networks (Networks connecting two types of things) it may focus on e.g., people (1) and meeting attendance (2) which in turn link the people through mutual attendance at meetings. These have been used in criminal network analysis through e.g., law enforcement surveillance on mafia meetings and attendance, etc.³¹ Link analysis on the other hand links people to cell phones and other non-human units in networks such as a roadside bomb network which may include humans, cell phones, and explosives.³² Phone records or court documents can also be good sources of open source intelligence on the structure of criminal or terror networks for social network analysis.³³ Scholars such as Krebs have also utilized open source media to build and analyze networks of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and the Hamburg cell.³⁴ Scholars have long identified SNA as useful for intelligence purposes. Harvard scholar Malcolm K. Sparrow wrote on the use of SNA for law enforcement intelligence in 1991.³⁵ Other scholars have pointed to the expansion of SNA because of the ubiquity of personal computers giving more researchers and intelligence gatherers and analyzers access to the powerful capacities software provides. SNA has been heavily used in the law enforcement intelligence community, e.g., one of the authors' former students works in an antihuman trafficking taskforce with the Houston DA's office, a position she earned in part based on her SNA experience from graduate school.³⁶

Interestingly, academics who have studied how intelligence analysts use SNA, found that while scholars were focused on leadership targeting in illicit networks, analysts were often using SNA to identify unidentified network participants. Analysts also complained of access to powerful software, but a lack of training on how to take advantage of it. The authors of the study which was limited to Australian law enforcement intelligence analysts urged more cooperation between law enforcement and scholars to alleviate these issues.³⁷

Table 1. A Sample of SNA Software packages

A Sample of SNA Software Packages
UCINET (Low cost) ⁵⁹
ORA (Moderate cost)
Analyst Notebook (High cost)
Palantir Gotham (Very high cost)
R (Free though difficult to use for the uninitiated)
Python (High difficulty)
Gephi (Free)

Source: Authors' elaboration

While we can think of SNA as highly quantitative, anyone who has built a dataset immediately recognizes the role of coding qualitative data as a major part of the endeavor. Thus, scholars have pointed to the necessity of combining qualitative research with quantitative social network analysis to triangulate into research results that combine the best elements of both methodologies. This is a point that Kenney and Coulthart have made when they advocate for the use of ethnography in conjunction with quantitative SNA to eliminate false positives.³⁸ This academic research leads to an important discussion vis-à-vis SNA, namely the ethical implications of which false positive identification (as a criminal or terrorist) is one of many.

Gathering datasets: What is possible? What is legal? What is ethical?

The ability to gather information on individuals and groups from disparate open-source data sources and then analyze and combine it with other datasets using SNA and similar algorithms sometimes called 'big data' is a powerful intelligence tool. It can also be harmful to the civil liberties of the individual. It allows governments and non-state actors to violate the rights of privacy, that may not have been explicitly written into constitutional systems, but were certainly assumed based upon rights included, such as those protecting the citizenry from undue search and seizure. It does not take much imagination to realize the kind of dystopia this technology and analysis can lead to assuming the normal pace of technological development.

One SNA platform that has received criticism for how it has been utilized in the public and private sector is Palantir.³⁹ It should be noted that a tool, is just that, a tool. In the hands of the ethical and well-regulated it can be used properly, but in the hands of the unchecked and unregulated, it can be used in Orwellian fashion. As reporting from Bloomberg demonstrated, this was the case in government

agencies in Los Angeles and in the security departments of major companies such as JPMorgan Chase & Co. As Bloomberg describes:

The company's engineers and products don't do any spying themselves; they're more like a spy's brain, collecting and analyzing information that's fed in from the hands, eyes, nose, and ears. The software combs through disparate data sources—financial documents, airline reservations, cellphone records, social media postings—and searches for connections that human analysts might miss. It then presents the linkages in colorful, easy-to-interpret graphics that look like spider webs.⁴⁰

The colorful easy to understand 'spiderwebs' are the visualizations of link analysis a close SNA cousin and largely based upon SNA algorithms. A primary critique was the ease of creating false positives through linkages to criminal or terror actors.

Finally, SNA can also be ethically combined with geospatial analysis. A simple example provided by Lowenthal is the overlaying of social media SNA data over a map to determine where a given topic is being discussed most. Lowenthal provides the examples of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) using social media to map refugee flows out of Syria.⁴¹

Open source GEOINT: ACLED

Geospatial intelligence or GEOINT is a key collections area that focuses on that which is connected to the earth. It is often associated with imagery be it gathered via satellite, French hot air balloon, planes, or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). GEOINT is not always imagery however, it can also be intelligence represented on maps and visualized. The National Geospatial intelligence Agency (NGA) is one of the key agencies utilizing GEOINT and encouraging open-source intelligence tools in this area via its NGA Pathfinder program.⁴²

One example of an open-source intelligence and scholarly tool is The Armed Conflict Location Event Data Project (ACLED). ACLED data on political violence events including their location down to the nearest municipality throughout much of the world.⁴³ This allows open source researchers to visualize and map ACLED data free via Tableau Public.⁴⁴ The ACLED data set is a U.S. nonprofit funded by the "Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations at the United States Department of State, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Federal Foreign Office, the Tableau Foundation, the International Organization for Migration, and the University of Texas at Austin."⁴⁵

ACLED stemmed from the dissertation research of founder Clionadh Raleigh working on geospatial datasets for conflict in Africa in 2005. It expanded

to other regions with funding from other sources including governments. More recently the dataset has expanded into Latin America and the Caribbean.⁴⁶ One strength of the data set is that it defines its coding rules locally to capture data that might otherwise be ignored. For example, there can be debates about what constitutes political violence vs. criminal violence. This is particularly important in areas like Latin America where scholars have pointed to issues of ‘criminal insurgency’⁴⁷ and ‘third generation gangs’⁴⁸ wherein criminal groups take on political aims in furtherance of criminal goals and subtly change the nature of the state and society itself in a move toward state transformation.

Another key advantage is that it collects local level data and does not limit itself to violence between the state and rebel groups as some data sets do. This allows for a richer data set with more varied actor types which is key in the Mexican context where self-defense forces may interact with various paramilitary criminal organizations, government forces at the local state and federal level, etc.⁴⁹ In the following two figures, situations of combat involving the *Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación* (CJNG) and *Cártel de Sinaloa* (CDS) with Mexican security forces are used to demonstrate the visualization potentials afforded by the ACLED platform.

Figure 6 below is a demonstration of the ACLED data and ability to visualize in Tableau Public. The figure displays the incidence of CJNG/CDS combat with Mexican state forces and shows widespread CJNG combat throughout the country.



Figure 6: *CJNG/CDS Combat with Mexican Military/National Guard/Law Enforcement.*⁵⁰

Figure 7 below, again uses CJNG/CDS incidence of combat with Mexican state forces to demonstrate how, in Tableau Public, researchers can hover their cursor over specific data events and view summaries of the political violence events. All of these are free to visualize if shared in Tableau Public. Researchers must take care not to share the underlying data and properly cite ACLED under their terms of attribution.




Figure 7: CJNG/CDS Combat with Mexican Military/National Guard/Law Enforcement highlighting note visualization capability in ACLED Data and Tableau Public.⁵¹

Another strength of the ACLED data source is its open access nature. While it has moved to a pay model beyond a certain number of downloads or depending on commercial use, it is freely accessible to the general public for research purposes. This increases its utility and the ability to evaluate it.

While an exhaustive discussion of the advantages of the ACLED dataset is beyond the scope of this paper given size constraints, particularly relevant tools within ACLED are the curated datasets and hubs by region. “The Early Warning Research Hub” is another ACLED tool relevant to our discussion of intelligence and illicit networks. This hub contains useful tools for predicting violent hotspots including a volatility and risk tool which shows where political violence is deviating above baseline norms, a “subnational hotspot mapper,” a “global threat tracker,” and a “conflict pulse” tool which forecasts behavior “a week into the future.”⁵²

The ACLED subnational hotspot tracker compares state or province violence in the most recent week to the most recent preceding month. It then ranks those regions by the greatest increases in political violence. The ACLED volatility and risk index can then be used on those areas to give a sense of the frequency of violence and whether the surge is out of the ordinary for the area using a baseline average of weekly events for the previous three years. It then measures the difference based on the number of standard deviations above normal to provide a risk level. The Global Threat Tracker jumps to the national level and assesses “countries at risk of violent escalation.” It should be noted that the conflict pulse tracker appears—as of November 2021—to only cover ISIS affiliated and Islamist groups in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.

The following three figures use data from the contemporary insurgency in Mozambique to demonstrate the conflict analysis potentials of the ACLED platform.

The map in Figure 8 shows a high concentration of violence in the Cabo Delgado province of Northeastern Mozambique using ACLED data. The violence is concentrated along the coastline and is largely attributed to an Islamist insurgency.

In an example of open-source intelligence and investigative reporting, *The New York Times* was able to paint a picture of the insurgent attacks on Palma through satellite imagery, interviews, mapping, and video analysis. It was an attack in which the government failed to respond and left the local population to face the insurgency on its own. Hundreds of thousands have been displaced in the region according to the *Times* and our 2021 analysis of 'strategic developments,' a category of the ACLED data that also includes looting and other non-regular events, shows that there were numerous instances of looting/property destruction resulting in, or likely to result in displaced persons in the region in 2021. See Figure 9 below which also includes a portion of the Tableau Public interface.

In March 2021, ISIS-linked insurgents in Mozambique launched an attack on Palma in the energy rich Cabo Delgado region. There is a large foreign direct investment project in a Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) facility in Palma led by the French company Total. Military forces provided security for LNG site, but not Palma despite claims to the contrary.⁵³ The insurgent group, Al-Sunna wa Jama'a, founded in 2017, is mostly local and claims ISIS allegiance via the Islamic State Central Africa Province since 2019. However, analysts such as Joseph Hanlon of the London School of Economics argue this is a local insurgency and has loose ties to ISIS.⁵⁴

Figure 10 quantifies the data on the location and concentration of violence in Mozambique as largely limited to the Cabo Delgado region which is energy rich and home to a large foreign investment in an LNG facility. Figures 6-10 are a limited sample of the ways that ACLED data can be visualized to rapidly produce GEOINT on criminal and insurgent networks.

Crime-Terror Nexus

We can view the Mozambique insurgency as targeting this region to deny the government resources, or in the hopes of the insurgency capturing these resources and profits, or for other local reasons. In terms of the crime-terror nexus the notion of the insurgency targeting the region for natural gas profits is most interesting for our discussion. Property destruction such as the burning of buildings, a criminal act in and of itself, can also have the effect of clearing people from a territory. Looting can have the effect of funding the insurgency via criminal conduct and taking

Mapping Events in Mozambique ACLED Data January 1- October 2021

Source: "Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); <https://www.acleddata.com/>"




Figure 8: Mapping Events in Mozambique ACLED Data January 1-October 2021.




Figure 9: Mapping ACLED Strategic Developments in Mozambique ACLED Data in Tableau Public 1 January-October 2021.

control of LNG facilities in the hope of selling on the international market can also fund an insurgency as had been done by groups such as ISIS.⁵⁵ Criminal armed groups such as the CJNG which are profit-motivated criminal groups will also engage in insurgent/terror tactics and paramilitary activities in their combat with government forces and rivals. These groups also attempt to win the support of the population by engaging in ‘social banditry’ as we have recently argued, wherein they attempt to purchase the support of the population.⁵⁶

Fatalities by Province in Mozambique ACLED Data 2015-October 2021

Source: "Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); <https://www.acleddata.com>."




Figure 10: Fatalities by Province in Mozambique ACLED Data January 1-October 2021.

ACLED and U.S. Crisis Monitor

ACLED also provides specialized analysis projects such as the U.S. Crisis Monitor for 2020 built with Princeton University's Bridging Divides Initiative and the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs' Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination. This dataset brings ACLED coverage to the United States and focuses on the period immediately before and after the George Floyd murder and the subsequent wave of demonstrations. Figure 11 below is a visualization of U.S. Crisis Monitor Data for 2020 reproduced from an ACLED Press release that visualizes Right-wing militias, Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests, and Covid-19 demonstrations.




Figure 11: “Demonstrations by Type” Reproduced From ACLED.⁵⁷

Figure 11 demonstrates the widespread character of demonstrations in the United States in 2020 and the geographic concentration of those events. Figure 12 below visualizes ACLED US Crisis Monitor Data to map event type and size events by the number of fatalities associated with them.

Protests and Political Violence in the United States 1 January 2020-October 2021
 Source: “Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); www.acleddata.com.”




Figure 12: Protests and Political Violence in the United States
 1 January 2020-October 2021⁵⁸

Figure 12 allows us to see that most demonstrations involved no fatalities and many of the events that led to significant casualties were either in the 'strategic developments' or the 'violence against civilians' categories. These fatality incidents were often mass-shooting events unlinked to demonstrations. The above figures demonstrate the GEOINT potentials of the ACLED data set and other tools like it.

Conclusion

Meeting contemporary intelligence needs requires a suite of analytical tools and organizational structures to support a range of analytical activities, information-sharing and the production of intelligence. Here we emphasize the need for networked co-production of intelligence to address the comprehensive range of threats facing contemporary society and the public agencies (as well as public-private partnerships) protecting them and ensuring the delivery of critical infrastructure lifelines and services. In this paper, we reviewed intelligence fusion, terrorism early warning, strategic early warning for strategic crime, transaction analysis, identity intelligence and intelligence preparation for operations (IPO). We also examined academic and open source (OSINT/SOCMINT) approaches and tools that complement the 'all-source fusion' approaches. Together, this discussion provides a foundation for assessing new intelligence analysis approaches and potentially new organizational and technological frameworks for protecting the populace and a meeting the range of human, technological, and natural threats and hazards facing our increasingly complex globally-connected society.

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Tricks, Skullduggery, Fraud: Crime & Finance, the Decisive Years, 2009–2014

Xavier Raufer

ABSTRACT

Decisive because they constitute our historical depth, the foundation of the second decade of the 21st century, the post-crash Wall-Street-Lehman-Brothers years are certainly close, but poorly known, studied, and analyzed.

Keywords: crime, finance, fraud

Trucos, engaños, fraude: crimen y finanzas, los años decisivos, 2009–2014

RESUMEN

Decisivos porque constituyen nuestro fondo histórico, la base de la segunda década del siglo XXI, los años posteriores al desplome de Wall-Street-Lehman-Brothers son ciertamente cercanos, pero poco conocidos, estudiados y analizados.

Palabras clave: crimen, finanzas, fraude

诡计、隐秘活动与诈骗：犯罪与金融——关键的2009–2014年

摘要

2009–2014年是关键的几年，因为其构成了我们的历史深度，并且是21世纪第二个十年的基础。这几年发生在华尔街-雷曼兄弟破产之后，与当前时代当然很接近，但却几乎没有被了解、研究和分析。

关键词：犯罪，金融，诈骗

“Does it take great insight to grasp that men’s ideas, conceptions and notions, in a word their consciousness, change with any change affecting their living conditions, their relationships and their social existence? What does the history of ideas demonstrate, except that intellectual production is transformed with material production? The dominant ideas of an epoch were never but the ideas of the dominant class.” Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 1847.

—For Karl Marx, the infrastructure determines the superstructure. Hence, the capitalist ownership of a media necessarily influences its vision of the world. Thus, the “configuring powers” of the neo-world have mutated into an *infosphere* associating various billionaires with the new “bands of capital”: media, communication and advertising agencies, the world of entertainment.

“One put in people’s heads that the society raised of the abstract thought, whereas it is made of habits, of uses, and that by grinding these under the millstones of the reason, one reduces the individuals to the state of atoms, interchangeable and anonymous.” Claude Lévi-Strauss, “De près et de loin, entretiens,” 1988.

“May (1968) brilliantly fulfills the wishes of capital, even if it means violating its taboos and running its wrath ... May 68 is the cradle of the new bourgeois society ... The Stock exchange brokers, and the Sorbonne agents of change drive out De Gaulle.” Régis Debray, *Modest contribution to the speeches and official ceremonies of the tenth anniversary*, 1978.

Criminological, this study concerns an economic-financial world whose foundations and strategic depth must be understood. A guide is therefore necessary. Here, the best is without question:

“Chronicle of a very big crisis - A global financial shock of more than 20 trillion euros,” by Mr. Jean-François Boulter, MA-Editions, 2017.

Its first three chapters (32 pages in all) clearly explain the crisis (before/during/after) in simple, jargon-free language; multiple boxes dissect the technical terms of American finance, their ins and outs. Recommended reading.

Introduction

Decisive because they constitute our historical depth, the foundation of the second decade of the 21st century, the post-crash Wall-Street-Lehman-Brothers years are certainly close, but poorly known, studied, and analyzed. For the United States first, and then for the political and financial sphere of the developed countries, they are THE perfect nightmare, the hangover to forget. The United States is a master of collective forgetfulness: the insolent and provocative writer Gore Vidal described his country as the *United States of Amnesia*.

This study is criminological, not economic-financial: it enumerates and comments on the skullduggery, deceit and fraud committed with impunity by New York finance first, and then by international finance; all wrapped in a protective ideological shell that a little teasing, we once called DGSI (Davos-Goldman-Sachs-Ideology).

Reminder: the financial and then economic crisis of 2007-2008 was first the collapse of the so-called *subprime* securities market, amounting to ± 500 billion dollars; then, as a result of the “prairie fire” effect, a final cost to the world economy of ± 20,000 billion euros.

In the background, globalization¹

First, there was the lyrical illusion. The illusionist was Jacques Attali, 23 years ago—or 23 centuries. Let’s read it: “They will not own companies, lands or offices. Rich in nomadic assets, they will use them nomadically, for themselves, promptly mobilizing capital and skills in changing sets, for ephemeral purposes in which the State will have no role. They will not aspire to lead public affairs (fame will be a curse for them). They would like to create, to enjoy, to move. Connected, informed, networked, they will not worry about bequeathing wealth or power to their few children: only education.”

“They will carry the best and the worst of a volatile, carefree, egotistical and hedonistic society, divided between dreams and violence. The hyper-class will group together several tens of millions of individuals. They will be attached to freedom, to citizens’ rights, to the market economy, to liberalism, to the democratic spirit. They will vote, create consumer associations, cultivate and develop a keen awareness of planetary issues; in the long run, they will be more interested in the human condition than in the future of their own offspring.”

Pure and perfect definition of Davos-Goldman-Sachs-Ideology, or DGSI. To this, let us quickly bring the counterpoison:

1 *Revue Défense Nationale* – “10 /2012 European vulnerabilities, finance too “ - Jacques Sapir “ the de-globalisation “ - Le Seuil 2011 - Hervé Juvin “ The reversal of the world “, Le Débat-Gallimard, 2010 - Jacques Attali, “ XXI century’s dictionary - Fayard, 1998

Globalization fetishism

(Jacques Sapir): The warship has always preceded the merchant ship ... [globalization] “has caused the destruction of the social bond in many countries and confronted countless masses with the specter of the war of all against all, with the shock of a forcible individualism, which foreshadows other regressions, much worse still...”

Free trade - globalist ideology

(Hervé Juvin): A system “that no longer knows itself from the outside, that refuses to let anyone be a stranger to its cults and its pumps, that wants to be the world’s system, unique and closed like a bubble ... Who are these masters who do not say their names and whose decisions weigh on the life of each of us, from Shanghai to Mexico City and from Tulle to Diego Suarez? [They make us] A war in which individualism is the flag and cultural products, the heavy artillery.”

Market Ideology

Human action recedes, and sometimes fades, before the quasi-mythical, even supernatural “forces” of the market. Yet:

(Hervé Juvin): “The financial markets have become a strategic space—and one of predation—in their own right. Battles take place there, most often without noise, without glitter, but not without victims. The ideology of the market is the obliteration of politics. Political leaders abandon the economy and finance to the markets. They no longer control or punish at all; it is up to them to repair, mitigate, console and entertain. Society no longer decides anything; it is now doomed to *compliance*.”

All at the base, the base

The liberal-libertarian neo-world is based on the illusory idea that “everything that counts, counts.” This neo-nominalism is the worst strategic trap in which companies and States can fall, which then take words for things, pen feels that reality is in the accounts and that the form decides the substance.

Neo-nominalism that is now crushing the American academic world²: “In the meantime, the *management* culture is imposing *management-by-behavior* standards on universities. One of these rules requires the academic bureaucracy to reduce everything to measurable data, which is now the only thing that is accepted: the number of publications and students, student population surveys, grants, revenues and, of course, the crucial impact, or rather fetishism, surrounding the famous “H-Index” [*the h-Index establishes a researcher’s productivity and impact*”

2 *Counterpunch* - July 28, 2021 “Academentia: the organization insanity of the modern University.”

by measuring the number and level of his or her citations.] Researchers are thus reduced by these bureaucrats to mathematical equations.”

As usual, everything was pre-said: the crash of 2008-2009, why, how³

The crash of 2008-2009 is even more serious because its actors act from an inviolable base, where they conceive their maneuvers, mobilize resources; finally, stash the loot. This contemporary Turtle Island of financial piracy is the archipelago of tax havens and *offshore* accounts. In 2013, there were 50 to 60 of these “havens” in the world, holding between \$8 trillion and \$32 trillion—a huge range that shows how little is actually known.⁴

As usual, the immense danger represented by this unstoppable fraud tool had long been detected and the President of the United States warned. Indeed, in 1937, the Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau warned Franklin Roosevelt as follows: “The [*offshore*] companies are frequently organized zed through foreign lawyers, with dummy incorporators and dummy directors, so that the names of the real parties in interest do not appear” (the English used to be clear, we keep the original).

Large American groups, their taxes and tax havens⁵

Around 1950, the profits of American companies were $\pm 50\%$ captured by the federal or state tax authorities. In 2018, these large groups were in fact taxed at $\pm 14\%$, due to globalization and their ability to be “taxed” in tax havens. Excluding the oil sector, the majority subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals had (in 1966) $\pm 10\%$ of their profits declared outside the United States; $\pm 50\%$ in 2018.

- 3 *Washington Post* - 7/04/2013 “Piercing the secrecy of offshore tax heavens” - *International Herald Tribune* - 14/12/2012 “When investors put profit before principles” - *La Tribune* - 19/11/2012 “Shadow banking: the shadow banking system that was worth \$6700 billion” - American Society of Criminology - 2012 Annual Meeting - 11/17/2012 “Enablers of organized crime session - Illicit financial flows and safe heavens of transnational organized crime” - *Le Monde* - 8/14/2012 “Offshore finance” - *La Tribune* - 7/22/2012 “Super-rich: up to \$25 trillion hidden in tax pa radishes” - *BBC News* - 7/22/2012 “Tax heavens: super-rich hiding at least \$21 tn.” - *Le Monde* - 16/06/2012 “La ‘finance de l’ombre’ dans le viseur de Bruxelles” - *Global Research* - 24/10/ 2011 “Reckless endangerment: totally corrupt America” - *Alternatives économiques* - 1/06/2011 “La fraude banalisée?” - *Libération* - 6/11/2010 “I saw a man destroyed by money in eleven days” - *New York Review of Books* - 12/09/2009 “How we were ruined and what we can do” - *Nouvel Observateur* - 25/01/2009 “Crisis: how banks use drug money” - *AFP* - 24/01/2009 “Many banks saved by drug money.”
- 4 In August 2012, a study by experts (economists, lawyers, etc.) from the *Tax Justice Network*, “The Price of Offshore Revisited” evaluates, in tax havens, only the liquid assets held by private *equity* funds: this gigantic financial “black hole” “weighs” between \$21,000 billion and \$32,000 billion and is owned by about 10 million individuals; within that, $\pm 100,000$ super-rich people own one-third to one-half of the loot. And the study omits non-financial assets: real estate, yachts, gold, private planes, etc. Three banks manage most of these offshore funds: UBS, Credit Suisse and Goldman Sachs.
- 5 *New York Times international* - 07/13/2021 “Shut down the global tax havens.”

Accelerated-before, three-quarters of a century later. Despite the explicit warning of H. Morgenthau, tax havens have proliferated in the world; they have produced all their harmful effects and aggravated the crash of 2008-2009; but in the economic and financial world, notice experts “impunity is generalized”; despite the immense crisis, not a single financier has done a day in jail.

Before the Wall Street crash of 2008, there was the crash of the American *Savings & Loans* in the early 1980s. Bill Black, a professor at the University of Kansas-City and former general inspector of the Savings & Loans network at the time of their failure, also warned: “If you don’t look for fraud, you won’t find it. If you look for it at, you will see it everywhere.” By financial fraud, B. Black meant the following *knowingly criminal* practices:

- Transgression of the laws of the market,
- Accounting concealment techniques,
- Illicit financial innovations.

All this, and more, is at work on Wall Street since the year 2000. And this is how the criminal balloon of the *subprimes* swells, inflates, and explodes.

- Millions of families borrow money for housing without any guarantee of repayment,
- Lenders lend with little concern for repayment,
- Their unsecured loans are “*securitized*” (aggregated into financial products), receiving fraudulently the “Triple A” of complicit or hostage rating agencies, knowing perfectly that they are worthless products,
- These securities are sold by banks (also knowing it) to their customers that they thus swindle; banks that, *at the same time*, play down, at a loss, on these same securities!

All of this was made possible by the massive deregulation of U.S. finance. Amusing coincidence: the senator who passed this law then became vice-president of the Swiss banking giant UBS.

In the bowels of the banking Moloch, *Hedge Fund* category⁶ the mechanism is the following: always going to the limits, taking “shortcuts” through the standard ad put; always pushing more and faster its own executives and employees to the fault—only criterion? Performance! Investors in these funds don’t care about rules and ethics: if there is a “shortcut,” they look the other way. A voluntary blindness bordering on complicity: the investor accepts that one cheats for his own benefit; thus, implicitly encouraged, the operators border more and more on the illicit. Does it pass? Good. Do we get caught? Apologies are forthcoming. Such is the permanent practice.

6 In French, *Hedge fund* = hedge fund.

The crash hit Wall Street. In 2010, a young French broker (then caught up in the turmoil) was asked if this had changed in the last two years. His answer: “When we talk about Wall Street, we talk about market efficiency, performance, complex products: *bullshit*. Wall Street is driven by human nature, with two dominant feelings: euphoria and fear. Human nature has not changed, Wall Street has not changed. A *bis repetita* is quite possible.”

Human nature again and again: everything is good to save its skin—money has no smell? Organized crime’s money will do the trick when liquidity is scarce, as early as the first half of 2008. In January 2009, Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the OUN Drugs & Crime (UNODC) warned that massive funds from money laundering were flooding into the international banking system. When States do not release emergency funds themselves: “In many cases, drug money is the only investment capital available ... Interbank credits have been financed with funds from drug trafficking and other illegal activities.”

How does black money sneak into legal finance? Through a grey zone of supposedly “legal” professional services from Dubai, London, New York, Hong Kong, etc., which in fact facilitate the laundering and illicit financial transactions. These professional “facilitators” are corrupt bankers, accountants, lawyers, etc. According to the UNODC, 1,600 billion dollars were laundered in this way in 2011, 580 billion of which went to organized crime alone. Hundreds of billions of black money injected into legal trade and industry, corrupting markets, financial institutions, public officials, local institutions, etc. Examples:

- In March 2010, the American regional bank Wachovia had to pay a (ridiculous) fine of 110 million dollars: from 2003 to 2008, it violated the *Bank Secrecy Act*, by deliberately refusing to create within itself the slightest serious anti-money laundering. And completed more than 420 billion dollars of transactions with Mexican “exchange houses,” notoriously linked to the local drug cartels.
- In the same year, *MoneyGram International* (“Global Money Services Business”) was fined \$100 million (again, a pittance) by the U.S. Department of Justice for deliberately not having an anti-money laundering program.

Financial technology is opaque and inventive; at any moment, it gives rise to new practices, which it applies on the spot, without concern for the famous “precautionary principle” which is now imposed on the world everywhere else; it launches new products, which are increasingly twisted and sophisticated; in the manner of chemical narcotics or doping products which can only be banned by detailing their precise chemical formula.

Heavily, painfully, the law ends up banning the new chemical drug, the new toxic financial product - but in the meantime, their inventors have already conceived others and are still “surfing” in this way, before the repressive waves hit. Such is the great strength of Goldman Sachs, whose gifted financiers are conceptually ten years ahead of the heavy-handed financial regulators trying to gold their

tricks; so agile and prescient that when the financial mess gets worse, they end up being called in to try to remedy it, whether at the national or international level, Mr. Mario Draghi is the most convincing example here.⁷

Just after the Wall Street crash, a “*shadow banking system*” (SBS) developed at full speed.⁸ Here, non-bank entities play the role of banks: investment funds, money market funds (life insurance type), stockbrokers, etc., carrying out credit activities, such as “*securitization*” (*subprimes*: here we go again!), in which credits become securities. These “*credit intermediaries, entities and activities outside the regular banking system*” intermediate or distribute credit, but do not accept deposits *and are not regulated as banks* [we submit].

According to the G20’s Financial Stability Board, 25 to 30% of the European financial system in 2010 is under the responsibility of such non-bank financial institutions, which, in total and for 2010, would already represent 46,000 billion euros. A fertile ground for future financial acrobatics; this freely, while after the crash-Wall Street, banks will have to—oh! slightly and only for a while—follow some rules, undergo some controls.

Post-crash *blitzkrieg*⁹

[*The United States around 1791*] “The mercantile spirit begins to

7 Vice President Europe of Goldman-Sachs (2002-2005), Governor of the Bank of Italy, 2006-2011, President of the European Central Bank 2011-2019, and President of the Italian Council since February 2021.

8 In 2002, the global *shadow banking* system was worth \$26 trillion; in 2012, \$67 trillion. U.S., \$23 trillion; EU, \$22 trillion; UK, \$9 trillion (balance: rest of the world).

9 *New York Times International* - 02/26/2016 “U.S. recovery is favoring wealthier areas” - *New York Times International* - 02/23/2016 “Why are white deaths rising?” - *New York Times International* - 13/02/2016 “Widening gap in wealth plays out in life span” - *New York Times International* - 19/01/2016 “Global rich grow richer and richer still” - *Financial Times* - 24/12/2015 “How to give away a billion dollars” - *Le Parisien* - 2/12/2015 “Donating 99% of his Facebook shares: la belle opération fiscale de Zuckerberg” - *France-Info* - 2/12/2015 “Non, Marc Zuckerberg ne donne pas toute sa fortune à des oeuvres” - *New York Times International* - 7/05/2014 “Top fund managers make peers envious” - *Libération* - 3/05/2014 “Vous vous reprendrez bien un peu de caviar” - *Le Monde* - 3/04/2014 “La bonne fortune des milliardaires européens” - *AFP* - 9/04/2014 “67 personnes accaparent la moitié de la richesse mondiale” - *New York Times International* - 5/04/2014 “As corporate profits rise, workers get a smaller slice of the pie” - *Le Monde-Forbes* - 5/03/2014 “Billionaires and democracy” - *The Guardian* - 20/01/2014 “Oxfam: 85 richest people as wealthy as half of the world population” - *Libération* - 4/01/2014 “Les 0,00001 vous souhaitez une très bonne année” - *Libération* - 11/10/2013 “Les riches se régalaient, les autres dégustent” - *Le Monde* - 18/09/2013 “The 400 richest Americans are even richer than before the crisis” - *Financial Times* - 16/08/2013 “How the rich are making sure they stay on top” - *International Herald Tribune* - 15/04/2013 “Hedge funds titans scoop up billions in 2012” - *Global Research* - 14/08/2012 “The global 1%: exposing the transnational ruling class” - *International Herald Tribune* - 27/03/2012 - “The rich get even richer” - *Le Monde* - 28/11/2011 “A knot of 147 companies at the heart of the global economy” - *Le Monde* - 29/01/2012 “Two-thirds of Americans believe class warfare is back” - *The Atlantic* - July-August - 2011 “The rich are different from you and me” - *Financial Times* - 30/06/2011 “Top dogs take ever bigger slice of global spoils” - *International Herald Tribune* - 20/11/2010 “America, the hedge-fund republic?” - *Libération* - 22/10/2008 “For twenty years, inequalities have been getting worse in rich countries.”

invade them; the interest becomes in them the national vice. Already, the game of the banks of the di towards States is hindered, and bankruptcies threaten the common fortune.” Chateaubriand - *Memoirs from Beyond the Grave*

The Wall Street crash provokes a revelation in liberal-progressive America, strongly marked by puritan moralism; let's say, to make it quick, the one that recognizes itself in the *The New York Times* (NYT): this America understands then that its country is no longer a democracy, but a plutocracy. The person who said this in November 2010 was their famous NYT columnist Nicholas Kristof. Citing the Washington-based *Economic Policy Institute*, Kristof points out that, in terms of social and economic inequality, the United States is (in 2010) WORSE than “all the banana republics of Central America”:

- The richest 1% of Americans own 34% of the country's private wealth,
- The bottom 90% of Americans own 29% of the country's private wealth,
- The richest 10% of Americans own 70% of the country's private wealth.

A widening chasm: changes in inequality, 2010-2015

2011

- From 1976 to 2007, 58% of income growth was sucked up by the richest 1%. In 2007 (shortly before the crash), the top 1% controlled 34.6% of the U.S. national wealth; the bottom 90% controlled 26.9%. Under G.W. Bush (2002-2007), it was 65%. In the richest 1%, the 0.1% of the hyper-rich swallow 80% of the increase. 50% of the national product (*National Income*) goes to the richest 10% of the population.

The “Davos elite” reveals the predatory greed of this “international plutocracy”: financial advantages ... the ability to manipulate markets for their own benefit. The idea appears that globalization aggravates inequalities.

At the heart of the global economy, a knot of 147 companies: a study by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich¹⁰ looks at the ownership of the 43,000 largest companies in the world. If the total value of these companies is X, 80% of the value of X belongs to 737 companies and 40%, to 147 of them: $\frac{3}{4}$ of the

10 University of Zurich, 2011. The most powerful companies in the world, starting from a documentary base of 37 million companies in the economy and finance. At the top, 147 companies control \pm 40% of the wealth of the other 37 million. In 2008, here are the first 25 of the 147: Barclays - Capital group companies - FMR corporation - Axa - State street corporation - JP Morgan Chase - Legal & general group - Vanguard group - UBS - Merrill Lynch - Wellington management - Deutsche bank - Franklin resources - Credit Suisse - Walton enterprises - Bank of New York Mellon - Natixis - Goldman Sachs - T. Rowe Price Group - Legg Mason - Morgan Stanley - Mitsubishi Financial group - Northern trust corp. - Société Générale - Bank of America.

financial sector. Here emerges a leading super-group, a mega-oligarchy, between collusion, influence and concentration. Example: the global financial market of derivatives is 96% controlled by THREE banks.

Prelude, from the end of 2008 ...

October 2008: the OECD (club of the then 30 richest countries in the world) decides: globalization is inequitable. Over the last 20 years, inequalities have increased in 3/4 of its member countries: “the richest have seen their income grow faster than that of the poor, even between the rich and the middle class.” Moral: the liberal capitalist slogan according to which “the rising tide raises all boats” (“trickle-down effect”) is a farce. The following demonstrates this.

2011

[*Pew Research Center*, Washington, December 2011] A lucid but powerless American people: “What is the N°1 conflict in American society?”

- 1 - Between rich and poor,
- 2 - about immigration,
- 3 - about racism.”

Abuse of financial capitalism ... accumulation of undeserved wealth ... growing gap between rich and poor ... Considering inflation, the average American income, from the 1970s to 2010, is unchanged or nearly so; that of the super-rich (0.01% of the population) is, over the same period, multiplied by 7.¹¹

2012

We learn that in 2010 (a year of recession and crisis), an additional product (or surplus over 2009) of \$288 billion was created; in the United States, the largest taxpayers (1% of total taxpayers) had an income of \$352,000 or more that year. 93% of this \$288 billion goes to this 1% of mega-taxpayers. 37% of this \$288 billion goes to the top 0.01%, ± 15,000 households with annual incomes over \$23.8 million.

Transnational plutocracy, ruling class or global power elite:

The world's wealth is estimated around 2010 at ± 200,000 billion dollars (2/3 of these fortunes, in North America or Europe). The richest half of the world's population has a net worth of \$4,000. For the richest 10%, it is \$72,000; for the top 1%, it is \$588,000. The poorest half of the world owns 2% of the world's wealth. 2.5 billion people in the world live on less than US \$2 a day.

11 See also on this topic: *International Herald Tribune*, 26/05/2012 “The shrinking American pie,” “The great divergence – America's growing inequality crisis and what we can do about it.” “The gap between rich and poor has been growing for the past 30 years in most of the world's advanced economies and especially in the United States ... What has mostly grown is the gap between those at the top and those in the middle.

The richest 1% of the world population represents \pm 40 million people. Of these, 10 million have assets of more than US \$1 million; 300,000 have assets of more than US\$ 30 million. At the very top, a *superclass* of 6,000 to 7,000 decision-makers (Da your... private jets, etc.); 94% men, European or American, usually White. “At the very top, plutocrats can shape opinion by buying newspapers or TV stations and financing political campaigns ... They may not have been elected by anyone, but their influence on events is considerable ... The more unequal our societies become, the more we are prisoners of this inequality.”

Added to this is the “shadow superclass” of criminal elites.

2013

[From 1973 to the beginning of 2013, that is \pm 40 years, 80% went to the richest 2%, 65% to the richest 1%; the trend has accelerated since 2008 and the *subprime* crash. Yet from 2000 to 2012, the real wealth of 90% of Americans (all but the top 10%), decreased by 25%, due to the same 2008 crash.]

[*Journal of Economic Perspectives*] Distributive virtues of the market: “Market forces, i.e., the outcome of freely negotiated contracts, may have caused most of the rise in inequality. Globalization and technological change favor the most talented ... At the very top, markets emerge in which the winner takes all the stake; there, the best among takers (or the luckiest), fund managers, writers or athletes, capture the bulk of the gains.”

Hedge Fund Titans in 2012: together, the 25 largest *hedge fund* bosses earned US \$14.4 billion; together they manage US \$2.6 trillion. The main ones:

Names	Company	Earnings
COHEN Steven A.	SAC Capital Advisors	1.4 billion USD
DALIO Ray	Bridgewater Associates	1.7 billion USD
TEPPER David	Appaloosa Management	2.2 billion USD
COOPERMAN Leon	Omega Advisors	560 million USD
SIMON James	Renaissance Technologies	1.1 billion USD
GRIFFIN Kenneth C.	Citadel	900 million USD
MANDEL Stephen Jr.	Lone Pine Capital	580 million USD

It goes on in 2013: the earnings of U.S. *hedge fund* managers are \$25 billion. The No. 1 earns 3.5 billion dollars (already, 2 billion in 2012); the No. 2, 2.4 billion USD; the No. 3, 2.3 billion USD, etc. The oligarchies concentrate wealth for their own benefit: 10% of the world’s population trusts 86% of it; the 1% of the most affluent own 46% of the world’s wealth.

[*Forbes*, 09/16/2013] In 2012, the wealth of the 400 richest Americans is \pm \$2 trillion, like the GDP of Russia. This is 300 billion more than in 2011, more than

double than in 2002. In the United States, the richest 10% own 90% of the stock market shares; the richest 1% of Americans capture \pm 20% of the country's total income, the highest since 1913.

Meanwhile, the middle class is suffering in the United States, even more so since the brutal post-crash Wall Street recession of 2008. To the point that the American social fabric is fraying.¹²

2014

In 2013, the 300 richest billionaires in the world collectively became +\$524 billion richer. Together they own \$3.7 trillion, which is one and a half times the GDP of (then) France; 10 times the GDP of Venezuela; 100 times the GDP of Serbia; 1,000 times that of Burkina Faso.

[OXFAM] The 85 richest people in the world together own €1.23 trillion (£1 trillion); as much as the poorest 3.5 billion people (half the world's population) combined.

[27^e edition of *Forbes*] At the end of 2013, the 1,645 billionaires in dollars together gained + 15% in one year, holding a total fortune of US \$6.4 trillion: a rate much higher than that of the global economy.

As of May 2014, the top 1% of the world's population is capturing an ever-increasing share of global income growth. Why: "The globalization of the economy, and its financialization."

United States, spring 2014: corporate profits are at their highest in 85 years; wages (and bonuses, "compensation," etc.) are at their lowest in 65 years. After taxes, corporate profits are \pm \$1.7 trillion, 10% of U.S. GDP; wages and employee benefits (retirement, etc.) are \$8.9 trillion, 52.7% of U.S. GDP, the lowest since 1948.

2015

There are 1,825 billionaires in the world. Altogether, their wealth is \pm \$7 trillion. In 2014, the global economy "weighs" \pm \$78 trillion. It has more than doubled in 30 years and the profits of this economy go on all to the richest 1% of the earth's people who as a result are ever richer.

LONGEVITY: In the United States, the disparity between the life spans of the rich and the poor is growing. In 1970, a 60-year-old in the wealthiest half of the population had 1.2 years more life expectancy than a 60-year-old in the poorest half. By 2001, the gap in average life expectancy had grown to 5.8 years.

In the generation born in 1920, the richest 10% live 6 years longer on average than the poorest 10%. For the generation born in 1950, it is 14 years more

¹² Read also on this point: International Herald Tribune, 8/06/2013 "Snuffed out by big money" - "The Unwinding - an inner history of the New America" George Packer, Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2013.

life. For the head of a poor family, life expectancy in 1920 was 72.9 years; in 1950, 73.6 years. Head of a rich family, life expectancy in 1920, 79.1 years; 1950, 87.2 years.

Since the end of the recession due to the Wall-Street crash (2010), the disparity is increasing in core, between rich and poor; more and more, we have a two-speed America, between prosperous and miserable areas. Comparison by zip code: in poor zip codes, for example, houses are 30 years older than in rich ones. The (caricatural) case of Texas: two zip codes in the same city, San Antonio, the rich one, 4% of the population below the poverty line; the poor one, 42%.

The crash-Wall Street crisis is not hitting minorities, but first and foremost the American poor, those without college degrees. While the mortality rate is falling among blacks and Hispanics, it is rising among the least educated 45–54-year-old whites, the lower-middle class category. Ditto for their hourly wage rate, which loses 14% from 1973 to 2012.

“PHILANTHROPY” In 2015, Mark Zuckerberg, CEO and large owner of *Facebook*, is the 7th largest fortune in the world (*Forbes* = \$44 billion). His “Chan-Zuck initiative,” to which he claims to “give his entire fortune,” has admirable intentions “to bring people together from all over the world, to promote equality for the children of the next generation ... connecting people to each other to build strong societies.” Yet, this so-called generous self-propaganda enterprise:

- remains under its full control, as a *Limited Liability Company*;
- ideologically promotes its own business: *marketing* social interactions; investing in various companies and lobbies to influence the public debate;
- allows colossal tax deductions.

Good intentions ... sweet language; behind the scenes, predatory mentality and practices: the “philanthropy” of other *high-tech* billionaires is of the same barrel. And their propaganda, just as much: we are coming to that.

DGSI: the machine to devour the world¹³

Extracted from a Wall Street crash 2007-2009 with impunity, the most aggressive fraction of American and international liberalism-wilderness is adopting a new order of battle. For a Harvard sociologist, these are “predatory formations,” a heterogeneous, geographically dispersed assembly of big group bosses, bankers, lawyers, accountants, scientists (mathematics and physics); global elites supported by powerful systemic capacities: IT ... Re seaux *high-tech* ... aggregating and manipulating complex knowledge and data. She concludes, “By their complex nature, these aggregates of individuals, institutions, networks and machines are difficult to identify and locate.”

Are these “predatory formations” invincible? Is the power of these “powers con figurative,” without limits or term? No: *Hubris* quickly invades them; this crazy excess and arrogance; this vertigo of absolute power that, according to the ancient Greek wisdom, the gods always punish cruelly. The all-calculable helping, unbridled cars and wild beasts detach themselves from reality; they migrate to a fantasy world where everything happens as the media-billionaires have decided it should, according to their own opinions, ideas, whims or obsessions; sectarianism or hatred. This, with a lot of trituration, of manipulation of the past, from now on struck of alignment.

However, this massive assault on reality has brutal consequences—woe betide anyone who ignores them: the criteria, canons and categories of the Cold War are dead; or only survive as dead stars and phenomena of retinal persistence. Thanks to social engineering, a new man, a new world must emerge, as originally thought by *Silicon Valley*.

An enterprise based on grand-messes and on discreet conclaves. Lap.

13 *Le Figaro* - 10/05/2014 “Colombia, an economic miracle in South America” - GE-Ideas - May 2014 “Ending the drug wars”, Report of the LSE, expert group on the economics of drug policy” - *Le Monde* - 26/04/2014 “Capitalism has entered into logics of destruction” - *Libération* - 10-12/04/2014 Forum de Rennes” - *Le Monde* - 22/01/2014 “The French still don’t like Davos” - *Le Figaro* - 7/11/2013 “Mexico, new Eldorado for French companies” - *International He raid Tribune* becomes *New York Times International* - 10/15/2013 - Special issue “Turning the page” - *New York Times* + *Le Figaro* - 1/10/2013 “Mexico’s new assets” - *Le Figaro* - 8/29/2013 “How Medellin bought itself a culture” - *Le Figaro* - 8/27/2013 “Querétaro, the emblem of Mexico that takes off” - *Le Monde Magazine* - 10/08/2013 “Curious Eldorado - Bogota, force of attraction” - *Libération* - 29-30/03/2013 “Forum de Rennes, la confiance règne” - *Colombia Report* - 1/03/2013 “Me delink named world’s most innovative city of 2012” - *International Herald Tribune* - 25/02/2013 “How Mexico got back in the game” - *Libération* - 25/02/2013 Forum “Prise d’élans pour la ville” - CLÉS - Grenoble ESC - 24/01/2013 “The Davos Forum - The game of global elites in globalization” - *International Herald Tribune Magazine* - 30/11/2012 “supplement Global Agenda” - World Happiness Report, United Nations - April 2012 “First world happiness report” *International Herald Tribune* - 25/02/2012 “Sub seizing other views at Davos” -

Davos...

At the heart of the DGSI (Davos-Goldman-Sachs-Ideology), this forum wants to impose a single global thought, in accordance with the objectives and interests of the globalized elites, or hyper-class, in the face of the old order of sovereign nation-states, born of post-Westphalian Europe - and this, of course, for hundreds of millions of dollars. Not ashamed to have praised the very thing that, coming from Wall Street, provoked the global crash of 2007-2008, “Davos” is more than ever dedicated to “reshaping the world”; pompous themes for plutocrats-patronesses, sweetly qualified as *Global Conversation*. (In 2012, *The Great Transformation, Shaping New Models*).

Its international pedestrians ...

The United Nations General Assembly hastened to follow suit: in April 2012, it organized a conference and disseminated a report by the “*Earth Institute*” on happiness in the world; politically correct nonsense and moralistic platitudes, “discovering” that, in general, it is better to be rich and healthy than poor and sick; free, of course, and endowed with good social relays (thank you, *Facebook*); not to mention a stable family life! In this, nothing even touches on crime or the highly criminogenic “social heterogeneity.”

Another DGSI-UN forum, the one dedicated to the liberalization of drugs. Talking about these traffics without saying ONE word about crime, the cartels, which dominate everything, is an immense achievement. Mission accomplished: 21 signatories, 13 experts (Nobel Prize winners ... elected officials ... politicians ... economists ... historians ... political scientists ... doctors ... Soros agents (“Open Society”) not a criminologist, not a line on organized crime. For all of them, drugs are a spontaneous generation; their manufacture and trafficking form a pyramid not even standing on its tip—but floating in the void.

... And his media vassals

The liberal-libertarian press is not to be outdone: in November 2012, a special issue of the *International Herald Tribune Magazine* titled *Global Agenda*; flooded with advertisements grand luxe, this magazine is ecstatic; everything delights it: the Earthlings have more smartphones than they have children (Thank you, *Apple*); they spent 50 million cumulated years looking at screens in 2012; sent 400 million Tweets per day ... Oh, some cis souls remain, otherwise, all is well! Science is progressing! Gender equality too! Nothing about black globalization. Crisis? Blah—no more globalizations will solve the problem. Globalized civilization is the future! Conclusion: “Without ting the vitality of our national identities, we are moving towards the first system of global governance.” Controlled by whom, this system, already? Silence.

Finally, a masterpiece of DGSi agit-prop, on October 15, 2013, when the *International Herald Tribune* becomes the *International New York Times*. 24 pages large format hyper luxury advertisements:

(Cartier ... Chanel ... Dubai Duty Free ... Ermenegildo Zegna ... LG *High Tech* ... Longlines ... Ralph Lauren ... Richard Mille ... The Peninsula ...)

Between the ads, reigns the naive optimism and the fascination of the future: the *high-tech* for will see everything ... Intelligent machines ... Agricultural *high-tech* ... Media, fashion, energy, cinema, video, *high-tech* too ... Financial giants, nice again ... Team sports and markets, all multicultural ... Inequality, political choice (of course, capitalists are innocent...). At the end, a glitch anyway: if tomorrow, the virus animals contaminated the man? Oh, in the abstract of course; no one is incriminated ... Conclusion: we must get moving ... find some energy! Faced with such an exciting future, the human herd is still very soft ... Nerve, what the hell! Do we need to specify it? Nothing on the dark side of globalization.

The Care Bear forums of Libération

After the global ukases of liberal libertarianism, their national declinations: here, *Libération* sticks to it, as a good agent of influence of the DGSi. For the hyper-class of the neo-world, the left is the worrying youth and its possible agitation: so as soon as possible, let's capture its media; let's transform them in a *mimetic* mode: to resemble every day the vaguely leftist post-sixties; to keep its symbolic attributes, anti-racism, anti-fascism; but from now on, to play an anxiolytic role and to fight against the enemies of the DGSi, or to exonerate it, according to the case. The deal is simple: this daily newspaper without readers (but not without echo) dies—or is sold to the DGSi; certainly, its uberized journalists are poorly paid; but it's either that or nothing at all.

Hence a heavy fire of Forums in 2012-2013, aimed at bringing urban youth into line, to “align its provinces”:

- Grenoble, February 1& 2, 2013: 92 speakers and 35 themes: diversity ... youth ... feminism ... economy ... sport ... music ... digital ... citizenship ... environment ... school ... Internet ... Nothing about the dark side of globalization.
- Forum Île-de-France “Le mouvement, c'est la ville” - 13 themes, 35 speakers: urbanism ... social ... mobility ... diversity ... Not a word about crime, the nightmare of the inhabitants of suburban areas. Then, “Prise d'élan dans la ville” (*Libération*, 25/02/2013), the art and manner of ignoring the elephant in the room: “think tomorrow and forget a little today” ... Transportation delays ... outdated equipment ... inequalities ... bike lanes ... slow everything down ... Crime on public transit? Assault, theft, rape? Not a word—everything is fine.
- Rennes Forum, March 29-30, 2013: 50 themes, 132 speakers, half-science,

half-people: what is in store for us, what the DGSI is directing us towards; also, what we must resist. A broth just as ideological as Stalin's *Pravda*.

- Rennes Forum (again), 10-11 April 2014 - 38 themes, 91 speakers: Where is Europe going ... The climate in 2030 A ticket to space ... Total oblivion of crime, of course.

The Eldorado scam, the flattery trick

It has always been known that “every flatterer lives at the expense of his listener,” but it still works! What do the great globalized financial beasts do to attract customers? They set off the propagandist cannon. The target country? Ignored nugget ... the Eldorado of tomorrow. This, without any subtlety: the bigger it is, the better it goes. One remembers the unfortunate Brazil in the grip of the worst economic and critical torments ... The torrent of honeyed flattery of press charlatans ... The cover of the *Inrocks*, the ecstatic file of *Libération!* “The country where the left wins,” no less...

Next victim, Mexico, during the carnage of the inter-cartel wars: “The dominant economic power of the 21st century ... So many engineers and technicians come out of its schools ... Natural gas in shambles ... Huge investments in automobiles, aerospace, consumer goods ... Start-ups galore ... \$5 billion a day in trade with the United States...” (*International Herald Tribune*, February 2013).

Mexico, in *Le Figaro*, this time, in January 2013: “Destination always more popular ... Growth exceeding that of the giants of its hemisphere ... Daily, foreign entrepreneurs land there, some from *Silicon Valley* ... They will never go back ... This tremendous energy, this feeling that anything can happen ... An open and creative country ... Charm, audacity ...”

Here comes Goldman-Sachs again (*Le Figaro*, still, August 2013): “According to the famous inventor of the BRICs, Mexico would become the 7th world economic power by 2020, ahead of India and Russia”... The historic arcades [of the city of Querétaro] house bio-bobo stores, its thousand-year-old houses turn into trendy bars...” *The Figaro*, again (November 2013): “Mexico, its privileged geographical location... its 112 million inhabitants, its emerging middle class... Already, 1,700 French companies in its 31 states...”

Another victim of the reputation scam, Medellín in Colombia (yes, the former stronghold of Pablo Escobar...): “one of the most innovative cities, rich in vision, which abolishes its barriers and practices cooperation to improve the quality of life of its inhabitants.” (Still, *Le Figaro*, August 2013): “Considered the most dangerous city in the world twenty years ago, the second largest city in Colombia has turned the page on Pablo Escobar ... The inhabitants are regaining a taste for life and business...”

Bogota, now (*Le Monde Magazine*, August 2013): “New tiger ... Its capital at draws tourists and students from around the world, seduced by its economic dynamism ... In the TOP 20 countries receiving the most foreign investment ... The refined restaurants rants pullulate ... Colombia attracts foreigners ... In the elegant north of the city, you can find all kinds of music, all kinds of atmospheres,” says a young French woman. Colombia, more widely: “Is there a Colombian miracle? One of the most promising countries of the sub-continent ... One of the most attractive for foreign investments ...” (*Le Figaro*, decidedly...)

So many blatant lies, of course, when it comes to countries that are constantly (and to this day) ravaged by criminal armies. A proof about Mexico, even though big media lie so much and more about this country: a report about the country’s security (*Knoll Global Fraud*, 2013-2014) asks expatriates living there:

- Have you experienced any physical theft? Yes, 30% (the year before, 19%),
- One or more internal flights in your company? Yes, 25% (the year before, 15%),
- Do you see corruption, bribery? Yes, 25% (the year before, 15%),
- Regulation defects? Yes, 20% (the year before, 4%),
- My company is more exposed to fraud in the last 12 months (2012, Yes, 56%), (2013, Yes... 93%)!

The report concludes that for foreign companies in Mexico, “the risk grows fast ... as do the vulnerabilities.” Let’s hope that the “Brazilian-style” scams described above have not caused too many victims among the French go-gos who believed in them...¹⁴

But why do the banking predators and their media agents feel that expatriates, tourists, investors and companies are in the lion’s den? Easy: they get rich, again and again. Because while the drug wars ravage Mexico, the northern cone of South America and most of Central America, foreign investments are pouring in. *Bank of America* report, September 2011: in Mexico, its businesses are little affected by the killings; same for Nestlé, etc. Even the 7 states in the north of Mexico, the most ravaged by the narco-war, have received more direct financial investments (FDI, *Foreign Direct Investments*), since the beginning of the war against the cartels, at the end of 2006!

The *UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbeans* (Eclac) publishes that the same is true in Central America: FDI, + 16% from 2009 to 2010 (except El Salvador). Cocaine producing countries? Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia maintain FDI.

Let us note that the flattery-predatory is not only used to fool distant and exotic countries, but also countries of the European Union—without Brussels tak-

14 - *Insight* - 09/16/2011 “Foreign investment not a casualty of the drug war explosion of violence.”

ing too much offense, or even deigning to notice it.¹⁵ It must be said that the magicians of Wall Street know how to do it: it was a brilliant idea to call a small poor country, secularly occupied by its neighbor, “Celtic Tiger” and having, in the face of the titans of finance, the “resilience” of a Chihuahua in front of a Pitbull. In the region, everyone is hypnotized: The Irish development model ... The Irish economic miracle ...

In February 2008 (just before the disaster), the Scottish independence leader Alex Salmond sees his country, independent, “becoming a Celtic Lion, whose economy will rival that of the Celtic Tiger, on the other side of the Irish Sea”—which tiger agonies already. Later in 2008, the economic expert for the Republican candidate (John McCain) in the U.S. presidential election, uses Ireland as an example of a pro-father country, with some of the lowest taxes in the world: “Senator McCain’s family emigrated from Ireland, along with millions of others, because they were hungry. Today, they [*the Irish*] have a higher per capita income than Americans.”

At full speed, the Irish banking system is swelling monstrously; speculation is becoming endemic - a real estate “bubble,” as is customary—while the country’s traditional activities (fishing, agriculture, etc.) are being abandoned because they are outdated. Weakened and underfunded, its financial control authorities can do nothing about it. How can an honest Irish civil servant stand up to this collective delusion?

The financial predators have the country in a whirlwind where theft and patriotism, in national interest and private profit are indistinguishable. Ireland’s then prime minister “can’t explain” the \$275,000 cash deposited in his account ... a win at the races? or repayment of a debt from before he had an account? For the *Mahon Tribunal*, the country’s political class is “hopelessly compromised.”

During 2008, the directors of one of the country’s pirate banks (Anglo-Irish Bank), in full amoral delirium, were recorded, preparing the lies to be told to their own government and laughing about the loans of tens of millions of euros that they would not be able to but to repay, with the Irish taxpayer picking up the tab ... Once the plundering is done, the magicians sneak back across the Atlantic. In 2010, the budget challenge city reached 32% of GDP, the highest in the European Union.

Saving the system costs the Irish €200 billion—plus the €50-70 billion in slipped in 2008-2010 by the state to support (in vain) its failing banks. 2010 days, unemployment is at 14%. Once again, Ireland is emigrating. From April 2010 to April 2011, 76,400 people left, +45%; of which 40,200 were Irish (most of them

15 *International Herald Tribune* - 29/07/2013 “Psychology of an Irish meltdown” - *International Herald Tribune* - 23/03/2012 “Corruption invaded Irish politics, tribunal says” - *Financial Times* - 3/10/2011 “Irish emigration rises as Celtic tiger grows” - *Courrier International* - 2/12/2010 “The miracle was just a mirage” - *New York Review of Books* - 11/11/2010 “Ireland: the rise and the crash.”

under 45 years old); the rest were immigrants leaving elsewhere. 1,500 Irish people move to Great Britain every month.

After Ireland and corruption, Greece and crime.¹⁶ 2010 sees immigration flooding into a Greece collapsed by its bankruptcy; for this country where street crime is usually minimal in the cities and absent from the villages, the Soros-style “open society” sees violent crime explode:

- armed robberies, doubling in 2010 over 2009,
- robbery of cab drivers, quadrupling (2010 over 2009),
- homicides, + 50% in 2010.

Athens, Piraeus, and surroundings: Albanian or Bulgarian gangs exploit criminalized African or Asian illegal migrants. Unheard of: bandits armed with kalashnikov shoot without hesitation at the debonair (and not very talented...) Greek police. In the suburbs, the number of gang wars and exactions by drug addicts is increasing manes in need.

Financial crime, chronology of a perfect crime: 2010-2014, the decisive years

United States

Prologue in 2014: seven years later, the *Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission* publishes a detailed report on the crash of 2007-2008, its origin, its course, what per put it and prohibited to counter it.¹⁷ In this text, we read 157 times the words “fraud” and “fraudulent.” And this: “*The signs of fraud were everywhere to be seen.*” As early as 2004, the Deputy Director of the FBI publicly denounced a “pervasive mortgage fraud problem” on Wall Street; intentional fraud ... voluntary admission ... conscious ignorance ... unhealthy financial products “bought and sold at the speed of light.” For the sake of clarity, the report recalls the excellent definition of mortgage fraud from Canadian law: “Deliberate use of inaccurate information, misrepresentations or omissions to finance, purchase or obtain a loan.” In short: any scheme or pretext to obtain an unjustified loan.

Doing so is a *crime* (a federal crime in the United States). The following are the statutes prosecuting fraudulent statements on the real value of securities (stocks, etc.) backed by mortgages:

- 18 USC § 1341 Mail Fraud Statute,
- 18 USC § 1343 Wire Fraud Statute,
- 18 USC § 1344 Bank Fraud Statute,

16 *International Herald Tribune* - 15/06/2011 “Greeks blame migrants for Athena’s crime wave.”

17 <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf>

- 15 USC § 78FF Securities Fraud Statute.

These federal laws were all in effect in the period (2000-2007) prior to the crash. One expert asks, “The tools for criminal prosecution are ready. The question is: who will use them?”

Answer: no one, never.

Example. At the end of 2008, Bank of America (BofA) buys the investment bank Merrill Lynch, which is bankrupt due to the crash. The CEO of BofA tells his shareholders that Merrill Lynch will lose 9 billion dollars in the 4th quarter of 2008. But the loss is \$16 billion: the CEO of BofA knows this very well. BofA executives knew the enormity of Merrill Lynch’s losses but are lying to their directors and to their general meeting. Deliberately misleading shareholders about the financial reality of a business is a crime. As a result, the financial section of the Manhattan prosecutor’s office and the SEC con damned (after a long period of inertia) BofA to a 150 million fine. Its CEO pays a 10 million fine (paid by the bank) and is banned from running a publicly traded company—but he is retired. Amusing detail: the CEO’s lawyer in the case is Mrs. Mary Jo White, whom B. Obama later appoints as chairman of the SEC.

Why these serial judicial abortions? As it is then (and still is) on the corporate and securities law side, U.S. federal law clearly distinguishes imprudence, or even incompetence of an executive, from a criminal intent or practice; merited yes, crime, no. Of course, the lawyers of the titans of finance abuse the superb magic wand. For who could establish criminal intent? The partners or executives of the offending company. But there, at the service of the fraudsters, exists the omerta—a fatal weapon once invented by the indefatigable criminal entity that is the mafia.

Demonstration.

2010¹⁸

In the summer of 2010, Goldman Sachs (GS) was fined \$550 million for “misleading investors”; those in the know were expecting twice that amount; in fact, it was 9 days of the investment bank’s profits the year before. Relief for shareholders and a rise in GS’ share price: more than enough to compensate for the fine.

At the end of February 2008, the global financial system was staggering on the brink of collapse. In 2010, 17 large American banks and financial companies distributed 2.03 billion dollars in bonuses to 600 of their executives—a level like the 2007 bonuses, before the crash triggered, directly or not, by these very beneficiaries. 80% of the sum is undeserved, say the Washington authorities. In July

18 *Le Monde* - 27/10/2010 “Ni coupables, ni responsables” - *International Herald Tribune* - 24/07/2010 “\$1.58 billion in banker’s bonuses were unmerited, U.S. says” - *International Herald Tribune* - 17/07/2010 “Costly settlement seen as Goldman coup.”

2010, these same financial institutions said they were sorry they could not recover the money lost in the crash and promised to behave properly in the future.

In October, Angelo Mozillo, ex-CEO of *Countrywide*, America's No. 1 *subprime* mortgage lender, got out of trouble. In 2007, he said of *subprime* loans, "In my life, I have never seen such a toxic financial product"—but sold them until the crash. From 2001 to 2008 this major actor of the disaster earned 522 million dollars as head of *Countrywide*. The Californian justice system fined him 67 million dollars in full settlement; without a single day in jail.

2011¹⁹

Reminder 1: In 2010, the American federal justice system sentenced 23,506 drug traffickers (*U.S. sentencing commission statistics*, Dept. of Justice). 96% of them received prison sentences. *The same is true* for all the money launderers: 806 convicted, 77% of them with firm sentences. In 2010, for example, a *dealer* from Anchorage, Alaska, received 10 years in prison for selling 10 grams of *crack cocaine*. In the same year, a trafficker from East St. Louis, Illinois, who imported 1.5 tons of cocaine in his area from 2004 to 2008, was sentenced to life imprisonment and a \$2.25 million fine.

Reminder 2: The United States of America has watertight tax havens on its own soil. Why go to exotic islands? Here is the start-up company *Wyoming Corporate Services* (WCS), home to 2,000 empty shells dedicated to stashing gray or black money. WCS provides an off-the-shelf company and a CEO lawyer, gets you a bank account; all in the confidential lawyer-client relationship. Similarly, Delaware and Nevada²⁰ do not have any regulatory tools for business start-ups; it is purely private, with no oversight or preliminary license. Thus, in these three states (perhaps elsewhere), a convict can find and run a start-up company without a preliminary investigation; in these states, no one knows the names of the real beneficiaries of the shell companies; only figure in vaguely re the "*nominee directors*" straw men. But Washington demands from the rest of the world a perfect transparency in international financial transactions.

19 *New York Times* - 12/19/2011 "WAMU grants small potatoes as executives escape liabilities" - *Los Angeles Times* - 11/27/2011 "International banks have aided Mexican drug gangs" - *New York Review of Books* - 11/24/2011 "Financial's reform: unfinished business" - *New York Review of Books* - 11/10/2011 "Should some banks be prosecuted?" - *International Herald Tribune* - 9/11/2011 "Promises, promises: Wall street gets some slack on fraud laws" - *Le Monde* - 25/10/2011 "Financial regulation : G20 challenges shadow banking" - *International Herald Tribune* - 16/07/2011 "Leading Wall Street into battle" - *International Herald Tribune* - 2/07/2011 "Western banks mishandled Libyan investments, report says" - *Reuters* - 28/06/2011 "A little house of secrets on the Great Plains" - *Le Monde* - 8/06/2011 "Goldman Sachs and Libyan millions" - *Borderland Beat* - 27/05/2011 "Too big to do time? Fed wrist slap for Wachovia bank makes a farce of the drug war" - *The Huffington Post* - 2/02/2011 "Afghanistan's too big to fail bank is failing - Guess our system doesn't work there, either" - *The Huffington Post* - 2/02/2011 "Afghanistan's too big to fail bank is failing."

20 U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment, 2006 "Wyoming, Delaware, Nevada = highest level of corporate anonymity."

More than two years after the Wall Street crash, how is financial crime being dealt with? “So far, federal agencies have charged very few of the large financial entities that caused the collapse; not a single indictment of any major bank executive” (The prestigious *New York Review of Books*).

Impunity, therefore. All the more so since, as everything fits together, the tiny FBI (constantly less than 15,000 agents for 320 million Americans) must “rob Peter to pay Paul” after the 9/11 attacks: before, its financial fraud section had more than 1,000 agents; in 2007, on the eve of the crash, it had 120 left.

These large financial predators know this. In addition, they are cronies of political leaders and flout the laws and rules, with complete disdain for the control/regulation agencies; they can commit fraud, forge documents, and launder criminal money. An immunity equivalent to a license to commit crimes.

The only comedy that these predators deign to submit to is to swear that the laws will be 100% respected from now on, that cheating is over, that in the future they will be impeccable, etc. An official account shows that between 1995 and 2010, 19 American giants (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan-Chase, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, CityGroup,²¹ etc.) took 51 of these oaths, only to make a mockery of it later: Bank of America, 5 oaths violated, Merrill Lynch, 7; City Group, 4, etc. —but the SEC has not prosecuted a single one of these cynical men for violating an oath. One banker quipped, “The SEC is a cop who hands out fliers, not tickets.”

And Washington’s modest efforts to order finance are countered by effective lobbyists dedicated to killing any reform; if not, water it down; water down the repressive dog as much as possible. Propelled by a hundred financial giants with millions of dollars, a lobbying ace like Steve Bartlett and his “*Financial Services Roundtable*” brilliantly managed to “reform the reform” (called, after the Wall Street crash, “Dodd-Frank Act”). In 1999, Bartlett had the Glass-Steagall law abolished, prohibiting the mixing of investment banks and commercial banks; he then created “*too big to fail*” banking monsters; and finally, the crash of 2007-2008.

Beyond simple lobbying, says an expert, “the weight of the banking lobby, the shortcomings of the regulators, the complicity of auditors, law firms or consultants acting as cartels, the weakness of counterpowers, emasculate the new regulations.”

Now let’s see the financial predators at work. The first to be caught—without serious consequences later on, don’t worry! —the regional bank Wachovia. Before the crash, it handled \$420 billion (transfers, cash, travelers’ checks, etc.) from Mexican exchange houses (*Casas de Cambio*), notorious cartel piggy banks. Some of this money is used to buy used planes that, in one case alone, brought 22 tons of cocaine into the United States. In 2009, the giant Wells Fargo buys Wachovia,

21 CityGroup, which the Federal Reserve also says, “lacks effective anti-money laundering tools.”

12.7 billion dollars; Wells Fargo is then fined 160 million dollars, less than 2% of its 2009 profits. None of its directors gets a day in prison. For (the powerless) federal prosecutor “Wachovia’s disregard for all our banking laws gave the international cocaine cartels a virtual *carte blanche* for their financing operations.”

From the grotesque sanctions register, let’s move on to Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu), which collapsed in 2008, causing the worst bank failure in U.S. history. For Senator Carl Lewin of Michigan, who chairs the Senate Select Committee, “WaMu symbolizes everything that went wrong in the banking industry and contributed to the financial crisis.” Three WaMu executives were “sanctioned” in December 2011, by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

- WaMu’s CEO earned \$88 million (bonuses, etc.) from 2001 to 2007. His fine is \$275,000; as a bonus, he is deprived of his pension,
- WaMu’s former president is fined \$100,000 plus pension deprivation (but otherwise gets \$5.4 million back),
- The former director of real estate lending was fined \$50,000 and deprived of his pension (but otherwise recovered \$1.9 million).

Sometimes financial piranhas also steal from foreign investors. In June 2006, the Libyan sovereign wealth fund LIA, “Libyan Investment Authority” was created with ± 40 billion dollars of liquidity. From January to June 2008, LIA deposits at gold man Sachs 1.3 billion dollars ... of which 98% vanish until 2010. Shameless looting, squandering by various *hedge funds* and large banks: unjustified fees of tens millions of dollars ... Goldman Sachs “doesn’t understand how it could have ‘lost’ a billion dollars...”²²

But why limit us to the usual prey and hunting grounds? This is the “Shadow Bank.” Three years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, G20 experts are alarmed to learn that 16,000 billion dollars of out-of-control assets form a *shadow banking* or peripheral financial system with “low transparency.” Its players including non-depository banks, *hedge funds*, insurers, money market and/or hedge funds and other private actors; entities on which regulators have “little or no visibility.” A per lousy pile of alternative products to bank credits, hyper-complex, associated with high-speed, automated and high frequency transactions.²³ Of course, the operators of this “underground financing” are still more or less the same people responsible for the 2007-2008 crash.²⁴

22 *New York Times* - 1/02/2014 “Libyan fund sues Goldman over loss from derivative trades” - Goldman Sachs “lost” \$1 billion in derivatives trading, but pocketed \$350 million in fees in the process, etc. Fate has a way of working itself out! In the case, Goldman Sachs also “lost its archives”...

23 *International Herald Tribune* - 10/24/2012 “Report finds little harm in high-speed trading” - After two years of observation, ultra-fast stock trading is deemed safe from manipulation for investors. After all, “markets have become too complex to be understood even by the most learned,” so... Possible criminal risks are not even mentioned in the study.

24 *Le Figaro* - 12/20/2012 “Shadow finance continues to grow”: according to the G20’s Financial Sta-

2012²⁵

Reminder: Pat Truglia is a (lay) associate of the Colombo family (New York Mafia), close to the family's *consigliere*, Thomas Farese. In November 2012, Truglia gets 2 years in prison for laundering \$40,000 ... Unfortunate! Because no member of the banking elite guilty of the Wall Street crash-2007-2008 is in prison, or has even been threatened to go. Apart from the unlucky mafiosi, only lampposts, or micro-bank bosses of lost holes are incarcerated: LaCoste national bank (LaCoste, Texas), Hume Bank (Missouri), Pinehurst bank (St Paul, Minnesota), Colonial Bank (Montgomery, Alabama).

On Wall Street itself, Rajat Gupta, the second knife away from the very tight center of banking power, is getting two years in prison and a \$5 million fine for "insider trading." This senior Goldman Sachs executive is said to have passed on confidential data to the CEO of Galleon Group, Raj Rajaratnam, who will be punished even more severely: 11 years in prison and a fine of more than 150 million dollars.

The *subprime* affair was impossible without the complicity of the rating agencies (Moody's Investors Services, Standard & Poor's, Fitch), whose model is already a chemically pure conflict of interest: the more products a financier has them rate, the richer they get. Only one small agency in New York, Egan-Jones Ratings (EJR), acts ethically: its clients pay it, not the financiers. The three big agencies are silent and will never be worried: the SEC is indicting EJR for trifles, such as a poorly completed paperwork.

bility Board, "shadow finance" represents in volume, at the end of 2011, half of the global banking system (27% of this same system in 2007). With a direct influence on the real economy, this shadow finance poses similar systemic risks to the global economy.

- 25 *Global Research* - 31/12/2012 "Fraud, money laundering and narcotics, impunity of the banking giants - no prosecution for HSBC. *AFP* - 12/17/2012 "Money laundering: 4.7 million euro fine for HSBC" - *Insight* - 12/14/2012 "Sinaloa cartel bought narco plane via HSBC Bank" - *Gangsters Inc.* 12/13/2012 "Greedy bankers of HSBC working with drug cartels" - *Le Monde* - 12/13/2012 "Monitor and punish" - *BBC News* - 12/11/2012 "HSBC to pay 1,9 bn in US money laundering penalties" - *Wall Street Journal* - 13/11/2012 "The greatest epidemic of elite white collar crime in the history of the world" - *Reuters* - 8/11/2012 "JP Morgan reaches deal with SEC staff on two mortgage probes" - *International Herald Tribune* - 26/10/2012 "Gupta sentenced to 2 years in insider trade case" - *International Herald Tribune* - 12/10/2012 "Emails suggest collusion among equity firms" - *International Herald Tribune* - 25/07/2012 "Cheats confess, but that's no consolation" - *The Guardian* - 07/21/2012 "Trade minister lord Green failed to halt flow of drugs cash as HSBC boss" - *Sydney Morning Herald* - 07/18/2012 "US Senate report accuses HSBC of money laundering" - *AFP* - 07/17/2012 "Anti-money laundering : A US parliamentary report points to HSBC's shortcomings" - *Insight* - 7/17/2012 "HSBC exposed US to Mexican drug money" - *Liberation* - 7/17/2012 "HSBC suspected of money laundering" - *AP* - 7/17/2012 "HSBC allowed narcosis to launder millions" - *Wall Street Journal* - 7/15/2012 "HSBC near pact in laundering der probe" - *Business Week* - 7/9/2012 "FBI says cartel used Bank of America to launder money" - *Fox News Latino* - 7/9/2012 "Mexico drug cartel funneled money through bank of America, FBI says" - *Rolling Stone* - 5/07/2012 "The scam Wall Street learned from the mafia" - *Reuters* - 7/05/2012 "Special report : Documents allege HSBC money laundering" - *International Herald Tribune* - 4/05/2012 "SEC's puzzling pursuit of small game" - *International Herald Tribune* - 20/04/2012 "For banks, an easy way around new rules" - *WND* - 2/02/2012 "Banking giant accused of laundering billions."

But says *The New York Times*—not exactly an anti-capitalist slur—Wall Street is populated by compulsive cheaters, always defrauding when in trouble—sometimes, monumentally, for decades [*We'll see the LIBOR fraud later*]. In the scandals of the time, Madoff, MF Global and Peregrine Financial Group “lost” 32 billion dollars, without recovering a tenth of the loot. Basic cheating on Wall Street: insider trading, of course. But the only scapegoats are two obscure emissaries from the Indian subcontinent (India, Gupta; Ceylon, Rajaratnam).

All this is nothing compared to the scandal that shook the banking giant HSBC.

Founded in 1865 by Scotsmen who were involved in the (then legal) opium trade between the British Raj of India and China, the *Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation* is a genuine giant. In 2011, it was the 5th largest bank in the world in terms of capital, with 2,600 million U.S. dollars in assets, present in 85 countries, 7,500 offices and branches: ± 55 million clients beyond, 1,200 correspondent banks.

As the world's leading financial and economic powerhouse, HSBC should refrain from cheating and act as an ethical bank. However, like other financial giants, HSBC never stops cheating—which led one magistrate to say that “The planet of crime has its own banking system: the problem is that it is also ours.”²⁶

Everything goes through it: transactions for Saudi banks “close to al-Qaeda”; recycling of funds from Iran (25,000 transactions, nearly \$20 billion); global financial assistance to bandits, swindlers and terrorists (including the Hezbollah): Mexico ... Argentina ... Russia ... Colombia ... Libya ... Sudan ... Burma ... Paraguay ... Cuba; embargos diverted, sanctions circumvented, etc.

Did you like Wachovia? On the criminal finance side, you'll love HSBC.

Some examples:

In the United States itself, since 2003, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the New York State Bank regulators have been watching HSBC for its serious lack of anti-money laundering controls. In its accounts, hundreds of billions of dollars are freely exchanged from banks and exchange offices in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, etc. Often on accounts of fictitious or dissolved companies or created by identity fraud. A field check reveals the addresses of the ghost companies holding the zombie accounts: empty offices, even vacant lots ... Buildings abandoned ... disconnected phones, etc. From 2005 to 2008, this “laundress” recycled \$106 million in cash.

Including a huge case of laundering the proceeds of a health care fraud.

26 Without falling into encyclopedism, let's note in passing that at the same time, another giant bank, the *Bank of America*, was laundering hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of the, in connection with the brother of Miguel-Angel Trevino, known as “Z40,” the great leader of the bloodthirsty cartel.

Two prosecutors (West Virginia, New York) are following the case: they condemn “a massive, conscious and systematic violation of the American anti-money laundering laws of and 2005 ... factitious *compliance*, superficial at best.” Conclusion: “HSBC has systematically and scandalously violated the Bank Secrecy Act.”

- *In Mexico* - Heart of the financial-criminal maelstrom. HSBC (HBMX) is clearly at the service of the cartels: money transfers ... currency exchange ... international settlements: all financial transactions useful to the *narcosis*. From 2006 to 2009, ± 670 billion US\$ circulate between HSBC-Mexico and HSBC-US (HBUS); on a daily basis, hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash are deposited without verification on a single account. In 2008 alone, HBMX sent HBUS \$4 billion in *cash*, making it the largest exporter of U.S. dollars from Mexico to the U.S. The vast majority of these banknote designs come from the Sinaloa (Mexico) cartel and the Norte del Valle (Colombia) cartel.

HSBC has no idea of the real holders of 15% of its Mexican bank accounts. Through two shell companies “Grupo Rahero SC” and “Grupo ETBP,” the HSBC-Cayman Islands subsidiary sets up the purchase of two second-hand planes from the American group IATS, of Oklahoma City, to deliver cocaine from the Sinaloa cartel, from Central America to Mexico.

Details that kill: interception of a telephone exchange between high-level Mexican *narcosis*. One says, “HSBC is the best place to launder our money. To facilitate the physical transfer of piles of dollars, the cartel accountants must deposit the cash ‘in boxes with the exact shape of the HBMX cashier’s windows!’” The U.S. justice system concluded that “HSBC-Mexico transferred [*more dirty money*] than any other Mexican bank ... but did not find it suspicious.”

The pot of gold discovered HSBC sheds crocodile tears. It “considers itself responsible” ... is “deeply sorry”... HBUS had a capitalization of ± 150 billion dollars. It is accused of having laundered 7 billion dollars for the *narcosis*; 16 billion dollars of secret transactions with Iran; in general, 670 billion dollars of suspicious movements. To make up for it all, HSBC is paying a \$1.9 billion fine—a pittance: in 2011, its global profit was \$22 billion.²⁷ Of course, none of its executives is sentenced to a day in prison and none of its banking licenses are revoked, anywhere. Hence the (unappealing) nickname of HSBC from the American anti-money laundering services: *Holy Shit Bank Corrupt*.

In the Wall-Street galaxy, the *private equity* giants are no better, between cronyism, connivance, and fake competition. In 2007, a complaint was filed against 11 of these titans by Boston shareholders (who felt that they had received billions of dollars) for illicit practices and violation of antitrust laws. They are Blackstone Group, KKR (Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts), Bain Capital, Apollo Management, Carlyle Group, Merrill Lynch, TPG, etc. What they are accused of: rigged auctions,

²⁷ *Bloomberg* - 3/07/2013 “HSBC judge approves \$1.9 billion drug money laundering deal.”

fictitious competition, etc. In 2012, the justice denounces a “secret pact between these 11 giants, to share the large possible acquisitions and thus, artificially and illegally maintain their low price.”

And what about the regulation that should avoid tomorrow any drama like the Wall Street crash of 2007-2008? As soon as it is voted, it is quickly circumvented. The new rule (“*Volcker Rule*”)²⁸ forbids banks to speculate for their own account in a casino style (not for their clients, but for their personal profit); funds that the taxpayer will pay in case of fail lite. The new Dodd-Frank law imposes the rule: banks must *immediately* close their “proprietary trading” desks. But the tricksters quickly discovered the loophole in the *Volcker Rule*: in order to “do their job,” “keep the market liquid,” “protect themselves” and “protect themselves,” banks can always *hedge* against the risks inherent in their activities. Stashed elsewhere in the bank for *hedging* reasons, this hedging activity quickly becomes a new ... proprietary trading center. The not-so-anti-Semitic *New York Times* called it a “Talmudic exercise” in outrage.

2012 also reveals the systemic, constant, incessant side of financial predation in the United States. This is a platonic revelation because, of course, the culprits emerge unscathed or almost unscathed from the trials that a powerless American justice system is exhausting itself to bring against them. It is about a criminal collusion organized between ... a cartel of the same (JP Morgan,²⁹ Bank of America, UBS, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Wachovia, etc.), in order to rig the public tenders for *Municipal Bonds*, an annual market of (then) 3,700 billion dollars.

Intermediaries who are accomplices of the above-mentioned banks (and others) have been rigging these tenders for ten years. Before going into detail, let us note that the leaders of these giant banks idolize and invoke the “markets” at every turn, making them the supreme arbiter of social life—but happily rigging them at the first opportunity. For this case, here is how.

When a municipality or state wants to build a new school or hospital, they look (in the American system) for investors on Wall Street. The money found is at the disposal of the city or the state, but if it is not used immediately and suddenly, it is placed. But the banks and intermediaries in charge of this are rigging these calls for tenders, sharing the blows and illegally lowering the interest rates, thus raiding billions of dollars: for UBS alone, 100 auctions of bonds in 4 years, 16 billion dollars stolen.

A seemingly small difference (5% interest instead of 5.15%) takes hundreds of millions of dollars out of the hands of municipalities: fewer computers, fewer

28 Named after Paul Volcker, former central banker and then financial advisor to President Obama.

29 JP Morgan has been involved in most of the financial scams of the 21st century (to stay with the recent period...). Among many others, it was for 20 years the bank of the stratospheric swindler Bernie Madoff, thus complicit in a scam of more than 25 billion dollars, perhaps the worst in the history of world finance. But JP Morgan says it “didn’t see any of this”..

textbooks, etc. Worse: the *New Jersey Health Care Facilities Finance Authority* issues bonds to finance state's hospitals. But rigging the interest on \$17 billion in bonds issued is causing 10 hospitals in the state to close—of course, in poor neighborhoods...

In the case, the magistrates collected 570,000 telephone damning conversations. Their conclusion: these bankers acted like mafia members. Trial in New York (Manhattan) in April-May 2012, after ten years of investigation. Significantly, there were no important journalists in the room. Second knives are on trial. UBS, Bank of America, Chase and Wells Fargo must together return 673 million dollars to spoliated cities. In 2011, Chase and Bank of America had already paid \$365 million in fines for these cheats. Yet that same year, they were still the two major actors in the municipal bond market, more than \$35 billion in bonds issued. Their fine? A drop in the bucket...

In the last quarter of 2012, it was the presidential campaign, where Barack Obama was re-elected against the Republican Mitt Romney. In October 2012, Obama's attorney general, Eric Holder, trumpets in a press conference the successes of his department in dealing with financial fraud: 530 indictments, including 172 financial executives, as part of 1 billion in fraud.

Once the election was over and the voter was fooled—but we suspected it—the wind fell back: 107 indictments, no executive or boss in the trap, for the misery of 95 million dollars: lampposts and peanuts...³⁰

2013³¹

Reminder, about the “double standard”: In California alone, due to the “*Three strikes and you're out*” law, there were 360 people sentenced to life in prison for *pilfering at the end of 2012*. At the same time, federal statistics report that since the 2008 crash, the income of 95% of Americans has declined. Since 2009, the cost of the crash to the U.S. economy has reached \$14 trillion.

30 *New York Times International* - 03/19/2014 “Hype trumped accuracy in fraud investigation.”

31 *New York Times* - 12/17/2013 “Judge questions lack of charges” - *Global Research* - 9/11/2013 “The SAC insider trading case - Hedge funds and America's financial aristocracy” - *Financial Times* - 5/11/2013 “SAC to pay biggest insider fine of \$ 1.8 bn” - *The Guardian* - 10/26/2013 “JP Morgan agrees to \$ 5,1 bn fine with mortgage regulators” - *International Herald Tribune* - 10/25/2013 “JP Morgan is a target in Madoff inquiry” - *Le Figaro* - 9/15/2013 “Five years after Lehman Brothers, the financial risk has shifted” - *International Herald Tribune* - 9/10/2013 “How US let Lehman executives off the hook” - *New York Review of Books* - 8/15/2013 “The Fed & big banking at the crossroads” - *International Herald Tribune* - 10/08/2013 “UBS agrees to settle Lehman case” - *Le Figaro* - 31/05/2013 “The crisis has sounded the markets, but leaves little trace in the legal chronicle” - *International Herald Tribune* - 21/05/2013 “US subpoenas hedge fund billionaire” - *Global Research* - 7/05/2013 “Money laundering and the drug trade: the role of the banks” - *International Herald Tribune* - 2/04/2013 “Dark Pools lure growing numbers of stock trades” - *Forbes* - 26/03/2013 “Fed hits Citi over money laundering problems” - *International Herald Tribune* - 16/01/2013 “How US hit a dead end in building case against billionaire” - *Atlantic Monthly* - Jan. 2013 “What's inside America's bank.”

Still in 2013, 80% of investors have “no confidence in the financier system.” We can understand them: evidence in support of this, giants such as Bank of America, CityGroup, HSBC, JP Morgan, Wachovia, Western Union, etc., “very opaque black boxes,” have almost with impunity laundered billions of cartel money.³²

Judicial aftermath of the 2008 crash: we learn that by falsifying documents, etc., UBS and JP Morgan deceived “Fannie Mae” and “Freddie Mac” on the quality of mortgages sold during the real estate bubble (which preceded the crash).³³ The Federal Housing Finance Agency fined UBS \$900 million³⁴ and JP Morgan \$5.1 billion, a mere trifle for the two giants. On the repression side, Eric Holder, Obama’s attorney general, is urging Congress to be careful with the mega-banks, as heavy penalties “could have a negative impact on the national and even global economy.” The street is ironic: *too big to jail*.

Five years after the collapse of Wall Street, where do we stand? “Today, the banks are bigger and opaquer than ever, acting much as they did before the crash”; these are of course the *usual suspects*: Bank of America, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Standard Chartered, UBS, Wells Fargo, etc. At the end of 2013, the top six U.S. banks held ± \$10 trillion in assets, 25% more than in 2008.

In the United States, since the (purely criminal) collapse of the *subprimes*, no financial crime case has been brought to trial. In the civil courts, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, and CityGroup, have paid risible fines and (modestly) compensated some clients. That is the end of the story. No Wall Street bank executive has faced a single criminal or regulatory charge since 2008. In 2012, the SEC dropped all charges, in secret and without public announcement. Yet these Lehman Brothers executives were bragging about the excellent health of their bank, shortly before it collapsed! A bank whose 2008 accounts were rigged to simulate a healthy balance sheet: “balance sheet manipulation” ... “Deception towards the shareholders,” are *crimes*. But here nothing, not even a fine...

“The *Dodd-Frank Act 2010*, which is supposed to remedy all this, is being sabotaged:”

- It gave the Federal Reserve a regulatory and supervisory role in finance and created a new position of vice president for banking supervision. As of August 2013, the position remains unfilled.

32 At the end of 2012, the world drug market (street price) is ± 400 billion dollars per year, 8% of world trade.

33 *Fannie Mae*: Federal National Mortgage Association (created in 1938) and *Freddie Mac*: Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (1970): two federal agencies with a public service mission, then privatized dedicated to encouraging access to home ownership for average Americans by purchasing their mortgage loans from banks.

34 UBS also lied to its investors about the health of Lehman Brothers and was fined \$120 million for doing so.

- It created a new *Financial Stability Oversight Council* at the Department of the Treasury—still a fictional one as of summer 2013.

And the six regulatory bodies for banking and finance? Rather inefficient, they step on each other's toes, in a climate of friction and confusion:

- Federal Reserve,
- SEC (Securities & Exchange Commission),
- FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation),
- CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission),
- Federal Housing Finance Agency,
- Office of the Controller of the Currency.

As far as predatory *hedge funds* are concerned, the “star” of the year was SAC Capital Advisors, owned by billionaire Steven A. Cohen (fortune of ± 9 billion dollars); *hedge fund*, which manages ± 15 billion dollars, a thousand employees, 5 offices in the world, etc.—undoubtedly one of the juiciest in the United States: the average profit of a *hedge fund* is about 8% per year—that is already important—that of SAC sometimes reaches 30% annually.

The reputation of *hedge funds* in general is not exactly pristine, but SAC's is awful: for the FBI it is “an empire of fraud ... a corrupt entity based on insider trading on an unprecedented scale”; its boss? “A mafia godfather, head of a criminal gang.” No less. SAC has already paid \$616 million for past fractions. Justice is served. Really? SAC must ultimately pay \$1.2 billion in fines for insider trading.

Steven A. Cohen, on the other hand, is untouchable: the American justice system as it is cannot nail a major financial predator, based on the confessions or accusations of his subordinates. In the end, some underlings plead guilty to insider trading, spend at worst a few months in the shade, pay risible fines (here, \$192,000 dollars, the worst...) or are banned from practicing for a few years. They probably don't regret it afterwards ... The boss? Nothing. In 2012, SAC earned \$1.3 billion: the fine will wipe out its annual profit.

A new tool of predation: the “*Dark Pools*,” private sites where shares are sold and exchanged outside the public platforms (NYSE, Nasdaq, etc.). There, *traders* and investors act “hidden behind a veil where only the operator and the *pool* know what is going on”—one can imagine the shenanigans. In 2008, $\pm 16\%$ of shares were sold on these “Black Pools”; by the end of 2013, the figure had risen to 40%. Of the thirty or so large *Dark Pools* in the United States, the main one, *Crossfinder*, belongs to Credit Suisse, a bank whose transparency is not ideal.

2014³⁵

Seven years have passed since the crash began. The ensuing global panic has not resulted in any serious international legislation on bankruptcy. In particular, the crucial international cooperation of commercial courts remains at zero. Despite the Obama White House's boasts that "*The era of 'too big to fail' is over,*" indicting per a large group in 2014 and punishing its guilty leaders remains just as impossible as it was seven years ago. Money laundering ... Market rigging ... Tax evasion ... Selling toxic financial products ... Stealing real estate rights ... Taking insane risks ... William Dudley, the perfectly impotent chairman of the New York Federal Reserve, moans, "We have evidence of the serious professional vices and perverses of many of the great financial institutions"; yet they, to put it philosophically, "persevere in their being."

We find out every day: in 2014, the SEC is investigating the complicity of Bank of America (again!) and stockbroker Charles Schwab with Mexican cartels (again). "We are troubled by the suggestion that we, Charles Schwab, would disobey anti-money laundering laws" says, without laughing, the usual silly helpful spokesperson

From Bank of America, no comment.

Outside of even the financial world Toyota, which seriously and long deceived its American customers about the safety of its vehicles, is fined \$1.2 billion in 2014—6% of its 2013 profits.

And the predatory banks? At the end of 2013, Bank of America's assets were \$3 trillion; CityGroup's assets were \$2.7 trillion, and JP Morgan's assets were \$3.7 trillion.

Let's conclude with JP Morgan: in 2013, its stock price rose by 28%; its balance sheet is close to 4,000 billion dollars; expected profit in 2014: \$28 billion. Thus, the \$13 billion fine planned by the U.S. Department of Justice would be easily digestible—especially since 7 of the 13 billion would be tax deductible ... But no: Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan's CEO, called Eric Holder, Attorney General, and demanded that he stop everything: "The Department of Justice is canceling a press conference and stopping the legal proceedings." The precise facts of the case against JP Morgan, the investigation and its results remain unknown. Delighted to

35 *New York Post* - 05/22/2014 "SEC probes Bank of America, Schwab, for cartel ties" - *New York Times International* - 04/9/2014 "Seeking justice, but settling for much less" - *New York Times International* - 04/4/2014 "A pivotal case ends with a whimper" - *New York Review of Books* - 04/3/2014 "Why have top executives escaped prosecution?" - *Le Monde* - 3/29/2014 "The Dodd-Frank Act didn't fix anything" - *New York Times* - 3/14/2014 "Viewing banks as the heart of darkness" - *Le Monde* - 1/25/2014 "JP Morgan, a denial of justice" - *New York Times* - 1/25/2014 "After fines, JP Morgan gives chief a big raise" - *New York Times* - 1/9/2014 "JP Morgan can afford its series of huge fines" - *New York review of Books* - 1/9/2014 "The financial crisis: why have no high-level executives been prosecuted?"

get away with such an efficient “neutralization” of Washington, the shareholders of JP Morgan maintain its annual remuneration at \$20 million dollars (despite the hole in the fines).

Elsewhere in the world

The plague of Wall Street infects the financial world³⁶

In the years 2010-2012, various European banks were targeted by the American justice system: ABN-Amro (Netherlands), Barclays and Lloyds (UK), Credit Suisse, etc. The leading Dutch financial services company, ING-Bank paid the U.S. Treasury, in June 2012, \$619 million in fines for laundering funds from Burma, Bangladesh, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan; as a bonus, it instructed Iran on the subtle art of circumventing an embargo.

HSBC-London was then under investigation for financing the Saudi Islamic bank al-Rajhi, “close” to al-Qaeda. Also in London, the banking giant Standard Chartered paid a \$667 million fine to the United States at the end of 2012 for “illicit activities.” This “barely scratches its profit for the year, 4.8 billion dollars.”

Caught red-handed, these British banks (the above, plus Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds Bank, etc.) beat their chests, willingly pay a (ridiculous) fine and solemnly swear never to break the law again. Of course, their huge losses are passed on to the taxpayer, to whom the collapse of HBOS (Halifax-Bank of Scotland) alone cost £20 billion.

Switzerland, criminal laundering,³⁷ fraudulent manipulations

It should be noted that Swiss law allows a fine to be tax-free (international, on all), thus reducing the bank’s net profit—and therefore its taxes. Credit Suisse CEO’s placid reaction after a (supposed) giant fine from the U.S. tax authorities: “We expect very little impact on our business.”

HSBC is again implicated; here, the HSBC Private Bank of Geneva; the Geneva bank Lombard Odier, too. According to the Spanish police, “Chinese mafia money transactions” have been identified; the proof is in the hundreds of pag-

36 *The Guardian* - 10/04/2013 “They cost us billions, yet our disgraced banks are getting away with it” - *International Herald Tribune* - 6/03/2013 “US penalty dents profit at Standard Chartered” - *The Guardian* - 10/11/2012 “Jersey inquiry into HSBC as list of account holders leaked” - *International Herald Tribune* - 10/11/2012 “UK officials investigate HSBC over tax haven” - *Global Research* - 11/10/2012 “Financial crime in London’s ‘parasites paradise’, or the best sanctuary money can buy.”

37 *Libération* - 21/05/2014 “Record fine imposed on Credit Suisse” - *RTS.ch* - 15/01/2013 “Une affaire de blanchiment élabore des banques genevoises” - *Le Monde* - 2/01/2013 “Blanchiment : le chaînon manquant entre financiers et trafiquants arrêté” - *Le Monde* - 21/12/2012 “Scandale du Libor : la manipulation était routinière et généralisée chez UBS” - *Le Figaro* - 20/12/2012 “Libor : UBS fined more than €1 billion” - *International Herald Tribune* - 12/20/2012 “UBS to pay \$ 1.5 billion for rigging rates” - *Global Research* - 2/11/2012 “HSBC caught in new drug money laundering scandal.”

es of transcribed phone taps and masses of bank documents. Executives of these banks were operating a compensation—of course illicit—between Chinese mafiosi wanting to get their criminal money out of Spain, and Spanish tax evaders wanting to recover at home, in cash, their money deposited in Switzerland. Another possibility is the transfer from bank to bank, in Switzerland itself—between HSBC Private Bank, Lombard Odier, or others. All this, to the detriment of the Spanish tax authorities.

The same system made it possible to launder the funds of Moroccan drug traffickers and wholesalers (including the “godfather,” Sofiane N.) operating between Morocco and the Paris region, or to operate compensation for their benefit. At the heart of the system are the Meyer brothers, Mardoché, Freha and Nissim el-Maleh, the latter one of the “wealth managers” of HSBC-Geneva. Plus, various other French Israeli Moroccans. And a laundered total exceeding (as far as we know) 100 million euros.

An impressive nebula of shell companies and accounts, a spider’s web woven between the Bahamas, Panama, the United Arab Emirates, Spain, the United States, Switzerland, France, Great Britain, and Israel. At the center of this web is a secret compensation chamber that generates tens of millions of euros each year.

- Collects, in France first, the cash of drug traffickers and puts it in a safe place,
- Provides cash to holders of illicit accounts abroad who want money for their lifestyle, without crossing a border; among them, ‘bobos,’ including two elected members of EELV, business lawyers, art dealers, company directors, etc.
- Finally, it launders drug money, especially in real estate operations in the Maghreb and the Middle East, as well as in gold bars, works of art, etc.

*City of London: Libor, foreign exchange market*³⁸

LIBOR³⁹ UBS and Credit Suisse are involved in the international bank rate scam. They moaned, pleaded good faith, “actively cooperated in the investigations,” and

38 *Libération* - 5/11/2013 “Currencies: investment banks in business” - *Le Monde* - 4/11/2013 “The foreign exchange market pays the price for its laxity” - *Financial Times* - 19/08/2013 “Damages sought for Libor fixing” - *AFP* - 29/01/2013 “A £500 million settlement in sight for RBS in the Libor affair” - *International Herald Tribune* - 10/01/2013 “UK grills executives from UBS on rate rigging” - *La Tribune* - 20/12/2012 “Libor: UBS’s troubles continue ... in China, this time” - *BBC News* - 12/19/2012 “UBS fined \$1,5 bn for Libor rigging” - *International Herald Tribune* - 12/12/2012 “UK authorities arrest 3 in rate-rigging scandal” - *Le Figaro* - 11/12/2012 “After Libor, Euribor scandal will break” - *International Herald Tribune* - 6/11/2012 “Barclays caught in US regulators vise” - *AFP* - 08/15/2012 “Ages make Libor” - 08/15/2012 “Libor affair: 7 banks subpoenaed in the United States” - *Libération* - 8/08/2012 “Standard Chartered, a new scandal for the City” - *Libération*. + *Afp* - 6/07/2012 “Libor scandal: a criminal investigation opened in the United Kingdom.”

39 An authentic international manipulation, coordinated on the scale of the financial planet: see the essential below, in the passage on the City of London, where the mess seems to have originated.

fired two or three lampoons: the usual *show*. Finally condemned, they don't care. *London Inter Bank Offered Rate*, the rate at which 18 mega-banks lend to each other, is calculated based on spontaneous self-declaration on a daily basis. Crucial for the global capital market (Dollar Yen, Euro, Swiss Franc, etc.), and therefore for the financing of economies, LIBOR refers to billions (minimum) of daily transactions.

However, this rate has been manipulated, at least for six full years, with the British control con damning "a serious corruption of financial procedures." In addition to LIBOR, EURI BOR (a panel of 43 continental European banks), and HIBOR (Hong Kong interbank rate, theoretically controlled by HKMA, *Hong Kong Money Authority*).

Let's note in passing that the mega-auditors like Deloitte, who are supposed to control their clients during the audit of their accounts, have seen nothing and denounced nothing. Same pitiful failure of the (platonic) *compliance* of these banks.

Many of the large predatory banks (always the same ones, to go quickly) "arranged" rates to their own advantage, to fill their pockets even more by increasing their positions, or to camouflage their difficulties. Proof that we are far from the stupid liberal concept of "victimless crime": various pension funds and *hedge funds* then sue these predatory banks, whose collusion and manipulations made them lose considerable sums.

At the end of the day, Barclays pays \$453 million to U.S. and U.K. regulators in June 2012 for manipulating LIBOR & EURIBOR—a small price to pay for dropping any further investigation.⁴⁰

The bill for UBS is a little more expensive: 1.2 billion dollars, between the U.S. justice system and the British and Swiss market authorities. From 2005 to 2010, the justice system denounces the more than 2,000 financial offences of dozens of important actors of UBS, which, at the end, makes an act of contrition ("We were too arrogant..."): the fines are not very expensive—but that doesn't cost anything.

In the same LIBOR round-up, Royal Bank of Scotland, HSBC, Rabobank (Netherlands), Deutsche Bank (Germany), JP Morgan, Citibank (US) were also caught (surprise!) for fines of several hundred million dollars.


FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET. Another market manipulation. In November 2013, a dozen *traders* from the "usual suspects" Barclays, CityGroup, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JP Morgan, Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS, undergo an international investigation (United States, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Switzerland)

⁴⁰ Then in great predatory form, Barclays was soon sued by the *Federal Energy Regulatory Commission* in the United States, which accused it of having manipulated the price of energy in California and in towers, by accumulating "complex transactions," and was about to impose a fine of 435 million dollars.

for rigging the FOREX (FOReign EXchange, foreign exchange market) of London, which then, brews ± 5,300 billion dollar (€ 3,900 billion) per day. These *traders* manipulated the prices of certain currencies to maximize their profits. Why bore the reader? We know the rest: ridiculous fines, flat apologies, etc.




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
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
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
Masonic Myths and Legends by Pierre Mollier

Freemasonry is one of the few organizations whose teaching method is still based on symbols. It presents these symbols by inserting them into legends that are told to its members in initiation ceremonies. But its history itself has also given rise to a whole mythology.




Resistance: Reflections on Survival, Hope and Love Poetry by William Morris, Photography by Jackie Malden

Resistance is a book of poems with photographs or a book of photographs with poems depending on your perspective. The book is comprised of three sections titled respectively: On Survival, On Hope, and On Love.




Bunker Diplomacy: An Arab-American in the U.S. Foreign Service by Nabeel Khoury

After twenty-five years in the Foreign Service, Dr. Nabeel A. Khoury retired from the U.S. Department of State in 2013 with the rank of Minister Counselor. In his last overseas posting, Khoury served as deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Yemen (2004-2007).




Managing Challenges for the Flint Water Crisis Edited by Tonya E. Thornton, Andrew D. Williams, Katherine M. Simon, Jennifer F. Sklarew

This edited volume examines several public management and intergovernmental failures, with particular attention on social, political, and financial impacts. Understanding disaster meaning, even causality, is essential to the problem-solving process.




Donald J. Trump, The 45th U.S. Presidency and Beyond International Perspectives Editors: John Dixon and Max J. Skidmore

The reality is that throughout Trump's presidency, there was a clearly perceptible decline of his—and America's—global standing, which accelerated as an upshot of his mishandling of both the Corvid-19 pandemic and his 2020 presidential election loss.



Brought to Light: The Mysterious George Washington Masonic Cave by Jason Williams, MD

The George Washington Masonic Cave near Charles Town, West Virginia, contains a signature carving of George Washington dated 1748. Although this inscription appears authentic, it has yet to be verified by historical accounts or scientific inquiry.



Abortion and Informed Common Sense by Max J. Skidmore

The controversy over a woman's "right to choose," as opposed to the numerous "rights" that abortion opponents decide should be assumed to exist for "unborn children," has always struck me as incomplete. Two missing elements of the argument seems obvious, yet they remain almost completely overlooked.




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
The Politics of Fiscal Responsibility: A Comparative Perspective by Tonya E. Thornton and F. Stevens Redburn

Fiscal policy challenges following the Great Recession forced members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to implement a set of economic policies to manage public debt.




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Why is America's health poorer than the health of other wealthy countries and why health inequities persist despite our efforts? In this book, researchers report on groundbreaking insights to simulate how these determinants come together to produce levels of population health and disparities and test new solutions.



Issues in Maritime Cyber Security Edited by Dr. Joe DiRenzo III, Dr. Nicole K. Drumhiller, and Dr. Fred S. Roberts

The complexity of making MTS safe from cyber attack is daunting and the need for all stakeholders in both government (at all levels) and private industry to be involved in cyber security is more significant than ever as the use of the MTS continues to grow.




A Radical In The East by S. Brent Morris, PhD

The papers presented here represent over twenty-five years of publications by S. Brent Morris. They explore his many questions about Freemasonry, usually dealing with origins of the Craft. A complex organization with a lengthy pedigree like Freemasonry has many basic foundational questions waiting to be answered, and that's what this book does: answers questions.




Contests of Initiative: Countering China's Gray Zone Strategy in the East and South China Seas by Dr. Raymond Kuo

China is engaged in a widespread assertion of sovereignty in the South and East China Seas. It employs a “gray zone” strategy: using coercive but sub-conventional military power to drive off challengers and prevent escalation, while simultaneously seizing territory and asserting maritime control.




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Anti-Poverty Measures in America: Scientism and Other Obstacles Editors, Max J. Skidmore and Biko Koenig

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